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The aim of the thesis is to provide a tradition-specific ‘Pentecostal rationality.’ To do this it 
will first analyse and evaluate some of the main contemporary Pentecostal rationalities and 
epistemologies (chapter 1), before proposing that Alasdair MacIntyre’s tradition-focused and 
historically-minded narrative approach is conducive in providing a more tradition-constituted 
Pentecostal rationality (chapter 2). Utilising the methodological insight of MacIntyre, the 
thesis will then provide a philosophically informed historical narrative of a Pentecostal 
tradition, namely, the Elim Pentecostal Church, by exploring its underlying context and roots 
as a classical British Pentecostal movement (chapter 3), its emergence as a religious tradition 
(chapter 4), and its two major ‘epistemological crises’ (chapters 5 & 6). Based on this 
historical narration, the thesis will argue that Elim’s tacit Pentecostal rationality is best 
defined as Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism in a Foursquare Gospel framework. This form of 
rationality will then be developed vis-à-vis Elim’s Pentecostal concept of truth (chapter 7), 
biblical hermeneutics (chapter 8), and pragmatic epistemic justification in dialogue with 
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The quest for a Pentecostal theology shaped by a Pentecostal theological methodology has 
been the interest of Pentecostal theologians for some time,
1
 and the importance of rationality, 
epistemology and theological hermeneutics is increasingly acknowledged as central in this 
pursuit.
2
 For example, Christopher Stephenson in his survey of three Pentecostal systematic 
theologians, namely Myer Pearlman, E. S. Williams, and French Arrington, notes that each 
one of them ‘makes epistemology the starting point’ of their theological endeavour, and thus 
their intellectual framework inevitably ends up influencing, even if not wholly determining, 
the content and nature of their theologies.
3
 It is for this reason that some Pentecostal scholars 
claim that there cannot be a Pentecostal theology without a distinct Pentecostal epistemology, 
or at least a rationality that is compatible with Pentecostal spirituality, beliefs and practices.
4
 
Modernistic epistemologies, adopted by much of conservative evangelical theology, are seen 
                                                 
1
 The terms ‘Pentecostal’ and ‘Pentecostalism’ are used generically as references to classical Pentecostalism, 
Charismatic Christianity, Christian renewal movements, and indigenous churches in the majority world that 
embody Pentecostal spirituality (e.g. emphasis on baptism in the Holy Spirit and spiritual gifts). For further 
discussion on defining ‘Pentecostal(ism)’ see Wolfgang Vondey, Beyond Pentecostalism: The Crisis of Global 
Christianity and the Renewal of the Theological Agenda (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 8-12; Allan 
Heaton Anderson, An Introduction to Pentecostalism. 2
nd
 ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1-
7; James K. A. Smith, ‘Pentecostalism,’ in The Oxford Handbook of The Epistemology of Theology, ed. William 
J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 608.       
2
 The first paragraph of the introduction is adapted from Simo Frestadius, ‘In Search of a “Pentecostal” 
Epistemology: Comparing the Contributions of Amos Yong and James K. A. Smith,’ Pneuma 38, no. 1-2 
(2016): 94. 
3
 Christopher A. Stephenson, ‘Epistemology in Pentecostal Systematic Theology: Myer Pearlman, E. S. 
Williams, and French L. Arrington,’ in The Role of Experience in Christian Life and Thought - Pentecostal 
Insights. SPS-36 Annual Meeting (Cleveland, TN: SPS, 2007), 307; cf.  Christopher A. Stephenson, ‘The Rule of 
Spirituality and the Rule of Doctrine,’ JPT 15, no. 1 (2006): 84. 
4
 Steven J. Land, Pentecostal Spirituality: A Passion for the Kingdom (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1993), 184; Kenneth J. Archer, The Gospel Revisited: Towards a Pentecostal Theology of Worship and Witness 
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publishing, 2011), 7; Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, ‘Epistemology, Ethos and Environment: In 
Search of a Theology of Pentecostal Theological Education,’ Pneuma 34, no. 2 (2012): 248-250.  
2 
 
by some as incompatible with Pentecostalism(s),
5
 and the so-called postmodern alternatives 




In light of this Pentecostal scholarly predicament, the purpose of the thesis is to contribute to 
this wider ‘search’ by offering a distinctive Pentecostal rationality. In trying to provide such a 
rationality, it needs to be clarified that this will not be done by following the ‘standard 
strategy’ employed by many modern theologians and philosophers; that is, a strategy which 
seeks to ‘develop a general account of rationality or justification and then apply it to theism to 
see how far belief in God is rational or justified.’
7
 The reasons for not adopting this 
‘modernistic’ approach are twofold. First, I believe that that the possibility of a universal, 
general and timeless rationality devoid of influences from any given tradition is questionable 
at best.
8
 Indeed, the inherent weakness of this ‘standard approach’ is exemplified in the failure 
of philosophers of religion to actually agree on what is the so-called ‘universal rationality,’ 
despite the assumption that this rationality should be universal and thus agreeable to all 
reasonable people.
9
 Second, I assume with Aristotle that the perceived order of things 
(ontology) should determine how things are known (epistemology).
10
 In other words, it is 
                                                 
5
 Paul W. Lewis, ‘Towards a Pentecostal Epistemology: The Role of Experience in Pentecostal Hermeneutics,’ 
SC 2, no. 1 (May 2000): 122; Archer, The Gospel Revisited, 7. 
6
 Kärkkäinen, ‘Epistemology, Ethos and Environment,’ 249-250; Robert Menzies, ‘Jumping Off the Postmodern 
Bandwagon,’ Pneuma, 16, no. 1 (1994): 116. 
7
 William J. Abraham, Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006), 6.  
8
 This is a basic assumption of the thesis and will not be argued for it in detail. That said, I will develop this idea 
when exploring MacIntyre’s work in chapter two. 
9
 Abraham, Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation, 8-9. For example,  two prominent Christian 
philosophers of religion disagree on the type of religious epistemology one should utilise in philosophising; that 
is, Richard Swinburne argues for a form of evidentialism and Alvin Plantinga for a type of reliabilism; Richard 
Swinburne, Faith and Reason. 2
nd
 ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Alvin Plantinga, Warranted 
Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); cf. Richard Swinburne, ‘Plantinga on warrant,’ RS 37, 
no. 2 (June 2001): 203-214; Alvin Plantinga, ‘Rationality and public evidence: a reply to Richard Swinburne,’ 
RS 37, no. 2 (June 2001): 215-222.  
10
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094b 13-27; cf. Alister E. McGrath, The Science of God (London: T&T Clark 
International, 2004), 107. 
3 
 
maintained that there should be an appropriate ‘epistemic fit’ between what is studied and 
how the study is carried out.
11
 Therefore, a study of a ‘Pentecostal God’ and his relationship 
with the world (i.e. Pentecostal theology), is approached in manner that is informed by these 
underlying Pentecostal assumptions. This need not result in an unfalsifiable fideism (as I hope 
to show in the thesis), but it does mean taking the underlying Pentecostal faith commitments 
seriously. 
 
So, rather than following the ‘standard strategy’ vis-à-vis religious reasoning, the thesis will 
seek to construct a Pentecostal epistemology that is grounded in Pentecostal intuitions. It will 
do so by adopting Alasdair MacIntyre’s notion that all substantive rationalities are ‘tradition-
dependent’ and ‘tradition-constituted,’ and will thus seek to construct a ‘tradition-specific’ 
Pentecostal rationality. This means that the thesis should be seen primarily as an exercise in 
philosophical theology, or religious philosophy, rather than in philosophy of religion (unless 
religion is understood as a subjective genitive).
12
 However, since it employs MacIntyre’s 
philosophical methodology, there will also be a strong historical element. Consequently, the 
thesis will seek to make three main contributions to knowledge: (1) provide a MacIntyrian 
tradition-specific Pentecostal rationality, which has not been done before; (2) present the first 
intellectual history of a major European Pentecostal denomination, namely, the Elim 
                                                 
11
 William J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino, ‘Introduction: The Epistemology of Theology,’ in The Oxford 
Handbook of The Epistemology of Theology, 1. 
12
 For example, David Cheetham contrasts philosophy of religion ‘with religious philosophy (or philosophical 
theology) where religion or theology is more the priority and which seeks to critically develop a more tradition-
specific line of thinking or refine the articulation of a particular area of a tradition’s beliefs;’ David Cheetham, 
‘Comparative Philosophy of Religion,’ in Contemporary Practice and Method in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. 
David Cheetham and Rolfe King (London: Continuum, 2008), 101. However, Nancey Murphy following 
MacIntyre’s logic calls into question the whole notion and possibility of ‘philosophy of religion;’ Nancey 
Murphy, ‘MacIntyre, Tradition-Dependent Rationality and the End of Philosophy of Religion,’ in Contemporary 
Practice and Method in the Philosophy of Religion, 32-44. 
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Pentecostal Church; (3) propose that Elim’s rationality is best characterised as Pentecostal 
Biblical Pragmatism and develop it accordingly.    
 
Overview of the Thesis 
To make these three contributions, the thesis is divided into three parts. The first part grounds 
the discussion by exploring the works of Amos Yong, James Smith and William Oliverio, Jr. 
on Pentecostal theological epistemology and rationality (chapter 1). This first chapter is in 
essence an analytical literature review of the three main Pentecostal academic works on the 
topic in question. I will argue that despite the important contributions of Yong, Smith and 
Oliverio, they all seem to suffer from an element of ahistoricism in their philosophical 
constructions which means that it is unclear to what extent their proposals are in fact 
‘Pentecostal,’ or at least they appear not to be grounded in any particular Pentecostal tradition. 
Following from this identified weakness, in chapter two I will outline MacIntyre’s notion of 
‘tradition-constituted’ and ‘tradition-constitutive’ rationality, and will suggest that 
MacIntyre’s methodological insights are conducive for constructing a truly tradition-specific 
Pentecostal rationality.  
 
Informed by chapters one and two, the second part of thesis will then seek to narrate the ‘Elim 
tradition’ with the aim of identifying its tacit rationality. However, this cannot be adequately 
done without paying sufficient attention to the Elim tradition as a whole, with particular 
emphasis on its history. Therefore, in this section I will first discuss the ‘prologues’ to the 
Elim tradition by looking at its social, philosophical and theological context, as well as its 
religious roots, with particular emphasis on British classical Pentecostalism (chapter 3). I will 
5 
 
then explore the birth of Elim by focusing on its early opponents, the content of its argument, 
implied rationality, and initial social embodiment (chapter 4). A central argument of this 
chapter is that the theological essence of the Elim tradition is the Foursquare Gospel and its 
rationality is Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism. This is followed by a narration of Elim’s two 
major crises (chapters 5 & 6), which in MacIntyre’s language can also be articulated as 
‘epistemological crises.’ In these chapters I attempt to demonstrate that the foundational 
theology and rationality identified in the previous chapter was central in helping Elim to 
overcome its two moments of crisis.  
 
The third and last part of the thesis is more constructive in nature (rather than analytical) by 
taking Elim’s tacit rationality of Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism and developing it in the 
context of the wider Elim tradition narrated in chapters three to six. Chapter seven begins by 
re-constructing Elim’s Pentecostal theory of truth and thus provides the metaphysical 
backdrop for a working Elim rationality. Chapter eight argues for a recalibrated biblical 
hermeneutic for Elim which is more consistent with its Pentecostal doctrine of the Bible. And 
chapter nine explores Elim’s pragmatic epistemic justification by developing Elim’s 
‘experientialism’ and ‘experimentalism’ in dialogue with William Alston.  
               
Methodology 
As has already been mentioned, the thesis is best located within the disciplines of 
philosophical and historical theology. Part one interacts primarily with the work of 
Pentecostal philosophical theologians (Yong, Smith and Oliverio), as well as an eclectic 
Catholic philosopher (MacIntyre). The engagements are based on the academic literature 
6 
 
written by these four authors and their interlocutors/commentators. Part two of the thesis is 
mainly historical and will deal with a range of primary sources particularly on the Elim 
movement, such as, articles in Elim’s official periodical (Elim Evangel); books by Elim 
ministers; Elim Conference minutes and reports; correspondence between Elim leaders; and I 
have also conducted five semi-structured interviews for the purpose of ‘oral history’ to 
supplement the limited written material on Elim’s history in the 1970s and 1980s (see chapter 
6). These primary sources will also be brought into a critical dialogue with key secondary 
sources on Elim’s history. Part three of the thesis, like the first part, is primarily theological 
and philosophical in its focus. That said, since Elim’s rationality has a strong biblical 
component, regular references will also be made to biblical material in line with Elim’s own 
method of reasoning. 
 
In terms of terminology, throughout the thesis the terms ‘rationality,’ ‘epistemology’ and 
‘philosophical hermeneutics’ will be used more or less synonymously. In other words, I take 
all of them to deal with questions relating to: the nature of knowledge; sources of knowledge; 
frameworks of reasoning; developing and utilising theories with a view for having 
justified/warranted beliefs. That said, my personal preference is to use the word ‘rationality’ 
for the simple reason that it is also MacIntyre’s preferred nomenclature. However, since I do 
not believe that it is possible to have neutral or ‘non-traditioned’ rationality, I do not use 
‘epistemology’ in this supposedly neutral sense and so distinguish it from the purportedly 
more linguistically saturated and metaphysically informed ‘hermeneutics.’
13
 
                                                 
13
 For example, William Oliverio prefers not to use the word ‘epistemology’ as for him it still carries the ghost of 
the Enlightenment with the assumption that there can be a ‘first philosophy’ that is neutral regarding prior beliefs 
and metaphysical assumptions; L. William Oliverio Jr., Theological Hermeneutics in the Classical Pentecostal 




Finally, on a reflexive note, I am an Elim minister and work at Elim’s Regents Theological 
College. Therefore, I am an insider to both Pentecostalism and Elim. However, I hope that the 
potential force of my own ‘Pentecostal biases’ in clouding my academic judgments will be 
offset by the insights often only available to a ‘native’ Pentecostal. Moreover, it needs to be 
pointed out that although I am exploring theological epistemology, my aim is not to argue for 
the truth of Elim’s particular position, but rather to articulate a Pentecostal rationality in light 
of the Elim tradition, which means that I am not essentially arguing for or against the truth of 
my own religious convictions.
8 
 
PART I – SEARCHING FOR A PENTECOSTAL RATIONALITY 
 
An increasing number of Pentecostal scholars have offered theological rationalities that are 
based on Pentecostal intuitions with the aim of serving Pentecostal theology faithfully.
1
 It is 
not hard to argue that the three central figures in this undertaking have been Amos Yong, 
James Smith, and William Oliverio Jr., who have each developed philosophically mature 
theories of knowledge stemming from Pentecostal presuppositions, and in doing so have 
helped pave the way forward for distinctive Pentecostal rationalities. Consequently, the 
purpose of the first section of the thesis is to analyse and evaluate the theological 
epistemologies of Yong, Smith and Oliverio (chapter 1) in order to appreciate the current 
landscape of Pentecostal theological rationalities, as well as to identify areas where further 
contributions could be made.  
 
In chapter one I will argue that Yong’s rationality is best identified as pneumatological 
correlationism in that he strives for a public theology and aims to bring the Pentecostal 
tradition into a mutually transformative dialogue with different sources of theological 
knowledge exemplified in other traditions/disciplines. However, I will suggest that it is 
questionable to what extent Yong’s Pentecostal rationality actually reflects the Pentecostal 
tradition he seeks to represent, and that his theory of epistemic justification needs further 
                                                 
1
 E.g. Land, Pentecostal Spirituality. Cheryl Bridges Johns, Pentecostal Formation: A Pedagogy Among the 
Oppressed (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993); Lewis, ‘Towards a Pentecostal Epistemology,’ 95-125; 
Mark J. Cartledge, Practical Theology: Charismatic and Empirical Theology (London: Paternoster, 2003), 41-
68; Vondey, Beyond Pentecostalism, 16-46; Archer, The Gospel Revisited, 1-17; Christopher A. Stephenson, 
Types of Pentecostal Theology: Method, System, Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 111-130; Pauli 
Kuosmanen, ‘Towards Pentecostal Epistemology: Being Virtuous in the Spirit’ (Masters’ thesis, Iso Kirja 
College – University of Wales, 2016); Daniel Castelo, Pentecostalism as a Christian Mystical Tradition (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2017). 
9 
 
articulation. With respect to Smith, I will argue that his approach can be seen as a version of 
Pentecostal postliberalism, since his primary focus is on the internal logic of the Christian 
tradition which he believes is based on and sustained by the liturgical practices and biblical 
narrative of the Christian community. I will also suggest that the main weaknesses of Smith’s 
rationality appear to be his one-sided view regarding the relationship between practices/faith 
and beliefs/theology; the focus on present practices at the expense of the historical, 
theological and communal narratives that shape these practices; the apparent dilemma in his 
theory of justification with respect to beliefs/narratives; and his potential anti-realism. When it 
comes to Oliverio, his Pentecostal rationality is presented to be appropriately captured in his 
phrase ‘hermeneutical realism’ with a conviction that all knowing is theory-laden but 
nevertheless reflects, or at least can reflect, an external reality. Regarding Oliverio, I will seek 
to point out that although initially it seems that he provides the needed historical and 
tradition-focused corrective to the Pentecostal epistemologies of Yong and Smith, his own 
proposal actually falls short of providing such a historically informed and tradition specific 
Pentecostal rationality.  
 
In light of the above, in the second chapter of this section I will suggest that despite the 
important contributions of Yong, Smith and Oliverio, further work toward the development of 
a truly tradition specific and historically informed narrative Pentecostal epistemology is still 
needed. To aid this task I will introduce Alasdair MacIntyre’s concepts of practices, tradition 





The importance of this section is not just to provide the ground work for the more historical 
and constructive sections to follow, but it also makes a contribution in its own right by 
critically evaluating the Pentecostal rationalities of Yong, Smith and Oliverio, as well as 
introducing the philosophical resources of MacIntyre which will aid the construction of a 
Pentecostal rationality.        
 
     
   
     
11 
 
CHAPTER 1 – THE ‘PENTECOSTAL’ RATIONALITIES OF AMOS YONG, JAMES 




As noted in the introduction to Part I of the thesis, the aim of this chapter is to analyse and 
evaluate three major contributions for Pentecostal rationality; that is, (1) Amos Yong’s 
‘Pneumatological Imagination,’ (2) James Smith’s ‘Affective, Embodied and Narrative 
Knowing,’ and (3) William Oliverio’s ‘Hermeneutical Realism.’ I will engage with each 
scholar respectively by first describing the main tenets of their Pentecostal rationality; second, 
by exploring what they consider to be the appropriate sources of theological knowledge or 
ways of acquiring knowledge; third, by identifying their epistemic criteria regarding 
justification/warrant with respect to theological beliefs; and fourth by providing some 
evaluative comments of their overall approach. Throughout this chapter I will use the words 
‘rationality,’ ‘epistemology,’ and ‘philosophical hermeneutics’ more or less synonymously 
(see ‘Introduction’). That said, for Yong and Smith I will primarily use the word 
‘epistemology’ and for Oliverio ‘hermeneutics’ as this reflects their preferred terminology.   
 
1.1. ‘Pneumatological Imagination:’ Yong’s Pentecostal Rationality 
Amos Yong is arguably the most influential Pentecostal theologian today. He is a prolific 
writer, a creative thinker and a modern polymath who has made significant contributions to a 
number of topics within contemporary theology. Yong has also been one of the main 
Pentecostal theologians to provide a theologically and philosophically mature Pentecostal 
                                                 
1
 This chapter is a fuller elaboration of a previously published article; Simo Frestadius, ‘In Search of a 
“Pentecostal” Epistemology,’ 93-114. 
12 
 
epistemology, hermeneutics and theological methodology.
2
 His main works on theological 
epistemology have been Spirit-Word-Community: Theological Hermeneutics in Trinitarian 
Perspective (2002),
3
 and a collection of articles published in The Dialogical Spirit: Christian 
Reason and Theological Method in the Third Millennium (2014),
4
 which Yong refers to as the 





1.1.1. ‘Pneumatological Imagination’ 
Yong’s theological rationality is captured in his concept of pneumatological imagination. It is 
pneumatological because Yong argues for a ‘foundational pneumatology,’ which means that 
ontology and metaphysics are best understood pneumatologically.
6
 His ‘foundational 
pneumatology’ is grounded on three theological principles. First, following Augustine, Yong 
understands the role of the Spirit as the bond of love between the Father and the Son, and 
hence in the Trinity the Spirit is the divine mediator in and into the life of God.
7
 Second, for 
Yong the Spirit is the ‘Spirit of power of life in creation’ as in Genesis 1:2 the Spirit hovers 
                                                 
2
 For other interactions with Yong’s theological epistemology see; L. William Oliverio, Jr., ‘An Interpretive 
Review Essay on Amos Yong’s Spirit-Word-Community: Theological Hermeneutics in Trinitarian Perspective,’ 
JPT 18, no. 2 (2009): 301-311;  Peter D. Neumann, Pentecostal Experience: An Ecumenical Encounter (Eugene, 
OR: Pickwick Publications, 2012), 274-309; Stephenson, Types of Pentecostal Theology, 89-91; L. William 
Oliverio, Jr., ‘The One and the Many: Amos Yong and the Pluralism and Dissolution of Later Modernity,’ in The 
Theology of Amos Yong and the New Face of Pentecostal Scholarship: Passion for the Spirit, ed. Wolfgang 
Vondey and Martin William Mittelstadt (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 51-54; Christopher A. Stephenson, ‘Reality, 
Knowledge, and Life in Community: Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Hermeneutics in the Work of Amos 
Yong,’ in The Theology of Amos Yong, 63-81; Oliverio, Theological Hermeneutics, 232-247; Stian Eriksen, ‘The 
epistemology of imagination and religious experience,’ Studia Theologica – Nordic Journal of Theology 69, no. 
1 (2015): 53-54.            
3
 Amos Yong, Spirit-Word-Community: Theological Hermeneutics in Trinitarian Perspective (Eugene, OR: 
Wipf & Stock, 2002). 
4
 Amos Yong, The Dialogical Spirit: Christian Reason and Theological Method in the Third Millennium 
(Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2014). 
5
 Yong, The Dialogical Spirit, 1. 
6
 Yong’s pneumatology should be understood in a Trinitarian context; see Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 215.    
7
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 59-72. Yong builds the Augustinian model of the Spirit on the Irenaean 
concept of the ‘two hands of God;’ Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 50-59. 
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over ‘the deep void and darkness’ in a preparatory fashion so that ‘the Word of God that 
creates is carried by the ruach.’
8
 In this sense the Spirit provides the connection between the 
creation and the Creator, and so is central in sustaining the creation within the life of the 
Triune God. Third, the Spirit is not just the Spirit of creation, but in the dispensation of the 
Pentecost event the Spirit is redemptively ‘poured out on all flesh’ (Acts 2:17) inaugurating a 




Since Yong follows the common epistemic principle of allowing the order of things 
(ontology) to determine how things are known (epistemology),
10
 it naturally follows that for 
him God can only be known truly in the Spirit, and hence Yong’s epistemology is logically 
pneumatically orientated.
11
 Moreover, in Yong’s foundational pneumatology it is evident that 
the Spirit is the mediator par excellence and thus utterly relational, whether that is within the 
Godhead, creation or at Pentecost. Therefore, if ontology is pneumatological then ‘whatever 
else reality might be, it is relational,’
12
 and thus epistemology should also be relational. 
 
The imagination, within Yong’s pneumatological imagination, is the human belief forming 
faculty in relation to God and the world. Yong uses the term ‘imagination’ not as a reference 
to fanciful ideas, or to a priori concepts, but as images formed in the mind through 
                                                 
8
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 43; Yong also emphasises that in the creation of humanity the imago Dei 
‘derives in part from our having received the divine breath of life’; Amos Yong, Beyond the Impasse: Toward a 
Pneumatological Theology of Religions (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 131.     
9
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 30; Yong, Beyond the Impasse, 131.  
10
 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094b 13-27; McGrath, The Science of God, 107.      
11
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 83-118; Amos Yong, The Spirit Poured Out on All Flesh: Pentecostalism and 
the Possibility of Global Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2005), 301-302. 
12





 In this sense all knowledge is experientially based and Yong’s 
rationality can be perceived as a form of empiricism.
14
 Following Charles Sanders Peirce (an 
important influence on Yong’s epistemology), Yong identifies two aspects within this 
experiential image forming.  
 
First, images are formed in the mind through passive perceiving, where images are 
automatically reproduced based on observed sense data.
15
 In Peircean language this first 
aspect of image forming are ‘perceptual judgments’ being ‘the uncontrollable operation of 




The second aspect of the imagination moves beyond simply reproducing images from 
experience to a negotiation of meaning by actively producing and constructing images of the 
world and thus can be seen as a type of ‘worldmaking.’
17
 Peirce referred to this second aspect 
as ‘perceptual facts’ which are ‘the controlled cognitions or ideas that follow upon perceptual 
judgments.’
18




                                                 
13
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 151. In some sense Yong’s notion of ‘imagination’ resembles that of Kant; see 
Andrew Brook, ‘Kant's View of the Mind and Consciousness of Self,’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2011 Edition), accessed January 4, 2018, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/kant-mind/.  
14
 See Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 133.  
15
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 128. 
16
 Amos Yong, ‘The Demise of Foundationalism and the Retention of Truth: What Evangelicals Can Learn from 
C. S. Peirce,’ CSR 29, no. 3 (Spring 2000): 570.     
17
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 144. 
18
 Yong, ‘The Demise of Foundationalism,’ 571.    
19
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 177.  
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Regarding these two aspects of the imagination, knowledge (perceptual facts) is dependent on 
and preceded by primary experience of perceptual judgements. This means that knowledge ‘is 
one step removed from basic, inarticulate beliefs (perceptual judgments) and two steps 
removed from the richness of the world and of our experience of the world,’
20
 which lays the 
foundation for Yong’s epistemic fallibilism discussed below (‘Justification/Warrant’).  
 
However, it is worth noting that these two aspects of the imagination should not be seen as 
simply objective processes, but ‘the imagination is selective, dividing what is trivial from 
what is important among experiential inputs in order for humans to engage the world 
evaluatively.’
21
 That is, the axiological nature of the imagination seeks to form images that 
most accurately reflect the world and ‘shape habits’ that enable the best ‘practical human life’ 
in the world.
22
 These value judgments of the imagination are not simply the result of the 
objective competence of the imaginative faculty in forming accurate images of the world, but 
of the ‘heart’ (i.e. affections, will and the spirit) of the observer,
23
 because it is the heart that is 
central in informing what a good practical human life looks like. Therefore, the imagination is 
also affective in nature and the disposition of the heart matters in forming accurate images of 
the world.    
 
To summarise thus far, for Yong knowledge is gained through the faculty of imagination 
which through experience forms images of the world both passively and actively, shaped by 
the disposition of the knower’s heart; and the world in which humans find themselves in is a 
                                                 
20
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 177.  
21
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 132.  
22
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 132.  
23
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 129.  
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pneumatically charged relational reality. Hence, Yong’s theological epistemology and 
rationality is best captured in his root metaphor of pneumatological imagination.  
 
1.1.2. Sources of Knowledge/Acquiring Knowledge 
Following from the concept of pneumatological imagination, Yong does not restrict his 
sources of theological knowledge to the biblical foundationalism of conservative 
evangelicalism or to spiritual experience as understood within one specific ‘cultural-
linguistic’ tradition. Since Yong maintains that reality as a whole is pneumatologically 
charged, divine encounters are not restricted to certain holy books or experiences within 
specific traditions, but the divine can be encountered in other people, cultures, religions, 
history, nature, and science.
24
 In other words, Yong interprets the whole world 
semiotically/symbolically as pointing to a deeper reality, namely, God, that can be 
experienced.
25





 and the natural sciences,
28
 because for him the pneumatological world 
in its fullness is the source for theological knowledge. 
 
                                                 
24
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 212-214, 300-301, 298-299.  
25
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 200; see also Yong, Beyond the Impasse, 61. 
26
 E.g. Amos Yong, Discerning the Spirit(s): A Pentecostal-Charismatic Contribution to Christian Theology of 
Religions (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000); Yong, Beyond the Impasse; Amos Yong, Hospitality and 
the Other: Pentecost, Christian Practice, and the Neighbor (New York, NY: Orbis Books, 2008).   
27
 E.g. Amos Yong, In the Days of Caesar: Pentecostalism and Political Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2009). 
28
 E.g. Amos Yong, ‘How Does God Do What God Does? Pentecostal –Charismatic Perspective on Divine 
Action in Dialogue with Modern Science,’ in Science and the Spirit: A Pentecostal Engagement with the 
Sciences, ed. James K. A. Smith and Amos Yong (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010), 50-71; 
Amos Yong, The Spirit of Creation: Modern Science and Divine Action in the Pentecostal-Charismatic 
Imagination (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011). 
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Yong is not, however, naïve about the direct nature of these divine encounters in the world, 
because he does not believe that there can be a direct unmediated spiritual experience. In fact, 
he argues that ‘the cultural-linguistic argument has got the better of the experiential-
expressivist argument – to use Lindbeck’s terminology’, and that ‘all knowledge is 
semiotically mediated and therefore at least one step (or sign) removed from the richness of 
experience.’
29
 Nevertheless, this does not lead him into Lindbeck’s postliberal position 
because he still maintains that there are no truly homogenous ‘forms of life’ or ‘grammars’ 
but there always exists ‘a complex togetherness of multiple histories, traditions, sources and 
experiences.’
30
 Moreover, Yong’s foundational pneumatology creates a further point of 
contact between different communities since the Spirit is the divine mediator among people. 
Therefore, despite acknowledging the mediated nature of all knowledge, Yong strongly 
argues for a public theology and sees it as a necessity if a theology seeks to claim universal 
applicability.
31
 Thus, theological knowledge should be acquired from all possible sources in 




It is this emphasis on public theology and the multiple sources of theological knowledge that 
makes Yong’s epistemology effectively correlationist with similarities to the mutually critical 
correlationism of David Tracy.
33
 Yong himself has noted that his pneumatological 
imagination ‘charts a path forward from the crossroad where Gelpi’s pneumatology and 
                                                 
29
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 208. 
30
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 302. For Lindbeck’s classic text see George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of 
Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age. 25
th
 Anniversary Edition (Louisville, KY: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 2009). 
31
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 304.  
32
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 305.  
33
 Tracy advocates ‘mutually critical correlations between the interpretations of tradition and situation or church 
and world;’ David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism 
(London: SCM, 1981), 80.   
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Tracy’s fundamental theology meet.’
34
 In other words, Yong’s pneumatological imagination 
utilises Donald Gelpi’s understanding of pneumatological experience and applies it to all of 
humanity, enabling a truly public theology à la Tracy. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest 
that Yong’s theological epistemology could be seen as a development of Tracy’s fundamental 
theology, and perhaps best captured in the phrase pneumatological correlationism. 
 
It is here that my reading of Yong also differs from that of Mark Mann, who argues that 
Yong’s epistemology, with respect to Tracy’s correlationism and Lindbeck’s postliberalism, 
has ‘much stronger affinity to postliberalism.’ Mann notes that Yong’s ‘sympathy’ for 
postliberalism ‘has become especially clear in his more recent work’, particularly Yong’s 
Hospitality and the Other.
35
 However, although Mann acknowledges Yong’s critique of 
postliberalism, he seems to overlook the extent to which Yong finds postliberalism wanting. 
For example, even in Hospitality and the Other, which according to Mann is Yong’s more 
sympathetic work on post-liberalism, Yong supplements Lindbeck’s proposal with his 





However, although Yong believes in the universal presence of the Spirit in the world and thus 
in the possibility of divine encounters in all spheres of life, he is careful to qualify that not all 
                                                 
34
 Yong, Beyond the Impasse, 63. 
35
 Mark Mann, ‘Traditionalist or Reformist: Amos Yong, Pentecostalism and the Future of Evangelical 
Theology,’ in The Theology of Amos Yong, 207, 207 n. 22.  
36
 Yong, Hospitality and the Other, 57, 128. For a further critique of postliberalism and narrative theology by 
Yong see Amos Yong, ‘Radically Orthodox, Reformed, and Pentecostal: Rethinking the Intersections of 
Post/Modernity and the Religions in Conversation with James K.A. Smith,’ JPT 15, no. 2 (2007), 241-242, 246-
247.    
19 
 
experiences in the world are, in fact, divine encounters, but rather one must ‘test the Spirit(s)’ 
(1 John 4:1). In terms of identifying the truthfulness of one’s images/beliefs about the world, 
Yong offers two theories of justification. The first, and his main theory of justification, is a 
pragmatic one. According to this, ‘true beliefs are those reached when the effects predicted 
are borne out in experience.’
37
 To test the truthfulness of an image or belief is to see whether 
it obtains ‘desirable results, not in the sense of that which human beings simply wish or want, 




From this Yong argues that the truthfulness of our images/beliefs is dependent on how in 
practice they are congruent with the world; and that our practices, behaviour and habits should 
be transformed to  reflect this reality.
39
 The latter assertion implies that truthful engagement in 
the world is ‘such that our activities and habits are transformed as a result of engaging the 
world,’ which means that truth is not just cognitive but also ethical.
40
 That is, our 
beliefs/images are justified pragmatically in as much they reflect both the 
ontological/metaphysical reality and the ethical/soteriological reality.
41
 Therefore, Yong’s 
pragmatic justification means that we test the truthfulness of our images/beliefs in practice 
and that we allow the truth to shape our habits to enable further truthful engagement in the 
pneumatic world. 
       
                                                 
37
 Yong, ‘The Demise of Foundationalism,’ 572. 
38
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 165. 
39
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 165. 
40
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 166. 
41
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 166.  
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Yong’s second test is that of coherence. That is, beliefs are justified if they are coherent with 
a person’s/community’s other beliefs.
42
 It is worth noting, however, that although Yong uses 
pragmatism and coherence as theories of justification, he does not accept them as appropriate 
theories of truth.
43
 In fact, he favours a ‘correspondence theory of truth’ in which 
correspondence is seen as ‘correlation,’ rather than ‘congruence,’ implying that true 
propositions need not be identical with their referents but should, nevertheless, resemble them 
sufficiently. He favours ‘correspondence as correlation’ because, following Peirce, he 
maintains that ‘all human experience is mediated semiotically.’
44
 Therefore, Yong is 
effectively a critical realist who sees pragmatism and coherence as appropriate theories of 
warrant.
45
 Yong summarises his approach to epistemic justification by stating that 
‘theological truth works and coheres because it corresponds – to put it crassly – with reality 




Yong’s critical realism, as well as his pragmatic and coherence theories of epistemic 
justification, is also very much shaped here by Peirce’s ‘triadic.’ Peirce, as interpreted by 
Yong, believed that all entities exist in triadic relationships consisting of Firstness which is 
the ‘thing itself;’ Secondness which is ‘that by which a thing is related to others;’ and 
Thirdness which ‘is what mediates between Firstness and Secondness’ (e.g. universals, laws 
and generalities).
47
 Yong states that:  
‘All things are what they are only as Firsts, Seconds, and Thirds – viz. having self-
identity independent of anything else, having relational identity in reaction to other 
                                                 
42
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 169-174.  
43
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 174. 
44
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 167-168, 185.   
45
 Yong refers to himself as a ‘committed metaphysical realist’; Yong, Beyond the Impasse, 71.  
46
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 298. 
47
 Yong, The Dialogical Spirit, 66; see also Yong, ‘The Demise of Foundationalism,’ 576,  
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This means that the ‘realism’ aspect of Yong’s epistemology is maintained by things having 
independent self-identity (Firstness), the ‘critical’ element is characterised by all knowing 
being semiotic (Secondness), and the possibility of ‘critical realism’ to correlate with reality is 
enabled by the consistent universals and laws in the world (Thirdness). Peirce’s triadic also 
underscores the relational element of Yong’s pneumatological imagination; that is, all 
knowing and being known takes place within this triadic relationship, facilitated by the Spirit 
of God.     
       
Yong’s critical realism and the concept of triadically mediated knowledge naturally leads to 
his notion of epistemic fallibilism. He asserts three reasons for the fallibilistic nature of 
human knowledge. First, all knowledge is partial.
49
 It is partial not only because the knower 
is working with images, signs and symbols, but also because what is known is either partial or 
incomplete (i.e. the world),
50
 or inexhaustible (i.e. God).
51
 Second, knowledge is perspectival 
in character as ‘all thinking is conditioned by the biological, cultural-linguistic, and purposive 
contexts of inquiry. These contexts determine, in some ways, what is considered to be 
valuable or important.’
52
 The third reason is the ‘finitude of knowledge’. To be human is to be 
finite and limited, an aspect reflected in our knowing.
53
 The significance of Yong’s epistemic 
                                                 
48
 Yong, The Dialogical Spirit, 66. 
49
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 176.  
50
 Yong’s thinking about the nature of the world is not very different from process theology. He states that ‘[t]he 
world is not static but evolving or becoming. Things are incomplete in this sense’; Yong, Spirit-Word-
Community, 178.  
51
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 210.  
52
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 180.  
53
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 182.  
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fallibilism is that the process of justification of beliefs through pragmatic and coherence 
theories must be perennial because of the fallible nature of all human knowing. In Yong’s 




1.1.4. Evaluative Comments 
To summarise the discussion so far, the key concept in Yong’s theological epistemology is 
the pneumatological imagination. The pneumatological aspect stems from Yong’s 
foundational pneumatology, and the imagination from his Peircean understanding that all 
human knowing is based on experience in which images of the world, and of God in the 
world, are formed both passively (‘perceptual judgments’) and actively (‘perceptual facts’) in 
the human mind. Furthermore, this image forming process is not an objective activity in the 
mind but an activity oriented by the observer’s ‘heart.’ When it comes to acquiring 
knowledge, since God is present in all of creation by the Spirit, the world in its fullness is the 
source of theological knowledge and thus knowledge of God is not simply limited to certain 
spheres of life, traditions or disciplines of enquiry. Nevertheless, not all experiences in the 
world are divine encounters, and therefore justification for appropriate images/beliefs of God 
must be discerned through pragmatic and coherence criteria. The need for seeking warrant for 
beliefs is further highlighted by the triadic and fallibility of all human knowing. 
 
Yong’s Pentecostal (read: pneumatological) rationality has a number of strengths. At the 
forefront, it is developed on the doctrine of the Spirit, which is one of the central aspects of 
Pentecostalism(s). A great emphasis is also placed on pneumatological experience, and, as 
                                                 
54
 Yong, Beyond the Impasse, 164. 
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Keith Warrington puts it, ‘a personal, experiential encounter of the Spirit’ is central to 
Pentecostals.
55
 This experience is not understood, however, in a naïve realist fashion because 
Yong acknowledges that all experience is semiotically mediated, but at the same time he does 
not restrict the experience simply to a cultural-linguistic tradition but allows the experience of 
God to also transform that tradition.
56
 Yong’s epistemology can also be seen as moving 
beyond Cartesian rationalism and classical foundationalism,
57
 which has been common in 
Evangelical epistemologies and thus an influence on Pentecostal theology. It acknowledges 
the holistic nature of knowledge and the value of the heart in the formation of 
images/beliefs.
58
 Nevertheless, Yong’s concept of the faculty of pneumatological imagination 
is not a retreat into subjectivism, relativism or fideistic confessionalism, due to his empiricism 
and the pragmatic justification of beliefs/images. Yong’s pragmatism is also not only 
philosophically robust, but reflects the strong pragmatic disposition already present within the 
Pentecostal movement, which Yong seeks to represent.
59
 Therefore, Yong’s pneumatic 
epistemology with its pneumatological correlationism can be seen as an alternative to 
classical foundationalist and postliberal theological epistemologies, and thus as a plausible 




                                                 
55
 Keith Warrington, Pentecostal Theology: A Theology of Encounter (London: T&T Clark, 2008), 20.   
56
 The importance of a transcendent pneumatological experience beyond a semiotic framework is deemed by 
Lewis and Macchia as an important feature of Pentecostalism; Lewis, ‘Towards a Pentecostal Epistemology’, 
100; Frank D. Macchia, ‘Christian Experience and Authority in the World: A Pentecostal Viewpoint,’ in The 
Authority of the Church in the World. National Council of Churches USA Faith and Order Commission, 
accessed September 10, 2013, http://www.ncccusa.org/faithandorder/authority.macchia.htm. 
57
 Although Yong does seem to suggest that his foundational pneumatology provides a weak form of 
foundationalism; Yong, Beyond the Impasse, 80; cf. Neumann, Pentecostal Experience, 286. For a critical 
overview of classical foundationalism see Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 67-107.  
58
 Clear similarities can be seen here with Land’s ‘orthopathy’ and Johns concept of yada; see Land, Pentecostal 
Spirituality, 134-136; Johns, Pentecostal Formation, 39.   
59
 See Lewis, ‘Towards a Pentecostal Epistemology’, 106; Grant Wacker, Heaven Below: Early Pentecostals and 
American Culture (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 13; Macchia, ‘Christian Experience and 
Authority in the World’; Neumann, Pentecostal Experience, 152.     
60




Having identified these strengths, there are at least two aspects of Yong’s theological 
epistemology that probably merit further discussion: (1) the general adequacy of his public 
theology and correlationism from a Pentecostal perspective, and (2) the effectiveness of his 
theory of justification/warrant.  
 
Regarding the first issue, it seems that Yong’s theological project is effectively that of a 
(super) ‘natural theologian,’ since he emphasises the possibility of a universal pneumatic 
experience that finds its basis in his foundational pneumatology. Now the question is whether 
Yong’s pneumatology in the context of Pentecostal theology and pneumatology is sufficiently 
robust to justify this position. For example, Smith has argued that Yong pushes the metaphor 
of ‘Spirit poured out on all flesh’ too far by not acknowledging its particular connection to 
Christians, rather than all people, in Acts.
61
 This criticism is further articulated by the 
Pentecostal theologian Roger Stronstad who strongly opposes Yong’s reading of Acts 2:17 by 
claiming that ‘the interpretation espoused by Amos Yong is factually incorrect. Contrary to 
Yong’s meaning, the Spirit is NOT poured out on all flesh.’
62
 Thus, the potential danger is 
that Yong’s pneumatology emphasises the universal Spirit of Creation at the expense of the 
particular Spirit of Christ; that is, epistemologically, not soteriologically, speaking.
63
 Or to 
pose the question differently, is (Yong’s) natural theology a ‘natural’ bed-fellow for 
Pentecostal theology, even when it is pneumatically based?  
 
                                                 
61
 James K. A. Smith, ‘The Spirit, Religions, and the World as Sacrament: A Response to Amos Yong’s 
Pneumatological Assist,’ JPT 15, no. 2 (2007): 254 n. 9.  
62
 Roger Stronstad, ‘A Review Essay on Amos Yong, Who is the Holy Spirit?: A Walk with the Apostles,’ JPT 
22, no. 2 (2013): 297.  
63
 Yong rejects soteriological universalism due to human freedom enabled by the Spirit; Amos Yong, ‘Radically 
Orthodox, Reformed and Pentecostal,’ 247.  
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Interestingly, L. William Oliverio has pointed out, after explicating Yong’s theological 
methodology, that ‘the question remains how Yong’s theological forays relate to the 
Pentecostal traditions that Yong seeks to represent and to those particularities he attends.’
64
 
This is a crucial question because if Yong’s epistemology does not relate to the Pentecostal 
traditions appropriately, this not only undermines his global/public theology by excluding 
Pentecostals, but also destroys the foundations upon which he hopes to build his public 
theology, namely Pentecostal presuppositions. I am not necessarily suggesting that Yong’s 
epistemology does not accurately reflect Pentecostalism, but that this issue simply needs 
further assessment if Yong’s Pentecostal epistemology is to be adopted and adapted by 
Pentecostal scholars going forward.  
 
Second, when it comes to Yong’s theory of justification/warrant, Yong has himself stated that 
he is ‘convinced that the Achilles’ heel of any pneumatological approach to theology of 
religions will be its failure to develop a criteriology of discernment adequate for the dynamic 
complexity of lived human religious experience.’
65
 At the same time, however, in his most 
philosophical and theoretical work Yong acknowledges that ‘the possibility, conditions, and 
justification of knowledge’ are not comprehensively discussed,
66
 and, as one might expect, 
this does cause some ambiguity in Yong’s epistemology and also leaves the Achilles’ heel of 
his epistemology very exposed.  
 
                                                 
64
 Oliverio, ‘The One and the Many,’ 60.  
65
 Yong, Beyond the Impasse, 166.  
66
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 120. To be fair to Yong, he has tried to remedy this lack to some extent in his 
later work.  
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For example, Yong maintains that, in the light of his pragmatic justification, beliefs are 
justified in practice in how they correspond to reality and this informs right habits in a person, 
enabling them to more truthfully interact with reality. However, Yong also asserts that truth, 
that is, reality is fundamentally eschatological.
67
 If this is the case, then simply testing our 
beliefs in the world, ever if the world is pneumatic, will not help us reach the truth of the 
matter or necessarily develop right epistemic habits, unless one maintains a fully realised 
eschatology. The reason being, that if the eschaton has not yet been fully realised, the current 
reality experienced in the world and the habits formed by it do not necessarily correspond to 
the age to come, which will reflect a different reality at least to some extent. Perhaps this is 
why Paul, among other NT writers, encourages his readers through his example to ‘walk by 
faith, not by sight’ (2 Cor. 5:7). However, Paul’s exhortation begs the question ‘how does one 
know that one is genuinely walking by faith and that one’s faith is warranted, if experience 
and practice cannot fully confirm this?’ The answer from a Christian perspective seems to 
point towards God’s special revelation in Christ mediated by the Bible and the Christian 
community.  
 
In fairness to Yong, his more recent articulation of theological epistemology has focused 
increasingly on Christ as the revelation of God and he has also argued for a closer relationship 
between christology, pneumatology, ecclesiology, practice and eschatology.
68
 Nevertheless, 
the relationships between Spirit and Word, experience and the Bible, practice and tradition, 
eschatology and history, could still be further developed with a more direct focus on epistemic 
justification. It is here that Yong’s pragmatic warrant and habit formation might also be 
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strengthened by Smith’s notion of habits being formed through the liturgy of the community 
of faith, which is the eschatological community (see 1.2.). 
 
In conclusion, Yong’s theological epistemology captured in his phrase ‘pneumatological 
imagination’ characterised by pneumatological correlationism is pneumatically orientated, 
pragmatically based, and universal in its aspiration. It is rich both philosophically and 
theologically, and thus offers potential for further Pentecostal epistemic engagement. 
Nevertheless, two questions remain: (1) to what extent does it reflect the Pentecostal 
traditions? And (2) is Yong’s theory of justification/warrant sufficiently strong within and in 
dialogue with those outside the Pentecostal community? 
 
1.2. Affective, Embodied and Narrative Knowing: Smith’s Pentecostal Rationality 
James Smith, like Yong, has been one of the pioneers of Pentecostal philosophical theology in 
the 21
st
 century. His main work focusing explicitly on Pentecostal philosophy and 
epistemology is Thinking in Tongues: Pentecostal Contributions to Christian Philosophy 
(2010);
69
 although many of the ideas presented here are expressed, as well as developed, in 
his other works. In his own words, Smith’s philosophical and theological journey has been 
from Christian ‘fundamentalism’ to ‘postliberalism.’
70
 Some of his main philosophical and 
theological influences and dialogue partners along this intellectual journey have been 
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reformed and Pentecostal theologians/philosophers, the Radical Orthodoxy movement, 




My discussion on Smith’s Pentecostal epistemology shares the structure of the previous 
section; that is, I will (1) describe the main tenets of Smith’s Pentecostal epistemology; (2) 
discus his identified sources of theological knowledge; (3) explore the epistemic criteria 
regarding justification/warrant; and (4) provide some evaluative comments on Smith’s 
theological epistemology.   
 
1.2.1. Affective, Embodied and Narrative Knowing 
Smith hopes to develop a Pentecostal epistemology that is based on the tacit epistemic 
principles present within Pentecostal faith and spirituality.
72
 His emphasis on constructing a 
theological epistemology of faith/spirituality follows his distinction between 
‘faith/spirituality’ and ‘theology.’
73
 Faith, according to Smith, is a ‘pre-theoretical 
experience,’
74
 whereas theology is ‘associated with the more narrow, propositional aspect of 
faith – doctrines, dogma, and theoretical reflection,’
75
 and in this sense theology is a ‘second-
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order’ discipline ‘one step back’ from the reality of faith.
76
 Moreover, for Smith it is the 
practices of faith/spirituality ‘that give rise to (articulated) beliefs’ of theology, not the other 
way around.
77
 Consequently, it seems that for Smith a Pentecostal epistemology stemming 
from a Pentecostal theology would be a construction from a secondary source, rather than the 
primary source of practised faith and spirituality. Therefore, to avoid dealing with lesser 
sources (read: theology), Smith seeks to build his theological epistemology on the primary 
source of Pentecostal spirituality, or at least his direct reflection on it. 
 
In reflecting on Pentecostal spirituality, Smith effectively identifies three key aspects for a 
Pentecostal theory of knowledge: knowing is (1) affective, (2) embodied and (3) narrative. He 
pitches these three principles against the Cartesian anthropology that reduces humans to 
‘thinking things’ which, he argues, has resulted in the idolisation of reason and the failure of 
modernistic epistemologies.
78
 Smith in fact suggests that ‘the epistemology implicit in 
Pentecostal spirituality... call[s] into question... [the] embrace of rationalist models of 
knowledge’ which ‘reduces Christian faith to a set of logical propositions.’
79
  In this sense he 
sees Pentecostalism as a type of ‘proto-postmodernism’ or ‘countermodernism,’ having great 
affinity with postmodern epistemologies,
80
 which is not necessarily surprising with respect to 
Smith’s own interest in postmodern theology and philosophy.
81
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So how does Smith interpret these three Pentecostal epistemic intuitions? First, he argues that 
for Pentecostals the affections and the ‘heart,’ not the ‘head,’ are at the centre of theological 
knowledge (and knowledge in general).
82
 Smith insists that this should not be seen as a 
Pentecostal rejection of reason per se or a return to naive anti-intellectualism, but ‘the point is 
to affirm the primacy of the heart and affections as the basis for a rational, intellectual 
engagement with and interpretation of the world.’
83
 Building on the philosophies of Martin 
Heidegger and Charles Taylor, Smith argues that we can ‘know’ (Wissen) only what we 
‘understand’ (Verstehen) and we can understand only what we ‘love/desire.’
84
 To put it 
differently, what we love shapes who we are;
85
 who we are is significant in shaping our 
worldview, that is, the way we ‘see,’ ‘inhabit’ and ‘engage’ the world;
86
 and, our worldview 
then sets the boundaries for our reasoning, intellectual engagement and beliefs about the 
world. Therefore, Smith infers that ‘we love before we know,’ and in a sense we can only 
know what we love because it is love that forms our plausibility structures of what could be.
87
 
This is why, for Smith, Pentecostal knowledge is fundamentally affective.   
 
The second element of Smith’s Pentecostal epistemology is imaginative embodiment which 
follows from his notion of affective knowledge. As seen above, for Smith the heart is the 
‘heart’ of theological knowing, and he goes on to claim that ‘the way to the heart is through 
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the body,’ as well as through the imagination.
88
 Smith closely links embodiment and 
imagination, and like Yong, he does not see imagination as ‘the stuff of make-believe 
creativity... or merely an act of pretense,’ rather he sees: 
it more as a quasi-faculty whereby we construe the world on a precognitive level, on a 
register that is fundamentally aesthetic precisely because it is so closely tied to the 
body... the imagination is a kind of midlevel organizing or synthesizing faculty that 
constitutes the world for us in a primarily affective mode... There is a kind of 
precognitive perception that is to be distinguished from perception proper – that is, 




The ‘precognitive perception,’ as distinct from ‘perception proper,’ is also referred to by 
Smith as ‘primary perception.’
90
 It is this primary perception which is our embodied ‘way of 
being-in-the world as being-with-the-world,’ attuning our imagination to reflect our embodied 
experience of the world around us.
91
 Smith’s primary perception is similar to Yong’s first 
aspect of the imagination (Peirce’s ‘perceptual judgments’) in which images are formed 
passively in the mind, although Smith places greater emphasis on the embodied nature of this 
passive image forming. Furthermore, like Yong’s second aspect of the imagination, or 
Peirce’s ‘perceptual facts,’ the rationality, intellection and ‘objective knowledge’ according to 
Smith is only made possible through this primary perception.
92
 In fact, ‘objective knowledge’ 
seems to be a reflection on the ‘primary perception’. Hence, Smith argues that as embodied 
creatures we firstly ‘feel our way around the world more than we think about it, before we 
think about it.’
93
 And it is this embodied being in, and feeling our way around the world that 
informs our imagination. 
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Smith points out that this principle of understanding humans as embodied and imaginative 
beings who imbibe images through their bodies is acted out in Pentecostal worship. He states 
that ‘there could be no Pentecostal spirituality without the matter of bodies; in other words, 
for Pentecostalism, bodies matter.’
94
 He supports his claim by noting how the importance of 
divine healing and expressive worship (e.g. lifting up of hands, laying on of hands, dancing, 
shaking, etc.) highlights the centrality of embodied encounters for Pentecostals with the 




Third, from the affective and embodied/imaginative aspects of knowing God, Smith proposes 
that narrative knowledge naturally ensues;
96
 he reasons that the form of knowing needs to be 
narrative/testimonial in order to carry the affective and embodied aspects. That is, ‘if the 
testimony is translated into mere’ facts, codified into propositions, distilled into ideas, then we 
are dealing with a different animal: I would both ‘know’ something different and ‘know’ it 
differently.’
97
 In other words, only narrative knowledge, not propositional knowledge, can do 
justice to the affective and embodied nature of knowing and is therefore irreducible to rational 
propositions. The role of the narrative within Smith’s epistemic triad is to provide a 
framework to help make ‘sense of our world, our experience, and events.’
98
 To use N. T. 
Wright’s terminology, the narrative functions as a ‘controlling story,’
99
 helping to interpret 
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the images formed through embodiment in the world. Or, in the words of Smith, ‘narrative is 
the scaffolding of our experience.’
100
      
  
1.2.2. Sources of Knowledge/Acquiring Knowledge 
In the light of Smith’s affective, embodied and narrative Pentecostal epistemology, I will now 
seek to further explore how in Smith’s terms we come to ‘know’ and what are the main 
‘sources’ of knowledge. At the forefront, similarly to Yong, Smith sees experience as the 
central source of theological knowledge.
101
 In fact, Smith acknowledges that his view of 
embodied knowing ‘by the images of the world that are absorbed by our bodies’ is a form of 
empiricism.
102
 So in simple terms for Smith, as for Yong, we come to acquire knowledge 
through our experience of the world.  
 
Smith, more so than Yong,
103
 however, emphasises that the affective, embodied and narrative 
theological knowing is shaped by practices, which can be seen as ‘rituals’ and ‘liturgies’ in 
which we participate,
104
 and these practices end up causing habits in our lives. Habit, as 
understood by Smith, is the ‘embodied know-how (the ‘practical sense’)’ that ‘orients my 
perception of the world without me realizing it.’
105
 The ‘know-how’ or ‘practical sense’ is 
also referred to by Merleau-Ponty as the praktognosia ‘by which I ‘understand’ the world 
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without recourse to discursive, propositional processing.’
106
 In other words, habits transform 
our imagination and thus our primary perception of the world.  Hence, Smith concludes that 
‘rituals make the man who makes the world,’
107
 because practices (read: rituals) shape our 
habits, and habits in turn inform our ‘know-how’/’practical sense’/praktognosia/imagination.    
        
Smith argues that our culture is full of these ‘identity-forming practices’ (i.e. liturgy) which 
influences our understanding and knowledge of the world and God, and in this sense liturgical 
practice, whether Christian or non-Christian, precedes our worldviews.
108
 To corroborate this 
claim, Smith notes that people in ‘the church were worshipping long before they got all their 
doctrines in order or articulated the elements of a Christian worldview; and they were 
engaged in and developing worship practices long before what we now call our Bible emerged 
and was solidified, so to speak.’
109
 Hence, it seems that for Smith a good source of theological 
knowledge is a context which enables us to participate in a form of liturgy which will shape 
our affective, embodied/imaginative and narrative knowing in a way that will increase true 
knowledge of God, because to shape a worldview and to form knowledge is to practice a 
specific liturgy.
110
 It is not hard to argue that, at least ideally, participation in the life of the 
Church provides this context and thus the Church as a liturgical community is an ideal, even 
if not the only, source of theological knowledge.
111
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It appears from Smith’s epistemological triad and the emphasis on knowing through liturgical 
participation, that we should engage in those practices that help align our affections, 
imagination and personal narratives increasingly with the reality of God and His Kingdom.
112
 
So how does one know that they have participated in the right liturgy and that their narrative 
knowledge of God is justified? For a person to discern the validity of their knowledge, Smith 
suggests placing their ‘micronarratives’ of the Kingdom within the ‘macronarrative of 
Scripture’ which portrays the true picture of God’s Kingdom.
113
 In other words, a person 
needs a sanctified perception which means ‘re-story-ing’ their ‘being-in-the-world.’
114
 Smith 
elaborates this by noting that ‘we need to be regularly immersed in the ‘true story of the 
whole world’; that is, our imaginations need to be restored, recalibrated, and realigned by an 
affective immersion in the story of God in Christ reconciling the world to himself.’
115
 The ‘re-
story-ing’ happens best within the worshipping community which participates in liturgies that 
accurately reflect the biblical metanarrative, that is, the ‘true story of the whole world.’ Thus, 
it seems that for Smith the justification for the Pentecostal community’s narrative is 
determined by the extent to which it accurately corresponds to and coheres with the Bible.  
 
This, however, raises the question of how, in a pluralist world, does the community know that 
their macro-narrative, namely Scripture, is in fact the true macro-narrative? Smith suggests 
two theories of justification for the biblical macro-narrative in relation to the contending 
stories. Firstly, there is the performative effectiveness of the narrative in lived experience vis-
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à-vis alternative and competing narratives ‘in the marketplace of ideas,’
116
 which lends itself 
to a type of pragmatic justification.
117
 It is important to highlight here that Smith is adamant 
that there is no public rationality or neutral ground between different traditions.
118
 This means 
that it is not possible to justify one’s narrative from some form of common criteria, and hence 
Smith strongly opposes any type of ‘correlated Christian theology.’
119
 In the absence of 
common ground between traditions, Smith argues that the biblical narrative is justified 
pragmatically with respect to competing narratives. The process of pragmatic justification has 
two steps. The first is to show that there is, in fact, no neutral point of view, and consequently 
to try to cling on to objective modernistic theories of warrant is disingenuous. For example, 
the secular ontology is also a ‘mythos and thus equal in epistemic status to the Christian 
mythos.’
120
 The next step is then to ‘out-narrate’ the competing myths not by arguments but by 
the language of life, through a lived witness.
121
 In the words of Smith, ‘the church does not 
have an apologetic; it is an apologetic.’
122
 As well as pragmatically justifying 
beliefs/narratives through this two-step process, Smith secondly argues that the 
beliefs/narratives can be also tested regarding their inner coherence, resulting in a coherence 
theory of justification.
123
 In other words, if the biblical narrative is internally coherent and 
consistent then one is not irrational in believing it. 
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In summary, the justification/warrant for Pentecostal narrative knowing is provided by three 
factors: (1) the way it fits with the biblical macro-narrative; the biblical macro-narrative, on 
the other hand, is justified by (2) a pragmatic criteria in its ability to ‘out-narrate’ competing 
narratives, as well as (3) the biblical macro-narrative’s own inner coherence. 
 
1.2.4. Evaluative Comments 
It has been suggested that Smith aspires to build his Pentecostal epistemology on the tacit 
epistemic principles present within Pentecostal practice and spirituality, rather than on 
Pentecostal theology. Within Pentecostal practice/spirituality he identifies three main aspects 
of Pentecostal theory of knowledge, namely that epistemology is (1) affective, (2) embodied 
and (3) narrative. Knowledge of the world and God is gained through habit forming practices, 
that is, rituals and liturgies, which shape this epistemic triad and one’s ‘know-how’ of the 
world. To discern whether one is participating in the appropriate practices, one needs to 
continually ‘re-story’ themselves within the biblical macro-narrative in the context of a 
Christian community to ensure that one’s narrative corresponds with the biblical macro-
narrative, and the warrant with respect to the biblical macro-narrative is determined by 
pragmatic and coherence criteria. 
 
The Pentecostal scholarly community has been significantly enriched by Smith’s 
philosophical vigour, insights and creativity in articulating a Pentecostal epistemology. 
Smith’s impressive work on Pentecostal philosophy as a whole, and epistemology in 
particular, has proved to be a significant contribution and catalyst for Pentecostal 
philosophical theology. Klaas Bom has gone so far as to claim that Smith’s epistemological 
38 
 
‘contribution provides a first step toward developing... a [Pentecostal epistemological] 
framework.’
124
 Bom’s assertion seems somewhat bold, not least in the light of Yong’s prior 
epistemological work, but, nevertheless, rightly highlights the importance of Smith’s 
contribution for Pentecostal epistemology. Particularly, Smith’s emphasis on spirituality, 
liturgical practice and (biblical) narrative as a source for Pentecostal epistemology is very 
valuable. It is also this aspect of Smith’s epistemology that makes it postliberal, a label with 




That said, there seem to be four weaknesses within Smith’s epistemology that merit further 
discussion: (1) his one-sided view regarding the relationship between practices/faith and 
beliefs/theology; (2) the focus on present practices at the expense of the historical, theological 
and communal narratives that shape these practices; (3) the apparent dilemma in his theory of 





One-Sided Relationship Between Faith and Theology 
As discussed above, Smith makes a distinction between practised ‘faith/spirituality’ and 
articulated ‘theology.’ He believes that the practised faith informs theology, and not vice 
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versa, and therefore to deal with the primary material of Pentecostalism he develops his 
Pentecostal epistemology from the implicit epistemic assumptions within Pentecostal 
faith/spirituality, rather than from Pentecostal theology or historical tradition. However, this 
approach is not without its difficulties.  
 
First, Smith’s insistence that it is practice that informs theology and not theology that informs 
practice seems to be overly simplistic,
127
 not least in the light of the two authors that Smith 
utilises in developing his idea of giving primacy to faith/spirituality over articulated beliefs 
(read: theology). Smith refers to Stephen Land’s definition of spirituality as ‘the integration of 
beliefs and practices in the affections which are themselves evoked and expressed by those 
beliefs and practices.’
128
 What is evident here is not the superiority of practice over beliefs, 
but the value of both in informing spirituality. In fact, Land explicitly states that for 
Pentecostals there is a ‘mutually conditioning interplay between knowledge and lived 
experience’ (my emphasis).
129
 Moreover, Charles Taylor’s notion of ‘social imaginary,’ 
which Smith also employs in developing a Pentecostal imaginary,
130
 neither supports the pre-
eminence of practice informing spirituality and beliefs. In fact, Taylor argues that the social 
imaginary is created by the mutual interplay of beliefs and practices, and that it is ‘absurd to 
believe that the practices always come first, or to adopt the opposite view, that ideas somehow 
drive history.’
131
 So, although Smith rightly emphasises the importance of practices informing 
beliefs and theology, he seems to overlook the role theology plays in influencing religious 
practices. The implications of this omission are that Smith’s Pentecostal epistemology does 
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not make the most of Pentecostal theology, which has shaped and is currently shaping 
Pentecostal spirituality, and therefore Smith’s interpretation of Pentecostal spirituality, which 
is the foundation of his epistemology, is arguably not fully informed.
132
      
 
Second, even if Smith is right in maintaining that the relationship between practised faith and 
articulated beliefs works one way only, he is still unable to avoid theology in developing his 
Pentecostal epistemology. The reason is that to construct an epistemology from Pentecostal 
faith/spirituality, Smith first needs to interpret the nature of Pentecostal faith/spirituality, 
which means that he inevitably ends up articulating a theoretical and theological framework 
upon which his epistemology is then based. For example, when constructing his Pentecostal 
epistemology Smith begins by providing a narrative description of a Pentecostal worshipping 
community, followed by a (theological) interpretation and articulation of his worshipping 
community, before developing a Pentecostal epistemology.
133
 Consequently, it seems that 
what Smith ends up building his epistemology on is not the unmediated spirituality of the 
faith community but rather his interpretation and articulation of this community’s faith; that 
is, Smith’s own Pentecostal theology. Since Smith is not able to bypass theology, Smith’s 
epistemology would benefit from a greater interaction with other Pentecostal theologians, 
who, like Smith, commonly see themselves as ‘witnesses’ of the Pentecostal community. In a 
true Pentecostal fashion, acknowledging the community’s many witnesses would provide a 
more informed theology (read: articulated beliefs from practiced faith), reflecting the richness 
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Non-Narrative Ahistorical and ‘Experiential-Expressive’ Pentecostal Epistemology 
Smith’s Pentecostal epistemology, however, would not only benefit from Pentecostal 
theology but also from greater appreciation of the history of Pentecostal communities. In fact, 
Smith’s ahistorical approach means that his purported narrative Pentecostal epistemology is in 
fact non-narrative. The reason being that Smith focuses mainly on present Pentecostal 
practices at the expense of the historical developments of a theology which gives meaning to 
these practices.  This means that his epistemology seems to focus on the contemporary 
Pentecostal scene without reflecting on the historical scenes (read: theology and historical 
narrative) that help put the present scene in its right context. The problem with a ‘one scene 
narrative’ is that it effectively becomes non-narrative altogether, because you cannot have a 
story with only one scene.
135
 Therefore, to construct a truly narrative Pentecostal 
epistemology, Smith and those who seek to build on his epistemology, need to pay closer 
attention to the historical and theological developments of the Pentecostal narrative, as well as 
its contemporary expressions. 
 
Not giving sufficient attention to Pentecostal history/tradition also weakens Smith’s attempt 
in providing a truly communal and ‘postliberal’ Pentecostal epistemology. As has already 
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been noted, Smith identifies himself as a postliberal and therefore, like Lindbeck, aims to 
provide an alternative to the so called ‘cognitive-propositional’ and ‘experiential-expressive’ 
approaches to religion.
136
 ‘Experiential-expressivism’ is seen as the model of liberal 
Christianity, and for Lindbeck, whom Smith quotes, a main difference between ‘liberals’ and 
‘postliberals’ is that: ‘Liberals start with experience, with an account of the present, and then 
adjust their vision of the kingdom of God accordingly, while postliberals are in principle 
committed to doing the reverse.’
137
 In other words, liberals start with experience and 
postliberals with tradition. Interestingly when constructing his Pentecostal epistemology 
Smith seems to adopt more of a liberal rather than the postliberal approach since he starts his 
description of epistemology from the experience of a Pentecostal believer, even if they are 





Now to be fair to Smith, his articulation of an epistemology from a Pentecostal worship 
service tries to capture a communal rather than just an individual religious experience, and 
thus Smith’s attempt in making ‘explicit’ what is ‘implicit’ in Pentecostal worship can be seen 
as ‘communal expressivism.’
139
 Moreover, his description of the Pentecostal service does not 
just focus on experience but also on practices within the worship service. Nevertheless, 
without locating his ‘communal expressivism’ or practices within the wider Pentecostal 
tradition and its historical narrative, Smith’s epistemology seems to resemble too closely the 
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‘experiential-expressive’ liberalism, which he seeks to distance himself from, rather than his 
preferred ‘cultural-linguistic’ postliberalism.   
 
Epistemic Priority: Communal Practices or Creeds/Canons?  
Smith also seems to have a possible problem in his theory of justification/warrant; that is 
Smith claims that practice precedes belief, not vice versa, and the church was worshipping 
long before it canonised its Scriptures or articulated its doctrines.
140
 For Smith, it was this 
worshipping community that gave us the Canon and the Creeds. Nevertheless, Smith also 
maintains that the worshipping community needs to regularly ‘recalibrate’ and ‘re-story’ its 
narrative in the light of the biblical metanarrative in order for its narrative knowing to be 
justified and warranted,
141
 and the doctrines of the church provide the rules and ‘grammar’ for 




This causes an apparent dilemma for Smith because (1) either the practices of the worshipping 
community are authoritative, and not the Scriptures or doctrines which simply reflect the 
community’s practices; or (2) the Scriptures and doctrines are authoritative and are the norm 
that should shape the practices of the worshipping community. It appears inconsistent for 
Smith to hold both assertions. If Smith adopts the first proposition his theory of warrant needs 
reshaping and he needs to develop some sort of experiential, or further refine his pragmatic, 
criterion for justified beliefs. If, on the other hand, he decides to give primacy to the second 
proposition, a more robust theory of warrant with respect to the biblical narrative, or special 
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revelation, needs to be constructed. Either way Smith’s theory of justification needs further 
clarification and articulation. 
 
Pentecostal (Anti-)Realism without Correspondence 
Smith identifies his contextual and pragmatic approach to epistemology as ‘“realism” without 
correspondence.’
143
 In other words, from a theological perspective he sees the need to affirm a 
‘sacramental ontology, with its Christian “realism,” [which maintains]: (1) the reality and 
independence of the transcendent God on whom creation depends for its existence; and (2) the 
participatory relation of created reality “in” God (per Acts 17; Col. 2).’
144
 However, from a 
philosophical perspective rather than seeing ‘reality’ as something that is actually ‘outside’ of 
the knower’s language game or conceptual framework as it is traditionally understood, Smith 
argues: 
that representation and correspondence and even ‘realism’ are games that we learn to 
play from a community of social practice… [thus] our realisms (and attendant claims 
to correspondence) are dependent upon communities of practice. In short, our claims 





Thus it seems that for Smith ‘representation,’ ‘correspondence’ and ‘realism’ are terms within 
an intratextual language game without necessarily referring to or reflecting an outside reality. 
However, such a definition of ‘realism’ seems at odds with how the term is commonly 
understood. For example, in philosophy of science Smith’s view is more similar to anti-realist 
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‘instrumentalism’ than what is generally understood as scientific realism.
146
 Moreover, and 
more importantly for Smith’s Pentecostal epistemology, his definition of ‘realism’ does not 
seem to fit how a typical Pentecostal believer understands the term (see chapters 3-6); and 
therefore Smith is in danger of not just making the implicit practiced Pentecostal 
epistemology explicit, but actually revising and transforming it into something else through 
Rortyan pragmatism. Indeed, both and Yong and Oliverio see ‘realism’ as an important 
feature of a Pentecostal epistemology (see above), and therefore Smith’s unconventional 
‘(anti-)realism’ may not sit comfortably with Pentecostal convictions or intuitions.  
 
In summary, despite the various strengths of Smith’s affective, embodied and narrative 
theological epistemology, his narrative postliberal approach is in danger of being liberal 
(read: ‘experiential-expressivist’) by not paying sufficient attention to the Pentecostal 
community’s theology, and non-narrative by effectively being ahistorical. The fact that it also 
seems to lean towards anti-realism would probably raise concerns for most classical 
Pentecostals, which again suggests that Smith’s rationality may not be so Pentecostal after all.        
  
1.3. Pentecostal ‘Hermeneutical Realism:’ Oliverio’s Pentecostal Rationality 
William Oliverio, Jr. is the third major contributor to Pentecostal epistemology and 
rationality, although Oliverio prefers to term ‘theological hermeneutics,’ rather than 
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theological epistemology, to characterise his methodological constructions.
147
 His preference 
for philosophical hermeneutics stems from his rejection of the common modernistic 
assumption that sees epistemology as ‘the first philosophy’ providing neutral and rational 
epistemic criteria for one’s philosophical quest for knowledge. In contrast to this modernistic 
ideal, and in accordance with the so called ‘linguistic turn’ within Western philosophy, 
Oliverio maintains that epistemological systems cannot be constructed prior to or 
independently of existing metaphysical or philosophical paradigms. Consequently, he prefers 
to frame his own project within the language of theological hermeneutics rather than 
theological epistemology, even when the primary focus of his work is set around traditional 
epistemological questions, such as, ‘what are the sources of the knowledge of God? And how 




As discussed in the introduction of the thesis, I share Oliverio’s criticisms of the 
Enlightenment approach to epistemology, but unlike Oliverio I do not believe that the term 
epistemology should be abandoned, as long as it is appropriately qualified and defined. 
Nevertheless, in this last section of the chapter I will mainly use Oliverio’s preferred term of 
‘philosophical/theological hermeneutics.’ Moreover, the fourfold structure employed above 
for engaging with Yong and Smith will also be utilised for interacting with Oliverio’s 
Pentecostal theological hermeneutics.  
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1.3.1. Pentecostal Theological Hermeneutics 
Oliverio’s discussion on Pentecostal hermeneutics is more accurately a discussion on classical 
Pentecostal hermeneutics. By classical Pentecostalism Oliverio means the first wave of 
Pentecostalism which emerged in the early twentieth century America (Bethel Bible College 
in Topeka, Kansas [1901] and Azusa Street in Los Angeles [1906]), which ‘has gone well 
beyond a movement within Christianity to the point that it has formed a significant Christian 
tradition.’
149
  Oliverio believes that the Pentecostal tradition is part of the wider Christian 
tradition, but it is also a tradition in its own right with an emphasis on ‘Spirit baptized living’ 




Oliverio’s work on theological hermeneutics makes at least two valuable contributions. First, 
it provides a historical account of four types of Pentecostal theological hermeneutics. Second, 
Oliverio makes his own contribution for the future of Pentecostal hermeneutics. I will begin 
by outlining Oliverio’s four types of Pentecostal hermeneutics, before looking at his own 
version.   
 
Four Types of Pentecostal Theological Hermeneutics 
After noting the theological roots of early Pentecostalism,
151
 Oliverio argues that over the 
hundred year history of classical Pentecostalism four types of hermeneutics can be identified: 
(1) the Original Classical Pentecostal Hermeneutic; (2) the Evangelical-Pentecostal 
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Hermeneutic; (3) the Contextual-Pentecostal Hermeneutic; and (4) the Ecumenical-
Pentecostal Hermeneutic.  
 
When exploring the first type, Original Classical Pentecostal Hermeneutic, Oliverio engages 
with the works of early American Pentecostal pioneers Charles Fox Parham (1873-1929), 
William Joseph Seymour (1870-1922), Charles Harrison Mason (1866-1961) and Garfield 
Thomas Haywood (1880-1931). He argues that despite some of the differences between these 
first generation Pentecostal leaders, the theological hermeneutic at work in their writings 
comprise four core characteristics. First, for these early Pentecostals ‘the Scriptures were the 
sole ultimate authority for belief and living, but they functioned dialogically with religious 
and general experience in producing Pentecostal beliefs.’
152
 Second, the restorationist and 
Latter Rain motif provided the historical narrative and eschatological posture for their 
understanding of God and the world. Third, the four/five-fold gospel set the grounding beliefs 
and the underlying doctrinal framework, and in doing so functioned as hypotheses in helping 
to make sense of the Bible and religious experiences. Fourth, the Pentecostal rationality was 
characterised by pragmatic and naïve realism which combined ‘a folksy version of common 
sense realism… with a strong affirmation of the supernatural.’
153
 In this sense, according to 
Oliverio, the early Pentecostal rationality served as ‘an alternative to a more complex and 
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In discussing the Original Classical Pentecostal Hermeneutic, Oliverio provides some 
insightful observations on the role of doctrine, Scripture and experience within early 
Pentecostalism. For example, he argues that the first Pentecostals seemed to use doctrines as 
‘organising ideas;’ that is, what ‘theories are to facts in Baconian science, so were doctrines 
and theological discourse to Scripture and experience in the original Classical Pentecostal 
hermeneutics.’
155
 Oliverio continues by pointing out that on this matter early Pentecostals 
were significantly influenced by modern rationality, and in line with Baconian common sense 
science, ‘doctrines acted as explanatory hypotheses which were supported by the facts, 




The second type of theological hermeneutics identified by Oliverio is the Evangelical-
Pentecostal Hermeneutic. The scriptural emphasis and the common sense rationality of early 
Pentecostals made it relatively easy for them to align themselves with an Evangelical type 
hermeneutic. In fact, Oliverio notes that by the mid-1910s Pentecostals began increasingly to 
justify their beliefs and experiences biblically. He states that:  
While in the original Classical Pentecostal hermeneutic new doctrines explained 
Scripture and life anew, in the Evangelical-Pentecostal hermeneutic demonstrating that 
Pentecostal doctrines were the result of the proper readings of the Bible came to the 
fore. Doing theology became a matter of discovering what the Bible taught – biblical 
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One of the implications of the shift from the Original Classical Pentecostal Hermeneutic to 
the Evangelical-Pentecostal Hermeneutic was that the openness to theological innovation 
present in early Pentecostalism was curtailed. 
 
Oliverio argues that this Evangelical-Pentecostal Hermeneutic quickly became the dominant 
hermeneutical approach among American classical Pentecostals, particularly among 
Pentecostal scholars and not least after Pentecostals joined the National Association of 
Evangelicals in the early-1940s. However, he also highlights some of the internal differences 
and developments within this hermeneutic. For example, the early advocates of the 
Evangelical-Pentecostal Hermeneutic ‘began to account for the internal context and history in 
the biblical texts’ (e.g. William Kerr and Myer Pearlman), whereas the later and more 
contemporary hermeneuts have also emphasised ‘the external context behind the text’ (e.g. 




The third type noted by Oliverio is the Contextual-Pentecostal Hermeneutic which is  
informed by the theoretical and existential concerns in the human experience of 
interpretation raised by contemporary philosophical or general hermeneutics. For 





Oliverio believes that the Contextual-Pentecostal Hermeneutic has four main emphases. First, 
there ‘is an emphasis on the situation and context of the interpreter, going beyond the 
affirmation of the historicity and context of the biblical texts already present in the 
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 Second, since the context of the 
hermeneut is not negligible, the way Scripture is understood and interpreted changes. 
Following from the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer, who Oliverio notes as ‘the most 
critical’ philosopher ‘to the background of the contextual-Pentecostal hermeneutic,’
161
 
according to this type the meaning of the text can only be discerned when the horizon of the 
reader and the horizon of the text come together in a ‘fusion of horizons.’
162
 Thus, to speak of 
meaning outside of this fusion is believed to be misleading. Third, the understanding of 
hermeneutics changes in that the biblical text is no longer seen as the (only) text,  but the 
whole world and human life within it is seen semiotically as a ‘text.’
163
 Based on this 
conviction, fourthly, the advocates of this approach have increasingly engaged with broader 




The fourth type is the Ecumenical-Pentecostal Hermeneutic. Like the Contextual-Pentecostal 
Hermeneutic, the Ecumenical-Pentecostal Hermeneutic places a strong emphasis on one’s 
context and/or tradition. This hermeneutical approach gives tradition a twofold significance. 
First, the Pentecostal hermeneut should be aware of their tradition, including its history, 
narrative and doctrines. Second, other (Christian) traditions should be respected and viewed 
as worthy interlocutors for the Pentecostal tradition in the hermeneut’s quest for theological 
knowledge. This twofold emphasis on tradition means that the Ecumenical-Pentecostal 
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hermeneutic is effectively a ‘dialogical hermeneutic’ where truth is discerned in the 
dialectical process between the Pentecostal tradition and other traditions.
165
 Scripture remains 
central in this process of discernment, but the Spirit’s revealing work and the ability to 





Informed by these four types of Pentecostal hermeneutics, and particularly influenced by the 
Contextual-Pentecostal Hermeneutics of Yong and Smith, Oliverio offers his own Pentecostal 
theological hermeneutics, which he calls ‘hermeneutical realism.’ It is hermeneutical because 
Oliverio maintains that a ‘“text”… is anything that is interpreted theologically.’
167
 This means 
that all (theological) understanding and knowledge is effectively ‘textual’ and thus must be 
approached hermeneutically. The implications of all knowledge being textual and semiotic is 
that one’s hermeneutical approach cannot be divorced from the linguistic framework and 
worldview within which it has been constructed or within which it functions. In Oliverio’s 
own words:  
My thesis is that theological hermeneutics is best understood in terms of holistic 
paradigms, our best theological accounts of the reality of our world which intertwine 
the ontologies implicit in our hermeneutics, the specific discernments made concerning 
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Nevertheless, despite the hermeneutical nature of all knowing and the impossibility to 
transcend one’s linguistic framework, Oliverio also argues for hermeneutical realism. The 
realism he advocates, however, is not a version of naïve-realism assuming the possibility of 
‘universally available reason, autonomous from culture, tradition or special revelation that 
corresponds to reality as it actually and statistically is.’
169
 But it is grounded on the belief that 
there is a reality beyond one’s cultural-linguistic framework and it is possible for individuals 




In developing both the hermeneutical and realist aspects of his theological epistemology, 
Oliverio draws from the works of the philosophers of science Thomas Kuhn and Imre 
Lakatos, the scientific theologian Nancy Murphy, and the Catholic philosopher Charles 
Taylor. With respect to Kuhn, Oliverio states that his hermeneutical approach shares 
similarities with Kuhn’s notion of paradigms, which Kuhn believed to consist of ‘a set 
beliefs, methods and values.’
171
 Moreover, like Kuhn, Oliverio believes that epistemological 




However, to further develop Kuhn’s concept of paradigm, and particularly the possibility of 
choosing rationally between various paradigms, Oliverio builds on Lakatos’ concept of 
Scientific Research Programmes (SRPs).
173
 Lakatos is significant because he argued that in a 
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post-Kuhnian era his notion of SRPs was the best way to differentiate science from 
pseudoscience, which both moved beyond the potential irrationality and antirealism of Kuhn’s 
paradigm theory, but at the same time did not return to a new version of naïve justificationism 
or falsificationism critiqued by Kuhn.
174
 Moreover, unlike some philosophers of science 
influenced by logical positivism, he was not against metaphysical beliefs per se. In fact, he 
claimed that SRPs are commonly stimulated by metaphysical beliefs and assumptions.
175
 
Thus Lakatos is a natural dialogue partner for Oliverio, as Oliverio seeks to develop a 
theological (read: metaphysical) epistemology with both hermeneutical and realist 
dimensions. 
 
Lakatos argued that a SRP does not consist of an ‘isolated hypothesis but rather a research 
programme’ comprises a set of hypotheses and theories.
176
 These hypotheses/theories within a 
SRP can be categorised into two types. First, there are theories that make the hard core of the 
SRP which ‘includes the methods, theories, and core beliefs of that program[me] that are non-
negotiable.’
177
 The hard inner core sets the agenda for the SRP and also serves as the positive 
heuristic of the programme. This hard core is the central part of the SRP and thus to abandon 
it equates to abandoning the SRP as a whole. Second, there are auxiliary hypotheses that in 
relation to the hard inner core help explain observed data, and also provide a protective belt 
around the hard core. The auxiliary hypotheses function as the negative heuristic, directing 
possible criticisms away from the hard inner core.
178
 There is greater flexibility within the 
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auxiliary hypotheses, as they can be adapted, or even replaced, in an attempt to relate 
observed data to the hard inner core in a more consistent way. 
 
Among Christian theologians/philosophers Murphy is perhaps best known for utilising 
Lakatos’ notion of SRPs in developing a theological methodology.
179
 Oliverio acknowledges 
this and affirms many aspects of Murphy’s adaptation of Lakatos’ work. Oliverio writes that,     
I find that much of Murphy’s appropriation of Lakatos is helpful… if entire traditions 
and types of theological hermeneutics are understood similarly to SRPs. They are ways 
of understanding reality, as programs for accounting for it, given certain core 




Oliverio agrees with Murphy that theology is not merely ‘the internal discourse of the 
Church,’ but like the natural sciences has an external reality to which it relates, and therefore 
there is a public element to theology which transcends any given context. However, due to the 
contextual, linguistic and theory laden nature of all knowing, there is no direct or unmediated 
access to this external reality. Rather, the data about God for the theological research 
programme is provided by (religious) communities.
181
 This is where Oliverio builds on the 
work of Smith where a distinction is made between ‘faith’ and ‘theology.’ In other words, 
faith is the lived experience of a religious community, whereas theology is a theoretical 
reflection on the experience of this community; and therefore in Anselmian terms theology is 
understood as ‘faith seeking understanding.’
182
 This means that for Oliverio, like for Murphy, 
theology is both a contextual and a public discourse; that is, the data for theology arises from 
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within religious (or non-religious) communities, but the data referred to is seen to refer to this 
‘reality’ either accurately or inaccurately.      
 
Nevertheless, despite the similarities between Oliverio’s and Murphy’s approaches, there are 
also some differences. The main difference seems to be that Murphy’s work sees theology 
more through the lens of the natural sciences, whereas Oliverio approaches ‘theological 
hermeneutics in terms of qualitative and linguistic categories rather than the scientific and 
quantitative ones found in the language of “probably reasoning.”’
183
 Oliverio’s motivation for 
this appears to be a desire to guard theology from becoming ‘something akin to a social 
science.’
184
 As part of this move, he distinguishes his ‘hermeneutical realism’ from the more 
commonly known ‘critical realism.’ Oliverio claims that while the latter focuses on a ‘single, 
proper critical method,’ his hermeneutical realism affirms ‘a historically contingent 




It is questionable whether Oliverio’s distinction between ‘hermeneutical realism’ and ‘critical 
realism’ is justifiable;
186
 nevertheless, it is in this context that Oliverio also draws from the 
work of Taylor who sees epistemological traditions closely connected with ‘the most 
important moral and spiritual ideas’ of communities, traditions or civilizations.
187
 In 
agreement with Taylor, Oliverio states that epistemology ‘functions in order to form our best 
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account of reality, and this best account is what it means to best ‘make sense’ of our lives.’
188
 
Therefore, hermeneutical realism is an all-encompassing endeavour as a hermeneutic of life, 
and so cannot be reduced to one particular field or scientific discipline. 
 
In sum, Oliverio’s hermeneutical realism follows the trajectory of the so-called Contextual-
Pentecostal Hermeneutic with a strong emphasis on the contextual, linguistic and theory laden 
nature of all knowing, but at the same time it maintains a ‘reality’ beyond any given 
paradigm. Oliverio’s contextual and realist epistemology is influenced by Kuhn’s concept of 
paradigms; Lakatos’ notion of SRPs, as well as its employment by Murphy within theological 
methodology; and Taylor’s holistic approach to epistemology as hermeneutics of life.  
 
1.3.2. Sources of Knowledge/Acquiring Knowledge 
As has already been noted, for Oliverio it appears to be the experience of religious and non-
religious communities that provides the data for theology. Consequently, the underlying 
source for knowledge in Oliverio’s hermeneutical realism is experience; that is, general 
human experience but also more specifically human religious experiences of ‘the other.’ 
Oliverio claims that for Pentecostals it is particularly ‘the experience of the presence of the 
Spirit [which] functions as the guide… in theological interpretation.’
189
 While reflecting 
historically on the Pentecostal movement, he notes that ‘the Azusa Street Revival provides 
reason for considering the experience of the Spirit as central to the founding of Classical 
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Pentecostal tradition, and thus at the core of its theological hermeneutic.’
190
 Therefore, like 
Yong’s and Smith’s theological epistemologies, Oliverio’s epistemology also seems to be 
fundamentally experiential and empiricist in nature.   
 
In the light of this, Oliverio goes onto to identify three specific sources for the pneumatic 
experience of the Pentecostal community. The first and ‘primary revelatory source for 
theological understanding’ is the Son of God who is also the Word of God.
191
 The Word of 
God is fundamentally revealed in the incarnation of Jesus of Nazareth, and it is the Scriptures 
that bear witness to the living Word of God. However, Oliverio also seems to want to move 
beyond the Barthian idea of the Bible simply being a witness to Christ and hence he adopts 
Nicholas Wolterstorff’s claim that the written words of the Bible are human words 




The second source of theological knowledge is ‘creation and culture,’ with Oliverio’s 
emphasis being on culture; that is, human cultivation of creation (e.g. human languages, 
traditions, actions and beliefs).
193
 Oliverio writes that ‘the hermeneutical task is not only to 
recognise that culture provides the context for interpretation but also that it provides both the 
venue for God’s revelation and the place of constructive interpretive action to better cultivate 
the world.’
194
 Although not developed in detail, it seems that Oliverio advocates some form of 
(general) revelation being present in various human cultures, and particularly in those cultures 
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that have been influenced by the Gospel.
195
 He believes that despite an individual’s ability to 
experience and think outside of any given paradigm, commensurability with other paradigms 
is possible through ‘our common humanity and common world to which we relate.’
196
 Hence, 
Pentecostal theology should learn from other disciplines, even if Oliverio rejects what he calls 
the ‘correlationist strategy’ in recent theology.
197
   
 
The third source of theological knowledge is the Christian tradition. Oliverio suggests that 
Pentecostal theological hermeneutics needs to draw on the richness of the wider Christian 
tradition as a whole, and also on the distinctives of the Pentecostal traditions. However, apart 
from referring to the importance of understanding a tradition’s historical past, present context, 
and current actions which help create its future, Oliverio provides very little explanation of 





If, as suggested by Oliverio, one’s beliefs about God are based on general and religious 
experiences, the Bible, creation and culture, and the wider Christian and Pentecostal tradition, 
how does one discern whether their interpretations of these sources do in fact reflect reality? 
To put it differently, how can a person or a community be justified in believing their 
particular interpretations of the data from these identified sources of knowledge?  
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In developing a theory of justification for his Pentecostal hermeneutical realism, Oliverio 
utilises the criteria provided by Lakatos and Taylor for choosing between competing SRPs 
and paradigms. As has already been mentioned, Lakatos’ sought to develop a scientific 
method that moved beyond the perceived arbitrariness and irrationality of Kuhn’s paradigm 
theory vis-à-vis choosing between alternative paradigms. To guard against any potential 
epistemological anarchism, Lakatos argued that the validity of a SRP is based on whether it is 
considered to be either a progressive or degenerating programme. A progressive programme 
is characterised by its internal coherence/consistency, explanatory power regarding the 
observed data, and also its ability to predict novel facts; that is, ability to predict previously 
unknown facts rather than ‘merely explain what is already known.’
199
 A degenerating 
programme, on the other hand, finds its hard core increasingly challenged and is only able to 
protect it by making ‘ad hoc modifications’ to its auxiliary hypotheses, which is seen to 
indicate inconsistencies within its hard core.
200
 A degenerating programme has also lost its 
ability, if it ever possessed such ability, to predict novel facts.  
 
Scientific progress is achieved through the ongoing competition between various SRPs, with 
the progressive programmes eventually gaining prominence over the degenerating 
programmes. However, it is worth reinforcing that for Lakatos, like for Oliverio, the 
preference of one SRP over another is not determined by a set of neutral facts mediating 
between the two competing SRPs, as all facts are considered to be theory laden, and therefore 
independent and neutral criteria is assumed to be practically impossible. This, nonetheless, 
according to Lakatos need not lead to relativism (a common objection to Kuhn’s paradigm 
                                                 
199
 Staley, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, 80.  
200
 Murphy, Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning, 59.  
61 
 
theory), since the progressive SRPs are superior to the degenerating ones in explaining data 
and in generating predictions of novel facts which can be empirically corroborated.  
 
In relation to choosing between two paradigms or SRPs, Oliverio also refers to Taylor who 
has argued against both epistemological foundationalism and relativism.
201
 Taylor has pointed 
out that deciding between paradigms A and B does not require a third and neutral criteria C. 
One can reasonably choose B over A without the need for C to mediate, because (1) choosing 
B over A can be seen to overcome some ‘error-inducing factor, such as confusion, an elision, 
a too-simple palette of possibilities, and the like;’
202
 (2) there is asymmetry between A and B, 




In summary, paradigms according to Oliverio seem to be justified or unjustified primarily in 
light of coherence and pragmatic criteria. In other words, a paradigm is judged based on the 
coherence/consistency of its various beliefs, and pragmatically in its ability to predict and 
corroborate ‘novel facts.’ It appears that those paradigms that are able to outdo their 
competitors in the above in an ‘asymmetrical’ manner are most likely to correspond with 
‘reality.’
204
 Like Yong, Oliverio also believes that the truth of any paradigm can only be 
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‘eschatologically verified,’ and thus his epistemology is also characterised by fallibilism and 




1.3.4. Evaluative Comments 
To recapitulate the discussion thus far, Oliverio begins his exploration of Pentecostal 
theological hermeneutics by offering four types of hermeneutics based on the history of 
classical Pentecostalism, namely, (1) the Original Classical Pentecostal Hermeneutic; (2) the 
Evangelical-Pentecostal Hermeneutic; (3) the Contextual-Pentecostal Hermeneutic; and (4) 
the Ecumenical Pentecostal Hermeneutic. He follows this by making his own contribution to 
Pentecostal hermeneutics by developing his ‘hermeneutical realism.’ This hermeneutical 
realism falls within the Contextual-Pentecostal Hermeneutic type, assuming that all 
theological knowing takes place within linguistic paradigms and thus there is no escape from 
interpretation (i.e. all knowing is hermeneutical). Nevertheless, what is potentially known and 
interpreted transcends one’s cultural-linguistic context, reflecting a reality beyond one’s 
paradigm. The main source of theological knowledge is the experience of the (Pentecostal) 
community, with particular emphasis on its experience of the Word of God, creation and 
culture, and tradition(s). The justification or corroboration of paradigms is determined by 
which beliefs systems are most ‘progressive’ (see Lakatos) or provide the best account of 
lived experience (see Taylor) with respect to other paradigms of religious beliefs.  
 
Oliverio’s contribution to Pentecostal hermeneutics/epistemology is manifold. To note some 
of them, Oliverio seems to provide the first systematic and historical analysis of Pentecostal 
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hermeneutics, and he therefore supplements the more ahistorical Pentecostal epistemologies 
provided by Yong and Smith. In his historical work he astutely demonstrates how 
Pentecostalism is a unique Christian tradition which has evolved theologically and 
philosophically over its hundred year history, perhaps best reflected in the four types of 
Pentecostal hermeneutics. Oliverio also deals with both academic and non-academic 
Pentecostal theologians, and hence appreciates that Pentecostal theology and philosophy is 
not just the privilege of academically educated theologians but also the practice of the wider 
Pentecostal community. Moreover, Oliverio’s own contribution for the future of Pentecostal 
epistemology is insightful and his interaction with Kuhn, Lakatos, Murphy and Taylor is 
informative.     
 
However, despite these valuable insights, the main weakness/limitation of Oliverio’s work is 
that his own Pentecostal ‘hermeneutical realism’ remains somewhat undeveloped.
206
 This has 
at least two implications. 
 
First, although Oliverio’s hermeneutical realism assumes that all hermeneutical activity can 
only take place within an existing paradigm, because all interpreting and knowing is 
contextually conditioned, Oliverio does not provide any real articulation of what constitutes 
the Pentecostal SRP and/or paradigm. To put this in Lakatosian terms, there is no real 
description of what might be the hard core and auxiliary protective belt of the Pentecostal 
paradigm. The closest Oliverio seems to come to identifying the hard core of Pentecostal 
hermeneutics is when he states that ‘the Azusa Street Revival provides reason for considering 
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the experience of the Spirit as central to the founding of classical Pentecostal tradition, and 
thus at the core of its theological hermeneutic.’
207
 However, the ‘experience of the Spirit,’ 
unless developed theologically, is a very vague hard core for Pentecostal hermeneutics. For 
example, within the Pentecostal experience of the Spirit what positive heuristic does it 
provide for the Pentecostal research programme or what novel facts does this hard core 
predict? Oliverio provides few clues here. Moreover, there is no explication regarding what 
might be the main Pentecostal auxiliary hypotheses surrounding the hard core of pneumatic 
experience.  
 
Of course it is impossible for Oliverio to do everything in a relatively short work on 
Pentecostal hermeneutics. Nevertheless, it is somewhat surprising that he does not articulate 
what he sees as the central tenets of the Pentecostal theological paradigm, not least as 
Murphy, who Oliverio engages with in detail, makes it clear that to develop a genuine 
‘Lakatosian Theology’ one needs to combine both method and content.
208
 Furthermore, in 
light of Oliverio’s astute historical analysis of classical Pentecostalism he interacts with 
plenty of Pentecostal material which could have been utilised in providing the content for a 
Pentecostal paradigm. In fact, it seems ironic that despite most of Oliverio’s project being 
historical in nature with respect to the four types of Pentecostal hermeneutics, his own 
Pentecostal hermeneutical realism is not more explicitly shaped by Pentecostal traditions and 
their histories. For example, could the Original Classical Pentecostal hermeneutic provide the 
hard inner core for his advocated Pentecostal hermeneutical realism? The lack of articulation 
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on this matter means that the potential of Oliverio’s Pentecostal hermeneutics in its current 
form remains largely unrealised. 
 
Now of course it is possible that even if Oliverio would have had the space and time to 
develop a Pentecostal paradigm along Lakatosian lines, he may have decided not to do so due 
to his desire to distinguish Pentecostal theology from the natural/social sciences, and develop 
a Pentecostal hermeneutic more reflective of Taylor’s phenomenological approach. However, 
if this is the case, the same critique would still apply as Oliverio’s work would then have to 
identify the Pentecostal ‘moral frameworks’ and the ‘hypergoods’ that are central to a 
Pentecostal ‘social imaginary’ according to Taylor.
209
 So whether one follows the approach of 
Lakatos or Taylor, there seems to be no escape from developing the core content of a 





Second, because Oliverio has not (yet) articulated what constitutes a Pentecostal paradigm, 
SRP or ‘social imaginary,’ it is not possible to actually evaluate whether Oliverio’s 
Pentecostal hermeneutical realism is epistemological speaking fit for purpose. In other words, 
is it coherent within itself as a hermeneutical paradigm in light of its own Pentecostal tradition 
(however that may be conceived)? And is it a progressive or degenerative vis-à-vis competing 
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theological or anti-theological hermeneutical paradigms?
211
 These questions cannot be 
answered without an identification of what makes the Pentecostal paradigm.       
               
In conclusion, there is much to commend in Oliverio’s Pentecostal hermeneutics, not least the 
historical explication of Pentecostal hermeneutics through four main ideal types. However, 
although at first it seems that Oliverio follows his historical typologies by providing a 
historically informed and tradition specific Pentecostal hermeneutics, he does not actually 
achieve this, or at best does so only in a sketch form. Therefore, a truly historical and 
tradition-specific Pentecostal philosophical hermeneutics is still to be articulated.  
 
1.4. Conclusion  
In this chapter I have outlined three major Pentecostal theological rationalities, epistemologies 
and/or hermeneutics. At the outset it needs to be acknowledged that the contributions of 
Yong, Smith and Oliverio in the search for a Pentecostal rationality have been seminal for 
Pentecostal studies. To use Oliverio’s categories, all three theological methodologies can be 
located within the camp of ‘Contextual-Pentecostal Hermeneutic.’ That said, Yong and Smith 
seem to represent the two sides within this category and Oliverio can be seen to hold a 
mediating position between the two. In other words, Yong is effectively a pneumatological 
correlationist in his epistemological approach with a firm grounding in the Pentecostal 
tradition and pneumatological theology; Smith as a type of Pentecostal postliberal with an 
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affinity to Pentecostal spirituality and practices; and Oliverio as a hermeneutical realist 
informed by classical Pentecostal history.  
 
In my evaluation of these three positions, I have noted that Yong’s rationality would merit 
further exploration regarding the extent to which it accurately reflects any given Pentecostal 
tradition. Smith’s approach seems to suffer from not fully appreciating Pentecostal theology, 
as well as being ahistorical, which appears to undermine the ‘Pentecostal’ aspects of his 
Pentecostal epistemology. In terms of tradition-specific and historically informed Pentecostal 
rationality, Oliverio’s approach is the most promising. But unfortunately he does not fully 
develop his own Pentecostal theological hermeneutics along his proposed methodology.  
 
In light of the analysis above, my aim is to develop a historical and tradition-specific 
Pentecostal rationality (see Part II). However, although many of the building blocks for doing 
so are already provided by Oliverio – particularly those that he has gleaned from Kuhn, 
Lakatos, Taylor and Murphy – it appears that Alasdair MacIntyre provides further 
methodological insights about how to do this in a philosophically mature way. 
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CHAPTER 2 – ON METHOD: MACINTYRE, TRADITION AND RATIONALITY 
 
The previous chapter has analysed and evaluated three prominent Pentecostal rationalities. I 
have tried to demonstrate that the philosophical contributions of Amos Yong, James Smith 
and William Oliverio are significant and should not be ignored by those in search of a 
Pentecostal rationality. Nevertheless, despite the importance of their work, the main weakness 
of all three seem to be that they suffer from being ahistorical (Oliverio more in practice than 
in theory), and therefore are in danger of not fully representing any particular Pentecostal 
tradition and its implicit epistemology.  
 
It is in the light of this that the philosophical work of Alasdair MacIntyre seems to provide 
important resources for constructing and developing a truly historically informed, tradition 
specific and narrative Pentecostal epistemology. Consequently, the purpose of this chapter is 
to explore the philosophical methodology of MacIntyre which will then be employed in the 
next section for constructing a Pentecostal rationality.  
 
The chapter will first explore MacIntyre’s concept of tradition-dependent rationality. Second, 
it will seek to demonstrate that contrary to some common objections, MacIntyre’s 
methodology does not lead to relativism or fideism, but through his notions of truth and 
dialectical justification a progressive quest for genuine knowledge is possible. Finally, it will 
conclude by discussing the potential benefits and implications of adopting MacIntyre’s 
methodology in constructing a Pentecostal rationality.       
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2.1. MacIntyre’s Tradition-Dependent Rationality 
According to Stanley Hauerwas, ‘few dispute that Alasdair MacIntyre is one of the most 
important philosophers of our time.’
1
 Indeed, MacIntyre’s academic oeuvre is impressive as it 
covers a multitude of topics in an interdisciplinary manner over a number of decades.
2
 Despite 
MacIntyre’s many interests, his primary work has been on moral and political philosophy. 
Moreover, he has been as an ardent critique of modernity, and his concepts of tradition and 
rationality have been widely debated. For the purposes of this chapter, I will simply focus on 
MacIntyre’s notion of tradition-dependent rationality, since this provides the methodological 
tools for my later construction of a Pentecostal rationality.     
 
2.1.1. Formal and Substantive Rationality 
Ironically MacIntyre’s concept of rationality has been simultaneously criticised as leading to 
relativism because of its inherent historicism,
3
 as well as not being ‘sufficiently relativistic or 
historicist’ due to its dialectical nature.
4
 These seemingly conflicting criticisms highlight two 
important aspects within MacIntyre’s concept of rationality, or what David Trenery refers to 
as his ‘hybrid position’ regarding Enlightenment rationality.
5
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Generally speaking MacIntyre views rationality as the criterion used for judging ‘truth and 
falsity.’
6
 However, within this basic view he understands there to be two kinds of rationality 
or first principles. First, there is ‘formal rationality’ which includes the basic laws of logic 
(e.g. the law of non-contradiction),
7
 and in his own words these first principles ‘are evident to 
all rational persons [and] do indeed provide standards and direction from the outset.’
8
 These 
aspects of rationality are seen to be universal and accessible to all (rational) people due to our 
‘common humanity.’
9
 It is this universal aspect of rationality that MacIntyre shares with the 




Nevertheless, although MacIntyre believes that formal rationality and the laws of logic are 
‘necessary’ conditions of rationality, he does not believe that they are ‘sufficient’ 
conditions.
11
 In other words, formal rationality provides the grounding for human reasoning, 
but on its own it does not enable us to make any meaningful judgments about truth and falsity. 
What is needed for making genuine epistemic judgements is not just formal rationality but 
‘substantive rationality,’ which ‘includes all those determinations and judgments about good 
reasons and acceptable evidence, that arise through tradition and convention.’
12
 A major 
difference between this second kind of rationality, vis-à-vis the first kind, is that it is ‘self-
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evident only to those educated to understand its principles;’
13
 that is, it only makes sense to 
those who have been appropriately ‘traditioned’ within this particular form of reasoning. 
Moreover, MacIntyre notes that ‘argument to [these second kind of] first principles cannot be 
demonstrative, for demonstration is from [these] first principles.’
14
 It is this second aspect of 
rationality that distances MacIntyre from the Enlightenment ideals of universal justification 
and common rational criteria, and also what makes his concept of rationality tradition-
dependent and tradition-constituted. 
 
In fact, much of MacIntyre’s mature philosophical work has been an argument for substantive 
rationality and an attempt to recover ‘a conception of rational enquiry as embodied in a 
tradition.’
15
 In his so-called mature philosophical work, he has tried to (re)establish that 
substantive rationalities are tradition-dependent, implying that rational enquiry is ‘inseparable 
from the intellectual and social tradition in which it is embodied.’
16
 He states that:   
there is no standing ground, no place of enquiry, no way to engage in the practices of 
advancing, evaluating, accepting, and rejecting reasoned argument apart from that 




Thus, argues MacIntyre, there are no ‘traditionless’ arguments or (substantive) rationalities, 
and those that claim such neutral status can be shown to be rooted in a specific tradition 
within a certain historical context.
18
 Following from this, MacIntyre maintains that the 
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Enlightenment project in its current form is bound to fail, since it is based on the ‘fiction’ that 




2.1.2. Tradition-Constitutive and Tradition-Constituted Rationality 
If then substantive rationality is tradition-dependent, what does MacIntyre mean by tradition 
and how is rationality tradition-constituted? According to MacIntyre, a tradition is a 
‘historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about 
the goods which constitute that tradition.’
20
 Or as he puts it elsewhere, 
A tradition is an argument extended through time in which certain fundamental 
agreements are defined and redefined in terms of two kinds of conflict: those with 
critics and enemies external to the tradition who reject all or at least key parts of those 
fundamental agreements, and those internal, interpretive debates through which the 
meaning and rationale of the fundamental agreements come to be expressed and by 




In light of these two definitions by MacIntyre, a tradition can be seen to have at least four 
significant features. First, a tradition is an argument, and as an argument it is by its very 
nature about something; that is, it has an object of enquiry which it makes claims about. A 
tradition is therefore a quest and an argument towards a certain telos, and the ‘goods which 
constitute that tradition’ are geared towards reaching this goal.
22
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Second, a tradition is not just an argument about something, but also an argument by 
someone. For MacIntyre, however, it is not just an argument by individuals, but by a 
community of people interested in and committed to the common object of enquiry. And 
since the argument is carried out by a group of people over time, it inevitably becomes 
‘socially embodied’ and ‘historically extended.’ Moreover, for the argument to be successful 
and sustained it needs to be supported by appropriate institutions created by the community.
23
 
Consequently, a tradition cannot be understood apart from the community of ‘arguers,’ 
including their history, social embodiment and institutions. 
 
Third, the argument is with someone. This could be either those external to the tradition, who 
nevertheless, make claims about the same goal of inquiry; or it could be with those internal to 
the tradition. Either way, to truly appreciate the nature of the argument one should be aware 




Fourth, the argument of the past and present community is not just shaped by its subject 
matter and its dialogue partners, but also how it is being carried out. Indeed the ‘how’ is the 
community’s method of argumentation and therefore effectively its rationality. However, as 
has already been noted, for MacIntyre the rationality of the tradition is not some universal or 
general rationality applicable to all traditions throughout all ages. Rather, the rationality of the 
community is tradition specific. So, what exactly then makes the rationality tradition-specific 
and tradition-constituted? 
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According to MacIntyre rationality is fundamentally a practice of the community.
25
 As a 
practice, it is characterised by its ‘intentions,’
26
 which if they are ‘internally good’ are 
oriented to achieve the telos of the tradition’s inquiry.
27
 So in an Aristotelian manner the order 
of things (ontology) is allowed to determine how things are known (epistemology),
28
 and 
therefore the rationality of the tradition will be significantly influenced by how the 
community perceives the nature of its telos. Furthermore, rationality as a practice is also 
informed by its ‘setting;’
29
 that is, by the history and context of the community of 
practitioners, as well as their interaction with the interlocutors, which means that the 
rationality will always be socially and historically conditioned. And finally, rationality as a 
practice is shaped by a ‘narrative,’ which is the community’s attempt to make its practice of 
reasoning intelligible by locating it in its historical context with an understanding of the 
origins (protos) and the goal (telos) of the argument. The practice of reasoning will only make 
sense within a narrative framework in which the community identifies how the argument has 
gone thus far, including telling stories of the successes and failures of the argument to date.
30
 
In sum, rationality is ‘a practice emerging from a history, or rather as an enacted form of a 
narrative interpretation of the events of a history;’
31
 therefore, rationality is tradition-
constituted. 
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However, although rationality in MacIntyrian lines is ‘tradition-constituted,’ it is also 
‘tradition-constitutive.’
32
 In other words, the practice of reasoning is not only shaped by the 
tradition but itself shapes the tradition by clarifying the nature and goal of the enquiry, 
helping to construct appropriate institutions to uphold the argument of the community, and to 
modify and sharpen the community’s argument in relation to internal and external critics.    
     
2.1.3. The Development of Traditions 
Thus far I have suggested that MacIntyre sees traditions as ‘arguments extended through time’ 
which are teleologically driven, socially embodied and contextually located, with a particular 
form of rationality specific to the tradition. In light of the above, I will now try to show 
through examples from MacIntyre’s own work how traditions as arguments may be formed, 
developed and even possibly defeated.  
 
In Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy and Tradition (1990) 
MacIntyre identifies what he sees as three dominant, and to some extent archetypal, 
intellectual traditions emerging in the late nineteenth
 
century Western philosophical and moral 
discourse.
33
 The first one is the Enlightenment tradition (read: Encyclopaedia), which 
MacIntyre equates with Adam Gifford’s supposedly neutral, unitary and ahistorical approach 
to rationality embodied in the Ninth Edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica.
34
 The second is 
Nietzsche’s genealogist approach (read: Genealogy), which sees both rationality and truth as 
                                                 
32
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33
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 MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions, 18.  
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relative to a particular context, and in doing so maintains that ‘there are no rules of rationality 
as such to be appealed to, there are rather strategies of insight and strategies of subversion.’
35
 
The third, and MacIntyre’s preferred approach, is traditionalism seen in the Thomism of Pope 
Leo XIII (read: Tradition), which on the one hand agrees with the genealogist in rejecting the 
ahistorical rationality of the encyclopaedist, but simultaneously attempts to transcend the 
relativism of the genealogist.
36
 I will now use these three ‘traditions’ as examples of how 
traditions may emerge and evolve over time.     
 
MacIntyre sees intellectual traditions developing in three stages.
37
 During the first stage a 
community is formed around a common object of enquiry, and authority is bestowed by this 
community on specific people, texts and/or doctrines with respect to the object of enquiry. For 
example, the three rival moral traditions identified above roughly speaking share the same 
object of enquiry (i.e. morality), but they differ because of their alternative authority figures, 
foundational beliefs, and grounding texts, which influence the nature of their quest for 
morality. So it could be said that the ‘Encyclopaedist Tradition’ affirms people like Gifford as 
its intellectual champions; it adopts the Enlightenment concepts of universal reason, 
autonomy and progress as its foundational ‘doctrines;’ and it sees the Ninth Edition of the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica as its canonical text. Within the ‘Genealogist Tradition,’ on the 
other hand, Nietzsche emerges as the enlightened ethicist; the close coupling of social 
conditioning and human beliefs becomes the controlling maxim; and Nietzsche’s Genealogy 
of Morals is identified as the grounding work. For the ‘Thomists Tradition’ then, Aquinas is 
                                                 
35
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36
 MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions, 59-60.  It is this affirmation of the genealogist critique of encyclopaedism 
and the concurrent rejection of relativism that has placed a significant burden of proof on MacIntyre’s 
traditionalism and his whole philosophical enterprise. This will be explored in 2.2. 
37
 MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 354-355. 
77 
 
viewed as the Doctor Angelicus, Thomism as the appropriate philosophical framework, and 




At the second stage, inadequacies and incoherencies are identified within the authoritative 
sources of the community, which can be fuelled by internal debates within, or external 
critique from outside the community. This second stage can also be seen as an 
‘epistemological crisis’ within the emerging tradition.
39
 Thus, for the Encyclopaedist the 
epistemological crisis might be caused by the seeming failure to actually establish the nature 
of universal rationality, exposing a weakness in a central belief of the tradition. The 
Genealogist might find it difficult to explain and evaluate his or her own project without 
falling into a ‘nongenealogical, academic mode;’
40
 and the Thomist might find their 
Aristotelian metaphysics challenged by current scientific discoveries.   
 
The third stage provides a potential remedy for the epistemological crisis encountered during 
the second stage, resulting in reformulations and reinterpretations of the tradition’s 
authoritative sources and central beliefs. This means that when it comes to the intellectual 
challenges faced by the Encyclopaedist, Genealogist or the Thomist, the central question is to 
what extent they can reinterpret the foundational sources and grounding beliefs of their 
particular tradition in order to overcome their current incongruities. According to MacIntyre, 
the degree to which the inadequacies can be resolved depends on the resources available 
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within the community’s tradition and upon the community’s inventiveness. For the tradition 
to continue after the reformulation, ‘some core of shared belief, constitutive of allegiance to 
the tradition, has to survive,’
41
 because without some continuity the tradition bears no 
resemblance to its authoritative origins and thus has been transformed altogether into 
something else. As living traditions evolve and develop stages two and three are regularly 
revisited, and it is this continual process that makes an intellectual tradition effectively ‘an 




MacIntyre’s concept of rationality embodied within a tradition and tradition being formed 
over a narrative history means that any ‘tradition-constituted and tradition constitutive rational 
enquiry cannot be elucidated apart from its exemplifications.’
43
 This means that to identify 
rationality, and rational justification, within a tradition cannot be done apart from a narrative 
enquiry into the tradition’s history, which is characterised by its origins (stage one), 
internal/external debates (stage two) and remedies (stage three).
44
 In fact, MacIntyre’s so-
called trilogy of After Virtue, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rival Versions of 
Moral Enquiry have tried to provide this historical exemplification with the aim of 
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It must be noted that this kind of ‘historicism’ leads to a fine tension in MacIntyre’s work, as 
pointed out by Terry Pinkhard, which MacIntyre shares with both Hegel and Wittgenstein; 
that is, ‘the double awareness of the historical and social contingency of all our points of view 
and the necessity to provide justifications of those points of view.’
46
 Indeed some, like Robert 
George, have suggested that MacIntyre fails to adequately balance this tension and his 
emphasis on historical particularism results in a form of philosophical relativism.
47
 However, 
as will be argued below this conclusion is unwarranted as MacIntyre seems to escape 
relativism, despite his particularism. 
 
2.2. Truth and Dialectical Justification 
It has been described thus far that all rationalities are seen by MacIntyre as tradition-
dependent and historically specific. However, as will be argued below this particularism 




MacIntyre is clear that truth should not be equated ‘with what is rationally justified in terms 
of the scheme of each particular standpoint,’
48
 and thus he cannot be seen as merely 
advocating pragmatic or coherence theories of truth.  Rather, truth is understood by him as 
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being closely connected to the object of inquiry within a specific tradition. In other words, 
since traditions are by nature about something, their adequacy is defined by their accuracy vis-
à-vis their object of enquiry.
49
 This means that a tradition, and its concomitant rationality, 
may in fact be flawed because they inaccurately reflect their object of enquiry, or to put it 
more starkly, do not appropriately ‘correspondent’ with ‘truth.’ MacIntyre notes that,  
the most primitive conception of truth is of the manifestness of the objects which 
present themselves to mind; and it is when mind fails to re-present that manifestness 




This does not imply that MacIntyre is favouring a simplistic correspondence theory of truth, 
or what he calls ‘truth as correspondence-to-fact,’
51
 but truth and truthful enquiry, 
nevertheless, are seen as the mind adequately corresponding to its object (adaequatio 
intellectus ad rem).
52
 Following from this, like Aristotle and Aquinas, MacIntyre believes  
truth to be the telos of rational enquiry; and rational enquiry so conceived must involve 
progress toward that telos through the replacement of less adequate by more adequate 




MacIntyre’s position regarding truth can thus be seen as a form of critical realism;
54
 that is, 
his concept of tradition-dependent rationality commits him to believe that our 
conceptualisation and categorisation of the world and objects of enquiry are inevitably shaped 
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by our traditions, but these conceptualisation and categorisations are only truthful to the 
extent to which they reflect the reality of the world and the objects of enquiry. In light of this, 
MacIntyre rejects the common anti-realist criticism of realist positions which assume that to 
claim ‘that there are realities that exist independently of and prior to any apprehension of 
them… [is tantamount to] claiming to be able to conceive of things as they are apart from our 
conceiving of them.’
55
 MacIntyre’s response to such anti-realist objection is to argue that 
although the objects of enquiry cannot be conceived ‘apart from our conceiving of them,’ this 
does not mean that there is no mind-independent reality. The reason being that our conceptual 
schemes can still reflect appropriately or inappropriately the objects of enquiry, and it is 
possible to move from a less adequate to a more adequate concept of this object. Indeed 
it is precisely in moving from less adequate to more adequate categorical and 
conceptual schemes and judgments that we recognize that the realities which we 
formerly categorized and conceptualized in one way, and now recategorize and 
reconceptualize in another are the same realities, and that they exists and have the 
characteristics that warrant or fail to warrant our categories and our conceptualizations 
independently of those categorizations and conceptualizations. We need therefore to be 
able and we do have the ability to identify and to reidentify objects independently of 




All of this suggests that not all conceptual schemes, traditions and rationalities are equally 
valid with respect to truth (read: the objects and telos of rational enquiry), and some can even 
cease to be living options altogether for simply not reflecting truth sufficiently.
57
 This, 
however, does raise the question of how can then traditions in practice progress towards 
‘truth,’ or be indeed found wanting and even defeated in the process?   
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2.2.2. Dialectical Justification 
As has been described above, traditions develop over time through encountering 
incoherencies (stage two) and by providing remedies to them (stage three). This second stage 
can also be seen as an ‘epistemological crisis’ within a tradition,
58
 and it is a constant threat to 
all progressive traditions because they are dealing with ‘reality,’ which may or may not be 
adequately reflected by the tradition.  When a tradition does find itself in an ‘epistemological 
crisis’, the solution (stage three) requires according to MacIntyre ‘the invention or discovery 
of new concepts and the framing of some new types of theory’ that have three 
characteristics.
59
 First, the new reformulation ‘must furnish a solution to the problems which 
had previously proved intractable in a systematic and coherent way.’
60
 Second, it must be able 
to explain what had made the tradition before this modification susceptible to the 
epistemological crisis. Third, ‘these first two tasks must be carried out in a way which 
exhibits some fundamental continuity of the new conceptual and theoretical structures with 





However, it is not guaranteed that a tradition will survive its ‘epistemological crisis’. In fact, 
there seem to be two ways by which it can be defeated. Firstly, ‘the lack of resolution itself 
defeats the tradition’, as the inconsistency by its own standards makes the tradition incoherent 
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 It is worth underscoring here that, although MacIntyre believes that all 
rationalities are tradition-dependent, he maintains that the ‘laws of logic’ are universal (i.e. 
formal rationality) and hence should be followed by all sufficient rationalities.
63
 It is this 
commitment to logic that grounds MacIntyre’s rejection of incoherent traditions, and which 
opens the possibility for a tradition to be defeated by its own inconsistency.  
 
The second way in which a tradition can be defeated is that during the ‘epistemological crisis’ 
a competing tradition is discovered that is able to meet, unlike one’s own tradition, the first 
two requirements of the solution to the crisis, namely resolve the crisis and show why the 
crisis emerged (see above). In this kind of a scenario those inhabiting the tradition in crisis 
should acknowledge ‘that the alien tradition is superior in rationality and in respect of its 
claims to truth to their own.’
64
 As highlighted by MacIntyre, the relationship between the two 
competing traditions in a situation like this is asymmetrical in that the superior tradition is 
able to do something that the defeated tradition fails to do, namely, resolve the crisis and 
explain why it arose in the first place.
65
 Therefore, in a situation like this a reasonable 
enquirer of truth ought to, at least in theory, align themselves with the more progressive 
tradition.     
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Now of course for one to be able to perceive how an ‘alien tradition’ is able to solve the 
epistemological crisis, this alien tradition needs to be understood by the adherents of the 
tradition in crisis, and consequently there needs to be an element of commensurability 
between the competing traditions. Aware of the need for commensurability, MacIntyre 
believes that competing traditions do in fact share some common features, that is, logic and 
similar, if not the same, object of enquiry. Indeed apart from some similarities and shared 
aspects between traditions there would be no possibility for disagreement in the first place.
66
 
Moreover, MacIntyre maintains that people can embody more than one tradition, just like they 
can speak more than one language fluently, and therefore they can be bilingual or multilingual 
with respect to traditions.
67
 That said, for anyone to move beyond their dominant tradition and 
embrace the resources of an alien tradition in a meaningful way, albeit a ‘second first 




In summary, MacIntyre’s tradition-dependent rationality should not be seen as an escape into 
relativism or fideism as any tradition and rationality engages with ‘truth’ and is thus faced 
with the possibility of falling ‘into a state of epistemological crisis.’
69
 In fact, the test for truth 
in the present, according to Macintyre,  
...therefore, is always to summon up as many questions and as many objections of the 
greatest strength possible; what can be justifiably claimed as truth is what has 
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Hence, justification for one’s tradition is essentially the ‘best account so far’ regarding the 





The influences of the philosophers of science Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn and Imre Lakatos 
are evident on MacIntyre’s concept of dialectical justification.
72
 MacIntyre’s notion of 
‘epistemological crises and dramatic narrative’ is particularly informed by Imre Lakatos’ 
notion of ‘Scientific Research Programmes’ (SRPs).
73
 Nevertheless, despite engaging with 
Lakatos’ idea of SRPs, MacIntyre does not fully utilise Lakatos’ insights regarding the ‘hard 
core’ and ‘auxiliary hypotheses’ of SRPs, and this causes some ambiguity in his methodology 
with respect to the essential and more peripheral beliefs of a tradition. Indeed, David Trenery 
has argued that this is a notable weakness in MacIntyre’s methodology and has sought to 
ameliorate this with George Lindbeck’s postliberalism.
74
 Although I share Trenery’s criticism 
of MacIntyre here, rather than borrowing from Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic framework in 
section two of the thesis I will employ Lakatos’ concepts of ‘hard core’ and ‘auxiliary 
hypotheses’ of a SRP to help clarify the real essence of an intellectual tradition from its 
surrounding tenets. In doing this I will effectively follow in the methodological footsteps of 
Nancey Murphy and William Oliverio, who have both referred to Lakatos in identifying the 
essential and peripheral beliefs of a theological tradition as discussed in chapter one (see 1.3.). 
In summary, although I maintain that MacIntyre’s notions of tradition and rationality are 
conducive for constructing a Pentecostal rationality, I also believe that Lakatos’ reflections on 
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the essence and periphery of SRPs provide further resources for articulating more precisely a 
Pentecostal intellectual tradition.       
 
2.3. Implications for Pentecostal Rationality and Epistemology 
So what are the benefits of utilising MacIntyre’s ideas of tradition-dependent rationality, truth 
and dialectical justification for constructing a Pentecostal rationality and epistemology? At 
least five helpful aspects can be identified.   
 
First, Pentecostal theologians in search of a Pentecostal epistemology have been quick to 
point out the incompatibility of modernistic epistemologies, adopted by much of conservative 
evangelical theology, with Pentecostalism (e.g. see Yong, Smith and Oliverio in chapter 1).
75
 
However, the postmodern alternatives are themselves not without problematic features 
(although see Smith in 1.2.).
76
 It is here that MacIntyre offers a way forward by providing a 
clear alternative to modernistic epistemologies, without falling into what many Pentecostals 
fear about postmodern (de)constructions, namely relativism. For example, Richard Davis and 
Paul Franks have argued against narrative Pentecostal epistemologies due to a fear of what 
they call ‘story-ism: favouring one’s own story over others without legitimate reason or 
justification.’
77
 However, as I have tried to demonstrate above, although MacIntyre’s 
approach is narrative in nature, his concept of dialectical justification means that his ‘story-
ism’ does not suffer from ‘favouring one’s own story’ without having adequate reasons. 
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Hence it seems that MacIntyre’s approach has great potential for articulating a rationality of a 
movement which has been identified as ‘paramodern,’
78





Second, following from MacIntyre’s ‘hybrid position’ regarding modernity and 
postmodernity, his (critical) realist concept of truth make him compatible with the basic 
Pentecostal intuition regarding truth and realism (e.g. see my critique of Smith in 1.2.4. and 
see chapter 7). Moreover, MacIntyre’s Aristotelian and Thomistic idea of truth is 
teleologically driven, which again seems to fit well with the eschatological emphasis of 
Pentecostals; that is, the assumption that ultimate reality will be fully revealed in the eschaton 
to come.    
 
Third, Walter Hollenweger has pointed out that one of the central characteristics of 
Pentecostalism is its narrative form,
80
 and therefore it is reasonable to suggest that a genuine 
Pentecostal epistemology should also be narrative in nature. As seen in the previous chapter, 
Smith has argued that the Pentecostal focus on ‘testimony points to the irreducibility (and 
perhaps primacy) of “narrative knowledge.”’
81
 However, although Smith’s emphasis on 
narrative knowing and epistemology is apposite for Pentecostalism, his own attempt to 
construct a Pentecostal epistemology seems to fail at delivering a truly narrative epistemology 
(see 1.2.4.). It is here that MacIntyre’s emphasis on historical narrative and tradition 
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formation will provide a way forward towards the development of a truly narrative 
Pentecostal rationality. 
 
Fourth, following from this narrative approach, MacIntyre’s methodology shares the 
contextual elements of Yong’s, Smith’s and Oliverio’s epistemologies, but his concept of 
tradition increasingly invites a Pentecostal community’s many witnesses (past and present) to 
testify to the formation of the Pentecostal narrative, tradition and rationality. This seems to be 
a genuine ‘testimony in the Spirit,’
82
 since it takes into consideration the many witnesses of 
any given Pentecostal tradition and allows for the development of a Pentecostal epistemology 
and rationality that is particular to that tradition. 
 
At this juncture it should be noted that methodologically MacIntyre’s approach is very similar 
to Oliverio’s, although it seems to provide further tools for understanding the exact nature of 
the Pentecostal tradition. Indeed my criticism of Oliverio (see 1.3.4.) was not directed at his 
methodology, but rather for not seeing it being put to use. In a MacIntyrian fashion I believe 
that ‘the concept of tradition-constituted and tradition-constitutive rational enquiry cannot be 
elucidated apart from its exemplifications.’
83
 Therefore, to truly test either MacIntyre’s or 
Oliverio’s methodology in relation to constructing a Pentecostal rationality, one needs to do 
this through an ‘exemplification’ and narration of an existing Pentecostal tradition.     
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Fifth, as a cursory reading of the main Pentecostal journals suggests, Pentecostalism in the 
21
st
 century is increasingly trying to articulate its identity and its key characteristics.
84
 It 
seems that MacIntyre’s approach can provide fresh methodological insights into analysing 
Pentecostal traditions. In fact, MacIntyre astutely points out that   
There characteristically comes a time in the history of tradition-constituted enquiries 
when those engaged in them may find occasion or need to frame a theory of their own 
activities of enquiry. What kind of theory is then developed will of course vary from 




Arguably this has not yet been sufficiently done for Pentecostalism, and not done at all for 
British Pentecostalism. The purpose of my thesis is not to construct a unified and global 
Pentecostal tradition, even if that could be done, but to focus on a particular British 
Pentecostal movement, namely on the Elim Pentecostal Church. The benefits of focusing on a 
particular tradition is that it pays due respect to the ‘glocal’ nature of Pentecostalism,
86
 and 
thus to the uniqueness of different Pentecostal traditions, despite their common family 
resemblances. That said, since Elim is one of the oldest and largest Pentecostal denominations 
in Europe, it can be seen as a representative example of European Pentecostalism generally, 
and therefore narrating its tradition, rationality and epistemology can also be seen as making a 
broader contribution to understanding global Pentecostalism.  
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In the previous part of the thesis I explored the ‘Pentecostal’ rationalities of Amos Yong, 
James Smith and William Oliverio (chapter 1). I concluded that the merits of their 
epistemological constructions are many, but they all seem to suffer from an element of 
ahistoricism when it comes to the construction of their theological hermeneutics (Yong and 
Smith more so than Oliverio). Consequently, I have proposed that Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
concept of tradition-constituted rationality provides the necessary methodological insights for 
developing a truly historical, narrative and tradition-specific Pentecostal rationality (chapter 
2). However, this cannot be done apart from providing a historical narrative and 
exemplification of a particular Pentecostal tradition. Therefore, part two of the thesis seeks to 
present a MacIntyrian narrative account of a particular Pentecostal tradition, namely, the Elim 
Pentecostal Church.  
 
I will do so by first providing ‘prologues’ to the Elim tradition by exploring its early context 
and roots (chapter 3). This is important for understanding how the Elim movement emerged, 
why it emerged in the way it did, and what theological and philosophical resources it inherited 
from its intellectual ancestors.
2
 This exploration is followed by an analysis of the emergence 
of the Elim ‘argument’ with particular emphasis on its early opponents, content, rationality 
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 Chapters 4-6 of this section have been presented in a shortened form in Simo Frestadius, ‘The Elim Tradition: 
“An Argument Extended through Time” (Alasdair MacIntyre),’JEPTA 36, no. 1 (2016): 57-68. 
2
 In articulating the ‘Catholic Philosophical Tradition,’ MacIntyre has a section on ‘Prologues to the Catholic 
Philosophical Tradition;’ Alasdair MacIntyre, God, Philosophy and Universities: A Selective History of the 
Catholic Philosophical Tradition (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011), 19.  
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and social embodiment (chapter 4). In many ways this chapter is foundational for 
understanding what constitutes the Elim tradition, since in MacIntyrian lines the early makeup 
of any given tradition establishes its central ethos and, in doing so, sets its future prospects 
regarding what it can and cannot become (without effectively morphing into another 
tradition).
3
 Indeed, the central argument of this chapter is that the essence of the Elim tradition 
is the Foursquare Gospel and its rationality is Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism.  The 
following two chapters (chapters 5-6) continue the narration of the Elim ‘argument extended 
through time’ by focusing on two of its main ‘epistemological crises’ to date; that is, the 
resignation of its founder George Jeffreys (chapter 5) and the challenge posed by the 
Charismatic and Restoration movements (chapter 6). In my evaluation of these two crises, I 
will seek to further substantiate that the hard core of Elim is the Foursquare Gospel and its 
rationality is Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism. Moreover, in chapters five and six it should 
also become clear that Elim has demonstrated significant flexibility in restructuring itself – in 
accordance with its pragmatism – to facilitate the future flourishing of its argument. 
 
Finally, it needs to be underscored that this part of the thesis is predominantly historical and I 
have sought to engage with a number of primary sources on Elim, as should become evident 
in the references. I believe the historical detail I have attempted to provide is important in 
establishing correct foundations for the more constructive contributions offered in the last 
section of the thesis, not least as I have critiqued Yong, Smith and Oliverio on aspects of their 
                                                 
3
 This parallels the view of those scholars who identify the roots and early expression of Pentecostalism as its 
essence rather than mere infancy; Harvey Cox, Fire From Heaven: The Rise of Pentecostal Spirituality and the 
Reshaping of Religion in the Twenty-First Century (London: Cassell, 1996), 262; Hollenweger, Pentecostalism, 
397; Allan Anderson, An Introduction to Pentecostalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 45.   
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ahistoricism. That said, this section also offers the first comprehensive intellectual history of 
the Elim Pentecostal Church, and thus in its own right contributes to the history of ideas.
4
                                                 
4
 For a timeline of Elim’s general history see ‘Appendix 1: Elim’s Chronology.’ 
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CHAPTER 3 – PROLOGUES TO THE ELIM TRADITION: THE CONTEXT AND 
ROOTS OF THE ELIM ARGUMENT 
 
Pentecostals have often self-identified their movement as originating directly from ‘heaven’ 
without having ‘earthly’ roots.
1
 According to this view, the birth of the Pentecostal movement 
was a providential act of God at the beginning of the twentieth century, which catapulted the 
Church back to experiencing the reality of Pentecost. This act not only restored the fullness of 
Apostolic and NT Christianity, but in doing so allowed the emerging Pentecostal movement 
to sidestep two thousand years of Church history.  
 
Despite the attractiveness of this view for ‘primitivist’ Pentecostal intuitions, such a reading 
of Pentecostal origins is not supported by the historical data. The likes of Vinson Synan, 
Walter Hollenweger and Donald Dayton have all persuasively argued that Pentecostalism 
should not be seen as a movement emerging ex nihilo, but rather as having deep historical, 
theological and social roots in other Christian traditions.
2
 This does not mean that early 
Pentecostalism did not have its own distinctives, but it does mean that these distinctives were 
part of a broader theological framework much of which had been inherited from, and was 
shared with, other Christian streams.  
                                                 
1
 This historiographical approach is identified by Cerillo and Wacker as ‘the providential approach;’ A. Cerillo, 
Jr. and G. Wacker, ‘Bibliography and Historiography of Pentecostalism in the United States,’ in The New 
International Dictionary of Pentecostal and Charismatic Movement, ed. Stanley M. Burgess and Eduard M. van 
der Maas (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2002), 397-399. See also Cornelis van der Laan, ‘Historical 
Approaches,’ in Studying Global Pentecostalism: Theories and Methods, ed. Allan Anderson et al (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 2010), 202-219; Cecil M. Robeck, Jr. ‘The Origins of Modern 
Pentecostalism: Some Historiographical Issues,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Pentecostalism, ed. Cecil M. 
Robeck, Jr. and Amos Yong (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 13-30.    
2
 Vinson Synan, The Holiness Pentecostal Tradition: Charismatic Movements in the Twentieth Century (Grand 




This appears to be true for classical Pentecostalism as a whole, and it also seems to be the 
case for Elim. Consequently, to appropriately narrate the Elim tradition as ‘an argument 
extended through time,’ it is necessary to start by identifying the ‘prologues’ to Elim; that is, 
to articulate its theological and intellectual roots. I aim to do this by first outlining the social, 
philosophical and theological context of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
Britain to help understand these roots within their surrounding habitat. Second, I will explore 
how Elim’s direct roots can be located in the Anglo-American Holiness Movements of the 
nineteenth century, the Welsh Revival (1904-1905), and fundamentally in early British 
Pentecostalism (1907-1914). These two aspects of ‘context’ and ‘roots’ are important in 
shedding light on why the Elim argument emerged in the first place, whose argument(s) did 
Elim adopt and adapt, against who was the Elim argument directed, and what rational 
resources were available for Elim within the existing religious climate.    
 
3.1. The Pre-Pentecostal Religious Context: Modernity, Religious Pluralism and 
Secularisation 
The Victorian era was a period of significant religious change in Britain, as an increasingly 
modernising Britain moved from a dominant form of Christian faith to religious pluralism and 
secularisation.
3
 In other words, the long held hegemony of the Church of England in society 
                                                 
3
 Modernity is defined with Peter Berger ‘as the changes brought about by the science and the technology created 
in the last few centuries;’ Peter L. Berger, The Many Altars of Modernity: Towards a Paradigm for Religion in a 
Pluralist Age (Boston, MA: De Gruyter, 2014), 5; Religious pluralism is understood in David Martin’s terms as 
‘voluntaristic pluralism;’ that is, ‘open competition of life-worlds and styles, each with a stall – more or less 
centrally placed – in the supermarket of beliefs’; David Martin, On Secularization: Towards A Revised General 
Theory (Farnham: Ashgate: 2005), 157. Secularisation, on the other hand, is seen as (1) the decline of religious 
influence in the common institutions of society and (2) the decline of religious beliefs and practices among 
individuals. This definition of secularisation reflects Charles Taylor’s first two definitions of secular. Taylor’s 
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was now being challenged and different religious, as well as non-religious, alternatives were 
becoming real ‘live options.’ As noted by Hugh McLeod, there does not appear to have been 
one ‘master-factor’ to explain these unprecedented religious changes, but a number of factors 
played their part.
4
 Therefore, to set the general context for the arrival of British 
Pentecostalism in 1907 and Elim in 1915, I will briefly note some of the social, philosophical 
and theological factors that contributed to the transformation of the religious landscape in 
Britain during the nineteenth and early twentieth century.
5
 
   
3.1.1. Social Context: Increasing Pluralism 
Although my focus in chapters four to six is to narrate Elim’s intellectual history, along 
MacIntyrian lines I maintain that this cannot be adequately done without some 
acknowledgement also of social history, since throughout history there seems to have been a 
mutual interplay between intellectual and social history.
6
 Consequently, I will begin the 
discussion here by identifying some key social changes which appear to have shaped the pre-




                                                                                                                                                        
third and preferred definition of secular in many ways amounts to (religious) pluralism; Taylor, A Secular Age, 
1-3.    
4
 Hugh McLeod, Secularisation in Western Europe, 1848-1914 (London: MacMillan, 2000), 184.   
5
 Cf. William K. Kay, ‘Modernity and the Arrival of Pentecostalism in Britain,’ PS 10, no. 1 (2011): 50-71. 
6
 MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 8. Cf. Owen Chadwick, The Secularization of the European 
Mind in the 19
th
 Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 14; Taylor, Modern Social 
Imaginaries, 63.   
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Modern Agents of Pluralisation: Urbanisation, Rail Network and the Printing Press 
Without a doubt the nineteenth century was a time of radical social change in Britain. Fuelled 
by the agricultural and industrial revolutions the nineteenth century witnessed increasing 
urbanisation of the British population. In 1800 it is estimated that 19.2% of the British 
population lived in towns and cities with over 5,000 inhabitants, whereas in 1900 this figure 
had risen to 67.4%.
7
 Urbanisation implied that vast populations left behind their former 
agricultural lifestyles, family units and religious communities, and started their lives afresh 
with industrial employment, new neighbours and a plurality of religious traditions in their 
new environments. 
 
It has not been uncommon for sociologists and historians to make a direct connection between 
urbanisation and secularisation in Britain.
8
 According to this view as people move from the 
countryside to the city, they simultaneously move from religion to non-religion. However, 
even if there is some historical evidence to support this in Britain and Europe, a direct 
causational link between urbanisation and secularisation is difficult to maintain, not least in 
light of nineteenth and twentieth century American history. For example, Roger Finke has 
demonstrated that unlike in Britain, urbanisation did not lead to decreased but increased 
religiosity in America.
9
 Thus, caution needs to be applied to any simplistic assumptions that 
nineteenth century urbanisation inevitably caused secularisation in Britain. 
                                                 
7
 Paul Bairoch and Gary Goertz, ‘Factors of Urbanisation in the Nineteenth Century Developed Countries: A 
Descriptive and Econometric Analysis,’ US 23 (1986): 288.  
8
 E.g. Alasdair MacIntyre, Secularization and Moral Change (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 11, 14-
15; Chadwick, The Secularization of the European Mind in the 19
th
 Century, 94. This view is also identified but 
challenged by Callum Brown, The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation 1800-2000. 2
nd
 ed. 
(London: Routledge, 2009), 8-9.    
9
 Roger Finke, ‘An Unsecular America,’ in Religion and Modernization, ed. Steve Bruce (Oxford: Oxford 




Nevertheless, urbanisation does seem to trigger an important change within society. The 
sociologist Peter Berger has pointed out that although urbanisation does not necessarily bring 
about secularisation, it does seem to bring about pluralism.
10
 The reason being that cities are 
places where ‘cognitive contamination’ takes place;
11
 that is, urbanisation implies that 
individuals who may have previously lived and worked in predominantly homogenous 
agricultural communities now find themselves in heterogenous urban environments rubbing 
shoulders and sharing views with people of diverse beliefs and practices. According to Berger 
such ‘cognitive contamination,’ which is facilitated by the plurality of beliefs within cities, 
inevitable ‘relativizes’ the beliefs of people.
12
 His rationale is that ‘any extended interaction 
with others who disagree with one’s own view of the world relativizes the latter.’
13
 This 
means, that unlike in a homogenous community, in a pluralist environment it is more difficult 
for any religious denomination to assume a monopoly status or for religious believers to 
simply take their beliefs for granted. Hence, pluralism facilitated by urbanisation births and 




Indeed, in line with Berger’s sociological reasoning, the historian McLeod has proposed that 
the nineteenth century European cities should be seen primarily, not as places of 
                                                 
10
 Peter L. Berger, ‘Religious America, Secular Europe?,’ in Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme and 
Variations, ed. Peter Berger, Grace David and Effie Fokas (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 12.   
11
 Berger, The Many Altars of Modernity, 5.  
12
 Berger, The Many Altars of Modernity, 2. 
13
 Berger, The Many Altars of Modernity, 3. 
14
 Peter Berger, ‘Religious America, Secular Europe?,’ 13. Interestingly Bruce, who is considered to be one of 
the main current advocates of the so-called ‘secularization theory,’ proposes that ‘the greatest damage to religion 
has been caused, not by competing secular ideas, but by the general relativism that supposed that all ideologies 
are equally true (and hence equally false);’ Steve Bruce, God is Dead: Secularization in the West (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 117.    
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secularisation, but as places of religious ‘diversity,’ ‘conflict’ and ‘contest.’
15
 Interestingly, 
unlike in America where the religious pluralism of cities seems to have increased religiosity, 
in Britain it appears to have had the opposite effect. There are potentially a plethora of reasons 
for this difference, and these will not be explored in detail.
16
 Nevertheless, the philosophical 
and theological factors in Britain discussed below may provide some clues (see 3.1.2. and 
3.1.3.). 
 
Pluralisation of beliefs in Victorian Britain, however, was not only aided by urbanisation but 
also by two other fruits of modernity, namely, mass transportation (read: the rail network) and 
mass communication (read: the press).
17
 Between 1829 and 1914 the railroad tracks in Britain 
increased from 51 miles to 20,000 miles, with the ‘“Golden of Age” of construction’ being 
from 1836 to 1870.
18
 The train network in Britain not only changed the landscape, introduced 
the concept of ‘universal time,’ and enabled a quick and affordable form of public 
transportation;
19
 but in doing so it connected individuals, communities and cities which had 
previously been isolated and thus further facilitated pluralism in Britain. 
 
The nineteenth century also saw a proliferation of newspapers in Britain creating ‘mass 
communication for mass consumption.’
20
 In the words of Edward Gitre, ‘the newspaper 
                                                 
15
 Hugh McLeod, ‘Review Essay: Religion in an Urbanizing Europe, c. 1840-1939,’ JUH 39, no. 6 (2013): 1179.  
16
 The jointly authored work by Berger, Davie and Fokas offers various historical, intellectual, institutional and 
social reasons why America and Europe have reacted so differently to modernisation; Peter Berger, Grace Davie 
and Effie Fokas, Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme and Variations (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).  
17
 Berger identifies both the steam engine and the printing press as ‘two powerful agents of modern pluralism;’ 
Berger, The Many Altars of Modernity, 5.  
18
 Edward J. Gitre, ‘The 1904-05 Welsh Revival: Modernization, Technologies, and Techniques of the Self,’ CH 
73, no. 4 (Dec. 2004): 804. 
19
 Gitre, ‘The 1904-05 Welsh Revival,’ 805-810. 
20
 Gitre, ‘The 1904-05 Welsh Revival,’ 821. 
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became the demotic voice of the people, the masses – as opposed to the church or state – able 
to reflect the ever-changing desires, whims, and needs of the imagined community.’
21
 The 
newspapers both reflected and created public opinion, but also exposed ordinary people to 
various ideas and, in doing so, once again increased pluralism in society.        
 
Further Agents of Pluralisation: Liberalisation of Politics and Education 
As well as seeing religious pluralism gaining prominence in British society through 
urbanisation, the rail network and the press, the nineteenth century witnessed liberalism 
facilitating further pluralism in society. The exact cause and effect relationship between 
liberalism and pluralism is difficult to know with certainty. Nevertheless, it is not hard to 
argue that the pluralism identified above made some form of liberalism a necessity for people 
of different views and practices to co-exist peacefully within British society. And once 
liberalism had penetrated some of the main institutions, this allowed for greater pluralism to 
take root in society. The influence of liberalism was keenly felt within both politics and 
education.   
 
In politics there were a number of important changes that undermined the hegemony of the 
Church of England. The Roman Catholic Relief Act in 1829 allowed Roman Catholics to sit 
in the Westminster Parliament, and in 1858 Jews were granted the same privilege. 
                                                 
21
 Gitre, ‘The 1904-05 Welsh Revival,’ 821.  
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Furthermore, the Gladstone’s Government of 1868-1874 attacked other privileges of the 




Similar liberalising changes were seen in education. In 1854 the University of Oxford and in 
1856 the University of Cambridge allowed the admission of non-Anglicans (e.g. Roman 
Catholics, Nonconformists and non-Christians) for its programmes. This was followed by the 





At the other end of the education sector, the Education Act of 1870 was the first piece of 
legislation in Britain stipulating government guided primary education for all. The 
significance of the Education Act is that the newly established state schools were to provide 
non-denominational religious education, unlike the voluntary church schools, and it also 
demonstrates the process of the state beginning to take over services previously provided by 
churches.
24
 Indeed, the years following saw the state and local authorities becoming 




These liberalising effects in politics, education and broader welfare can be seen as causing 
secularisation in Britain, namely, the declining influence of the Church of England on 
                                                 
22
 McLeod, Secularization in Western Europe, 56.   
23
 Universities Test Act 1871, United Kingdom, accessed March 21, 2016, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/34-35/26. 
24
 The 1870 Education Act, United Kingdom, accessed March 21, 2016, http://www.parliament.uk/about/living-
heritage/transformingsociety/livinglearning/school/overview/1870educationact/. 
25
 McLeod, Secularization in Western Europe, 57.   
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important institutions within society. These changes undermined the ancien régime in Britain, 
where the Church (of England) had previously played a central role in all aspects of society, 
by bringing social differentiation; that is, ‘increasing autonomy of the various spheres of 
human activity.’
26
 Politics, education and welfare were no longer necessarily seen through a 
theological lens, but as independent and secular entities.       
 
However, it is worth noting that although the atheist/agnostic John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty 
(1859) became a landmark work on liberalism, a significant force for liberalism in Britain 
during the nineteenth century were the Protestant dissenters who sought to eliminate religious 
privileges of the established Church and establish religious equality.
27
 In fact, to a great extent 
the nineteenth century secularisation of society was not implemented by free-thinkers but by 
Christians, particularly of nonconformist persuasion. Therefore, the changes in politics and 
education were not ‘secular’ in the sense of being anti-religious as such, but ‘secular’ in the 
sense of facilitating the plurality of religious and non-religious beliefs to flourish in society. 
Nevertheless, these social changes increasingly cultivated the ground for the possibility of 
philosophical and religious change.        
 
3.1.2. Philosophical Context: Change in the Conditions of Knowledge 
The seventeenth and eighteenth century Enlightenment with its emphasis on reason, 
empiricism and science changed the ‘intellectual conditions’ of knowledge in Britain.
28
 The 
                                                 
26
 Martin, On Secularization, 123.  
27
 McLeod, Secularization in Western Europe, 105. 
28
 Chadwick, The Secularization of the European Mind in the 19
th
 Century, 144. For works paying particular 
attention to the British Enlightenment see Roy Porter, Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern 
102 
 
influence of the Enlightenment during these centuries, however, was mainly contained among 
the social elite, whereas the nineteenth century saw a proliferation and development of the 
Enlightenment principles among the wider population. As noted by Owen Chadwick, this 
seemed to cultivate religious doubt within society. Chadwick has proposed that the 1840s can 
be characterised as ‘the time of doubts’ vis-à-vis traditional religious beliefs and theological 
methodologies, but as the nineteenth century progressed this mood gathered momentum, 
meaning that by the 1860s Britain had entered ‘the age of Doubt.’
29
 Although Chadwick’s 
identification of the Victorian society first facing ‘doubts’ and then moving to a singular and 
capitalised form of ‘Doubt’ somewhat exaggerates the prominence of religious doubt in the 
late Victorian era,
30
 it does, nevertheless, correctly highlight the change in the expected 





Developments in Science and History: From Common Sense Realism to Scientific 
Empiricism   
Scientific and historical developments both seemed to contribute to this epistemic change. 
Unlike much of the French Enlightenment, the British Enlightenment was not intrinsically 
hostile to organised religion or Christian beliefs.
32
 In fact, up to the mid nineteenth century 
                                                                                                                                                        
World (London: The Penguin Press, 2000); Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Roads to Modernity: The British, French 
and American Enlightenments (London: Vintage Books, 2008).   
29
 Chadwick, The Secularization of the European Mind in the 19
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 See Timothy Larsen, Crisis of Doubt: Honest Faith in Nineteenth-Century England (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008).  
31
 McLeod, Secularisation in Western Europe, 147; James C. Livingston, Religious Thought in the Victorian 
Age: Challenges and Reconceptions (London: Continuum, 2006), 31; David Hempton, Evangelical 
Disenchantment: Nine Portraits of Faith and Doubt (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 2.  
32
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majority of (Evangelical) Christians claimed perfect harmony between scientific knowledge 
and Christian truth. In the words of Bebbington, for them there ‘was no possibility of divorce 
between faith and reason.’
33
 However, the first clear test for this harmony seemed to come 
from geology, which now propounded that the earth was millions of years old and thus 
appeared to oppose a ‘literal’ and ‘common sense’ reading of Genesis.
34
 Charles Darwin’s 
influential works Origin of Species (1859) and Descent of Man (1871) further undermined 
this common (Evangelical) reading of Genesis. Moreover, Darwin’s theory provided an 
explanation for biological life without appealing to teleology and so challenged what had 
previously been seen as a strong argument for the existence of God, and it also raised serious 




However, it was not just the new scientific discoveries that influenced people’s understanding 
of and approach to religion, but the scientific method itself was modified in the nineteenth 
century. In the early nineteenth century the ‘Common Sense Realism’ of Thomas Reid 
combined with the inductive scientific methodology of Francis Bacon was the predominant 
intellectual paradigm, particularly among Evangelicals in Britain.
36
 In other words, along 
Reidian lines it was believed that the world could be experienced and understood directly 
through the innate faculty of ‘Common Sense’ present in all humans; and along Bacon’s 
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 ed. 
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inductive method this understanding was believed to be achieved by (1) examining the 
evidence in question, (2) gathering facts from this examination, and (3) then classifying these 
facts according to a coordinating law/maxim.
37
 The challenge to the Common Sense approach 
is well captured in John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic (1843), which became ‘the definitive 
account of the philosophy of science and social science’ for the remainder of the century.
38
 
Mill’s positivist empiricism undermined both the intuitionist common sense advocated by 
Reid and Baconianism,
39
 as Mill believed that a scientific method should be characterised by 
(1) starting with a range of hypothesis, (2) then examining data that eliminates ‘all hypothesis 
but one,’ and (3) finally concluding that the ‘uneliminated hypothesis is true.’
40
 In other 
words, Mill thought that hypotheses were fundamental to scientific progress,
41
 and that it was 
possible for induction to exceed the simple data of experience.
42
 Thus, the modified approach 
to science and knowledge exemplified by Mill subjected previously assumed common sense 
beliefs to rigorous empiricism and increasingly introduced the concept of hypothesis to 
scientific inquiry, undermining aspects of the naïve realism of Baconianism. 
 
In fact, it seemed that Darwin’s theory of evolution was developed by utilising Mill’s method 
of hypothesis/induction. For example, the Victorian intellectual T. H. Huxley defended 
Darwin’s scientific methodology against its critics – who claimed that it was ‘not inductive 
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enough, not Baconian enough’ – by arguing that Darwin’s method was in line with that of 
Mill and was ‘the only adequate method.’
43
 This debate is significant because it highlights 
that the opponents of Darwin’s theory where not just opposing his conclusions but also his 
methodology; that is, the modified scientific method. Among Darwin’s critics were 
particularly conservative Evangelicals who on the whole still followed the ‘Common Sense’ 
approach. All of this suggests that the scientific debate in the nineteenth century was as much 
about appropriate rationalities, as it was about the actual content of the debates. Indeed, the 
twentieth century disputes between the so-called Liberal and Fundamentalist Christians was 
characterised by these opposing rationalities carried over from the nineteenth century.
44
 This 
is important for not only appropriately understanding the religious disputes of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, but also for locating and making sense of the emerging 
Pentecostal and Elim rationality.     
  
What makes this ‘clash’ of rationalities even more significant is that the ‘new’ scientific 
method was not only utilised in the domain of natural science but was applied to other spheres 
of knowledge in a positivistic manner. The Utilitarian Movement – first articulated by Jeremy 
Bentham and then further developed by John Stuart Mill – is a good example of the new 
empirical principles being put to use for understanding and grounding morality within society. 
Mill is known for praising Bentham ‘for employing a scientific method in morals and 
politics.’
45
 Moreover, T. H. Huxley noted that his own agnosticism regarding religion was 
composed of applying what he saw as the new scientific method to all of human experience, 
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and in doing so he rejected metaphysical speculations and Christian doctrines as either 
unproven or unprovable.
46
 W. K. Clifford took his positivism even a step further by arguing 
that those who failed to apply scientific reasoning to their beliefs were not just mistaken but 
morally culpable. His well-known positivist and evidentialist maxim was: ‘it is wrong always, 




The scientific method was also utilised in the study of history and historical texts, including 
the Bible. Like the natural scientist, the ideal historian and religious scholar was also seen as 
an objective scientific enquirer. Scripture was now to be analysed like any other document, 
which seemed to undermine its authority and divine origins. Moreover, the refusal of 
historical criticism to look beyond natural explanations challenged concepts like providence 
and miracles. This meant that a divide was created between sacred history (the sphere of faith) 
and secular history (the sphere of science), with the latter having epistemic primacy.
48
 The 
apparent locus classicus of this new secular and positivist historical approach was David 
Strauss’ The Life of Jesus (1835) translated from German into English by the ex-Evangelical 
George Elliot (Mary Ann Evans) in 1846. Strauss’ work exemplifies the demythologising 
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Alternatives to Empiricism: Romanticism and Idealism 
However, not all were satisfied with the Enlightenment and Empiricist legacy being applied to 
religious and historical knowledge in a positivist manner. The nineteenth century saw the 
emergence of a new cultural and intellectual mood: Romanticism. Although Romanticism was 
a diverse phenomenon, its essential aspects can be articulated in its reaction against the 
Enlightenment.
49
 Its emphasis was not on argument but experience, not on reason but on 
‘will, spirit and emotion.’
50
 One of its most influential voices, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 
captures the Romantic sentiment well with respect to religion:  
I more than fear the prevailing taste for books on Natural Theology, Physico-Theology, 
Demonstrations of God from Nature, Evidences of Christianity, and the like. Evidences 
of Christianity! I am weary of the word. Make a man feel the want of it; rouse him, if 




For Coleridge Christian belief is based on inner experience and feeling rather than on 
arguments or external evidences. This Romantic emphasis on intuition and experience was 
carried on later in the century by the Oxford Movement,
52
 and especially by its champion 
John Henry Newman who strongly opposed scientific positivism. In his seminal work An 
Essay in Aid of Grammar of Assent (1870), Newman argued that the positivist epistemic 
standards were too narrow for general human beliefs and religious beliefs in particular. British 
Idealism of the late nineteenth century, although different from Coleridge’s romanticism and 
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However, despite the force of the romantic mood in the late nineteenth century British 
philosophy, these sentiments, particularly in the form of British Idealism, were challenged in 
the early twentieth century by realists such as G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell.
54
 In fact, it 
was Russell who emerged as the most influential British philosopher of the twentieth century 




It is worth pointing out at this point that unlike in America where Pragmatism became the 
dominant philosophical movement in replacing Idealism,
56
 in Britain, despite the effort of F. 
C. S. Schiller, this philosophical movement never gained prominence (at least not in the 
academy).
57
 This is noteworthy as I will argue below that in relation to the main Anglo-
American philosophical ‘schools’ of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
Pentecostalism and Elim share many similarities with Pragmatism.     
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In summary, the intellectual context of the nineteenth century can be seen as continuing the 
Enlightenment and British Empiricist legacy, albeit with an increased emphasis on hypothesis 
and positivistic scientific method which began permeating society’s epistemic standards 
regarding all spheres of knowledge, including that of religious knowledge. The ‘new’ 
methods of induction and hypothesis exemplified in the work of J. S. Mill provided a direct 
challenge to Common Sense Realism as the dominant philosophical position. Applying this 
more positivistic methodology to religious beliefs, coupled with Darwinian evolution, also 
raised doubts for many regarding the traditional Christian doctrines. Romanticism in its 
various forms sought to counter scientific positivism and offer an experiential epistemic 
alternative, but its philosophical influence, as least in the form of Idealism, was diminishing 
as the new century dawned. The general significance of the nineteenth century intellectual 
context for religious belief was that whether one was a positivist or romanticist (or indeed 
neither!), it was increasingly difficult to take Christian beliefs for granted because the 
conditions for knowledge had been challenged and changed. As a result, the Victorian 
intellectuals had become ‘religious/philosophical seekers’ in search of justified beliefs.
58
 This 
change had implications for individual believers, as well as their religious institutions.   
 
3.1.3. Theological Context: Evangelical Conversionism and Diversity of Religious 
Options 
It was not, however, simply changes in society and the intellectual environment of the 
Victorian era that facilitated secularisation, plurality of beliefs, and the need for individuals to 
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justify their beliefs and make religious choices accordingly. The Evangelical emphasis on 
genuine Christianity and true conversion also made its contribution.  
 
Evangelical Conversionism 
In the nineteenth century Evangelicalism was a dominant religious force in Britain and its 
theological influence was significant.
59
 In the previous century John Wesley, a founding 
father of British Evangelicalism, had argued that it is possible for an individual to have the 
outward appearance of being a Christian without actually truly being one.
60
 The nineteenth 
century Evangelical tradition shared Wesley’s conviction and reinforced the idea that a 
genuine Christian should not just participate in religious rituals but have a conversion 
experience, which was understood as consisting of a personal decision for Christ, as well as 




These two aspects (i.e. decision and conviction) of the Evangelical conversion paradigm were 
important in shaping people’s religious psyche. First, there was a strong emphasis on 
individual choice. This marked an important shift from the church tradition of the so-called 
ancien régime where one was born into the Church rather than choosing to belong to it. 
Callum Brown states that it was in fact this aspect of choosing that ‘broke the mental chains 
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of the ancien régime in Britain,’ enabling people to see the previously dominant church 




Second, there was an expectation that a real Christian would have a firm conviction of the 
truth of Christianity.
63
 Timothy Larsen points out that a ‘person who had internalized such a 
way of thinking learned that continuing with a life of worship while quietly doubting the 
claims on which it is based was not only of no spiritual benefit but was also a craven thing to 
do.’
64
 In other words, whereas individuals before could quite comfortably remain in the 
Church despite their religious doubts, this was less of an option for the Evangelical doubter. 
Thus, Evangelical conversionism seemed to either push Victorians towards a more committed 
form of (Evangelical) Christianity, or push them out of Christianity altogether.   
 
Charles Taylor has identified Reform as the main cause of Western secularisation. He refers to 
it as the ‘Reform Master Narrative’ of secularisation and summarises it in the following way:  
Reform demanded that everyone be real, 100 percent Christian. Reform not only 
disenchants, but disciplines and re-orders life and society. Along with civility, this 
makes for a notion of moral order which gives a new sense to Christianity, and the 
demands of the faith. This collapses the distances of faith from Christendom. It induces 




Although Taylor’s historical scope is broader than the nineteenth century, the Evangelical 
emphasis to reform Victorian Christianity through the conversion paradigm seems to have had 
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the exact effects identified by Taylor. To put it differently, the Evangelicals articulated new 
‘demands of the faith’, distancing what was perceived to be true Christian faith from nominal 
Christianity of Christendom, and in doing so induced an anthropocentric shift by prioritising 
individual choice. It also polarised these two groups, namely, what it saw as true Christians 
and non-Christians, and thus undermined the monopoly status of the so called ‘Christian faith 
of Britain.’  
 
Whether Evangelicals of the nineteenth century pursuing religious reform were aware of or 
even intended the secularising effects of their conversionist agenda is difficult to know for 
certain.
66
 Nevertheless, it is telling that John Wesley in the eighteenth century predicted that 
something like this would happen when he wrote ‘that in a century or two the people of 
England will be fairly divided into real Deists and real Christians.’
67
 Wesley himself did not 
only predict this but welcomed it, and was personally happy to use sceptical arguments to 




Diversity of Religious Options 
That said, the Victorians of the late nineteenth century should not be simply divided into two 
homogenous ‘religious’ groups; that is, (Evangelical) Christians and non-Christians, or what 
Wesley saw as Christians and Deists. There were, in fact, several ‘religious’ options for both 
Christians and non-Christians.  
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Regarding the latter, McLeod has noted that ‘in the second half of the nineteenth century non-
religious views of the world became a possibility for the mass of the people, rather than only 
for small elite groups.’
69
 Like Christianity these various views offered their own paths to 
‘salvation’ and human fulfilment. McLeod has identified four common non-Christian views 
and/or paths. First, there was ‘salvation by politics alone’ which followed the legacy of the 
French Revolution and was promulgated by ‘republicans,’ ‘radicals,’ ‘nationalists’ and 
‘socialists.’ Second, there was salvation by ‘science’ which saw scientific discoveries and 
technological advances as the harbinger of the golden age of humanity. The third way to 
salvation was through ‘aesthetics’ which advocated art, music and literature as the path for 
true human flourishing. Fourth, there was ‘spiritualism’ which rejected both materialism and 
Christianity, offering a new way between the two.
70
 All of these were seen as viable options, 
and it was not uncommon for people to pick and mix from the above to construct their own 
paths to fulfilment. 
 
In terms of Christian options, Evangelicalism, with its various denominational incarnations, 
was also one option among others. The two most prominent Christian alternatives to 
Evangelicalism were Broad Church Liberalism and Anglo-Catholicism. Both movements, like 
Evangelicalism, were influenced by the contemporaneous general trends identified above, and 
were particularly aware of biblical criticism, the questioning of the plausibility of miracles, 
and scepticism towards orthodox Christian beliefs.         
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The 1860 publication of Essays and Reviews proved to be a seminal work for articulating the 
theology of Broad Church Liberalism.
71
 The seven articles in the work, among other things, 
urged the Bible to be treated like any other book (Benjamin Jowett), seemed to deny the 
possibility of miracles (Baden Bowell), and questioned the nature of Christian doctrines such 
as that of hell (Henry Bristow Wilson). The aim of Essays and Reviews was to modernise 
Christian theology. The work was received with great hostility by many, but as stated by 
Reardon, ‘Essays and Reviews gave liberalism a place in English theology from which it 
could not in future be dislodged and might extend a continuously widening influence.’
72
 
Thirty years later the publication of Lux Mundi (1889) continued this legacy. Its editor 





Indeed, the prevailing theological trend during late nineteenth century was towards a liberal 
stance,
74
 at least from an Evangelical perspective. Essays and Reviews and Lux Mundi argued 
that Christian theology had to reconcile itself with modernity. This had implications for 
traditional Christian views on creation, providence, the Fall, sin, evil and theodicy, miracles, 




However, like Evangelicalism, Anglo-Catholicism especially those aligning themselves with 
the Oxford Movement (i.e. Tractarianism), were critical of the liberal trends in theology. 
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Influenced by Romanticism, the Oxford Movement from 1830s onwards attacked liberalism, 
but unlike Evangelicalism it did not do so by seeking to reassert the Reformation doctrines 
(e.g. authority and primacy of Scripture), but to revive ‘a high doctrine of the church and its 
ministry.’
76
 From 1840s onwards the movement inclined towards Roman Catholicism and at 
the end of 1845 its charismatic leader John Henry Newman joined the Roman Catholic 
Church.
77
 Although the dominance of the Oxford movement declined after Newman’s 
departure, its influence was lasting in emphasising the authority of the Church, holiness, and 
ritualism in worship. The Oxford Movement’s legacy was its ability to reinstate Catholic 
spirituality and theology into British Christianity. 
 
3.1.4. Elim’s Context: An Argument within Modernity 
In discussing some of the social, philosophical and theological trends of the Victorian era I 
have tried to show that the nineteenth century and early twentieth century was a period of 
increasing modernisation, secularisation and pluralisation of beliefs within Britain. This 
trajectory was fuelled by urbanisation, liberalisation of politics and education, Enlightenment 
rationality, scientific positivism, Romanticism, Evangelical conversionism, and the 
emergence of viable Christian and non-Christian options with respect to ‘salvation’ and 
human flourishing. Religious plurality in society meant that it was difficult to take any 
religion or worldview for granted. In the words of Charles Taylor, the ‘conditions of belief’ 
had changed;
78
 implying that adhering to any religion increasingly became a choice and for 
this choice to be justified one had to have reasons, not least when many of the religions and 
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worldviews were in direct competition. However, as the Victorian era reached its twilight 
having reasons for one’s beliefs was not a straightforward task, because there was not just one 
form of rationality available to ground one’s beliefs. Rather, versions of Common Sense 
Realism, Mill’s Scientific Empiricism, Romanticism, Idealism, and the New Realism of 
Moore and Russell were all on offer.       
   
This is the wider social, intellectual and theological context for the emergence of British 
Pentecostalism in 1907 and Elim in 1915. Indeed, it seems difficult to fully understand the 
Elim argument without locating it in this context. Three aspects are particularly noteworthy 
from the discussion above in locating and better appreciating the emerging Pentecostal and 
Elim tradition in Britain. First, in line with the early twentieth century sitz im leben, the 
Pentecostal faith from its inception was a religion of radical choice. That is, Pentecostalism 
was not seen as an inherited faith, but one would actively choose to become a Pentecostal. 
This choice would typically mean having a conversion experience, deciding to get baptised in 
water, and then seeking baptism in the Holy Spirit. As a religion of choice, Pentecostalism 
was very much in line with the spirit of the era.     
 
Second, the decision for Pentecostalism/Elim meant that one would choose what was claimed 
as ‘apostolic faith’ or the ‘Full Gospel.’ As has been argued above, this was not the only 
option in the marketplace of religions, and therefore in choosing Pentecostalism one would 
also explicitly, or at least implicitly, reject the non-religious alternatives, Roman Catholicism, 
liberal Christianity and cessationist forms of Evangelicalism. Consequently, the choice for 
Pentecostal Christianity was shaped also by the decision against its alternatives. Indeed, the 
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very concepts of apostolic faith and the Full Gospel were understood in relation to what it 
stood against in the contemporaneous religious discourse. I will argue in chapter four that the 
Elim argument spearheaded by George Jeffreys was particularly shaped by its antagonism 
against the so-called theological liberals, Christian ritualism and cessationist evangelicals. 
However, it should be added that the Pentecostal and Elim argument against some religious 
traditions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was not an argument per se 
against modernity, even if Pentecostals often saw themselves as opposing aspects of 
modernistic (read: liberal) theologies.  
 
Third, in the context of competing religious and non-religious options, some reasons were 
needed for choosing Pentecostalism over its alternatives. This task was not without 
complexity, as the nineteenth and early twentieth century intellectual environment did not 
simply have one form of rationality but embodied various rationalities. Now the average 
religious seeker was probably not fully cognizant of these various epistemological options, 
but, nevertheless, they were expected to make rational choices in an environment of 
competing rationalities. Thus, the question of justification for religious belief was not merely 
about having ‘good reasons’ but also about having a ‘good rationality.’ Interestingly 
Pentecostalism and Elim would not simply adopt any existing rationality, but developed its 
own rationality and ways of reasoning for accepting and promulgating the Pentecostal faith. 
This Pentecostal/Elim rationality was certainly influenced by the smorgasbord of existing 
rationalities, but as I hope to demonstrate below it cannot simply be equated with a single 
rationality on offer. Therefore, what made British Pentecostalism and Elim unique traditions 
was not just what they believed, but how they justified these beliefs. And their approach to 
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justification of beliefs was very much influenced by contemporary ways of reasoning, and 
thus could be seen as another modern rationality.     
 
In conclusion, the foundations for British Pentecostalism and Elim were provided by the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century social, intellectual and theological environment. This 
was a context of modernisation, pluralisation and secularisation. Although British 
Pentecostalism would react against some aspects of this context, it would be misleading to 
call Pentecostalism in Britain simply a ‘protest against modernity’ and its consequences.
79
 To 
put it simply, the context had changed too drastically for early British Pentecostals to return to 
pre-modernity, and more importantly British Pentecostals were themselves children of 
modernity (e.g. emphasis on choice and ways of reasoning) to be able to fully protest against 
modernity. Perhaps early British Pentecostalism could be called a ‘paramodern’ movement à 
la Kenneth Archer; that is, a movement emerging within modernity and sharing some aspects 
with it, but simultaneously not able to ‘accept Modernity’s worldview completely.’
80
 
However, although Archer’s concept of ‘paramodern’ is insightful, it can also give the wrong 
impression that ‘modernity’ is somehow a uniform concept, which Pentecostalism opposes. 
To avoid this possible misconception, it is better to speak with Berger of ‘multiple 
modernities,’
81
 and to view the emerging British Pentecostalism and Elim as modern religious 
movements with some unique emphases.
82
 Therefore, in light of Elim’s first prologue, namely 
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its social, intellectual and theological context, the emerging Elim movement discussed in the 
next chapter is best seen as a modern religious tradition.   
 
3.2. Holiness, Revival and Pentecostal Roots of Elim 
I have suggested above that in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Britain there were 
effectively three main Christian ‘streams:’ Evangelicalism, Anglo-Catholicism and Broad 
Church Liberalism. Pentecostalism in Britain is best located within the Evangelical stream 
and seen as ‘part of the larger quest for evangelical spirituality.’
83
 Early Pentecostals would 
share many of the theological beliefs, ways of reasoning and religious practices of other 
Evangelicals, even if they were to develop their own distinctives. However, within this 
broader Evangelical framework, it was the radical Evangelicalism of the Holiness Movements 
and the Welsh Revival that were particularly significant in laying the foundations for British 
Pentecostalism.        
 
3.2.1. The Holiness Movements 
Like their American counterparts, early British Pentecostal leaders had deep roots in the 
Holiness movements of the nineteenth century.
84
 For example, the so-called ‘Father of British 
Pentecostalism,’ Alexander Boddy, regularly attended the Keswick Conventions and was also 
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a member of the Pentecostal League of Prayer founded by Richard Reader Harris.
85
 George 
Jeffreys, the founder of Elim, also seemed to have visited the Keswick conventions,
86
 and 
other Elim pioneers, such as, E. J. Phillips,
87
 R. E. Darragh,
88
 and Ernest C. W. Boulton
89
 all 
had strong links with the Holiness traditions.       
  
David Bebbington has identified four main Holiness traditions in nineteenth century England; 
that is, the High Church Tradition, the Calvinist Tradition, the Wesleyan Tradition, and the 
Keswick Tradition.
90
 The High Church tradition, incorporating the Oxford Movement, seems 
to have had little direct influence on British Pentecostalism or Elim, not least due to its 
Anglo-Catholic spirituality and opposition to Evangelicalism.
91
 The Calvinist, Wesleyan and 
Keswick traditions, on the other hand, did have a significant influence on early British 
Pentecostalism. Keswick is particularly important as it can be seen as a ‘synthesis’ of the 
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The Keswick tradition emerged in the summer of 1875 when its first convention was held in 
Keswick at the Lake District.
93
 From inception its focus was on ‘the higher Christian life’ and 
‘sanctification by faith.’
94
 It was the emphasis on sanctification that it held in common with 
the Wesleyan Holiness tradition. However, the Keswick Holiness views were also informed 
by the Reformed Holiness teachings of the Americans Charles Finney, Asa Mahan and 
William E. Boardman, making it more acceptable to Calvinists.
95
 Regarding sanctification, 
the Keswick tradition taught that ‘sin was not eradicated’ but ‘repressed’ by the working of 
the Holy Spirit.
96
 In other words, the experience and process of sanctification for the Keswick 
movement did not imply sin being completely removed from the believer but counteracted by 
the presence of the Holy Spirit. To experience the fullness God’s empowering presence, one 
was encouraged to surrender fully to God (‘let go’) and to place one’s faith completely in 
Him (‘let God’).
97
 For some Wesleyans, like Reader Harris, the emphasis on ‘repression’ of 
sin, rather than its ‘eradication,’ was seen as unbiblical,
98
 but the Keswick emphasis on 
‘higher Christin life,’ sanctification, and the role of the Spirit seemed to be broad enough to 
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Theology and Rationality of Keswick 
The Keswick Movement, as well as the broader Wesleyan and Calvinist holiness traditions, 
was significant in providing theological and rational roots for early British Pentecostalism and 
Elim. In terms of theology, it effectively provided the framework for the Fourfold Gospel 
(Jesus as Saviour, Healer, Baptiser in the Holy Spirit, and coming King), which was to 
become a central tenet for early Pentecostals and, as I will argue in chapter four, the doctrinal 
‘hard core’ for Elim.  
 
In terms of the Fourfold Gospel, the Keswick movement first shared the evangelical emphasis 
on conversion. Second, its focus on sanctification and the need for a deeper Christian 
experience of the Holy Spirit suggested the need for a crisis moment that was subsequent to 
conversion. In fact, Donald Gee notes that thanks to the holiness movements the ‘phrase 
‘Baptism of the Holy Ghost’ began to appear and become familiar in the sense of a real 
spiritual crisis for the Christian subsequent to regeneration.’
100
 This notion of having a 
spiritual experience subsequent to conversion, coupled with the ‘higher life’ teaching that the 
Spirit baptism was not just for personal sanctification but for the purpose of empowerment,
101
 
paved the way for the Pentecostal doctrine of Spirit Baptism.  
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Third, the doctrine of sanctification was also seen by many Keswick and holiness teachers as 
connected to the divine healing of the body.
102
 This emphasis would be carried into the 
Pentecostal movement, for example, Mary Boddy – the wife of Alexader Boddy and a British 
Pentecostal pioneer in her own right – taught a close ‘relation of “full sanctification to Divine 
Life and Healing.”’
103
 Finally, the Keswick tradition advocated premillennialism over 
postmillennialism,
104
 which would become the eschatological position of most Classical 
Pentecostals, including Elim. 
 
In terms of rationality the ‘higher life’ and ‘holiness’ advocates were biblical primitivists 
searching for a deeper spiritual experience. This meant that they saw great value in what they 
believed to be true biblical religious experiences. For example, the influential American 
holiness preacher A. J. Gordon stated that ‘experience is the surest touchstone of truth. It is 
not always infallible [but] this is a kind of testimony which is not easily ruled out of court.’
105
 
And the regular Keswick speaker F. B. Meyer encouraged Christians to move from ‘the realm 
of shadows into that of realities.’
106
 It is thus not surprising that space was given for spiritual 
encounters to take place at the Keswick Conventions and ‘testimonies’ of people who had had 
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Thus, in many ways the rationality of Keswick was ‘Romantic’ in nature; that is, it preferred 
personal experience over argument.
108
 For example, the view of the Romantic ‘Lake Poet’ 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge regarding the importance of experience and feeling in grounding 
true Christianity, over ‘evidences’ and ‘arguments’ (see 3.1.2.),
109
 seemed to have been shared 
by the Keswick movement.  
 
These spiritual experiences at Keswick were primarily seen as individual and inner 
experiences for Christians. In other words, the Keswick Conventions focused on inner 
religious experience, and discouraged ‘emotionalism’ and physical manifestations;
110
 there 
was a dislike for mass meetings and using ‘devices for attracting large crowds;’
111
and the 
purpose of the experience was to renew the Christian, not to convert the unbeliever, even if 




This kind of Keswick rationality characterised by experientialism and testimony would be 
shared by the Welsh Revival, as well as the early Pentecostals. However, both the Welsh 
Revival and Pentecostalism would move beyond the Keswick concept of experience by 
focusing also on external manifestations, facilitating collective spiritual experiences, and not 
limiting religious encounters just to Christians (this will be developed below).  
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In sum, the influence of the holiness ethos, particularly in its Keswick expression, was 
significant for the emergence of early British Pentecostalism and Elim, and it is central for 
understanding their roots. In the words of Malcolm Hathaway:  
The Keswick movement played a seminal role in the origins of the Welsh Revival and 
the Pentecostal movement. It raised the level of spiritual life and commitment in the 
churches, against the wider background of decline caused by higher criticism, 
theological liberalism and the religion-science conflict.
113
  
        
The ‘higher life’ and holiness traditions fitted well into the Victorian sitz im leben. They 
sought true and authentic Christian spirituality, were Romantic in their intellectual mood by 
emphasising spiritual experience over ‘arguments,’ and they opposed the so called liberal 




3.2.2. The Welsh Revival 
The Welsh Revival of 1904-1905 was influenced by ‘the Keswick movement and its holiness 
teaching.’
115
 Like Keswick, the revival at Wales had a significant impact on British and 
worldwide Pentecostalism.
116
 The early American participant-historian of Pentecostalism, 
Frank Bartleman, wrote in 1925 that the Pentecostal movement was ‘rocked in the cradle of 
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 a view shared by his British contemporaries Alexander Boddy, Ernest C. W. 
Boulton and Donald Gee, who all acknowledged the Welsh Revival as one of the main 




Indeed many British Pentecostal pioneers had been personally impacted by the revival. The 
‘father of British Pentecostalism,’ Alexander Boddy, made contact with the Welsh revivalist 
Evan Roberts and visited Tonypandy in South Wales to see the revival. Thomas Ball Barratt, 
who is often acknowledged as bringing Pentecostalism to Europe, was also in contact with 
Roberts and began midday prayer meetings for revival in Norway.
119
 Moreover, some key 
early British Pentecostal leaders were converted through the revival. Daniel Williams, the 
founder of the Apostolic Church, claimed that he was ‘saved’ through the ministry of 
Roberts;
120
 and Donald Gee, the future Assemblies of God statesman, in his own words, 
‘personally accepted Christ as his Saviour’ in a London meeting held by the Welsh revivalist 
Seth Joshua.
121
 Of particular significance to Elim is that George Jeffreys and his older brother 
Stephen were both converted during the revival in Wales.
122
 With respect to George Jeffreys, 
Andrew Walker and Neil Hudson have persuasively argued that the Welsh Revival was not 
only the place of his conversion but also became the benchmark for what Pentecostalism 
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 a position further supported by Noel Brooks who was an associate of 
Jeffreys.
124
 In this sense George Jeffreys and other Pentecostal pioneers were truly ‘children 
of the Welsh Revival.’  
 
The Welsh Revival can be seen to have lasted from the autumn of 1904 to the summer of 
1905, although there were reports of spiritual awakening in Wales from 1903 onwards.
125
 The 
revival was facilitated by a band of revivalists, including Seth Joshua, Joseph Jenkins and 
most notably Evan Roberts.
126
 During the revival there were 32,000 to 100,000 converts and 
many more attended meetings claiming spiritual renewal.
127
 It began in South Wales but 




One key aspect of the Welsh Revival, as stated by Edward J. Gitre, is that it was arguably ‘the 
first distinctly modern religious revival.’
129
 Its local and global effect was partly enabled by 
modern developments of ‘mass communication and mass public transportation.’
130
 In other 
words, the press spread the news of the revival like ‘wildfire’ and the British rail network 
enabled ordinary people to come and experience the ‘revival fire’ for themselves. These tools 
of modernity would also be utilised by British Pentecostals later on to further their cause.  
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Theology and Rationality of the Welsh Revival  
The main significance of the Welsh Revival for Pentecostals was not its theology as such – 
although on the whole it reaffirmed the Evangelical theology of Keswick – but (1) its ethos 
and rationality, and (2) its non-institutional nature. Regarding the first, the Welsh Revival 
shared the underlying Romantic rationality of the Keswick movement which emphasised 
religious experience over arguments. However, the Welsh Revival also developed and 
modified the Keswick concept of religious experience from an internal and individualistic 
encounter of God for Christians, to an emotional, spontaneous, and collective divine 
encounter accompanied by external manifestations to be experienced by both believers and 
sceptics alike.  
 
To put it differently, the Welsh Revival meetings were characterised by emotionalism and 
informality, commonly channelled through spontaneous music and corporate prayer.
131
 
Roberts himself was an exemplar of spontaneity as he sought direct guidance of the Holy 
Spirit in the meetings and did not necessarily prepare beforehand what he would say or do.
132
 
The meetings also tended to be democratic in nature where members of the congregations, 
who had previously often been marginalised (e.g. women and young people), were given 
freedom to contribute in their own way and contrary to the traditional patterns of the Welsh 
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 There is also some evidence of charismata, like glossolalia, 




Moreover, the spiritual experience was not just to renew existing Christians but also to 
convert the sceptics. S. B. Shaw’s reporting in 1905 of the revival highlights stories of 
agnostics and atheists converting to Christianity.
135
 The story of Tom Hughes is his primary 
example where a sceptic who was a member of the ‘Ethical Society’ was not converted to 
Christianity through arguments but by both witnessing and experiencing something in the 
revival meetings. These encounters caused Hughes to not only convert but also burn his 
books, which supposedly advocated non-Christian sentiments. The moral of Shaw’s story 
about the conversion of Hughes seems to be that no arguments were needed to win the 
sceptic, only a deep spiritual experience. This experience was sufficient to refute and win over 
the cynic to the Christian faith.
136
 Indeed, this was seen as the answer for re-converting what 
was seen as ‘backsliding’ Britain.
137
      
 
These characteristics – particularly emotionalism, informality, spiritual manifestations, and 
evangelistic emphasis – made the Welsh Revival different from Keswick, which was 
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significantly more reserved in its ethos and spirituality.
138
 This revivalist ethos would be later 
emulated by Pentecostals, even if some of the excesses of the Welsh Revival witnessed by 




Second, despite the immediate ‘successes’ of the Welsh Revival, its long term potential did 
not seem to be fully realised. Roberts did not appear to have a clear ecclesiology and the 
leaders of revival did not make an effort to strategically organise its results.
140
 The new 
converts were welcomed into the existing Nonconformist churches, but these churches did not 
seek to reform their liturgical practices to accommodate the revivalist spirituality of their new 
converts but simply continued with their traditional approaches to Christian worship. Robert 
Pope sees this failure to reform as the great mistake of the Welsh Nonconformist churches and 
the possible cause of its twentieth century decline.
141
 It is not hard to argue that the 
Pentecostal denominational leaders, many of who themselves were ‘children of the revival,’ 
did not want to find their revival in a similar predicament where either due to a lack of 
ecclesial structure people would fall away, or due to existing rigid ecclesial structures the 
momentum of Pentecostalism would be lost. Consequently, many Pentecostal leaders sought 
to create new church structures with the aim of avoiding both of these pitfalls and to provide 
institutions for the Pentecostal experience to flourish.
142
 In this sense, the Welsh Revival was 
not just an influence for British Pentecostalism in what it achieved, but also in what it failed 
to achieve. 
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In sum, the Welsh Revival set a model of spiritual renewal for the early Pentecostals. Like the 
Keswick Movement, its emphasis on spiritual experience and holiness motifs would be shared 
by the early Pentecostals. However, more so than the Keswick Movement, it was its ability to 
facilitate spiritual encounters for the masses with spiritual manifestations that left a lasting 
impression on the Pentecostal pioneers, particularly George Jeffreys. It was this aspect of 
spiritual experiences with external signs on a large scale that provided the spiritual, 
theological and rational resources for the emerging British Pentecostals. And it was the 
seeming failure of the Welsh Non-conformist churches to reap the full benefits of the revival 
that may have motivated some early Pentecostal pioneers to form new Pentecostal 
denominations.     
 
3.2.3. British Pentecostalism 
By 1907 Britain seemed to be ready for the emergence of Pentecostalism. The underlying 
context of increasing religious pluralism and secularisation of society, the theology and 
spiritualty of the Holiness Movements, and the revivalist experientialism and hunger 
generated by the Welsh Revival, provided a fertile ground for the emergence and spreading of 
Pentecostalism in Britain. Donald Dayton, writing about the birth of Pentecostalism in USA, 
notes that the ‘higher Christian life’ and Holiness movements with their emphasis on 
salvation, baptism in the Spirit, divine healing and the second coming functioned as ‘a sort of 
pre-Pentecostal tinderbox awaiting the spark that would set it off.’
143
 He goes on to point out 
that when Pentecostalism did finally emerge, the leaders within the Holiness movement 
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‘recognized that it was only the gift of tongues that set it apart from their own teachings.’
144
 A 
similar comment can be said of British Pentecostalism; that is, the Holiness movement(s) and 
the Welsh Revival provided the theological framework, spiritual expectation and rational 
resources for the Pentecostal renewal; and like in America it seemed to be glossolalia that was 
mainly condemned by the British Pentecostals’ Holiness counterparts.
145
 However, I will 
argue that it was not just the theology of glossolalia that was the difference between the early 
Pentecostals and their holiness predecessors, but the rationality that accompanied this 
doctrine.  
 
Los Angeles, Barratt and Boddy 
The question of Pentecostal origins has been widely debated by scholars. For example, was 
there a single origin (monogenesis) or multiple origins (polygenesis) for the global 
movement?
146
 Moreover, if there was a single origin, was it Topeka with Charles Fox Parham 
or Los Angeles with William Seymour?
147
 My aim is not to discuss the global origins of 
Pentecostalism as such, but rather to focus on the origins of British Pentecostalism in as much 
as it is relevant for understanding Elim. As has already been argued, the emergence of British 
Pentecostalism can only be understood in the context of the broader British religious context, 
the Holiness movements and the Welsh Revival. However, the American Pentecostal 
influence on British Pentecostalism cannot be ignored. Cornelis van der Laan has 
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demonstrated from early British Pentecostal periodicals that in self-identifying the origins of 
the British Pentecostalism ‘Azusa Street plays a very important role as the place where the 
fire first fell and from where it spread over the world,’ whereas ‘the Topeka event and Parham 
are completely absent.’
 148
 For example, in early Elim Evangels Thomas E. Hackett refers to 
April 1906 and Los Angeles as the place where the Pentecostal ‘movement commenced,’
149
 





This link with Los Angeles for British Pentecostalism was largely created by three influential 
British Pentecostal pioneers: Thomas Ball Barratt, Alexander Boddy and Cecill Polhill. While 
visiting America and residing in New York at A. B. Simpson’s ‘Missionary Home,’ Barratt 
heard of the Azusa Street revival taking place in Los Angeles. Inspired by the Azusa events, 
in October 1906 Barratt had a profound religious experience which was then followed by 
‘speaking in tongues’ in November 1906.
151
 When Barratt returned to Norway, he began 
preaching the Pentecostal message and holding revival meetings in Oslo. 
 
Boddy received news of the events taking place at Azusa Street and also of the Oslo meetings 
under Barratt’s leadership. Encouraged by what he heard, he visited Barratt in Oslo in March 
1907 for four days.
152
 According to Boddy’s own reflection of his time in Christiania (Oslo), 
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‘the presence and power of God were even beyond that of the meetings in Wales... [and] in 
one meeting... [I] received a blessed and wonderful ‘Baptism’ of the Holy Ghost.’
153
 He was 
clearly impressed with what he witnessed and experienced in Oslo, and when he returned to 
England be began advocating the Pentecostal message, including speaking in tongues. Boddy 
also invited Barratt to visit Sunderland and it was at the end of August 1907 that Barratt 
finally arrived at Sunderland. At Sunderland Barratt held a number of revival meetings with 
the result of many receiving Baptism in the Spirit accompanied with speaking in tongues.
154
 
Although these were not the first instances of individuals experiencing Baptism in the Spirit 
understood through a Pentecostal lens in Britain,
155
 they seemed to be the first occasion where 
collective speaking in tongues took place.
156
 In fact, Donald Gee referred to Barratt’s 





That said, Boddy’s influence on British Pentecostalism and Sunderland’s significance as the 
early centre of the emerging movement was not just down to Barratt’s visit.
158
 From 1908 to 
1914 annual Pentecostal conferences were conducted by Boddy at Sunderland and from 1908 
to 1926 Boddy also edited the Confidence magazine. Both of these proved to be formative for 
British Pentecostal practice and theology.
159
 In fact, when it comes to Elim it was at the 
Sunderland convention in 1913 where George Jeffreys was first introduced to William 
                                                 
153
 Boddy, ‘The Pentecostal Movement,’ 194. 
154
 Wakefield, Alexander Boddy, 84-89. 
155
 Catherine Price of Brixton (London) spoke in tongues in January 1907 and is credited as the first person in 
Britain to speak in tongues in the twentieth century; Neil Hudson, ‘The Earliest Days of British Pentecostalism,’ 
JEPTA 21, no. 1 (2001): 52.   
156
 William K. Kay, ‘Sunderland’s Legacy in New Denominations,’ JEPTA 28, no. 2 (2008): 193. 
157
 Gee, The Pentecostal Movement, 24.  
158
 For analysis of other important ‘centres’ of British Pentecostalism see Walsh, To Meet and Satisfy a Very 
Hungry People.  
159
 Kay, ‘Sunderland’s Legacy in New Denominations,’ 193-196. Hudson, ‘The Earliest Days of British 
Pentecostalism,’ 66-67.  
135 
 
Gillespie, who subsequently invited Jeffreys to Ireland leading to the birth of Elim in 1915.
160
 
Moreover, the Pentecostal Missionary Union (PMU) was founded in 1909 with Boddy’s close 
associate Cecil Polhill as its President (who himself had received the Pentecostal experience 
at Azusa in February 1908),
161
 and Boddy as the editorial secretary.
162
 The PMU was pivotal 
in training many early British Pentecostal pioneers, such as, Elim’s George Jeffreys and E. J. 
Phillips.
163
 The formation of the PMU also meant that British Pentecostalism under the 
leadership of Boddy and Polhill, would travel overseas with the organisation’s missionaries. 
 
Theology and Rationality of Early British Pentecostalism 
As has already been suggested, the early British Pentecostals shared the fourfold/fivefold 
doctrinal emphasis common in the Holiness movement. Indeed, Mark Cartledge has argued 
that the early Pentecostal theology of the Confidence magazine was very much characterised 
by the fourfold/fivefold framework, despite the actual absence of the phrases ‘Fourfold-
Gospel’ or ‘Fivefold-Gospel.’
164
 Cartledge’s conclusion is supported by the early issues of 
Confidence, where the themes of Jesus as saviour, sanctifier, healer, baptiser in the Spirit and 
coming King are common topics of discussion.
165
 Furthermore, the programme of the first 
‘Whitsuntide Conference’ held at Sunderland in June 1908 highlights the centrality of the 
Fourfold Gospel for the emerging British Pentecostalism. In other words, there are three 
themed sessions for the Conference which cover three of the four aspects of the Fourfold 
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Gospel; that is, there is a session on (1) ‘‘Tongues’ as a Sign of ‘Pentecost’;’ (2) ‘The Coming 
of the Lord;’ and (3) ‘Divine Life – Health and Healing in Christ.’
166
 Boddy’s own reflective 
conclusion on the Sunderland Conference further affirms the importance of the Christocentric 
Fourfold/Fivefold Gospel. He writes:  
Glory to God! Souls are being saved and sanctified, bodies healed, demons cast out, 
and the Holy Ghost poured out ‘as at the beginning,’ but far above all ‘we see Jesus,’ 
and His Love is flooding our own souls, and in our gathering of 1908 we felt that we 
were knit together by a love that burst all bonds of Church organization and social 




The distinctive feature of the British Pentecostal movement vis-à-vis the wider British 
Holiness fraternity, is the emphasis on receiving ‘Pentecost’ or ‘Baptism in the Holy Spirit’ 
with tongues as the evidence. Boddy notes in his first editorial of Confidence that the 
magazine could have legitimately been called ‘Pentecost with signs,’
168
 and interestingly 
those coming to the first Sunderland Conference are expected to sign a declaration stating: ‘I 
declare that I am in full sympathy with those who are seeking “Pentecost” with the Sign of the 
Tongues. I also undertake to accept the ruling of the chairman.’
169
 This declaration 
underscores both the centrality of glossolalia as the sign and also the seeming opposition from 
some (presumably from the holiness traditions), who may have wanted to attend the first 
British Pentecostal Conference. This same sentiment is reflected in one of the first British 
Pentecostal theological statements, namely, the ‘London Declaration’ on ‘The Baptism in the 
Holy Ghost’ – signed in November 1909 by prominent Pentecostal leaders – which starts by 
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stating that ‘THE “PROMISE OF THE FATHER” (Acts i., 4) was, and is, evidenced by the 




The significance of the ‘Sign of the Tongues,’ however, is not just in emphasising the 
importance of ‘tongues’ within early Pentecostal theology, but in the actual need to have a 
‘sign.’ In other words, there appears to be an ‘experiential’ and ‘evidentialist’ dimension in 
the rationality of the emerging Pentecostals. To put it differently, Pentecostals needed to have 
evidence for their encounter with God, and a genuine spiritual experience for them needed to 
be supported by external evidence, namely, ‘tongues.’ In fact, the common synonym for the 
word ‘sign’ on the pages of Confidence is ‘scriptural evidence(s).’
171
 Consequently, it seems 
that the rationality of early Pentecostalism could be categorised as a form of biblical and 
experiential evidentialism. 
 
Indeed, Kenneth Archer, William Oliverio and Bradford McCall have noted that early 
American Pentecostalism affirmed both the authority of ‘Scripture’ and ‘experience.’
172
 In the 
words of Oliverio, ‘the Protestant Christian Scriptures were the sole ultimate authority for 
Christian belief and living which functioned dialogically with the religious and general 
experiences of early Pentecostals to form a theological understanding of their world.’
173
 This 
dual emphasis on the ‘Bible’ and ‘experience’ was also strongly present in the British 
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Reappropriation of Baconian Common Sense Realism in Renewal Hermeneutics,’ 228. 
173
 Oliverio, Theological Hermeneutics, 31. 
138 
 
Pentecostal psyche, and it is what makes them different from the early twentieth century 
Protestant Liberals, who primarily emphasised (inner) experience, and Protestant 
Fundamentalist, who primarily emphasised the Scriptures. Pentecostals focused on both 
experience and scripture and thus in the words of Nancey Murphy would hold a ‘middle 




Nevertheless, Pentecostals in both America and Britain did not simply understand experience 
as an inner spiritual matter of the heart, but as an external spiritual manifestation with visible 
evidences along biblical lines. This kind of biblical and experiential evidentialism is 
interesting in the light of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century intellectual context 
discussed above. The Pentecostal logic seems to be, perhaps somewhat ironically, a 
combination of Coleridge’s Romanticism of ‘experience over arguments’ and Clifford’s 
Evidentialism of ‘it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon 
insufficient evidence.’
175
 In combining Romanticism and Evidentialism Pentecostalism shows 
developments from the Keswick and Welsh Revival understandings of what is deemed as an 
authoritative spiritual experience. At the risk of oversimplification, the Keswick emphasis 
appears to have been on personal inner spiritual experience in line with the Romantic mood. 
The Welsh Revival develops this inner Keswickian experience by intensifying it in the 
context of revival meetings, and starts to show some ‘signs’ of external spiritual 
manifestations. The Pentecostal movement then further moves from the ‘inner’ to the ‘outer’ 
aspects of experience by now articulating the need for there to be specific and verifiable 
evidence for one’s encounter with God. Boddy himself suggests that there is a difference 
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between the Keswick and the Pentecostal Movement possibly along the lines I have 
suggested. In his words: ‘Many of us thank God for Keswick in the past... [but we] feel that 





Therefore, the Pentecostal distinctive with respect to the Holiness movements and the Welsh 
Revival is not only the theology of ‘tongues,’ but the Pentecostal movement also 
demonstrates a unique element within its rationality. It takes on the Romantic experientialism 
of Keswick and adds an element of external verification to it. To put it simply, Pentecostalism 
is Keswick Romanticism ‘baptised’ with Evidentialism.
177
 This Evidentialism, however, is not 
simply aligned to Mill’s new scientific method or simply a retreat to Baconian Common 
Sense philosophy. It does carry elements of both, particularly the latter,
178
 but it also offers its 
own nascent rationality of biblical pragmatism which Elim would adopt and develop, as will 
be argued in the next chapter. 
 
3.2.4. Elim’s Roots: From Keswick ‘Romanticism’ to Pentecostal ‘Evidentialism’ 
The purpose of this chapter has been to outline the ‘prologues’ to the Elim tradition. In doing 
so, the first part has explored the social, philosophical and theological context within which 
British Pentecostalism and Elim emerged, and this second section has identified the roots 
which nourished British Pentecostalism and Elim to life. Regarding the roots, I have argued 
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that British Pentecostalism is best seen within the tradition of British Evangelicalism with 
more direct theological and rational links to the nineteenth century Holiness traditions 
(particularly Keswick) and the early twentieth century Welsh Revival. The theology of early 
Pentecostals in Britain was on the whole Evangelical with an emphasis on the Four/Fivefold 
Gospel that had been largely inherited from Keswick and the Welsh Revival. The main 
theological difference between early British Pentecostals and their holiness ancestors was the 
Pentecostal emphasis on Spirit Baptism with the ‘sign of tongues.’ However, as I have tried to 
demonstrate, an important distinction between early Pentecostals and the holiness fraternity 
was not just on the ‘theology of tongues,’ but on the underlying rationality at work within this 
doctrine. In other words, Pentecostals took the Romantic experientialism of Keswick, which 
had been externalised in the Welsh Revival, and ‘baptised it in Evidentialism’ by demanding 
‘evidences’ and ‘signs’ for the validity of one’s Spirit baptism. It was this move that gave 
Pentecostals their distinct theological emphasis and unique rationality. Elim, as a British 
Pentecostal tradition, would go on to embody and develop this innovation. 
 
The next chapter will move from Elim’s context and roots to focusing explicitly on Elim. 
However, as noted by MacIntyre, we are all ‘born with a past,’
179
 and thus we can only make 
sense of the emerging Elim argument if we understand its pre-history. In sum, Elim was 
birthed in the context of modernity and its early nourishment was from Keswick, Welsh 
Revival and nascent British Pentecostalism as it went on to argue its own case.  
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CHAPTER 4 – THE BIRTH OF ELIM: THE EARLY OPPONENTS, CONTENT, 
RATIONALITY AND EMBODIMENT OF THE ELIM ARGUMENT 
 
In the previous chapter I identified the ‘prologues’ to the Elim tradition by first outlining its 
broader social, philosophical and theological context, and then narrating its theological and 
intellectual roots within Keswick, the Welsh Revival and British Pentecostalism. Shaped by 
this wider context and firmly rooted in the British Pentecostal heritage, Elim emerged as a 
movement in 7
th
 January 1915. Elim’s initial 18 years (1915-1933) can be seen along 
MacIntyrian lines as the first stage in the formation of the Elim tradition and thus 




To identify the essence of the emerging Elim argument, I will utilise the methodology 
presented in chapter two by first discussing Elim’s implied opponents. Second, I will seek to 
discern exactly what the Elim movement was arguing for, with particular emphasis on its 
early theological hard core and auxiliary hypotheses. Third, I will explore how Elim in its 
early days sought to proceed with this argument; that is, what was the movement’s tacit 
rationality? And finally I will explore the social embodiment of the argument. 
 
The primary sources used in this chapter are Elim Evangel (the authorised Elim periodical 
depicting the views of the movement to its own adherents and other interested parties), Elim 
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books and pamphlets (particularly those written by George Jeffreys), letter correspondence, 
and Elim’s early constitutional and doctrinal documents.    
 
4.1. The Implied Opponents of the Elim Argument 
When the Elim argument entered the British religious scene it quickly articulated both what it 
stood for and also what it stood against. In Elim’s first official statement of beliefs, the 
movement is presented as ‘earnestly contending for the Faith which once was delivered to the 
saints’ (Jude 3) in a ‘Laodicean age of apostasy’ that was making the Church ‘powerless to 
cope with the sin and unbelief which is overwhelming in the world in the present age.’
2
 For 
Elim this purported ‘apostasy’ seems to have been caused by three trends within early 
twentieth century Western Christianity, namely, (1) liberalism (often equated with 
‘Modernism’) with its ‘Higher Criticism’ and ‘New Theology;’ (2) cessationism regarding the 
supernatural gifts of the Holy Spirt in the current dispensation; and (3) ritualism which was 
seen as a distraction from the true essence of Christianity. It was against these three opponents 
that Elim directed its argument. 
 
4.1.1. Contending Against Liberalism 
As discussed in the previous chapter (see particularly 3.1.2. and 3.1.3.), in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century religious scepticism and theological liberalism was on the rise in 
Britain. Russell Spittler has noted that classical Pentecostalism as a whole, just like 
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Fundamentalism and Neo-Orthodoxy, can be seen as reacting against this liberal trend within 
European and American Christianity.
3
 This seems to be true also for Elim, as from its 
inception it opposed theological liberalism,
4
 and from May 1931 onwards the Elim Evangel 
explicitly identified on its first page that the Elim ‘Movement stands uncompromisingly for 
the whole Bible as the inspired word of God and contends for THE FAITH against modern 




Elim seemed to have three major concerns with so-called ‘modern thought.’ Firstly, along 
with Higher Criticism, it appeared to challenge the divine authority of the Bible. George 
Jeffreys lamented that ‘it was considered a terrible thing a few years ago for a person to 
openly condemn the Scriptures,’ but today the ‘Bible as the inspired word of God is 
disputed.’
6
 This ‘disputing’ of the Bible’s divine authority was seemingly carried out by the 
Higher Critics in undermining Moses’ authorship of the Pentateuch, questioning the 
historicity of Noah’s Flood, and attempts to reconcile Darwinian evolution with Genesis 1-2.
7
 
Secondly, the Modernists rejected the miraculous nature of the Christian faith as understood 
by Elim. Indeed, the anti-supernaturalism of the Higher Critics was believed to be a major 
reason for them not accepting the (full) divine inspiration of Scripture.
8
 Thirdly, in denying 
the supernatural aspects of Christianity the New Theologians were believed to be 
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inappropriately rewriting orthodox doctrines by rejecting Christ’s divine incarnation, 




Elim was resolute in its attack against these liberal trends; not least as the Modernist approach 
to the Bible and Christian beliefs was argued to originate from the ‘devil... the Father of lies’ 
who was believed to be the ‘first Higher Critic’ in questioning the truthfulness of God’s 
words.
10
 Writing in 1923 George Jeffreys went as far as to suggest that ‘if Germany, with the 
other nations, had rejected the poison of New Theology and Higher Criticism, they would 
have escaped the awful judgments that were now falling upon them.’
11
 Consequently, Elim’s 
opposition to theological liberalism was not just based on the latter disputing the authority of 
the Bible, rejecting supernaturalism and undermining orthodox Christian doctrines, but on the 
conviction that these beliefs emanated from ‘the devil’ and thus in due course would receive 
divine punishment.   
 
So does this opposition to ‘Modernism’ make Elim effectively a Fundamentalist Movement? 
Elim certainly rejected liberal theology with the vehemence of the Fundamentalists.
12
 
Moreover, Elim shared many of the same religious roots with the Fundamentalists in the 
Holiness Traditions, and also held a number of similar theological convictions, with particular 
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emphasis on the authority of the Bible and the second coming of Christ.
13
 Indeed, the Elim 
Movement was quite happy to be associated with Fundamentalism,
14
 and George Jeffreys 
together with the Fundamentalist Professor J. Robertson were even visualised by Elim 




Nevertheless, there were also significant differences between Elim and Fundamentalism with 
respect to their rationality and theology. Regarding rationality, the Fundamentalists 
effectively followed Baconian Common Sense approach,
16
 whereas Elim would adopt a 
Pentecostal type experiential/pragmatic rationality (this will be developed in 4.3.). In terms of 
theology, the Fundamentalists embraced a more cessationist view regarding the gifts of the 
Spirit, whereas Elim promulgated what it saw as the ‘Full Gospel’ (this will be developed in 
4.2.). It was these types of theological differences (grounded in differing rationalities) that 
appeared to lead to the 1928 condemnation of Pentecostals by the World’s Christian 
Fundamentals Association,
17
 and also what made many of the Fundamentalists Elim’s second 
implied opponents.            
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4.1.2. Contending Against Fundamentalist Cessationism 
George Jeffreys claimed that by contending for the miraculous Gospel, Elim was not just 
against the ‘higher critic,’ but also what he called the ‘lower critic.’ According to Jeffreys, 
The lower critic is the one who unreservedly accepts the Bible as the inspired Word of 
God, but who endeavours to shew from its pages that we are not living in the days of 
miracles. If he cannot succeed in proving that the miraculous was withdrawn at the end 
of the apostolic days, he attempts to postpone the supernatural element to a future 
millennium... the lower critic is the most inconsistent with his own standpoint, and 
indeed presents a pitiable sight. He starts off by declaring his absolute faith in a 
present-day miraculous Bible with all its commands and promises, and then argues that 
miracles are not for the present age... While professing to believe in a supernatural 




Elim’s criticism of the ‘lower critic’ was partly a reaction to the lower critics’ opposition to 
Elim’s belief in present day miracles. Indeed, ever since the Pentecostal movement emerged 
in Britain it was heavily criticised, particularly by the Holiness fraternity.
19
 Desmond 
Cartwright insightfully points out that in 1907-1913 the opposition towards Pentecostalism 
was mainly with respect to ‘speaking in tongues,’ but by the 1920s the criticism had shifted to 
the Pentecostal practice and theology of ‘divine healing.’
20
 George Jeffreys was a healing 
evangelist reaching increasing influence in the 1920s and thus it was this rejection of ‘divine 
healing’ (read: miracles) by certain Evangelical groups that was a major concern for Jeffreys 
and Elim. 
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That said, Elim did accept some criticism against the ‘experiential excesses’ of certain 
Pentecostals. To this effect Elim identified itself as a movement that ‘condemns 
extravagances and fanaticism in every shape and form.’
21
 Nevertheless, Elim saw itself as 
promulgating ‘the old time Gospel in old time power.’
22
 Therefore, it was the assumption of 
the cessationists that the gifts of the Holy Spirit had been withdrawn, not their criticism of 
experiential fanaticism, that Elim contended against.
23
     
     
4.1.3. Contending Against Ritualism 
As well as directing its argument against the ‘higher critics’ and the ‘lower critics,’ Elim was 
also opposed to ‘ritualism.’ George Jeffreys maintained that ‘in some quarters, even if they 
claim to believe the old truths [the orthodox Christian beliefs, including miracles], they are 
lost to sight behind the rituals of crucifixes, vestments, masses, confessionals.’
24
 The main 
perceived problem with the Roman Catholic Church, as well as Anglo-Catholicism, was its 
ritualism, which was seen as a barrier for experiencing the Full Gospel.
25
 For example, when 
George and Stephen Jeffreys visited Rome in 1922 they said that they ‘saw great Church 
buildings which were like prison houses, altars, statutes, vestments and everything the carnal 
mind could devise to in order to obscure the light of the Gospel.’
26
 And when the Elim Bible 
College was opened in 1925, Boulton contrasts how a building that had previously been a 
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Roman Catholic Convent characterised by ‘bitterness’ and ‘medieval monasticism’ was now 




4.2. The Content of the Elim Argument: The Foursquare Gospel 
The response of Elim to liberalism, cessationism and ritualism was the promulgation of the 
‘Full Gospel.’ Hence, when the Elim Evangelistic Band was formed by George Jeffreys and 
six others in Monaghan, Ireland, on 7
th
 January 1915, the minutes of the instituting meeting 
indicate that the purpose of the new movement was to reach ‘Ireland with the Full Gospel on 
Pentecostal lines.’
28
 So what exactly was this Pentecostal Full Gospel? Or to put it differently, 
what was the content of the Elim argument? 
 
4.2.1. What We Believe (1916) 
The first official articulation of the Full Gospel was published in January 1916 under the title 
Elim Christ Church: What We Believe,
29
 although Jeffreys seems to have been working on the 
booklet since August 1915. This doctrinal document is not so much a statement of faith as a 
statement of distinctives.
30
 In other words, there is no real discussion on general doctrines 
found in traditional Christian creeds with which Elim concurred, but the focus is primarily on 
the differences from other Christian traditions, not least cessationist evangelicalism and 
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modernist liberalism. Nevertheless, it does provide an early explanation of the Full Gospel as 
perceived by Elim.   
 
The document begins by underscoring that Elim is advocating the ‘faith which was once 
delivered to the saints’ (Jude 3), with particular emphasis on the faith’s supernatural and 
spiritual elements.
31
 Thus, the Full Gospel was not seen by Elim as a new invention, unlike 
the New Theology of liberalism, but it was understood as the orthodox truth proclaimed by 
the NT Church, and thus the new movement identified itself with what it saw as the faith of 
the Apostles. 
 
The doctrines identified in this early articulation include (I) the sinfulness of all humanity, (II) 
salvation by faith and through the atoning sacrifice of Christ, (III) baptism in the Holy Spirit, 
(IV) restoration of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, (V) ‘eternal conscious punishment of all Christ 
rejectors,’ (VI) the ‘personal and pre-Millennial’ return of Christ, (VII) healing in the 
atonement and promised healing according to James 5:14, and (VIII) whole body ministry of 
the church, with particular emphasis on the offices of Ephesians 4:11.
32
 This is followed by 
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To help interpret Elim’s first statement of beliefs, I will compare it with ‘The Doctrinal Basis 
of Faith of the World’s Evangelical Alliance (1846),’ which to a great extent served as the 
baseline for Evangelical theology of the period;
34
 and Thomas B. Barratt’s proposed 
‘Standards of Truth’ for European Pentecostalism (1911), which was an early attempt to 
provide a Pentecostal equivalent to the doctrinal statement of the Evangelical Alliance.
35
 In 
relation to these two statements, the obvious omission in Elim’s What We Believe is that there 
is no article on the Bible or the Godhead/Trinity (an ‘oversight’ that was corrected in Elim’s 
next doctrinal statement). With Evangelical Alliance, Elim effectively shares the doctrines on 
human sinfulness, Christ’s incarnation and atonement, justification by faith, eternal state of 
both the righteous and the wicked, and the ordinances. However, unlike the Evangelical 
Alliance, Elim has included articles on Baptism in the Holy Spirit, restoration of the spiritual 
gifts, premillennial return of Christ, and divine healing in the atonement. Unsurprisingly 
Barratt also has statements on Baptism in the Spirit, gifts of the Spirit, and the second coming 
of Christ. But what is surprising is that unlike Barratt, the Elim statement does not explicitly 
mention ‘speaking in tongues’ either in relation to Spirit Baptism or spiritual gifts, but instead 
has a distinct article on divine healing. Perhaps one should not to read too much into this, but 
it does seem to highlight how the gift of tongues was not considered as the unique ‘gift/sign’ 
of Baptism in the Spirit within Elim, whereas divine healing was of particular importance for 
the movement from its inception. In sum, Elim adopted the basic Evangelical beliefs; with 
fellow Pentecostals it emphasised Baptism in the Spirit, spiritual gifts and second coming of 
Christ; but it also developed its own Pentecostal distinctive in appearing to emphasise divine 
healing over the gift of tongues. Indeed, for Elim this was the Full Gospel.    
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The Full Gospel would later be expressed in 1920s as the Foursquare Gospel. This later 
articulation, however, should not be seen as a novel development, because the fourfold pattern 
is already strongly present in What We Believe with statements covering the role of Jesus as 
(1) Saviour, (2) Healer, (3) Baptiser in the Holy Spirit, and (4) coming King. In other words, 
in What We Believe Jesus is already identified as the saviour of fallen individuals who can 
become ‘new creations’ by receiving the gift of eternal life, and freedom from ‘the penalty 
and power of sin’ through his atoning work. The ‘saved’ must also produce the fruit of the 
Spirit, which highlights that sanctification is seen as part of salvation.
36
 The article on divine 
healing emphasises healing in the atonement and the promise of healing according to James 
5:14-15, which notes church elders anointing the person suffering with oil, praying in faith 
and seeing him/her restored to health.
37
  Baptism in the Holy Spirit is seen as something that 
‘every regenerate person should seek’ for empowerment and hence is understood as a 
subsequent experience to conversion, but, as has already been noted, unlike for many early 
British Pentecostals tongues is not seen, or at least not mentioned, as the initial evidence of 
Spirit Baptism.
38
 Finally, ‘the personal and premillennial’ return of Jesus is affirmed.
39
 
Therefore, it seems that the explicit references to and centrality of the Foursquare Gospel 
from the mid-1920s onwards should not be seen as an unexpected development from the 
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earlier Full Gospel of 1915-1916, but rather as Elim’s theological articulation of the implicit 




4.2.2. ‘Statement of Fundamental Truths’ (1922)  
The 1916 doctrinal document was followed by Elim’s ‘Statement of Fundamental Truths’ in 
1922, with some revisions from the original What We Believe.
41
 The new additions in the 
1922 Statement are articles on the Bible, the Trinity, and ordination of ministers.
42
 As 
mentioned above, it is interesting that the centrality of the Bible is not explicitly stated in the 
1916 document, although it is assumed throughout.
43
 The doctrine of the Trinity may have 
been introduced due to the increasing influence of Oneness Pentecostals in North America in 
the early 1920s.
44
 The addition of ordination of ministers as the third ‘ordinance,’ with water 
baptism and Holy Communion, is possibly caused by the expanding movement’s need to 
formulate a doctrine regarding its own accredited and approved ministers. 
 
However, like in 1916 the Foursquare Gospel motif is central in the 1922 statement. The 
articles on Jesus as saviour are more or less identical to those of 1916. Healing is also still 
seen to be in the atonement and therefore available to ‘all who believe,’ although there is no 
more mention of James 5:14. The personal and pre-millennial return of Jesus is also 
                                                 
40
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 However, the doctrine of Baptism in the Holy Spirit is revised to include 
speaking in tongues as the initial evidence,
46
 bringing Elim in line with the majority view of 
early British Pentecostals,
47




4.2.3. ‘Fundamental Truths of the Foursquare Gospel Churches’ (1928/1934) 
In the late 1920s Elim articulated its core doctrines for the third time.
49
 In these statements 
there is a new article on the Church, and assertions on the ‘fruit of the Spirit’ and ‘anointing 
with oil’ which had been present in 1916 but omitted in 1922. It appears that as Elim is 
coming of age as a denomination there is an intensified need to identify what constitutes the 
Church Catholic. To put it differently, as a new denomination Elim needed to increasingly 
clarify how it perceived and related to other Christian traditions. 
 
For the first time the Foursquare Gospel receives an explicit articulation; that is, there are four 
articles with the titles ‘The Saviour,’ ‘The Healer,’ ‘The Baptiser’ and ‘The Coming King.’
50
 
This clear fourfold categorisation seems to have been influenced by the North American tour 
of Jeffreys and other Elim leaders in 1924. During this visit, the group was exposed to the 
work of the Christian and Missionary Alliance (CMA) founded by Albert Benjamin Simpson, 
                                                 
45
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who had first coined the term ‘Fourfold Gospel’ in 1890, and they also visited Aimee Semple 
McPherson’s ‘International Church of the Foursquare Gospel.’
51
 From North America, 
Jeffreys wrote to E. J. Phillips that he wanted Elim ‘to be in Great Britain what the CMA is in 
America, with the difference that we retain the whole truth of Pentecost with signs.’
52
 
Consequently, like McPherson, Jeffreys substituted ‘baptism in the Holy Spirit’ for 
‘sanctification,’ and on his return to England began explicitly promulgating the Foursquare 
Gospel. In 1929 the name of the Elim Pentecostal Alliance, which in 1918 had subsumed the 
Elim Evangelistic Band, was changed to the Elim Foursquare Gospel Alliance, and Jeffreys 





When comparing the 1928 document with that of 1922, Jesus as saviour and coming King 
effectively remain unchanged. However, Baptism in the Spirit is yet again changed in that 
tongues as the initial evidence is replaced with the phrase ‘with signs following.’
54
 This 
restores the 1916 emphasis on general ‘signs’ rather than elevating tongues as the ‘sign.’
55
 
Moreover, the doctrine of healing is altered by deleting the explicit mention of healing being 
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in the atonement, and there is also an added phrase that ‘those who will walk in obedience to 




4.2.4. The Foursquare Gospel and Doctrinal Statements: Elim’s Hard Core and Auxiliary 
Hypotheses 
In light of the first three doctrinal statements, I will now try to articulate what appears to have 
been the essence of the early Elim argument. Nancey Murphy has noted that the hard core of 
a ‘philosophical and/or theological tradition’ (to use MacIntyre’s language) is its ‘central 
organizing idea... while theories regarding the various doctrines would constitute auxiliary 
hypotheses elaborating that central idea and relating it to the data’ (my italics).
57
 For Elim this 
‘central organising idea’ (read: hard core) seems to be the Foursquare Gospel for at least three 
reasons.  
 
First, as I have tried to demonstrate above the first references to the ‘Full Gospel along 
Pentecostal lines’ already implies the Foursquare Gospel. Second, it is the fourfold 
theological emphasis of Jesus as (1) Saviour, (2) Healer, (3) Baptiser in the Holy Spirit and 
(4) coming King that makes Elim different from mainstream British Evangelicalism, and thus 
in Lakatosian terms makes Elim, like other classical Pentecostal denominations who share 
this fourfold focus, a distinct research programme. Third, and perhaps most importantly, Elim 
itself during its formational period identifies the Foursquare Gospel as its ‘central organising 
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idea.’ This is reflected in Elim changing its name from ‘Elim Pentecostal Alliance’ to ‘Elim 
Foursquare Gospel Alliance’ in 1929. Moreover, from 1925 onwards the Foursquare Gospel 
is also presented as the guiding principle in providing the four sides that hold together Elim’s 
other beliefs (see Appendix 3).
58
 And these four aspects are depicted also symbolically as the 




If the Foursquare Gospel is Elim’s hard core, as I suggest, then the doctrines articulated in 
Elim’s theological statements of 1916, 1922 and 1928/1934 can be identified as the auxiliary 
hypotheses unpacking this controlling fourfold Christological conviction. As such the 
doctrinal statements have two important functions. First, they provide further descriptions of 
the hard core’s positive heuristic. For example, the governing idea of ‘Jesus is healer’ is 
further expressed in the doctrinal statement that Jesus provides healing in the atonement. In 
other words, the doctrine of ‘healing in the atonement’ provides a more elaborate model of 
what it means to believe that ‘Jesus is healer,’ and thus positively explains a central aspect of 
Elim’s hard core.     
   
Second, as auxiliary hypotheses, these doctrinal statements also provide the negative heuristic 
for the Elim tradition in protecting ‘the hard core from falsification by making additions or 
changes in the belt of auxiliary hypotheses.’
60
 For example, the concept of Jesus as baptiser in 
the Holy Spirit was first presented as something that all Christians should seek (1916); then 
this doctrine was developed by stating that Spirit baptism is evidenced by speaking in tongues 
                                                 
58
 No author, ‘What We Believe,’ EE 6, no. 1 (January 1, 1925): last page [no page number].  
59
 No author, ‘The Elim Evangel,’ EE 6, no. 1 (January 1, 1925): front cover [no page number]. Kay also refers 
to the Foursquare Gospel as Jeffreys’ ‘organising principle;’ Kay, George Jeffreys, 221.   
60
 Murphy, Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning, 184. 
157 
 
(1922); until the doctrine was modified by replacing tongues as the unique sign with the more 
general concept of Baptism in the Spirit being accompanied ‘with signs following’ (1928). 
These changes may well reflect the ‘data’ of the Pentecostal experience shaping Elim’s 
interpretation of Jesus as Spirit Baptiser. To put it differently, throughout these three doctrinal 
statements the hard core of Jesus as Baptiser in the Spirit is maintained, but the auxiliary 
hypotheses/doctrines change as they seek to relate the data with the hard core. Indeed, seeing 
Elim’s doctrinal statements as the auxiliary hypotheses provide reasons why the statements 
changed during the first fifteen years.  
 
In sum, it is not hard to argue that the Foursquare Gospel is the hard core of Elim,
61
 and the 
doctrinal statements are the protective belt that are subject to change as it connects the 
theological data to Elim’s hard core. This argument will be further developed and 
substantiated when looking at Elim’s two epistemological crises (chapters 5 & 6).   
 
4.3. The Rationality of the Elim Argument: Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism 
To summarise the discussion thus far, the early Elim argument seems to have been primarily 
directed at the so called ‘higher critics’ (read: modernist liberal Christians), ‘lower critics’ 
(read: cessationist evangelical Christians) and ‘ritualists’ (read: Roman Catholics and Anglo-
Catholics). The content of the argument can be captured in the phrase Full Gospel, which was 
later explicitly articulated as the Foursquare Gospel. This Foursquare Gospel can be seen as 
Elim’s hard core and the various doctrinal statements as Elim’s auxiliary hypothesis.  Indeed, 
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the content of the Elim argument appears to have directly challenged the modernist attempts 
to demythologise Christianity by seeking to re-establish the purported scriptural and orthodox 
Christocentric doctrines of old; counter cessationism by highlighting the miraculous aspects 
of the Gospel for the current age; and oppose ritualism in presenting the raw potency of the 
Full Gospel. 
 
So how then did Elim justify its argument? To put it differently, what was Elim’s underlying 
rationality and epistemology, and what did the movement consider as appropriate sources for 
its theological ‘data’? In exploring these questions, I will propose that Elim affirmed three 
main sources for theological knowledge, namely, (1) its (pre-)Pentecostal tradition, (2) the 
Bible and (3) experience. These three sources did not merely provide Elim with theological 
data for formulating beliefs, but also functioned as its epistemic core in helping to formulate 
its theory of justification and warrant. In short, I will argue in this section that in light of these 
three aspects Elim’s tacit rationality is best identified as Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism.     
  
4.3.1. Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism: The Role of Tradition 
The Evangelical and Pentecostal heritage of Elim provided the movement’s background 
theological beliefs. As has already been pointed out, Elim’s first doctrinal statements share a 
number of similarities with the ‘The Doctrinal Basis of Faith of the World’s Evangelical 
Alliance (1846)’ and Thomas B. Barratt’s ‘Standards of Truth’ for European Pentecostalism 
(1911). This is not surprising as many Elim pioneers had received their early religious 
nurturing within British Evangelicalism (see 3.2.1.), and later spiritual nourishment from 




The early Elim literature underscores the importance of the wider Evangelical and Pentecostal 
traditions for Elim’s theological identity. For example, Ernest C. W. Boulton writes how the 
Elim story ‘flows out of what was designated the Pentecostal Movement in the British Isles as 
it emerged in 1907.’
62
 And R. E. McAlister explains how Pentecostalism, among other things, 




Consequently, it is reasonable to suggest that the wider Evangelical and Pentecostal traditions 
gave Elim its basic beliefs and frameworks of thinking. This does not mean that Elim did not 
go on to develop its own distinctives with respect to theology and ways of reasoning, but it 
does mean that these distinctives were not developed ex nihilo but in the context of British 
Evangelicalism and emerging Pentecostalism. Indeed, Elim’s biblicism and pragmatism 
‘flowed out of’ its (pre-)Pentecostal heritage.         
 
4.3.2. Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism: The Role of the Bible 
In line with Elim’s inherited Evangelicalism and Pentecostalism, the Bible was the grounding 
document and primary theological source for the early Elim argument.
64
 In fact, from the mid-
1920s onwards the phrase ‘Foursquare on the Word of God’ became the movement’s motto 
(see Appendix 2 and 3).
65
 Moreover, as already noted, although there is no article on the Bible 
in the 1916 What We Believe, its centrality is assumed throughout the document, and this 
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assumption is formalised in the 1922 Statement of Fundamental Truths with the first article 
stating: ‘we believe that the Bible is the inspired Word of God, and that none may add or take 
away therefrom, except at their peril.’
66





Elim appeared to give epistemological primacy to the Bible for two reasons. First, although 
Elim did not have a developed theory of truth, consistent with its Evangelical worldview, 
Elim seemed to assume that ‘truth’ and true knowledge was effectively theocentric.
68
 This 
view is reflected in R. E. McAlister Elim Evangel article on ‘What is Truth?’ when he writes 
that ‘if I have God’s viewpoint regarding any subject, I have the truth respecting that 
subject.’
69
 In other words, as the ultimate reality, God is the source and justifier of all truth, 
and therefore true beliefs about any given subject equals to having God’s beliefs on that 
particular subject. This kind of theory of truth is very similar to the one advocated by 
Jonathan Edwards when he writes that ‘the only adequate definition of Truth is, the agreement 
of our ideas with existence,’ and since God is the only necessarily existing being, truth is the 
‘consistence and agreement of our ideas, with the ideas of God.’
 70
   
 
Following from this theocentric concept of truth, secondly, it was further believed by Elim, 
again with many Evangelicals, that the ‘Bible gives us the mind of God [read: truth] on every 
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subject pertaining unto life and godliness,’
71
 because the Bible is divinely inspired by God. 
This ‘divine inspiration’ was not assumed to apply to some parts of the Bible, but was 
believed to be verbal and plenary. For example, Percy Parker in discussing the issue quotes 
Clarence Larkin that inspiration ‘extends to every sentence, word, mark, point, jot and title in 
the original parchments.’
72
 Parker also agrees with the 1893 General Assembly of the 
Presbyterian Church of America that the Bible ‘is the very Word of God, and consequently 
wholly without error,’
73
 and concludes with James Martin Gray of the Moody Institute, 
against any neo-orthodox sentiments, that ‘the Bible does not merely contain the Word of 
God; it is the Word of God.’
74
 To summarise, the Bible’s primacy as a theological source for 
Elim stems from the notion that (1) ‘truth’ fundamentally corresponds with God and his ideas, 
and (2) God’s nature and his ideas are revealed in the Bible due to its divine inspiration.   
 
Since the Bible as whole was believed to be verbally inspired by God, it seemed logical for 
Elim to also maintain that the Bible was infallible in what it affirmed or taught, since God was 
assumed to be infallible.
75
 Elim’s similarities here with the ‘Old Princeton’ theology 
regarding inspiration, infallibility and inerrancy of the Bible à la Charles Hodge, Archibald 
Alexander Hodge and Benjamin Warfield are noteworthy.
76
 In fact, Archibald Alexander 
Hodge is affirmingly quoted in Elim Evangel on divine inspiration and the infallibility of the 
Bible.
77
 This means that Elim’s concept of biblical inspiration would have also been shared 
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by the cessationist fundamentalists, and thus Elim’s view on the Bible’s divine authority is 
more or less identical with that of the Fundamentalist movement of the early twentieth 
century. 
 
So what justification did Elim then provide for believing that the Bible was in fact divinely 
inspired and therefore accurately conveyed the mind of God? In the Elim literature three 
common arguments are provided for believing that the Bible is inspired by God. First, and 
probably the most common argument, is the argument from transformed lives.
78
 It is 
suggested that when it comes to the divine authority and inspiration of the Bible, ‘one of the 
greatest, if not the greatest proofs, is its miraculous regenerative power in the lives of men.’
79
 
F. A. Conners echoes this notion when he writes that ‘the greatest proof of the inspiration of 
the Bible is its transforming power in the lives of men.’
80
 Second, the divine inspiration of the 
Bible is supported by the argument from the uniqueness of the Bible.
81
 This argument seeks to 
demonstrate how the Bible is supreme in its message, unity, and ability to transcend cultures 
and languages. Furthermore, it is suggested that the Bible’s fulfilled prophecies, preservation 
throughout the ages, and phenomenal publication history points towards its supernatural 
origins. Third, there is the argument from its own testimony.
82
 In other words, the words of 
Jesus as recorded in the Gospels, as well as the accounts in 2 Timothy 3:16 and 2 Peter 1:21, 
are seen as evidence that the Bible is the verbally inspired Word of God. 
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It seems that the first two types of arguments for divine inspiration, namely, argument from 
transformed lives and argument from the Bible’s uniqueness, indicate a pragmatic rationality 
at work within Elim. In other words, these arguments to a great extent assume that results, 
such as, changed lives, fulfilled prophecies, relevance in different cultures, preservation 
against the odds, and publishing success, point towards the Bible’s divine origins. In fact, it 
seems that the first two arguments provide the underlying rationale for the Bible’s divine 
authority, and the third argument is then used to explain the nature of this authority; that is, 
the Bible carries divine authority because it is divinely inspired along the lines of 2 Timothy 
3:16 and 2 Peter 1:21. Furthermore, the third argument also provides some justification why 
inspiration should be applied to the whole Bible and not just some passages.       
      
When it came to Elim’s early biblical hermeneutics, this ‘verbally inspired and infallible 
Word of God’ appears to have been interpreted in a common sense fashion, or what Kenneth 
Archer has referred to as ‘the Bible Reading Method,’ where Scriptures are read in a pre-
critical and canonical proof-text manner through a devotional lens.
83
 Elim’s ‘Bible Reading 
Method’ is well demonstrated in the Elim Evangel article on ‘How to Study the Word.’
84
 In 
studying the Bible the reader is encouraged to (1) ‘Seek the Literal Meaning’ of the text in a 
pre-critical manner; (2) ‘Use the best Possible Translation’ in terms of its accuracy and 
English expression; (3) ‘Use the Marginal References’ and thus  read the text canonically; (4) 
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‘Trust Christ for… Openings,’ that is, rely on Christ to reveal the Scriptures; and (5) ‘Study 
for Your Own Life’, that is, read the Bible devotionally. 
 
In sum, the Bible was seen by Elim as a grounding document for theological knowledge, 
because God was seen as the ultimate truth and the Bible was believed to be His fully inspired 
and infallible word. Elim had primarily pragmatic reasons for believing in the divine 
inspiration of the Bible, and it encouraged its members to adopt a form of ‘Bible Reading 
Method’ to gather theological data from Scripture.  
 
4.3.3. Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism: The Role of Experience 
However, the Bible and the Evangelical/Pentecostal tradition were not Elim’s only sources of 
theological knowledge. The pragmatic rationality, already evident in Elim’s justification for 
the divine inspiration of the Bible, meant that ‘experience’ played an important role both as a 
source of knowledge and particularly in providing justification for theological beliefs.  
 
Elim’s basic understanding of ‘religious experience’ was inherited from early British 
Pentecostalism (see 3.2.3.). As suggested in chapter three, (British) Pentecostalism is best 
seen as Keswick Romanticism ‘baptised’ with Evidentialism. In other words, like the Welsh 
Revival early British Pentecostals externalized the inner religious experience of Keswick, but 
they also moved beyond the Welsh Revival by expecting specific biblical signs and evidences 
to accompany genuine spiritual encounters. In early British Pentecostal thinking the 
distinctive religious experience was ‘baptism in the Spirit’ and the biblical sign was ‘speaking 
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in tongues.’ As has been noted, for Elim the notions of baptism in the Spirit accompanied by 
biblical evidences remained central, but the idea of tongues as ‘the initial evidence’ was not 
maintained (despite its inclusion in the 1922 doctrinal statement). Instead the general 
manifestation of spiritual gifts, with particular emphasis on divine healing, was seen as the 
evidence of the outworking of Spirit baptism. 
 
In light of the above, the role of ‘experience’ was central for Elim to justify its early 
argument. Moreover, this experience based rationality seems to have been characterized by 
what I will call experientialism and experimentalism, which together constituted Elim’s 
pragmatic rationality. 
 
First, by experientialism I simply mean the foundational role that experience played in 
shaping Elim’s rationality. George Jeffreys fondly referred to a quote from his Bible College 
days asserting that ‘He that hath an experience is not at the mercy of him that hath an 
argument.’
85
 Jeffreys particularly saw this to be the case when one’s experience was 
Scriptural, and thus in his mind there was a close relationship between the Bible and personal 
experience, each mutually confirming the other. This same line of thinking was shared by 
Donald Gee’s Elim Evangel article written in 1922 where he argued that: 
No man possessed of a Scriptural experience need be afraid of an argument, he is 
beyond its reach. Any man rejoicing in a living experience of God in his life has a 
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Jeffreys’ and Gee’s reasoning reflects the nineteenth century Romantic preference for 
‘experience over argument’ (see 3.1.2.). To put it differently, within Elim’s rationality 
the experience becomes the ‘argument.’ In some ways this approach is epistemologically 
similar to the so-called Reformed Epistemology which claims that belief in God is a 
‘basic belief’ rising from a ‘spiritual intuition/sensus divinitatis’ (Alvin Plantinga) or 
‘religious experience’ (William Alston), and therefore supposedly needs no further 




Nevertheless, Elim’s second aspect of experimentalism moves beyond subjective 
experientialism as it tries to provide ‘evidences’ or ‘signs’ to authenticate the religious 
experience. This is the Evidentialist addition to the Romantic experientialism. 
Interestingly, in contemporary philosophy of religion the idea of ‘confirming empirical 
evidence’ is often expected by those critiquing the Reformed epistemologists more 
subjective accounts of spiritual experience.
88
 Moreover, this is the type of empirical 
evidence demanded by John Locke – regarded by some as the father of modern 
‘evidentialism’ –
89
 when discussing religious ‘enthusiasm’ of his day, characterised by 
spiritual experientialism and intuitive revelation.
90
 Locke proposed that if the 
‘enthusiasts’ are to be justified in their beliefs based on their personal experience and 
revelations, they need to be like    
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...the holy men of old, who had revelations from GOD, [but also] had something else 
beside that internal light of assurance in their own minds, to testify to them, that it was 
from GOD. They were not left to their own persuasions alone, that those persuasions 
were from GOD; but had outward signs to convince them of the author of those 
revelations. And when they were to convince others, they had a power given them to 
justify the truth of their commission from heaven; and by visible signs to assert the 




It appears that the ‘outward signs’ and ‘visible signs’ demanded by Locke are exactly 
what Elim sought to provide when justifying its experientialism and the content of its 
Full Gospel. To give some examples of its evidentalist experimentalism in action, in 
1928 Ernest C. W. Boulton wrote a history of the early Elim movement in which he 
referred to George Jeffreys as ‘a minister whose weapon is the Word, and who relies 
wholly upon the Spirit of God to produce the desired results’ (my emphasis).
92
 Much of 
Boulton’s description of the ministry of Jeffreys and the initial developments of Elim 
emphasise how Scriptural truths (i.e. the Foursquare Gospel) were substantiated through 
experiential and empirical evidence. For example, after reporting the testimony of a 
woman who had been healed of a tubercular knee, he boldly states:  
And then the modern biblical exegete would persuade us that the miraculous is 
impossible. In the face of such positive proofs we cannot but accept the statements of 




It was this type of experimental justification that seemed to provide Elim with the epistemic 
grounds for both its belief in the authority of the Bible and its Foursquare Gospel reading of 
it. R. E. Darragh follows a very similar logic when he reflects on the first 17 years of Elim’s 
history in his book In Defence of His Word by stating that if  
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all those who have proved Jesus Christ to be the same to-day in the twentieth century 
[would say] Hallelujah... Hallelujahs would come from thousands of voices, and 
thousands of hands would be raised as testimony that they have proved this to be true, 
for some have had their ears opened, others have received their sight, and many lame 
have discarded their crutches and stepped out of wheeled carriages, never to get into 
them again. Some have had cancers and growths removed in answer to prayer, and 




The rest of Darragh’s book is a collection of short testimonies of purported healings 
from Jeffreys’ ministry, which seek to demonstrate that Elim’s argument is supported 
by its results; that is, experientialism is backed up by experimentalism. 
 
David Middlemiss has argued that the twentieth century Pentecostal/Charismatic 
movement has simply followed the epistemology of religious ‘enthusiasm’ of 
seventeenth to nineteenth century, and that ‘within the charismatic movement, there is 
little evidence of a concern for philosophical epistemology.’
95
 Although this claim may 
apply to some Pentecostals and Charismatics, it does not accurately reflect early British 
Pentecostalism or Elim. In other words, Elim’s rationality, which reflected the early 
British Pentecostal rationality, was effectively evidentialist enthusiasm and thus 
fulfilled John Locke’s epistemic requirements for Christian ‘enthusiasm.’ And although 
Elim may not have had the academic resources in constructing a ‘philosophical 
epistemology’ to be studied and critiqued in universities, Elim nevertheless was 
‘concerned’ in providing an epistemology to justify its beliefs, as sketched above. 
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Elim’s experientialist experimentalism or enthusiast evidentialism as a rationality has a 
number of similarities to American Pragmatism of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. First, in line with the views of William James, Elim seems to believe 
that the essence of ‘religion’ is identified as a spiritual experience (read: 
experientialism), rather than merely a form of ‘theology’ or ‘ecclesiasticism,’ albeit for 
Elim this experience was understood in a canonical context and interpreted through a 
Pentecostal lens. To put it differently, James’ conviction that ‘knowledge about a thing 
is not the thing itself’ is reflected well in Elim’s experientialism.
96
 For example, this 
sentiment is well captured by Elim’s Henry Proctor when he writes that a ‘real, vital 
Christian experience is a progression from faith to knowledge;’
97
 that is, an experience 
confirms the truth of one’s faith, or in Jamesian language moves one from the 
‘knowledge about a thing’ to ‘the thing itself.’ 
 
Second, like American Pragmatism, Elim’s experientialism is effectively empiricist. In 
other words, knowledge of God and the world is gained primarily through the senses. 
Experience is king.  
 
However, third, like the American pragmatists William James and Charles Sanders 
Peirce, Elim also moves beyond the empiricists paradigm with its experimentalism that 
focuses on ‘results’ and ‘effects’ vis-à-vis beliefs and concepts. To put it simply, 
‘empiricism’ focuses primarily on what produces the belief, whereas ‘pragmatism’ 
focuses on what the belief produces. This is well captured in Peirce’s famous pragmatic 
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maxim, also adopted and elaborated by James,
98
 which states that when it comes to 
beliefs about objects,  
consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearing, we conceive the 
object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of 
our conception of the object.
99
  
   
Based on this pragmatic principle, Peirce developed his inferential method of 
‘abduction,’ ‘deduction’ and ‘induction.’ In other words, (1) the ‘inferential knowing’ 
starts abductively by formulating a hypothesis based on the raw data of experience (e.g. 
‘the earth is round, not flat’); (2) this is followed by a deductive inference predicting 
‘operational consequences of the hypothesis’ (e.g. if one sails across the Atlantic Ocean 
one will eventually reach the Orient, rather than fall off the face of the earth); and (3) 
finally after testing the deductive inference (e.g. sailing across the Atlantic), through 
inductive reasoning a general rule/law can then be established (e.g. ‘the laws of nature 




While it would be misguied to assume that Elim’s early rationality came even close to 
the philosophical sophistication of Peirce’s inferential logic, it does seem that Elim’s 
underlying rationality shares central aspects of Peirce’s pragmatism (or pragmaticism as 
Peirce preferred to call it). For example, it is not difficult to imagine that Elim’s central 
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belief of Jesus as Healer was tacitly formulated along the lines of Peircean logic; that is, 
(1) experience and testimony suggests that Jesus heals people today (abduction); (2) in 
an evangelistic meeting people will be healed after being prayed for (deduction); (3) 
after praying for people in an evangelistic meeting and witnessing their purported 
healings, a general ‘rule’ of Jesus as healer can be established (induction).   
 
Indeed, as has been discussed above, Elim’s understanding about the nature of Jesus as 
healer and Jesus as baptiser in the Holy Spirit were modified in 1922 and 1928/1934 
from the original 1916 statement. It is not hard to argue that the adaption of these 
doctrinal statements demonstrates Elim’s Peircean type pragmatic rationality at work. In 
other words, with respect to divine healing, in the earlier doctrinal statements healing is 
believed to be in the atonement. However, in the 1928/1934 statement it is no longer 
assumed to be in the atonement, but ‘those who will walk in obedience to His [Christ’s] 
will can claim Divine Healing for their bodies.’ This change can easily be explained in 
the light of Elim’s pragmatic rationality (even if it does not fully follow Peirce’s 
abductive, deductive and inductive logic); that is, (1) based on scripture and experience 
Elim believed that Jesus heals; (2) initially this was believed to be because healing was 
in the atonement; (3) however, not everyone who was prayed for received healing in the 
same way as they seemed to receive forgiveness of sins; (4) therefore, healing may not 
be in the atonement, but those can claim healing who walk in obedience because Jesus 
is still the healer. Interestingly, the doctrine of healing was further modified in 1993 by 
deleting the notion that those who walk in obedience can claim healing, and again this 
modification seems to have been largely caused by ‘results’ and ‘effects’ not supporting 




When it comes to baptism in the Holy Spirit, the same pragmatic logic seems to explain 
the changing understanding of the doctrine; that is, (1) in the 1916 statement Jesus is 
identified as the Baptiser in the Holy Spirit; (2) in 1922 speaking in tongues is identified 
as the initial evidence of one’s Spirit baptism; (3) however, experience did not seem to 
support the idea that only those who spoke in tongues had been filled with the Holy 
Spirit; (4) thus in 1928/1934 tongues as initial evidence is replaced by the more generic 
idea of signs following, which better reflects the experience of Elim.  
 
Consequently, Elim’s pragmatic experiential experimentalism appears to have strong 
family resemblances to Peirce’s ‘critical common sensism,’ which like other common 
sense rationalities of the time appreciates sense experiences, but with Peirce is also 
critical of common sense and seeks to test these intuitions in practice.
101
 This means that 
Elim’s pragmatism is also fallibilistic, acknowledging that one’s beliefs can be wrong 
(e.g. healing in the atonement and tongues as initial evidence), which is another 
important feature of Peirce’s and James’ Pragmatism.  
 
In 1907 William James argued that pragmatic philosophy provided the alternative to the 
cold religious scholastic rationalism and the atheistic positivist empiricism. In fact, he 
believed that pragmatism would be an appropriate religious philosophical method for 
the modern era (although he believed that both the religious and non-religious could 
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utilise the pragmatic method).
102
 Interestingly, despite F. C. S. Schiller’s efforts to 
advocate pragmatism under the name ‘humanism’ in Britain, philosophical pragmatism 
never gained prominence in British Universities. Nevertheless, even if James’ vision of 
a religious pragmatic philosophy may have not infiltrated the academic halls of Oxford 
or Cambridge, it seems that a version of it was developed and embodied by the British 
Pentecostal movement which was birthed the very same year James published his 
Pragmatism (1907). Elim went on to modify and develop this Pentecostal pragmatic 
method as its own religious rationality, or what I have called Pentecostal Biblical 
Pragmatism. Therefore, if my analysis is correct, Elim and British Pentecostalism 
represent a genuine British philosophical and religious pragmatism, and something 
future histories of British philosophical pragmatism should not ignore. Although Elim 
pioneers may have lacked philosophical erudition in articulating their rationality, they 
did not lack the practical energy in living out their pragmatism, and thus were in some 
sense true pragmatic pragmatists.  
 
4.3.4. Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism: ‘Tradition-Constituted and Tradition-
Constitutive Rationality’ (MacIntyre) 
In this section I have argued that Elim’s rationality should be seen as Pentecostal Biblical 
Pragmatism. It is Pentecostal because Elim inherited many of the underlying theological and 
epistemological assumptions of early British Pentecostals. It is biblical because for Elim the 
Bible was the grounding document and a primary source of theological knowledge. It is 
pragmatic because Elim believed that its argument was justified by religious experience 
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(experientialism) and evidenced by life transforming ‘signs,’ ‘effects’ and ‘results’ 
(experimentalism). 
 
Following Alasdair MacIntyre’s methodology (see 2.1.), Elim’s rationality seems to naturally 
emerge from within the Elim tradition, namely, it is ‘tradition-constituted.’ To put it 
differently, Elim’s Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism stems from the content of its argument 
(the experiential Foursquare Gospel), it is shaped by its social, religious and intellectual 
context (late nineteenth and early twentieth century Britain), it is informed by its implied 
opponents (liberals, cessationists and ritualists), and characterised by its institutions 
(discussed below). In short, it is truly a tradition-specific rationality.  
 
However, as noted by MacIntyre, rationalities are not only ‘tradition-constituted’ but also 
‘tradition-constitutive.’
103
 This ‘tradition-constitutive’ element is also true of Elim’s 
rationality as its pragmatism is not only informed by the experiential Foursquare Gospel, but 
itself ends up shaping the nature of the Foursquare Gospel by modifying doctrines about 
baptism in the Holy Spirit and divine healing. Therefore, Elim’s Pentecostal Biblical 
Pragmatism fits well within MacIntyre’s concept of ‘tradition-constituted and tradition-
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4.4. The Social Embodiment of the Elim Argument: The Elim Alliance 
In MacIntyrian terms the Elim argument was not just against someone (opponents), about 
something (content) or justified in a particular way (rationality), but it was also carried out by 
a community that socially embodied the argument (see 2.1.2.). This ‘Elim community’ 
created social systems and shared methods that helped to sustain, develop and propagate the 
Elim argument in its historical context. Alvin Goldman points out that such ‘social systems’ 
can be seen as ‘epistemic systems’ which ‘house social practices, procedures, institutions, 
and/or patterns of interpersonal influence that affect the epistemic outcomes of its 
members.’
104
 Elim seemed to have at least three types of prominent epistemic systems for, 
and social expressions of its argument, namely, (1) revivalistic meetings, (2) alliance of local 
churches, ministers and ministries, and (3) publishing and training institutions.   
 
4.4.1. Revivalistic Meetings: The Primary Platform of the Elim Argument 
Elim’s founder George Jeffreys was first and foremost an evangelistic revivalist. Jeffreys was 
converted during the Welsh Revival (see 3.2.2.) and in the words of Andrew Walker and Neil 
Hudson ‘his whole life and ministry would reflect the fact that he was a child of the Welsh 
Revival.’
105
 In fact, some of the first references to George and his brother Stephen Jeffreys in 
British Pentecostal periodicals identify the brothers as the Pentecostal ‘Welsh Revivalists.’
106
 
George Jeffreys describes some of these first revivalistic meetings held with his brother in 
1913 in Wales by writing that:  
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The work here is deepening, and numerous conversions are taking place daily, and 
many have received the Baptism of the Holy Ghost with the Signs following. Praise the 
Lord! Some miraculous cases of healing have also taken place, and it is a real 
Apostolic Revival... The dear Lord is once again drawing multitudes after Him. We 




This concept of holding a series of revival meetings in one town after another, 
characterised by preaching the Full Gospel with an expectation of ‘signs’ following 
(e.g. dramatic conversions, Spirit baptisms and divine healings), was to be George 
Jeffreys’ focus and modus operandi for Elim between 1915-1933. Indeed, it seems that 
the primary purpose of the Elim Evangelistic Band (the first social embodiment of 
Elim) and Elim’s later Revival Party was to carry out this type of ministry.      
   
With George Jeffreys at the helm, these two revivalistic organisations held meetings 
with significant pulling power, filling some of the largest venues in the British Isles for 
a number of years. For example, it is recorded that in 1930 Jeffreys filled the Bingley 
Hall in Birmingham (seating 15,000 people) 26 times with the final service 
commencing half an hour early due to the venue already being full. Moreover, it is 
claimed that during these meetings 10,000 people were converted, 1,100 were baptised 
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It is difficult to verify or falsify these early accounts (although there is no prima facie 
reason to suspect their accuracy). Nevertheless, at least in Elim’s own understanding 
these revivalistic meetings facilitated by George Jeffreys and his evangelistic team 
provided an important social embodiment for the Elim argument. In other words, they 
became a primary platform for the full force of the Elim argument to be experienced as 
Elim proclaimed what it saw as the biblically grounded Foursquare Gospel, and as it 
sought to demonstrate this truth through experiential and empirical means.  
 
4.4.2. Alliance of Congregations, Ministers and Ministries: The Faithful Advocates of 
the Elim Argument 
However, to sustain the ministry of the revivalist meetings and to disciple its new 
converts, Elim saw it as necessary to also establish local congregations, churches 
and/or Pentecostal centres. In fact, the instituting minutes of the Elim Evangelistic 
Band state that George Jeffreys was appointed as an evangelist and ‘that a centre be 
chosen by him for the purpose of establishing a church out of which evangelists would 
be sent.’
109
 The first local church was founded in Belfast in the summer of 1915.
110
 At 
this stage Jeffreys and other Elim leaders had no intention of starting a new 
denomination.
111
 Nevertheless, as the movement grew during its early years – not least 
due to the success of the revivalist meetings – a number of new assemblies were 
established and new workers recruited,
112
 which meant that the formation of a 
denomination was becoming inevitable. Indeed, on 7
th
 June 1918 the Elim Pentecostal 
                                                 
109




 Desmond Cartwright, The Great Evangelists, 44. 
111
 Desmond Cartwright, The Great Evangelists, 44; Hathaway, ‘The Elim Pentecostal Church,’ 13. 
112
 Chris Cartwright mentions that by 1920 there were 15 churches in Ireland; Chris Cartwright, Defining 
Moments, 26; cf. Kay, George Jeffreys, 82.   
178 
 
Alliance was formed – subsuming the Elim Evangelistic Band, Elim assemblies and 
Elim missions – and effectively constituted Elim as a denomination (although at this 
stage members of the Alliance could also be members of their existing churches and 
Elim was not ‘encouraging members to leave their own denominations’).
113
  George 
Jeffreys was made the Superintendent of this new denomination with the power to 
nominate its Council who would function as the denomination’s governing body, 




In the 1920s Elim expanded from Ireland to Wales, England and Scotland, and further 
structures and increasing central control were introduced in the 1922 Constitution.
115
 
George Jeffreys remained as the unchallenged founder and leader of the movement 
with an ability to choose a team of Overseers ‘for the purpose of consultation and 
decision on any matter affecting the Elim Pentecostal Alliance as the need arises.’
116
 
The Constitution also highlights a specific role for the General Secretary as Jeffreys’ 
right hand person, as well as District Superintendents to look after workers and 
assemblies within their area.
117
 The increasing structure and control was believed to 
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As suggested in the previous chapter (see 3.2.2.), one of the perceived failures of the 
Welsh Revival was its inability to provide sufficient social structures and institutions 
to maintain its revivalistic success. And it seems that Elim was wary of finding British 
Pentecostalism and its own revivalism in the same predicament. This fear is reflected 
in Ernest C. W. Boulton’s analysis of the development of British Pentecostalism and 
Elim. He writes:  
Within six years of its introduction into Great Britain, the Pentecostal revival had 
assumed such proportions as to necessitate the creation of some form of scriptural 
organisation. To observant minds it was evidence that unless some stable, scriptural 
government was established, the whole thing would become unwieldy and 





Boulton continues by arguing that it was at this stage that Jeffreys and Elim entered the 
religious scene with its ‘scriptural organisation.’ However, constructing such an organisation 
was not a simple task. In fact, the 1922 Constitution was revised a number of times in the 
1920s – partly to attract existing British Pentecostal congregations into the Elim ranks by 
giving them greater autonomy in an otherwise centrally governed alliance – before it was 
finally cemented in the 1934 Deed Poll.
120
 For understanding the social embodiment of the 
Elim argument as a new denomination, there are at least three important factors to note from 
the Deed Poll. 
  
First, the Deed Poll firmly articulates the purpose of the Elim movement. That is, Elim’s 
name as ‘Elim Foursquare Gospel Alliance’ is confirmed and the ‘objects of the Alliance are 
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to spread and propagate the full Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ and the Fundamental 
Truths.’
121
 These statements affirm that the content of the Elim argument is to be the 
Foursquare Gospel with its supporting doctrines. 
 
Second, the objectives of Elim are to be carried out through ‘the training and sending of 
Ministers and Evangelists, the establishment of Churches, the formation of Sunday Schools 
and the issue of religious publications throughout Great Britain and elsewhere’ (commas 
added).
122
 In other words, the Elim argument is to be embodied by ministers, evangelists, 
local congregations, children/youth ministries, training and publications. 
 
Third, the governance of Elim is transferred from George Jeffreys to the Executive Council 
consisting of nine members.
123
 As the founder of the movement, Jeffreys was still an ex 
officio member of the Executive and was also able to personally nominate three of its nine 
members. The other ex officio member of the Executive was the General Secretary (E. J. 
Phillips). Nevertheless, the remaining four members were to be chosen by the Ministerial 
Conference, consisting of Elim’s increasing number of ministers. Thus, Jeffreys could no 
longer govern without the support of the Executive approved by its ministers. For Elim this 
began the process of sharing power within the wider Elim community, which would 
increasingly become the case through the movement’s first and second epistemological crises 
(see chapters 5-6). 
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Thus, the Deed Poll can be seen as ending the first stage of Elim’s tradition formation. That 
is, the Deed Poll seeks to articulate the purpose, nature and structure of Elim, and deliberately 
makes it difficult to change these going forward.
124
 Elim had now ‘come of age;’ it had 
developed from the Elim Evangelistic Band to a denomination comprising of assemblies, 
ministers and ministries. 
 
4.4.3. Publishing and Training: The Supporting Systems of the Elim Argument  
As well as having an Evangelistic Band, assemblies, ministers and other ministries, Elim also 
developed additional systems to further sustain its argument, namely, publishing and training. 
In terms of publishing, the Elim Evangel was launched in December 1919. The Evangel was 
Elim’s official organ of communication with the aim of promulgating the movement’s 
theology, reflecting on and advertising Elim’s various ministries (particularly the revivalistic 
meetings), and encouraging the Elim community to increasingly live out the Full Gospel. For 
the interested ‘outsiders’ the periodical also functioned as a window into Elim. Elim was also 
the first Pentecostal movement ‘to move into independent publishing’ when in April 1924 it 
opened its purpose-built printing press.
125
 The press was used effectively to publish 
pamphlets/books and by 1936 it had published over 50 books.
126
 Like the Evangel, these 
publications helped to consolidate Elim’s Pentecostal message in the minds of its adherents 
and to introduce the movement’s message to new audiences.  
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These early Elim books, pamphlets and articles were generally characterised by their 
biblicism and testimonial nature. This is not surprising vis-à-vis Elim’s rationality. The reason 
being that Elim’s epistemic biblicism demanded that the movement’s argument be 
consistently supported, explained and developed in light of the Christian Scriptures. Its 
pragmatism, on the other hand, meant that experience accompanied with visible effects 
should also be central stage in its rhetoric, and the next best thing to personal experience is a 
second person account of such phenomena (i.e. testimony).        
 
When it came to training, Elim opened its Bible College in 1925. As Elim expanded in 
England, there was an increasing need for new ministers to lead the recently established 
churches. Most of these ministers, however, had received little or no theological training, and 
thus it was deemed necessary for Elim to open its own Bible College.
127
 The purpose of the 
college is made clear in an Elim Evangel notice titled ‘Elim Bible College: Four Square on the 
Word of God.’
128
 The notice states that ‘studies in all things essential to the four square 
ministry of the Word will be given, as well as practical training in the ever increasing Elim 




Malcolm Hathaway observes that the early theological curriculum of the Elim Bible College 
‘was very basic, majoring on Pentecostal doctrines and practices, and evangelism.’
130
 The 
early courses tended to be short (some students staying only for a few months), and the first 
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tutors were not academically qualified theologians or biblical scholars.
131
 Nevertheless, it was 
believed that there was a need to instruct future ministers in the Bible as well as in Pentecostal 
doctrines. The fact that the lecturers were not academically trained did not seem to be an 
issue, as long as they were considered to be well versed in the Bible, possessed a good 
understanding of the Full Gospel, and were perceived to be practically effective. Indeed, 
Elim’s rationality of Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism and its message of the Foursquare 
Gospel did not require academic credentials of the college tutors, as long as they effectively 
exemplified the Elim ethos and were able to instruct others accordingly. 
 
In summary, the Elim argument was socially embodied first in its revivalistic meetings 
facilitated by the Elim Evangelistic Band and then the Revival Party. This provided the space 
for Elim to demonstrate the strength of its arguments by drawing people to experience what it 
deemed as the biblical Full Gospel. Second, the assemblies, ministers and various ministries, 
which in the end constituted the Elim denomination, provided the structures for maintaining 
and discipling the faithful advocates of the Elim argument. Elim’s various Constitutions from 
1922 to 1934 sought to clarify and formalise these structures. Third, publishing and training 
institutions functioned as supporting systems to inspire and educate people in the ways of the 
Full Gospel.    
 
4.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that the Elim argument was directed at, and offered as, an 
alternative to liberal Christianity, cessationist fundamentalism and ritualistic religion. The 
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content of the argument was essentially the Foursquare Gospel (‘hard core’) surrounded by 
Elim’s doctrinal statements (‘auxiliary hypotheses’). The rationality of the argument was 
Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism; that is, Elim’s epistemology was shaped by the wider 
Pentecostal tradition; Elim saw the Bible as the grounding document with respect to truth; and 
its theories of justification were effectively pragmatic with an emphasis on experience and 
‘results’/’effects.’ The content and rationality of the Elim argument was socially embodied in 
revivalistic meetings, in the emerging Elim denomination consisting of local churches, 
ministers and various ministries, and in its publishing and training institutions. 
 
The Pentecostal rationality articulated in this chapter is ‘contextual’ and thus follows in the 
methodological footsteps of Amos Yong, James Smith and William Oliverio, Jr. However, in 
identifying a tradition-specific rationality along MacIntyrian lines the chapter also makes its 
own contribution to the search for a Pentecostal rationality in four ways.  
 
First, it acknowledges that Pentecostal rationalities need to be understood in their historical 
contexts and in relation to their dialogue partners and implied opponents. Consequently, 
Smith’s point that early twentieth century Pentecostalism can be seen as a reaction to and 
within modernism is supported by the description of the emerging Elim argument. 
 
Second, the theological guiding principle for Pentecostal rationality – or at least for Elim’s 
Pentecostal rationality – has been identified as the Christological Foursquare Gospel. This is 
an important difference to those Pentecostal rationalities that start with pneumatology (e.g. 
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Yong’s ‘pneumatological imagination’). Although the reality of the Christological Foursquare 
Gospel was seen to be pneumatically mediated, the theological essence was still 
Christologically focused. The Foursquare Gospel also provides the ‘hard core’ for the Elim 
Pentecostal paradigm with the doctrinal statement functioning as ‘auxiliary hypothesis.’ So, 
what has been depicted in this chapter can be seen to propose a further articulation of what 
Oliverio’s Pentecostal hermeneutical paradigm/research programme could consist of, albeit I 
do not claim that the content of the Elim argument is necessarily universal to all classical 
Pentecostals.  
 
Third, Elim’s rationality as Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism underscores the need for (1) 
understanding Pentecostal epistemology in the context of its Evangelical and Pentecostal 
heritage (Pentecostal); (2) it highlights the centrality of the Bible, as articulated particularly in 
Smith’s epistemology (biblical); and (3) it demonstrates the pragmatic nature of Pentecostal 
epistemology, a feature present in Yong’s, Smith’s and Oliverio’s epistemologies 
(pragmatism). As a philosophical tradition, therefore, Elim is effectively a pragmatic tradition 
with a number of similarities to American Pragmatism.
132
 In particular, it seems that the 
narrative nature of Elim and other (British) classical Pentecostals is closely connected to 
pragmatism to the extent that Pentecostals love to tell stories, because second person accounts 
are the best way of communicating personal ‘experiences’ and the effects of those 
‘experiences.’    
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Wacker, Heaven Below, 13; Koo Dong Yun, ‘A Metaphysical Construct of Experience: Concerning the 
Problematic Usage of ‘Experience’ within Pentecostal Horizons,’ in The Role of Experience in Christian Life 
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Fourth, I have outlined that as a living tradition the content and rationality of the Elim 
argument is inevitably socially embodied, with institutions and epistemic systems both 
reflecting and supporting the tradition. These social embodiments are more varied, complex 
and organised than suggested by Smith’s focus just on a Pentecostal worship service, even if 
these dynamic gatherings are also important social embodiments as seen vis-à-vis the 
revivalistic meetings of Elim.  
 
As a final note, in this chapter I have not evaluated or developed Elim’s tradition specific 
Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism, but I will do so in Part III of the thesis. However, before 
this can be adequately done, I will need to narrate the Elim argument in light of its two major 
epistemological crises. To put it differently, this chapter has only provided the first scene 
(albeit a major scene) of the Elim narrative, and it is now time to narrate the next two major 
scenes.   
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CHAPTER 5 – THE ELIM ARGUMENT EXTENDED THROUGH TIME (I): THE 
RESIGNATION OF JEFFREYS AND ELIM’S FIRST EPISTEMOLOGICAL CRISIS 
 
The previous chapter has outlined the birth of the Elim argument, with particular emphasis on 
the implied opponents, the content of the Elim argument, its tacit rationality and its social 
embodiment. In MacIntyrian terms this can be stated as the birth of the Elim tradition and the 
first stage of its tradition formation. However, after a tradition has been formed, MacIntyre 
sees traditions evolving and developing by going through two further stages.
1
 As discussed in 
chapter two, at the second stage inadequacies and incoherencies are identified within the 
tradition, which can be fuelled by internal debates within, or external critique from outside, 
the community. This second stage can also be seen as an ‘epistemological crisis’ within the 
tradition, as it can cause the tradition to not just question its identity but also its existing 
beliefs, sources of knowledge and its practices regarding epistemic warrant.
2
  The third stage 
provides a potential remedy for the epistemological crisis encountered during the second 
stage, resulting in reformulations and reinterpretations of the tradition.  
 
For MacIntyre the degree to which the inadequacies can be resolved depends on the resources 
available within the community’s tradition and on the community’s inventiveness. Moreover, 
for the movement to continue after the reformulation, ‘some core of shared belief, constitutive 
of allegiance to the tradition, has to survive,’
3
 because without some continuity the tradition 
bears no resemblance to its authoritative origins and thus has been transformed altogether into 
                                                 
1
 Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 354-355. 
2
 See MacIntyre, ‘Epistemological crises, dramatic narrative, and the philosophy of science,’ 3-23.  
3
 MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 356. 
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something else. As living traditions evolve and develop stages two and three are regularly 
revisited, and it is this continual process that makes a tradition effectively ‘an argument 
extended through time.’ 
   
As has already been suggested in the previous chapter, by 1934 Elim had moved from its 
formational stage into a formalised tradition. The Elim Historian, Maldwyn Jones, points out 
that by 1934 Jeffreys had practically ‘ceased his pioneering evangelistic crusades’ and was 
now focusing on ‘re-visiting the larger churches that he had opened.’
4
 In 1934 Elim also 
introduced the Deed Poll which cemented the movement’s constitution and the young 
tradition’s central tenets, as well as transferred its governance from Jeffreys and his group of 
overseers to the Executive Council approved by the Ministerial Conference. Thus, by 1934 it 




However, Jeffreys did not think that his work in Elim was done. On the contrary, in the 1930s 
he began his efforts to ‘reform’ the institutionalised movement which he had founded; an 
effort which eventually led to his own resignation from Elim and propelled the denomination 
into its first major epistemological crisis. The purported reasons for Jeffreys resignation, as 
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12
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13
 My purpose in this chapter is not to revisit the various factors that led to the schism 
in Elim, such as, the potential personality clashes between E. J. Phillips and George Jeffreys, 
Phillips’ and Jeffreys’ respective illnesses, the tensions in the Irish Churches, the claimed 
financial difficulties in Elim, the formation of the World Revival Crusade, or even the major 
issue of Church government (although I will discuss the question of Church government to 
some extent in section 5.3.).
14
  My focus will be, however, on the issue of British Israelism 
(BI) in the context of Elim’s eschatological beliefs. The exploration of the BI controversy in 
the 1930s is important in not only appreciating a main, if not the main, reason for Jeffreys’ 
resignation, but also in understanding how Elim developed its hard core doctrine of ‘Jesus as 
coming King,’ and thus the BI debate helps illuminate the very nature of the Elim argument in 
terms of its content and rationality. 
 
In discussing Elim’s first epistemological crisis, with a particular emphasis on the BI 
controversy, I will: (1) provide an overview of Elim’s eschatological beliefs in the 1930s; (2) 
                                                                                                                                                        
8
 Desmond Cartwright, The Great Evangelists. This is written by the former Elim historian and therefore broadly 
speaking, although not uncritically, reflects Elim’s view on the matter.  
9
 Albert W. Edsor, ‘Set Your House in Order’: God’s Call to George Jeffreys as the Founder of the Elim 
Pentecostal Movement (Chichester: New Wine Press, 1989). This is a partisan defence of Jeffreys by his 
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 Hathaway, ‘The Elim Pentecostal Church,’ 1-39. This is written by an academic Elim minister and offers a 
balanced, albeit brief, account of the events.   
11
 D. Neil Hudson, ‘A Schism and its Aftermath: an historical analysis of denomination discerption in the Elim 
Pentecostal Church, 1939-1940’ (PhD dissertation, King’s College, London, 1999). To date this is the most 
comprehensive academic account of the schism, and it is written by a critical insider of the Elim movement (i.e. 
an academically trained Elim minister).  
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Pentecostal historian/theologian. It focuses particularly on the British Israel issue and my argument in this 
chapter is most closely aligned with its overall conclusion.    
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narrate the BI debates from 1932 to 1937; (3) suggest that Jeffreys’ attempt to reform Elim’s 
church governance in 1938 to 1940 was largely motivated by his desire to bring BI teaching 
into Elim; and (4) argue how the crisis resulting from Jeffreys’ resignation and its resolution 
substantiates my argument regarding the content (Foursquare Gospel) and rationality 
(Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism) of the Elim argument.  
 
5.1. The Coming King: An Overview of Elim’s Eschatology 
In chapter four I have argued that the Foursquare Gospel of Jesus as Saviour, Healer, Baptiser 
in the Holy Spirit and coming King is the hard core of the Elim argument (see 4.2.4.). I will 
now argue that the question of rightly interpreting the fourth of these foundational beliefs, 
namely, the eschatological doctrine of Jesus as coming King, was central in the Elim debates 
of the 1930s and a key factor leading to the eventual resignation of Jeffreys in 1939. Noel 
Brooks and Albert Edsor (close associates of Jeffreys) claimed that BI, which was Jeffreys’ 
particular understanding of eschatology and fulfilment of biblical prophecy, had nothing to do 
with him leaving Elim but instead he was simply driven by a divine mandate for ‘setting his 
house in order’ and redeeming the local Elim churches from the tyranny of central 
government.
15
 Such interpretation of the events, however, is neither supported by Elim’s 
Conference Minutes or Jeffreys’ letter correspondence with Elim’s Executive Council in the 
1930s, both of which demonstrate his constant attempt to bring BI into Elim. Moreover, such 
a reading also fails to appreciate the importance eschatology played in constituting the Elim 
tradition, particularly during a period when the movement’s apocalyptic senses were 
heightened due to the political uncertainties in Europe. To substantiate this argument, I will 
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 Brooks, Fight for the Faith and Freedom, 74-77; Edsor, ‘Set Your House in Order,’ 123-124. Brooks does 
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191 
 
first discuss Elim’s basic doctrine of Jesus as coming King and then explore the BI 
controversy.           
         
5.1.1. Dispensational Pre-Millennialism 
The doctrine of Jesus as coming King is expressed in the 1934 Deed Poll Fundamental Truths 
as: ‘We believe in the personal and pre-millennial return of our Lord Jesus Christ to receive 
unto Himself the Church and afterwards to set up His Throne as King.’
16
 Four aspects 
regarding this statement are worth highlighting. 
 
First, the return of Christ is believed to be ‘personal.’ The Elim literature from the period 
commonly articulates why Christ’s second coming should not be spiritualised. For example, 
the Elim minister Charles Kingston at the outset of his book The Coming of Christ and After 
seeks to demonstrate that Christ’s return is personal and physical, and he argues against any 
interpretation that tries to equate it with regeneration, Pentecost, or the soul of the Christian 
ascending to heaven after death.
17
 This insistence on the literal and physical return of Christ is 
to a great extent due to Elim’s Pentecostal reaction against the ‘modernist teaching’ on the 
spiritual and non-corporeal nature of the Parousia, although Elim always maintained that its 
view regarding the matter was simply ‘biblical.’ 
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Second, this ‘personal’ and ‘physical’ return of Christ is understood to be premillennial with 
two distinct stages. In the first stage Christ ‘receives[s] unto Himself the Church.’ This stage 
is equated with the ‘rapture’ where Christians, both those who have already died and those 
who are still alive, are taken up from the earth to meet Christ in the clouds (the common 
proof-text used here was 1 Thessalonians 4:16-18). This is followed by the second stage 
where Christ ‘will set up His Throne as King,’ which means that he will return to the earth 
with the Church and begin his thousand year reign on earth (a literal understanding and 
chronological reading of Revelation 20 was generally assumed within Elim literature). The 
tribulation period is believed to take place between stages one and two, and the final judgment 
and the coming of the new heaven and the new earth is thought to succeed Christ’s millennial 
reign.
18
 Thus, Elim’s eschatology of the period is effectively dispensational pre-tribulational 
premillennialism.  
 
Third, linked to Elim’s dispensational premillennialism, there is an assumption that ‘things 
will get worse’ before Christ returns. For example, W. G. Hathaway claims that as the return 
of Christ approaches, persecution of true Christians will increase and apostasy will be 
committed by many.
19
 Kingston echoes this pessimistic outlook by arguing that optimism 
regarding world events is naïve as the current ‘religious signs’ of ‘false religions,’ ‘pleasure 
loving’ and ‘superstition;’ ‘social signs’ of ‘infidelity’ ‘crime’ and ‘immorality;’ ‘providential 
signs’ of ‘famines,’ ‘pestilences’ and ‘earthquakes;’ and ‘political signs’ of ‘wars’ and 
‘distress of nations’ are all expected phenomena before the second coming.
20
 This implies that 
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Elim’s eschatological imagination seems to be dominated by apocalyptic destructionism, and 
hence it is unsurprising that the movement emphasises ‘saving souls’ rather than bringing 
social transformation. F. L. French’s words in Elim Evangel are telling:   
To this day many in the high position in the professing Church see looming largely 
before them a ‘social gospel’ of an improved and bettered world... But God is not 
improving the world in this dispensation. He has judged and condemned it, and is 




To put it simply, Elim’s apocalyptic premillennialism assumes that the world is under 
judgment and therefore investing resources in trying to improve it in the current 
dispensation is at best futile and at worst going against the decrees of God.   
 
Fourth, despite the dire apocalyptic understanding of world events, or perhaps exactly because 
of such dystopic view of the end times, the return of Christ is seen within Elim as the ‘hope of 
the believer.’
22
 In other words, the parousia is believed to complete the history of the world, 
and in contrast to the anticipated apocalyptic calamities, Christ’s coming will initiate a 
harmonious existence between God, people and the whole of creation, which means that the 
new world will be free of death, war and injustice. It is in the light of this eschatological hope 
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5.1.2. Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism and the Three Prophetic Schools 
Elim’s eschatological vision reflects and is informed by its rationality of Pentecostal Biblical 
Pragmatism. That is, the general premillennial framework is inherited from Elim’s (pre-) 
Pentecostal roots, particularly shaped by the dispensational premillennialism of John Nelson 
Darby which was popular in British Holiness and Evangelical circles at the turn of the 
century.
24
 However, although the influence of the late nineteenth century radical Evangelical 
eschatology is significant, Elim was always quick to highlight that its views were biblical; 
that is, the bible was maintained as the grounding document for its eschatological beliefs. M. 
L. Lowe represents Elim’s perspective well when he writes that to rightly understand the 
nature of Christ’s return one needs to simply ‘take it to the Scriptures.’
25
 Correct exposition of 
the scriptures and its prophecies regarding the end times was then characterised by Elim’s 
pragmatism with a focus on ‘effects’ and ‘results.’ To put it differently, Elim’s eschatology 
was strongly characterised by an emphasis on biblical prophecies and an attempt to try to 
correlate them with real world events. Ernest C. W. Boulton, in an Elim Evangel editorial, 
went as far as to suggest that he could not think of a ‘mightier or weightier argument’ in the 
Church’s ‘conflict with atheism, agnosticism and modern criticism, than that of fulfilled 
prophecy.’
26
 This ‘fulfilled prophecy’ referred to the promises that were believed to have been 
fulfilled during the biblical era, as well as those that were now supposedly being fulfilled 
before the very eyes of Boulton and his contemporaries. The point was that the pragmatic 
effects of biblical prophecy were allegedly visible in the unfolding history of the world.  
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Elim’s hard core doctrine of Jesus as Coming King understood in a pre-millennial framework 
was seen as a non-negotiable within the Elim tradition, not least as it seemed to be consonant 
with its rationality of Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism. Nevertheless, within this agreed 
doctrinal framework, in the 1930s there were three interpretive schools of thought particularly 
with respect to understanding biblical prophecies. These were: (1) the Historicist School 
which saw biblical prophecies, particularly the Book of Revelation, being fulfilled during the 
different epochs of church history, with a view that the seven churches in Revelation 2-3 
referred to the seven dispensations of the Church; (2) the Futurist School which saw many 
biblical prophecies, and Revelation especially, as being fulfilled just before the return of 
Christ; (3) the BI School which saw Celto-Anglo-Saxon people as the lost tribes of Israel with 




At the risk of repetition, it is worth underscoring that all three schools utilised Elim’s 
rationality of biblical pragmatism in seeking to identify and point out the ‘effects’ of biblical 
prophecy on past, present and future world events. However, despite the shared rationality by 
these three schools within Elim, it was the debate between them, and particularly the rejection 
of BI by the majority of Elim ministers as a reasonable school of eschatological interpretation, 
that contributed to Elim’s first ‘epistemological crisis.’  
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5.2. The British Israel Controversy 
The origins of modern BI can be traced to John Wilson and his work Our Israelitish Origin 
(1814).
28
 The BI teaching gained particular prominence towards the late nineteenth century 
probably due to the increasing interest in biblical prophecy, ‘abounding racial theories’ in 
Europe, and the global dominance of the British Empire.
29
 Indeed, at the beginning of the 
twentieth century BI had up to two million adherents,
30
 and from 1919 onwards the British 
Israel World Federation functioned as the movement’s leading society.
31
 Some notable early 
Pentecostal pioneers, such as, the American Charles Fox Parham and the British William 
Oliver Hutchinson were followers of BI.
32
 In Elim the three most vocal advocates of this 
doctrine were John Leech, George Jeffreys and James McWhirter.       
     
There was no one official version of BI, and Jeffreys was in fact careful to distance himself 
from what he saw as the more extreme aspects of BI.
33
 Nevertheless, the central feature of BI 
was the identification of the Celto-Anglo-Saxons as Israelites and Britain as Israel (or at least 
the Tribe of Ephraim).
34
 To justify this ‘identity’ the following reasons were commonly 
offered by the advocates of BI.  
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The BI proponents believed that God promised Abraham that until the end of the age the 
people of Israel would survive and function as a nation. However, in light of the defeat and 
exile of Israel’s Northern Kingdom (722 BCE) and Judah’s Southern Kingdom (586 BCE), 
this promised continuity for Israel as a nation had not been realised in Palestine. 
Consequently, it was suggested by the supporters of BI that this continuation of Israel as a 
nation needed to be actualised elsewhere for God to have fulfilled his promise to Abraham. 
Following from this assumption, it was then proposed that God had been faithful in fulfilling 
his promise in the Celto-Anglo-Saxon people who were in fact Israel.  
 
Equating Britain as Israel was maintained by a historical narrative which claimed that after 
the destruction of Judah, Zedekiah’s daughters escaped Egypt and took refuge in the ‘isles of 
the sea’ (Jer. 31:10), which was understood to be the British Isles. The descendants of 
Zedekiah’s daughters were then believed to have become the royal house in Britain, meaning 
that ‘the British royal family is directly linked to the house of David.’
35
 The common 
Israelites followed the royal line to the British Isles gradually after wandering through Europe 
following their initial exile to Assyria in 722 BCE.
36
 A key proof-text used here was 2 Samuel 
7:10 which supposedly referred to God ‘planting’ Israel to a ‘place’ interpreted as Britain 
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where they would ‘dwell in their own place and be disturbed no more.’
37
 Thus, Britain was 
seen as the modern day Israel and the success of the British Empire, as well as other Celto-
Anglo-Saxon nations (e.g. United States of America), was explained as God’s divine favour 
on his chosen people. 
 
A key assumption within BI was the distinction between ‘Jews’ and ‘Israel’; that is, ‘Jews’ 
consisted of the tribes of Judah and Benjamin, whereas ‘Israel’ consisted of the remaining ten 
(or eleven) tribes. This distinction was important for BI because it allowed its adherents to 
argue that those who returned to Judah from 538 BCE onwards as recorded in Ezra-Nehemiah 
were primarily the ‘Jews’ rather than the ten tribes of ‘Israel.’
38
 The tribes of ‘Israel,’ 
according to BI, did not return to Palestine but made their way to Britain. Furthermore, there 
was a common assumption that it had been the ‘Jews’ in Palestine during the first century 
rather than ‘Israel’ who had rejected Christ, and ‘Israel’ as the Celto-Anglo-Saxon peoples 
had on the whole accepted Christ. James McWhirter went as far as to suggest that this meant 
that the ‘spiritual blessing’ promised to Judah had now been transferred to ‘Israel’ (read: 
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5.2.1. The First Round of the British Israel Controversy: The Elim Conferences 1932-
1934 
Although Jeffreys seems to have adopted the BI position from around 1920 onwards – most 
likely due to the influence of John Leech – BI does not really feature within Elim literature 
until the early 1930s.
40
 There seems to be no single reason why all of a sudden Jeffreys began 
to advocate strongly for BI. Nevertheless, it appears that for Elim as a movement the 
uncertain political climate of 1930s Europe brought eschatological questions increasingly to 
the forefront of its psyche. Moreover, by the 1930s the hard-core of the Elim argument (read: 
Foursquare Gospel) and its Fundamental Truths had been firmly established, which means 
that there was a growing need to further develop the auxiliary hypotheses surrounding these 
core doctrines. 
 
Whatever the reasons for the emergence of BI in Elim, it was seen as a significant doctrine by 
its advocates. Although in some correspondence Jeffreys refers to BI as a secondary doctrine 
and a ‘minor question’ in relation to Elim’s Fundamental Truths,
41
 his persistence, despite the 
strong opposition, in trying to make BI an acceptable prophetic interpretive school within 
Elim suggests that it had greater significance for Jeffreys than he publicly indicated. Indeed, 
James McWhirter – Jeffreys’ close associate, member of his Revival Party and fellow 
supporter of BI – believed that:  
                                                 
40
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The greatest spiritual awakening that has ever been will come with the realization of 
our identity with Israel. The psychological effect will be that the nation will begin to 
live up to it, and at that time the nation will be re-born. When our national privilege is 
understood it will beget in us a sacred sense of responsibility. The result will be 
transforming reaction from materialism to new spiritual life. That is Paul’s argument to 
the Romans. ‘Now if the fall of them (Israel) be the riches of the world, and the loss of 




If Jeffreys shared these sentiments and believed that BI was the missing key in initiating ‘the 
greatest spiritual awakening,’ it is no wonder why he passionately attempted to make Elim a 
BI movement.
43
 Jeffreys first attempt to bring BI into Elim came in 1932 at Elim’s ‘Northern 
Division Conference’ at Glossop.
44
 BI received a cold reception among the Elim ministers 
present, so Jeffreys decided to bring up the issue again in Elim’s first ever national ministerial 
conference in 1933. The minutes of the 1933 conference note that the question of BI, Futurist 
and Historicist Interpretations of Prophecy were discussed under ‘Supplementary Statement 
of Belief,’ and regarding BI the Conference ‘agreed that it should neither be preached nor 





The 1933 conference decision, however, did not weaken Jeffreys’ resolve, and for the 1934 
conference he requested that BI would be debated by the conference and almost two days was 
dedicated for this debate.
46
 The 1934 conference debate proved to be a watershed moment for 
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BI in Elim, albeit not for the reasons hoped for by Jeffreys. On the Tuesday morning of the 
conference, John Leech – a well-educated and established debater –
47
 ‘spoke on the subject of 
British-Israelism, and his address was discussed for the remainder of the morning.’
48
 The rest 
of Tuesday focused on other matters, and the debate continued on Wednesday with the whole 
day devoted for the topic. Leech started the morning by presenting the case for BI, after which 
‘he was questioned, and his address was discussed.’
49
 This was followed by E. J. Phillips 
presenting his reasons against BI,
50




The content and nature of the conference BI debate is a practical demonstration of Elim’s 
biblical pragmatism in action. Unfortunately the official notes from the debate do not include 
Leech’s opening speech.
52
 Nevertheless, the questioning and criticism of Leech which have 
been preserved indicate what he probably covered in his initial presentation.
53
 Based on these 
notes William Kay reasonably suggests that Leech seemed to focus first in trying to provide 
evidence for the distinction between ‘Jews’ (Judah) and ‘Israel’ (the ten northern tribes), and 
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the notion that Israel did not return to Palestine with Judah after the exile. Secondly, Leech 




To substantiate these two points, Leech appears to have argued primarily from the Bible and 
secondarily from history/ethnography. His biblical arguments explored 2 Samuel 7:10 which 
he saw as a reference to Israel being planted in Britain, and Isaiah 41, 49:1 which he claimed 
spoke of the British Isles. At the risk of oversimplification, the logic of Leech’s pragmatic 
biblical argument went along the following lines: (1) 2 Samuel 7:10 refers to God richly 
blessing his people by planting them to ‘another place;’ (2) the Isaiah passages indicate that 
this ‘place’ is the (British) Isles far away from Palestine; and (3) in light of God’s perceived 
blessing of Britain and its current Empire, Britain must be the place referred to in these 
passages and the British people must be the lost tribes of Israel. He further supported his 
‘biblical’ argument by historical/ethnographical claims that the British people are a pure 
nation, implying their ethnic purity as Israelites. In his own words, ‘I can assure you that our 
people here are not a mixed people; they come from one stock, and all modern and learned 




The conference members, however, were not convinced of Leech’s arguments. They not only 
challenged his historical and ethnographical claims,
56
 but they particularly critiqued his 
biblical statements in two ways. First, they pointed out that his BI interpretations were not the 
natural reading of the texts. For example, W. G. Hathaway stated that ‘the place’ of 2 Samuel 
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7:10 probably simply refers to Palestine and actually in the text there is no reference to 
‘another place;’
57
 E. J. Phillips noted that in light of the context of 2 Samuel 7:10, the promise 
applies to all tribes of Israel, not just to Leech’s proposed ten northern tribes, and so 
challenged the assumed distinction between ‘Israel’ and the ‘Jews’;
58
 and Charles Kingston 
remarked that Isaiah was actually written to Judah and not to the ten tribes of Israel, 
undermining Leech’s idea that Isaiah somehow referred to the ten Northern tribes dwelling in 
the far away Islands.
59
 Moreover, Leech’s interpretation of certain Hebrew words and verb 
tenses were questioned.
60
 This interaction between Leech and his critics shows the centrality 
of the Bible within the debate, as well as the conference members’ deep knowledge of the 
Bible and their ability to wrestle with hermeneutical questions. It also demonstrates that the 
Elim ministers did not accept beliefs blindly but evaluated doctrines in light of Scripture.   
 
Second, as well as criticising Leech’s biblical exegesis, the conference also challenged the 
logic of Leech’s argumentation. As already alluded to, Leech effectively utilised a pragmatic 
rationality to justify BI; that is, he maintained that the ‘results’ which for him was the 
superiority of Britain and its Empire demonstrated the truth of BI. However, both E. J. 
Phillips and Charles Kingston objected to what they saw as inappropriate circularity and 
‘question begging’ in Leech’s argument.
61
 Phillips and Kingston had a fair point, as in terms 
of propositional logic Leech seemed to suffer from the logical fallacy of ‘affirming the 
consequent’ (i.e. the ‘converse error’). To spell this out, a pragmatic BI argument in a valid 
modus ponens format would probably have gone something along the lines of ‘If Britain is 
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Israel, then Britain experiences global dominance.’ However, this need not imply the 
converse, namely, ‘If Britain experiences global dominance, then Britain is Israel,’ since there 
could be various reasons why Britain could experience global dominance with no relation 
whatsoever to its identity as Israel. In fairness to Leech’s logic, all pragmatic arguments are 
susceptible to this type of circularity. Therefore, as pointed out by Bruce Marshall, a 
pragmatic thesis can at best only falsify rather than verify a belief.
62
 In other words, and in 
relation to Leech’s BI argument, Britain’s global dominance cannot verify the truth of BI, 
because there could be other reasons to explain this phenomenon. But, if Britain does not 
experience global dominance, then this lack of dominance may well falsify the BI doctrine 
(assuming of course that British dominance is a necessary sign for its identity as Israel). 
Consequently, the best that Leech’s pragmatic argument could ever do by the very nature of 
being pragmatic was to suggest that BI was not false, but strictly speaking it could never 
prove the truth of BI.  
 
This accusation of ‘question begging’, as well as the inability for Leech to prove his BI 
position, on their own would have probably not sufficiently undermined the BI position 
among the conference members, not least as the Elim tradition as whole embodied a 
pragmatic rationality not dissimilar to the one used by Leech. However, Leech’s supposed 
‘question begging’ combined with (1) the more natural and anti-BI readings of the biblical 
texts in question, (2) the more plausible eschatological schools of interpretation already within 
Elim (i.e. Futurist and Historicist), and (3) the possible falsifying evidence against BI 
provided by Phillips in his upcoming speech, ensured that BI doctrine remained unconvincing 
to the conference members. 
                                                 
62




Indeed, Phillips in his presentation was determined to provide this falsifying evidence against 
BI. Appreciating the centrality of the Bible within the Elim constituency, he maintained that 
‘in my arguments against [BI] I am going to confine myself entirely to the scriptures.’
63
 Neil 
Hudson has suggested that Phillips’ reasoning was primarily ‘pragmatic’ rather than 
‘theological.’
64
 This inference, however, is not supported by the notes from the debate, where 
Phillips fundamentally produces biblical and theological arguments. In fact, Phillips produces 
eight distinct theological arguments. In the first argument, which is by far the most detailed, 
he states that the BI distinction between ‘Jews’ and ‘Israel’ cannot be maintained in light of 
Scripture. He systematically explores passages from 1 Chronicles, 2 Chronicles, Ezra, 
Nehemiah, Esther, Jeremiah, Ezekiel and Acts, with the following conclusion: 
I say [that] from these Scriptures we have overwhelming proof that the Jews and the 
Israelites are one people, and consequently it is useless to look for the 10 tribes outside 
the people today who are called Jews and generally known as Jews. There may be a 
few odd ones outside; I do not deny it; they have been scattered and left behind, but the 
Jews generally embrace the whole of Israel.
65
   
     
His second argument notes that many of the promises to Israel, like ‘growing in number,’ are 
actually conditional on Israel ‘obeying the voice of the Lord and keeping His 
commandments.’
66
 He does not think that any ‘sanctified Christian’ would suggest that 
Britain as a nation is obedient to God, and therefore many of the so-called ‘blessings’ claimed 
by the advocates of BI to currently ‘rest on’ Britain (e.g. growing population) due to its 
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identity as Israel cannot be right. To the contrary, argues Phillips, if Britain were Israel due to 
the nation’s current disobedience to Christ they should actually be experiencing punishment 




The third and fourth arguments simply pointed out that unlike the Jews, Britain does not 
follow Israel’s mandate of the Sabbath or circumcision.
68
 The fifth proposed that according to 
James 1:1 and Acts 26:6-7 the ten tribes were never lost in the first place (contra BI). The 
sixth claimed that Amos 9:8 suggests that God never intended just to restore the ten tribes of 
Israel;
69
 the seventh argued that the Jews alone have remained as a distinct people group 
according to Numbers 23:9, not the British;
70
 and the final argument maintained that Britain 
cannot be Israel because it has ‘borrowed millions of pounds’ and has a significant national 




After making his speech, Phillips was questioned by the members of conference. Much of the 
questioning focuses on whether the ‘bulk’ of the ten tribes returned to Palestine with Judah, 
and whether the ten tribes had ever been reunited with Judah after the exile.
72
 Leech also tried 
to explain how James, Peter and Paul in the NT could refer to the twelve tribes, but that did 
not mean that the bulk of the ten tribes were not lost.
73
 The most vocal critics of Phillips’ 
presentation seemed to be Leech (naturally), Robert Mercer and James McWhirter. Jeffreys 
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functioned as the moderator of the debate, and although on the whole he chaired the debate 




After the debate, it was discussed whether BI should be taught in Elim churches. According to 
the conference minutes:   
...it was decided, evidently [and] unanimously that it [BI] should neither be preached 
nor attacked in any Elim Church under Direct Government, nor should any Minister 
under direct Government on any B.I. platform. As regards Elim Churches not under 
Direct Government the majority were apparently of the opinion that it should be 
permissible to preach it within certain limits provided that it would not harm in any 




A vote was also taken on the notion of BI ‘identity.’ Of the 131 eligible to vote: 17 
accepted BI, 73 rejected it, and 41 were neutral.
76
 The conference decision to ban the 
teaching of BI in the main Elim churches and the vote with a majority of the 
conference rejecting BI indicates that Phillips was the clear winner of the debate, 
although based on the 1932 and 1933 conferences it seems that majority of Elim 
ministers were already predisposed against BI before the debate. Nevertheless, the 
biblical tour de force provided by Phillips seemed to provide a blow for BI within the 
Elim movement from which it would never recover. The potential appeal of Leech’s 
faltering pragmatic logic and his questionable scriptural interpretations, were 
dismantled by Phillips’ systematic biblical arguments. 
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The debate underscores an important aspect of Elim’s biblical pragmatism. That is, 
Elim’s rationality is not just pragmatism. If its rationality would have simply been 
characterised by pragmatism, Leech may have been able to muster greater support for 
BI with his pragmatic arguments. However, he was not able to do so because Elim’s 
rationality is biblical pragmatism. This means that a belief’s ‘effects’ and ‘results’ on 
their own are not sufficient to convince an Elimite of its ‘truth’, if the belief does not 
also have sufficient grounding in Scripture. In other words, pragmatic effectiveness 
needs to be married with scriptural faithfulness within Elim’s biblical pragmatism. 
Indeed, Leech was not criticised as such for his pragmatism by Phillips but for his poor 
biblical hermeneutics.
77
 This suggests that within Elim’s biblical pragmatism a text has 
certain interpretive limits and a text cannot be made to mean anything even if such an 
interpretation might have pragmatic potential. Some assumed hermeneutical principles 
need to guide the scope of possible interpretations. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, and as seen in this debate, these hermeneutical principles are informed by 
Elim’s common sense ‘Bible Reading Method.’ That said, this does not mean that 
Elim’s rationality is thus simply characterised by biblicism. Phillips’ own rhetoric and 
biblical interpretation regarding the history of the Jewish people carried pragmatic 
elements, and as an experienced debater Leech most certainly would have not utilised 
pragmatic arguments if he believed them to carry no weigh with his audience. In sum, 
Elim’s tacit rationality in the 1934 conference debate was biblical pragmatism.   
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5.2.2. The Second Round of the British Israel Controversy: The Elim Conferences in 
1935-1939 
Although in 1934 Leech was defeated by Phillips in the BI debate and the doctrine of BI was 
clearly rejected by the Elim conference, Jeffreys brought up BI once again in the 1935 Elim 
conference. Jeffreys’ motivation for doing so seems to have been at least partly influenced by 
certain members of the conference being dissatisfied about not being able to preach BI within 
the centrally governed Elim churches. To that effect, the minutes of the 1935 conference note 
that Jeffreys ‘suggested that there should be liberty to preach British-Israelism in Direct 
Government Churches and outlined the points of agreement in Futurist, Historicist, and 
British-Israel Schools.’
78
 This was followed by a vote about these three main schools of 
prophetic interpretation. The question put to the conference was whether it accepted, rejected 
or was neutral with respect to these three schools. When it came to the ‘Futurist 
Interpretation’ of the 102 total votes: 68 accepted it, 11 rejected it and 23 were neutral; 
regarding the ‘Historicists Interpretation’ of the 103 total votes: 59 accepted it, 13 rejected it 





The voting results indicate that the ‘Futurist Interpretation’ regarding biblical prophecy was 
the most popular within Elim and the ‘Historicist Interpretation’ a close second. Both of these 
schools were also accepted by more people than the combined numbers of those who rejected 
or held neutral positions regarding them. This suggests that both positions were broadly 
accepted within Elim and the two interpretations were not necessarily seen as being mutually 
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exclusive; that is, the numbers in favour of both suggest that indeed some accepted both 
interpretative frameworks.  
 
BI, however, was not affirmed by the conference. In fact, more people rejected the position 
than affirmed it or expressed neutrality regarding it. This general acceptance of the Futurist 
and Historicist Interpretations and the rejection of BI is also reflected in the vote vis-à-vis 
which schools of prophecy should not be taught in Elim. Of the 84 who voted on this 
particular issue, five were against the Futurist School, seven against the Historicist School, 
and 72 against BI.
80
 The numbers speak for themselves. 
 
These votes were followed by further discussion and debate on the question of BI, until the 
following resolution was proposed by E. J. Phillips and carried by the conference:  
...this Conference desires to place on record that while it has never imposed any 
definite ban on the teaching of British-Israel in any Elim Church, its Ministers 
mutually agree that for the purpose of preserving unity it shall treat the teaching of 
British-Israel in the same way as is the custom with other matter on which there is an 
acute difference of opinion, viz: neither to propagate it nor attack it in any Direct 
Government Church. It further puts on record that for the same reason it considers it 





So, yet again Jeffreys and his proposals in favour of BI were rejected by the Conference. The 
defeat of BI at the 1934 conference could not be reversed by Jeffreys in 1935. In fact, the 
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conference minutes read that after his defeat Jeffreys promised ‘that he would never bring up 




Indeed, the question of BI seems not to have been discussed at the 1936 Elim Conferrence.
83
 
Nonetheless, Jeffreys had not yet given up on bringing BI into Elim. In 1937 from January to 
March there was an extended letter correspondence between Jeffreys and Phillips/Elim’s 
Executive Council on the question of BI.
84
 It was initiated by Phillips’ concern that if Jeffreys 
was to launch his ‘World Revival Crusade,’
85
 he would be leading an organisation which 
‘would propagate doctrines which are considered unscriptural by the majority of Elim 
people,’
86
 and by these ‘unscriptural’ doctrines Phillips meant BI.
87
 Jeffreys appears to have 
been offended by Phillips’ allegation of him holding ‘unscriptural’ beliefs,
88
 which is not 
surprising for a leader of movement that prides itself on being biblical. 
 
Jeffreys then tried to justify the validity of his BI position and he pleads with Phillips that he 
should be ‘given the same liberty in the pulpit and in the press, as is given to the other views 
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on prophecy in Elim.’
89
 He later also argues that if one was to follow ‘strict neutrality’ 
regarding BI, as suggested by the 1933, 1934 and 1935 conference decisions, then 
large proportion of Futurist Teaching would have to be cut out to maintain a neutral 
attitude. For example: There must be no suggestion that the Jews constitute all Israel, 




In Jeffreys letters there is also an increasing undertone that if he will not have his way, 
he will resign from Elim.
91
 The correspondence effectively finishes with Phillips 
frustratingly stating that Jeffreys seems to have given the Executive only two options: 
(1) for Jeffreys to resign as the leader of the movement or (2) allow the teaching of BI 
in all Elim churches. Phillips thinks that both options would ‘split the work.’
92
 Phillips 
surmises that the Executive is uncomfortable with both of these options, and thus the 




Phillips was not able to attend the September 1937 Elim Conference due to illness, 
caused predominantly by years of overworking and stress exacerbated by the BI 
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 Nevertheless, before the conference he wrote a letter from his hospital 
bed to Boulton, Hathaway, Corry, Kingston and Smith and advised them how to 
repudiate Jeffreys’ attempts to make BI acceptable in Elim. Phillips also wrote a letter 
to Jeffreys where he pleaded with his old friend not to split Elim over BI. He states 
frankly that due to Jeffreys’ insistence on making BI acceptable in Elim, there is a 





The 1937 conference was made aware of the correspondence earlier in the year 
between Jeffreys and the Executive Council on the question of BI.
96
 The minutes of 
the conference also note how,  
After much discussion, Principal suggested that possibly the only way to come to a 
satisfactory solution of the question of doctrine would be to cut out all three schools of 




This debate continued the following day and there seemed to be a genuine desire to keep the 
movement united. Samuel Gorman followed Jeffreys’ thinking and   
suggested that if the subject of Prophecy was likely to cause any division in our 
Churches, he considered it would be best to drop the question of Prophecy altogether, 
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This view, however, was challenged by Robert Mercer, who argued that if Gorman’s proposal 
was adopted ‘some feeling would remain that we were cutting out about one third of the 
Bible.’ Consequently, argued Mercer who seemed to be an advocate of BI, a more conducive 




Despite the willingness of the conference to seek a compromise, not teaching biblical 
prophecy would have impinged on Elim trying to articulate one of its core doctrines (i.e. Jesus 
as coming King) and thus this option could not be accepted. However, at the same time 
allowing for the teaching of BI in Elim would have meant that doctrines that were considered 
unscriptural and divisive by a majority of the movement’s ministers could be taught within 
Elim, which made it an implausible option for the conference. In other words, the content and 
rationality of the Elim argument could not allow for either of these two options to be adopted. 
Thus, the following two resolutions were passed. First, it was      
RESOLVED that this Conference is of the opinion that there is sufficient common 
ground in the main schools of Prophecy to allow scope for teaching on this point 
without encroaching on debatable ground of Prophetical interpretation, and that where 
difficulties arise in a local Church over the teaching of debatable points of Prophecy, 





This resolution acknowledged that the three schools of prophecy within Elim 
effectively still shared Elim’s Fundamental Truth of dispensational pre-millennialism, 
it encouraged ministers to focus on this key doctrine, and steer away from the more 
debatable points. However, the second resolution reaffirmed the 1935 Conference ban 
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on the teaching of BI in Elim’s Direct Government Churches and advised against Elim 
ministers appearing on BI platforms. This clearly still identifies BI as the minority and 
opposed prophetic school in Elim. Both of the resolutions were passed with 59 in 




Therefore, in the 1937 conference Elim once again confirmed its rejection of BI and Jeffreys 
had now for the fifth time (1932, 1933, 1934, 1935 and 1937) to bring BI teaching into Elim 
in an Elim Conference, despite his promise at the 1935 conference that he would never do so 
again. The conference discussion and decision also point out how Elim could not do away 
with its core doctrine of Jesus as coming King, including the auxiliary hypothesis of biblical 
prophecy surrounding it, but in light of its rationality neither could it accept BI which it 
believed to be unscriptural and therefore irrational. 
 
BI would not be discussed at the 1938 or the 1939 Elim Conference, despite there being a real 
threat of Jeffreys resigning from Elim. Nevertheless, a resolution was passed in the 1938 
conference where all ministers and probationers needed to sign Elim’s Fundamental Truths.
102
 
Moreover, it was agreed that ‘doctrinal questions [were] to be decided by the Conference with 
power in the hands of the Executive to deal with any matter between Annual Conference.’
103
 
The first resolution guaranteed that all Elim ministers would support the essential Elim 
argument and the second resolution ensured that no local Elim church could alter the doctrinal 
statements of the movement or its agreements about teaching certain doctrines (e.g. BI) 
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without the conference’s approval. The second resolution, namely, the notion that ‘matters of 
doctrine be decided by the Ministerial Conference and not by the local church’ was also 




5.3. ‘Set Your House in Order:’ The Question of Church Government 
Although Jeffreys had expressed a need to reform aspects of Elim government ever since the 
1934 Deed Poll,
105
 in 1937 he became determined to do so. In January 1937 Jeffreys wrote to 
Phillips that ‘I am more convinced than ever that the message I told you of, “set your house in 
order,” is a Divine command which I personally dare not disobey.’
106
 In other words, Jeffreys 
believed that he now had a divine mandate to reform Elim.  
 
In fairness to Jeffreys, despite the introduction of the Deed Poll in 1934 with the attempt to 
provide a coherent constitution and working governance for Elim, the structure of Elim 
remained complex. There were churches that were part of the central government (i.e. Direct 
Government Churches), churches that were governed by a founding minister of the local 
church, and churches governed by deacons of the local church. Desmond Cartwright estimates 
that in 1938 there were 89 churches (‘most of the larger churches’) under Direct Government 
and 90 in the other two groups.
107
 The churches and ministers under central government were 
effectively the inner circle of Elim and there was a sense among the other ministers that they 
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were not a central part of the movement.
108
 Furthermore, as reflected in the Elim Conference 
minutes, from the mid to late 1930s there was a desire among Elim ministers to make the 
Conference (rather than the Executive Council) the governing body of Elim; there were 
discussions about increasingly including the local churches in the Conference through lay 
representation (this was particularly driven by the tensions in the Irish churches); devolving 
some responsibilities of the central headquarters to district presbyteries; attempts to give the 
local church greater autonomy vis-à-vis its leaders (Local Church Officers); and clarifying the 
ownership of property. Therefore, Jeffreys did have some justification to reform Elim’s 
institutions. Indeed, he believed that by making these structural changes the Elim argument 
would gain new ground. Or in his own words:  
I am persuaded that if we can consolidate our Ministerial Conference as the heart of 
Elim and at the same time include all in the new ‘Elim Church’, and rules broad 





However, as seen in Phillips’ 1939 Conference speech, Jeffreys suffered from two main 
weaknesses as the potential reformer of Elim. First, he was inconsistent in his proposals. 
Phillips bluntly remarked that Jeffreys was bringing ‘something different every year’ and 
some of these proposals ‘are totally opposed in principle to others.’
110
 This statement is 
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supported by a simple reading of the correspondence between Jeffreys and Phillips, as well as 




Second, and more importantly for my argument in this chapter, many in Elim believed that 
Jeffreys attempted to revise the movement’s structure primarily to bring in BI. Based on 
Phillips’ notes this was certainly his view, as well as the view of the elected members of the 
Executive Council.
112
 Although Jeffreys always publicly denied that this was his motivation, 
Phillips claimed that Jeffreys personally told him in 1937 that he had introduced the Local 
Church Government scheme for the ‘purpose of making an outlet for B.I.’
113
 This would 
certainly explain Jeffreys attempt to disband Elim’s Direct Government Structure by 
introducing a new more inclusive body consisting of all ministers and lay representatives, as 
the ban on BI applied to Direct Government churches and BI was primarily opposed by its 
ministers. This interpretation is also made more plausible by the fact that in the conference 
debates the question of BI and church government were often closely discussed.
114
 
Furthermore, Jeffreys’ aired ‘dissatisfaction’ with the Deed Poll of April 1934 does only seem 
to come after the Elim Conference in September 1934 when Leech lost the BI debate to 
Phillips and when the Conference issued a ban on BI. 
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Now, it would be inappropriate to simply dismiss the various other reasons for Jeffreys 
aspiration to reform Elim’s structures. Nevertheless, it does appear that BI was a major 
(perhaps the major) contributing factor for Jeffreys’ desire to reform Elim with a view of 
making BI acceptable in Elim. Jeffreys managed to initiate a number of institutional changes 




5.4. The ‘Epistemological Crisis’ and its Resolution 
In writing to Phillips on 9
th
 December 1936 Jeffreys seems to have first explicitly mentioned 
his plan to step down as the leader of Elim.
116
 At the 1938 Elim Conference he expressed this 
view publicly when he gave ‘the Conference an ultimatum, stating that the Conference must 
introduce a new legislative body with lay representation or else he would have no alternative 
but to resign in six months time.’
117
 Despite this threat, the Conference did not agree to 
Jeffreys’ demand. However, rather than resigning, Jeffreys withdrew his resignation. 
Nonetheless, Jeffreys threat was a sign of things to come. 
 




 Jeffreys and the 
Executive Council were at loggerheads. Prior to the Conference both sides had sent various 
circular letters to the ministers presenting their opposing views on church governance. Indeed, 
the relationships seem to have deteriorated to the point that Jeffreys decided not to attend the 
Conference in person. Instead he was represented by a group of close allies and on occasions 
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he appeared in person to make a statement to the Conference. His decision to absent himself 




A key event at the Conference was Phillips’ carefully crafted response to Jeffreys’ circular 
letter to the ministers. As already discussed, Phillips identified that he and the elected 
members of the Executive Council were of the view that Jeffreys’ motivation to change 
Elim’s governance was to bring BI into Elim. However, he also spelled out Jeffreys’ 
inconsistencies on matter of policy over the years. After judicially providing a number of 
historical examples to support this assertion, Phillips bluntly concluded that the ‘troubles in 
our work to-day [are] entirely caused by G.J’ and that ‘G.J. [is] totally unfitted for the 
business side of the work of God.’
120
 By any standards, this was a devastating speech for 
Jeffreys. Indeed, Neil Hudson notes that in the speech Phillips essentially destroyed ‘Jeffreys’ 
credibility’ in front of the whole Conference.
121
 William Kay echoes this sentiment when he 
writes that in Phillips’ speech ‘the mystique of Jeffreys was stripped way and he was shown 




Nevertheless, despite Phillips’ damning analysis of Jeffreys the reformer, the Conference 
worked for days to accommodate Jeffreys’ demands on restructuring Elim. But in the end, this 
was to no avail. Although the Conference had accommodated many of Jeffreys’ proposals, on 
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 December 1939 Jeffreys resigned from Elim.
123
 In response the Conference unanimously 
passed the resolution:  
That this Ministerial Conference of the Elim Foursquare Gospel Alliance on learning 
of the resignation of its President, Principal George Jeffreys, wishes to place on record 
its deep and heartfelt gratitude to him under God for his untiring and loyal service to 





Jeffreys was also asked to consider a new ‘office as Moderator and spiritual leader of the 
Alliance, and remain Principal of the Elim Bible College.’
125
 Discussions soon began between 
Jeffreys’ and the Executive to realise the Conferences wishes regarding Jeffreys’ new 
honorary role within Elim, and the plan was to do so at the next Elim Conference (May 1940). 
However, despite the desire for unity on both side, Jeffreys was not planning to simply 
become an ornamental figurehead. To the contrary, even before Jeffreys had been accepted 








 May 1940 Elim 
Conference to ministers and the lay representatives from churches.
126
 One of the five agenda 
items focused on ‘matters of doctrines outside the Fundamentals’ (item 2) and another one on 
‘the attitude of the Elim movement to British-Israel teaching’ (item 3). Days before the 
Conference was due to start, Jeffreys unannounced circulated a commentary pamphlet on the 
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agenda items to the Conference attendees in which he specifically focused on supplementary 
matters of doctrine and BI, and he argued that these matters should be decided by local 
churches rather than by Elim’s central government.
127
 This caused the Elim Headquarters to 
immediately issue a letter to the recipients of Jeffreys’ commentary in which Hathaway 
expressed his disappointment that Jeffreys had circulated this pamphlet.
128
 Hathaway also 
identified six reasons why all doctrinal matters should be decided by Elim’s central 
government, and he seems to refer to BI as the cause of Elim’s troubles when he writes that 
‘these doctrinal issues which have been at the root of our troubles are now brought to the 
fore.’
129
 This incident firstly highlights that Jeffreys had not changed in his conviction to 
reform Elim, and secondly that BI was again at the heart of Elim’s crisis.      
   
The 1940 Elim Conference was less dramatic than the circulated letters may have suggested. 
It continued a reforming agenda by deciding that (1) the Conference consisting of Ministers 
and lay representatives was ‘to become the Governing Body of the Movement’; (2) District 
Presbyteries would be set up; (3) the Executive Council would be elected by postal votes 
before the Conference; (4) a new Property Board would be introduced; and (5) the Deed Poll 
would be revisited.
130
 In terms of BI and other supplementary doctrines, after ‘considerable 
discussion’ the following resolution was passed (with 83 voting for and 72 against) that ‘all 
questions of doctrine outside the Fundamentals be decided by the Governing Body, with 
liberty of expression for different interpretations of prophecy in the churches.’
131
 This 
resolution with a small majority may have been a compromise in that it maintained the 
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Resolutions of 1938 and 1939 that the ‘Governing Body’ should decide supplementary 
doctrines against Jeffreys’ proposal, but it also allowed the possibility to express ‘different 
interpretations of prophecy,’ although it is unclear whether this would have actually allowed 
for the teaching of BI. Nevertheless, after these decisions Jeffreys accepted the invitation from 
the Conference to re-join Elim as the President and its spiritual leader, and the Conference 




Although on a surface level the Conference seemed to have reconciled Jeffreys with Elim, this 
reconciliation was short-lived as on 12
th
 November 1940 Jeffreys resigned for the second and 
final time from Elim. Jeffreys offered a number of reasons for his resignation, one of them 
being the inability for a local church to decide its own supplementary doctrines.
133
 Elim’s 
Executive Council responded with a pamphlet where they expressed their frustration that 
Jeffreys seemed only to be satisfied if the Conference and the Executive Council would 
become ‘Yes-men’ and simply agree to all of his demands. They also pointed out that if 
Jeffreys’ so-called biblical pattern for church government were followed through, among 
other things, ministers would be able to adopt ‘their own peculiar doctrine or theories, as they 
may wish.’
134
 This war of words, primarily in the form of pamphlets, continued for some time 
between the two sides.
135
 Moreover, a handful of Elim ministers followed Jeffreys out of Elim 
and joined a competing movement that Jeffreys started: the Bible Pattern Church Fellowship.  
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Reflecting on Jeffrey’s resignation from Elim, Neil Hudson states that ‘there could be little 
disguising that the Movement was in the gravest danger of extinction.’
136
 Or to put in 
MacIntyrian terms, the resignation of Jeffreys propelled Elim into its first ‘epistemological 
crisis.’ So, why did Jeffreys’ resignation cause an epistemological crisis in Elim? Jeffreys 
departure from Elim led to its epistemological crisis, because up until his resignation Jeffreys 
was the human embodiment of the Elim argument; that is, he was effectively the 
exemplification of the content (Foursquare Gospel) and rationality (Pentecostal Biblical 
Pragmatism) of the Elim tradition. After all, Jeffreys had founded Elim, he had been its 
primary leader for 25 years, planted many of its churches, and brought a number of Elim 
ministers and members to the Pentecostal experience through his campaigns. Thus, when 
Jeffreys left the essence of the Elim tradition was challenged. It would have been difficult for 
Elim’s faithful adherents to avoid thinking that if they had been wrong about Jeffreys (read: 
the human embodiment of the Elim argument), perhaps they were also wrong about the 
viability of the Elim tradition as a whole? 
 
As already discussed, according to MacIntyre, the degree to which an epistemological crisis 
can be overcome by a tradition depends on the resources available within the tradition, upon 
its inventiveness, and their needs to be continuity within the tradition’s past.
137
 So how did 
Elim overcome this internal crisis and how was its tradition reformulated in the process? 
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5.4.1. Returning to the Bible, the Foursquare Gospel and Evangelism 
Elim’s response to the crisis was effectively ad fontes; that is, Elim quickly reaffirmed the 
Bible as its grounding document. Shortly after the public announcement in Elim Evangel of 
Jeffreys’ final resignation,
138
 a series of articles appeared on ‘Scriptural Principles of Church 
Government’ written by senior Elim leaders with the aim of providing biblical justification 
for Elim’s position on church governance.
139
 The question of church governance was a 
contentious issue between Elim and Jeffreys and thus Elim needed to make sure that its 
argument was biblically grounded. Furthermore, when the Elim Evangel reported on the 
Conference discussion on church property, another contentious issue between Elim and 
Jeffreys, the resolutions of the Conference were apparently passed ‘after careful and prayerful 
consideration, during which Bibles were open and many scriptures quoted’ (my italics),
140
 
highlighting again the centrality of the Bible in providing epistemic warrant for the Elim 
tradition as it sought to overcome its crisis. 
 
However, Elim secondly also sought return to the main content of the movement’s argument. 
The 1941 Elim Conference issued a ‘Declaration,’ which was then published in Elim Evangel 
that:  
…the strife and contention that has lately arisen among us has not been engendered by 
the Spirit of God, but rather by the Adversary, in an endeavour to divert and distract 
our attention from the main purpose for which God Himself brought this work into 
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being, namely the preaching of the Gospel of God to all men, the dissemination of the 
Pentecostal doctrines for the edifying of believers, the proclamation and practice of the 
highest standard of Christian discipleship, the teaching of Divine Healing, and the 
quickening among true believers of the Blessed Hope of the Return of our Lord and 
Saviour Jesus Christ [my italics].
141
   
 
What is clear here is not only the reiteration of the Foursquare Gospel (or Fivefold-Gospel 
with the inclusion of ‘highest standard of Christian discipleship’), but also of the theological 
interpretation of Jeffreys’ actions as orchestrated by the ‘Adversary’ in diverting Elim from its 
raison d'être. Thus, the Foursquare Gospel is not only reaffirmed as central to the tradition, 
but the actions of Jeffreys are also condemned in light of the Full Gospel. In fact, the 
Conference made a decision to disassociate itself completely from Jeffreys,
142
 because he was 
seen as distracting Elim from focusing on the essence of its argument.  
 
This attempt to take Elim back to the Foursquare Gospel during its moment of crisis is also 
seen in W. G. Hathaway’s fourteen Elim Evangel articles under the title ‘This Pentecost’ 
written predominantly after Jeffreys’ first resignation.
143
 Furthermore, reports from the 1944 
Elim Conference indicate that in trying to come to terms with the departure of its leader, the 
movement  returned to the Full Gospel, as the members of the Conference were encouraged to 
‘think back again to those first principles of the early days’ (W. G. Hathaway), to ‘get back to 
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Pentecost’ (L. C. Quest), to restore the ‘message of Pentecost’ (G. L. W. Ladlow), and to not 




Although the doctrine of Jesus as coming King had been at the heart of the schism due to the 
BI controversy, this did not deter Elim from continuing to advocate its eschatological 
theories. The futurist and historicist interpretations of prophecy continued to capture the 
imaginations of Elim ministers, and during the war years Britain, Germany and Russia were 
boldly identified within the pages of Scripture.
145
 That said, there is also some evidence to 
suggest that there was some movement away from making specific prophetic predictions and 
a desire to stick to the bare minimum of Elim’s dispensational premillennialism. For example, 
J. Dyke urged Elim not to merely speculate within its various prophetic schools, but for its 
members to examine their lives to see if they ‘reflect the characteristics of a sincere Christian 




         
Third, as well as seeking to ground itself anew on Scripture and reaffirm the Foursquare 
Gospel, Elim sought to reclaim its evangelistic and revivalist mandate. Phillips firmly stated 
in an editorial titled ‘Elim’s Task – Evangelise!’ that evangelism was ‘the greatest task of the 
Elim Movement.’
147
 In another article he noted that ‘Elim was founded on aggressive 
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Evangelism,’ highlighted by the names of ‘Elim Evangelistic Band’ and Elim Evangel.
148
 
Indeed, when in 1945 the Evangelistic Council was established, P. S. Brewster emerged as 





However, it seems that evangelism was not only to be the prerogative and responsibility of a 
few individuals, but a new found emphasis was placed on each member to engage in personal 
evangelism.
150
 Samuel Gorman, Elim’s Evangelistic Secretary, argued that Elim members and 
ministers should not leave evangelism ‘to the recognised leading preachers and evangelists of 
to-day – get on with the job yourself, and God will bless you in the doing of it.’
151
 This theme 
of personal evangelism is very visible in the Elim Evangels of the period and there was even a 
‘Special Personal Evangelism Number.’
152
 Some of this change of emphasis from evangelistic 
campaigns to personal evangelism was certainly necessitated by the Second World War and 
the restrictions to hold major public gatherings.
153
 Nevertheless, it appears that after Jeffreys’ 
departure there was also a genuine desire by the senior leaders in Elim to see its argument 
being embodied and promulgated by all within Elim, not just by some.  
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5.4.2. Reforming the Structure: Democratising the Embodiment of the Elim Argument  
So, it seems that Elim overcame its ‘epistemological crisis’’ by restating the centrality of the 
Bible as its foundational document, reiterating its Pentecostal mandate of proclaiming the 
Foursquare Gospel, and re-engaging in evangelism. However, aspects of the Elim tradition 
were also reformulated. Its founder, Jeffreys, who had been the face of the movement, was 
erased. Symbolically this ‘erasing’ of Jeffreys from Elim is evident in the pages of Elim 
Evangel where his picture still appears at the front page on 22
nd
 December 1940 as the 
movement’s central figure, but then completely disappears from 5
th
 January 1941 onwards.
154
 
Linked to this, there was also an attempt to downplay the significance of Jeffreys for Elim. In 





Although it needs to be acknowledged that Elim did have its new champions to replace 
Jeffreys (particularly Phillips, W. G. Hathaway, Boulton, Smith and the new evangelist 
Brewster); nevertheless, Elim also reformulated its structure so that the essence of the 
movement would no longer be embodied in one particular person (as had been the case with 
Jeffreys) or even in a small group of leaders (as was the case with the Executive Council), but 
rather in the Conference that consisted of Elim’s ministers and lay representatives of the local 
churches. Thus, Elim sought to move from an autocratic form of government to a democratic 
one, as it renewed its constitution. 
 
                                                 
154
 See No author, ‘The Elim Evangel and Foursquare Revialist,’ EE 20, no. 51 (December 22, 1939): 801; No 
author, ‘The Elim Evangelist and Foursquare Revivalist,’ EE 21, no. 1 (January 5, 1940): 10.   
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 Cf. Hudson, ‘A Schism and its Aftermath,’ 309-310. 
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Ironically many of the constitutional changes towards the democratisation in Elim had been 
initiated by Jeffreys. Moreover, the Conference had already proven its ability to govern and 
make reasoned decisions from 1933 onwards, not least as it had consistently rejected the 
attempts of its leader to bring BI into Elim. Therefore, to make the Conference, rather than the 
Executive Council, the governing body of Elim was reasonable and particularly important 
when the movement sought new ways of embodying its argument after Jeffreys’ departure. 
 
As noted above, after Jeffreys’ first resignation, the process for reform had already been 
actioned by the 1940 Conference with particular emphasis on making the Conference – 
consisting of Ministers and lay representatives – Elim’s governing body and thus changing 
the Deed Poll. A draft of the new constitution was circulated to ministers and churches on 
May 1941,
156
 and discussed and agreed in principle at the September 1941 Elim 
Conference.
157
 The new constitution came into effect on January 1942 when the Deed of 
Variation was issued,
158





There were three main changes brought by Elim’s new constitution through the Deed of 
Variation.
160
 First, the Conference consisting of Ministers and lay representatives on an equal 
                                                 
156
 E. J. Phillips, letter to Ministers and Lay Representatives (May 16, 1941), Elim Archives, Malvern.  
157
 Minutes of the Elim Conference (1941), 3. 
158
 Ernest J. Phillips, Joseph Smith, Ernest C. W. Boulton and W. G. Hathaway, Elim Foursquate Gospel 
Alliance. Deed of Variation – of – Deed Poll by George Jeffreys dated 10
th
 April 1934 (London: Electric Law 
Press, January 14, 1942).  
159
 Minutes of the ‘Elim Foursquare Gospel Alliance. Annual Conference 1942. Representative Session,’ 
Archives of the General Superintendent, Elim International Centre, Malvern; Selwyn Homer, ‘The Elim 
Conference of 1942,’ EE 23, no. 40 (October 5, 1942): 471. 
160
 These are summarised well in No author, ‘What is Elim’s New Constitution?’ EE 22, no. 24 (August 25, 
1941): 521, 523. 
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basis, rather than the Executive Council, became the Governing body of the movement. This 
move continued the democratisation of Elim’s governance as the movement had initially been 
governed by Jeffreys, from 1934 onwards by the Executive Council (albeit with Jeffreys still 
possessing significant prerogatives), and now by the Conference. With the inclusion of lay 
representatives Elim could boldly claim that ‘the voice of the people will be heard on the 
central governing body of the Movement.’
161
 Second, the local church structure was changed 
so that it was now ‘controlled by the ‘Church Officers,’ who will consist of the deacons 
together with the elders (if any) and the minister.’
162
 The deacons would be elected by the 
members of the church and the elders by the ministers and the District Superintendent. This 
also signified a move from an autocratic model to a more democratic model of governance, 
because for much of Elim’s history (the first 12 years) the local church ministers had been in 
complete control of their congregations. Third, a new body of managing trustees was set up to 
oversee church buildings. This group would be elected by the Conference and would consist 
of three ministers and three laymen. Furthermore, the new Constitution would ensure that the 
local ‘church cannot take it [the building] from the denomination nor can the denomination 
take it away from the church.’
163
 Again this was a move of sharing power as up until 1934 
Jeffreys had been the ‘managing trustee’, from 1934 this role had been carried by the 
Executive Council, and now it would be an elected body of ministers and lay men.  
 
In sum, like Elim’s revised evangelism strategy that focused on empowering all within Elim 
to evangelise, the constitutional changes vis-à-vis central denominational governance, local 
church governance and management of buildings resulted in increasing democratisation 
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 ‘What is Elim’s New Constitution?’ 521. 
162
 ‘What is Elim’s New Constitution?’ 521. 
163
 ‘What is Elim’s New Constitution?’ 523. 
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within Elim. The Elim argument would no longer be embodied by one person (i.e. Jeffreys) or 
even by a group of people (i.e. the Executive Council) but by Elim’s members, lay 
representatives and Ministers. This was the major reformulation of Elim resulting from its 
first ‘epistemological crisis.’  
 
5.5. Conclusion              
In this section I have narrated the first ‘epistemological crisis’ in Elim, which was caused by 
Jeffreys’ resignation from the movement he had founded. I have argued that at the heart of the 
conflict between Jeffreys and the Executive Council was Elim’s hard core doctrine of Jesus as 
Coming King and Jeffreys’ particular BI hypothesis regarding it. Thus, although I have 
acknowledged the various reasons that led to the schism in Elim (including the question of 
church governance), I have tried to demonstrate that the eschatological issue of BI was 
central. The general disagreement on the issues of BI between the two parties, and especially 
the 1934 BI Conference debate between Leech and Phillips, exemplifies the practical 
outworking of Elim’s Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism identified in the previous chapter as 
Elim’s tradition-specific rationality, and so also underscores that Elim’s rationality is 
precisely biblical pragmatism with Pentecostal assumptions. That is, Elim’s rationality is not 
mere biblicism nor mere pragmatism, but any pragmatic argument within Elim must also have 
some kind of prior justification based on a justified reading of a biblical text, and likewise a 
warranted interpretation of a biblical text must produce pragmatic results. 
 
The resolution of Elim’s epistemological crisis further underscores the essential content and 
method of the Elim argument. In other words, in the process of coming to terms with Jeffreys’ 
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departure Elim deliberately utilised its biblical reasoning, reclaimed its Pentecostal (i.e. 
Foursquare Gospel) heritage, and sought to recapture is evangelistic zeal in promulgating the 
Elim argument. However, in the process Elim was also transformed structurally into a more 
democratic movement. To put it differently, the primary embodiment of the recalibrated Elim 
argument was now to be the Elim conference consisting of Ministers and lay representatives 
of local churches, rather than being vested in one man (i.e. Jeffreys) or a selected group of 
leaders (i.e. the Executive Council). In MacIntyrian terms, Elim successfully moved from 
stage two (epistemological crisis) to stage three (resolution) and the Elim argument continued, 
albeit in a modified institutional embodiment. 
 
In summation, my narration of the Elim argument through its first epistemological crisis has 
not only proposed fresh historical insights into understanding Jeffreys’ resignation from Elim 
vis-à-vis Elim’s wider eschatology, but more importantly for my overall thesis it has 
substantiated my claim that the content (read: hard core) of the Elim tradition is the 
Foursquare Gospel and the tacit rationality is Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism.
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CHAPTER 6 – THE ELIM ARGUMENT EXTENDED THROUGH TIME (II): THE 
CHARISMATIC/RESTORATION MOVEMENTS AND ELIM’S SECOND 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL CRISIS 
 
Up until the 1960s Elim and other classical Pentecostal denominations (e.g. Assemblies of 
God and the Apostolic Church) could claim uniqueness in British Christianity when it came to 
baptism in the Holy Spirit, spiritual gifts and divine healing. This, however, changed when the 
Charismatic movement emerged within mainline British churches from the 1960s onwards. 
Although many within Elim initially welcomed what they saw as the renewing work of the 
Spirit in the established Churches,
1
 the Charismatic Renewal, and particularly the Restoration 
movement which flowed from it, 
2
 collectively instigated Elim’s second epistemological 
crisis. 
 
In narrating Elim’s second epistemological crisis, I will: (1) briefly outline the birth of the 
Charismatic movement in Britain with particular emphasis on the ‘Restoration Charismatics;’
3
 
(2) discuss how the Restoration Charismatics challenged the Elim argument by seemingly 
providing an updated and improved version of it; and (3) analyse how Elim resolved its crisis 
                                                 
1
 John Lancaster, interview by author, Leeds, United Kingdom, August 6, 2015; Julian W. Ward, interview by 
author, Crewe, United Kingdom, August 7, 2017; K. John Cave, interview by author, Malvern, United Kingdom, 
August 17, 2017; Smyth, interview by author. 
2
 I will use the terms Restoration movement, Restoration Charismatics, House Churches, British New Church 
movement, etc. more or less interchangeably.    
3
 A distinction is commonly made between ‘Renewal Charismatics’ and ‘Restoration Charismatics.’ The first 
were those who believed that the purpose of the charismatic revival was to ‘renew’ existing churches and thus 
they remained within the established churches, whereas the latter were those who believed that the charismatic 
revival could not be fully realised within existing church structures and thus they formed new churches; William 
K. Kay, Apostolic Networks in Britain: New Ways of Being Church (Paternoster: Milton Keynes, 2007), 21; 
Nigel Scotland, ‘From the “not yet” to the “now and the not yet:” Charismatic Kingdom Theology 1960-2010,’ 
JPT 20, no. 2 (2011): 274.      
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by returning to the essential content and rationality of its argument, and by also reformulating 
its structures and re-interpreting one of its hard core doctrines. In exploring these three 
themes, my aim is again to provide an exemplification of the Elim argument, and therefore 
substantiate and develop my overall argument regarding the content, rationality and 
embodiment of the Elim tradition. 
 
Like in the previous two chapters, the primary sources used in this chapter are Elim 
publications, reports, constitutional documents and doctrinal statements. However, to 
supplement the limited written material on Elim’s history during this period, I have conducted 
five semi-structured interviews for the purpose of ‘oral history.’ As stated by John Creswell, 
‘oral history consists of gathering personal reflections of events and their causes and effects 
from one individual or several individuals.’
4
 Thus, these five recorded interviews are treated 
as individual sources which provide description and interpretation of Elim in the late-1970s 
and early 1980s. I do not claim that they provide a comprehensive account of how Elim 
ministers and members experienced Elim’s second epistemological crisis; that is, I have not 
engaged in ‘phenomenological’ or ‘grounded theory’ empirical research.
5
 That said, the five 









 and John Smyth,
10
 all had influential roles within Elim during the period, and therefore 
                                                 
4
 John W. Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches. 3rd ed. 
(London: Sage, 2013), 73. For further discussion on ‘oral history’ see Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods. 
4
th
 ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012),488-491; Donald A. Ritchie, Doing Oral History. 3
rd
 ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
5
 Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design, 76-81, 83; Rithie, Doing Oral History, 123.   
6
 Lancaster was a member of Elim’s Executive Council from early-1960s until mid-1980s. He also contributed to 
the 1981 Southport Conference; Lancaster, interview by author. 
7
 Jones is the official Elim historian and he contributed to the 1981 Southport Conference; Maldwyn Jones, 
interview by author, Malvern, United Kingdom, July 25, 2016. 
8
 Ward was the Director of Studies at Elim Bible College (now Regents Theological College) and he contributed 
to the 1981 Southport Conference; Ward, interview by author.  
9
 Cave was the host of the 1981 Southport Conference; Cave, interview by author. 
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their first-person accounts provide valuable individual insights into this phase of Elim’s 
history.          
  
6.1. The Charismatic Movement: The ‘Renewal Charismatics’ and the ‘Restoration 
Charismatics’ 
A key event in the emergence of the Charismatic movement in Britain occurred in 1962 when 
the Anglican minister Michael Harper was ‘baptised in the Holy Spirit.’ Following from this 
spiritual experience, Harper went on to establish the Fountain Trust in 1964, an ecumenical 
organisation with the purpose of bringing charismatic renewal to British churches. Over the 
1960s and 1970s the Fountain Trust was relatively successful in encouraging the established 
churches to embrace charismatic spirituality and theology.
11
 It did this by holding a number of 
conferences, publishing its Renewal magazine, and bringing together Christian leaders and 




                                                                                                                                                        
10
 Smyth was the Field Superintendent, member of the Executive Council, and keynote speaker at the 1981 
Southport Conference; Smyth, interview by author.  
11
 David Hilborn, ‘Charismatic Renewal in Britain: Roots, Influences and Later Developments,’ Evangelical 
Alliance: Better Together, accessed June 20, 2015, http://www.eauk.org/church/resources/theological-
articles/charismatic-renewal-in-britain.cfm; Peter Hocken, Streams of Renewal: The Origins and Early 
Development of the Charismatic Movement in Great Britain. Revised Edition (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1997), 
115-122. 
12
 The Elim Minister and the previous Director of Studies at the Elim Bible College (now Regents Theological 
College), Julian Ward, was a member of the Consultative Council of the Fountain Trust. In 1979 Ward was 
asked by Tom Smail to become a member of its Executive Council but was told not to accept this position by 
Elim’s General Secretary, Ron Jones. Jones was concerned how Elim’s Northern Irish Churches would react in 
Ward being an Executive member of a body that held some of its meetings in Roman Catholic Churches. This 
demonstrates some of the concerns that Elim had about the Charismatic movement, particularly when it included 
Roman Catholics; Ward, interview by author.   
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While reflecting on this period, the Elim veteran John Lancaster points out the challenge the 
Charismatic movement posed for Elim, as there now was a fresh movement within the 
historic churches which appeared to be ‘outdoing’ Elim in being Pentecostal. Lancaster notes 
that the situation was exacerbated by the fact that by the early 1960s Elim had become 
increasingly Evangelical at the expense of its Pentecostal ethos.
13
 These two aspects, the 
arrival of the Charismatic movement and Elim’s increasing evangelicalisation, surmises 
Lancaster, forced Elim to ask questions about its identity as a movement, or in MacIntyrian 
terms revisit the exact nature of its current argument.
14
   
 
Nevertheless, in the end it was not the Charismatic Renewal per se, but the Restoration 
movement which flowed from the Charismatic movement that led Elim to its second major 
epistemological crisis. Unlike the ‘Renewal Charismatics’ within the Charismatic movement 
who emphasised the revitalisation of existing denominations, the ‘Restorationist 
Charismatics’ not only argued for the need to establish new churches freed from the structures 
of existing denominations, but encouraged existing Christians to leave their denominations to 




                                                 
13
 By Pentecostal Lancaster means focus on baptism in the Holy Spirit and spiritual gifts; Lancaster, interview by 
author. It is also worth noting that Elim joined the Evangelical Alliance in 1964 which fits well with Lancaster’s 
historical analysis of Elim.  
14
 Lancaster, interview by author. 
15
 The difference between ‘Renewal Charismatics’ and ‘Restorationist Charismatics’ is well captured in the 
debate between David Watson and Arthur Wallis in Renewal magazine under the title ‘stay in or come out.’ 
Watson argued for ‘staying in’ and Wallis for ‘coming out’; David Watson, ‘Stay In or Come Out? New Life 
From Inside,’ Renewal 52 (August/September, 1974): 10-13; Arthur Wallis, ‘Stay In or Come Out? The Church 
in the House,’ Renewal 52 (August/September, 1974): 14-16. 
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The main theological architect of the ‘Restoration Charismatics’ was Arthur Wallis.
16
 Wallis 
had an Open Brethren background and thus had been nurtured in an environment emphasising 
the primacy of local congregations and the ineffectiveness of denominations.
17
 In 1951 he was 
‘baptised in the Holy Spirit,’ but rather than joining a Pentecostal denomination he began 
advocating for a revival which would break down denominational walls and unite the 
universal Church ready for the second coming of Christ.
18
 From the early 1970s onwards he 
began to increasingly work towards the achievement of this restorationist goal, and in 1972 he 
invited five men (Bryn Jones, Peter Lyne, David Mansell, Graham Perrins and Hugh 
Thompson) to his home to discuss eschatology.
19
 This gathering proved to be momentous by 
bringing together key leaders with a shared vision for the charismatically restored church and 
can in effect be seen as the birth of the British Restoration movement. The six men formed 
covenant relationships with each other and after John Noble joined their ranks they became 
known as the ‘magnificent seven’ (John Noble joined the group after Bryn Jones prophesied 




The so-called ‘magnificent seven’ met at least three times and then decided to broaden the 
leadership by inviting seven others (Gerald Coates, Barney Coombs, John MacLaughlin, 
Campbell McAlpine, Ian McCullogh, Maurice Smith and George Tartleton) into their number 
                                                 
16
 Andrew Walker identifies Wallis as the ‘theological architect’ of Restorationism together with David Lillie; 
Andrew Walker, Restoring the Kingdom: The Radical Christianity of the House Church Movement. Fully 
Revised and Expanded Edition (Guildford: Eagle, 1998), 21. 
17
 Walker, Restoring the Kingdom, 52. Walker is of the view that the roots of Restorationism can be identified in 
the Brethren Movement, the Catholic Apostolic Church and classical Penteecostalism; Walker, Restoring the 
Kingdom, 51-53. 
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 See Arthur Wallis, In the Day of Thy Power (London: Christian Literature Crusade, 1967). The first edition 
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 Walker, Restoring the Kingdom, 75; Kay, Apostolic Networks, 24.  
20
 Walker, Restoring the Kingdom, 76.  
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and so making the ‘magnificent seven’ the ‘fabulous fourteen.’
21
 However, as early as 1974 
onwards the ‘fabulous fourteen’ began to show signs of having two factions, with John Noble 
leading in the south and Bryn Jones in the north.
22
 This was not just a geographical divide but 
there appears to have been personality differences and stylistic preferences between the 
northern and southern ‘brothers.’ Moreover, the northern leaders were becoming worried that 
their southern colleagues were falling into antinomianism.
23
 Indeed in 1976 Wallis, part of the 
northern group, wrote a letter to the southern brothers (probably with the approval of Bryn 
Jones) questioning their motives, raising concerns about their approach to ‘law and grace,’ 
and even suggesting that they were being deceived by demonic forces.
24
 This letter seriously 
severed the relationships between the two groups and eventually led to a split between them. 
 
Andrew Walker has famously called the northern group, albeit it included the likes of Terry 
Virgo from the South East of England, as Restoration 1 (R1) and the southern grouping as 
Restoration 2 (R2).
25
 It is worth noting that from the beginning differences already existed 
between the leaders of the Restoration movement. Nevertheless, after the split they became 
clearly expressed and embodied in the two factions. The differences between R1 and R2 are 
succinctly summarised by William Kay:  
R1 was the more exclusive, organised, authoritarian and radical of the two groups, and 
R2, centred largely in London, was more flexible, more expressive and more willing to 




                                                 
21
 Walker, Restoring the Kingdom, 76; Kay, Apostolic Networks, 24.   
22
 Walker, Restoring the Kingdom, 81-82. Kay, Apostolic Networks, 25. 
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 Walker, Restoring the Kingdom, 88-92, 103-108. 
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 Kay, Apostolic Networks, 25. 
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 Walker, Restoring the Kingdom, 38-42. 
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 Kay, Apostolic Networks, 20. 
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Interestingly, it was R1 as the more radical wing of ‘Restoration Charismatics’ which seemed 
to pose the greater threat to Elim. Indeed, R1 appeared to directly challenge the Elim 
argument by providing a theologically improved expression of Pentecostalism.   
 
6.2. The Restoration Charismatic Movement: Ecclesiologically and Eschatologically 
Updated Elim Argument 
The theological similarities between the ‘Restorationist Charismatic’ (particularly R1) and 
Elim are noteworthy. Like Elim, the Restorationists saw the Bible as the grounding document 
for beliefs and practices and their outworking of biblical exposition was effectively 
pragmatic.
27
 Their theology was also mainly Christocentric with an emphasis on conversion 
and believers baptism (read: Jesus as Saviour). Baptism in the Holy Spirit was also seen along 
Pentecostal lines as a subsequent experience to conversion, and spiritual gifts were believed to 
be for the contemporary Church (read: Jesus as Baptiser in the Holy Spirit and Jesus as 





However, despite these significant theological similarities, there were also important 
differences, particularly when it came to (1) ecclesiology and (2) eschatology. In terms of 
ecclesiology, Arthur Wallis consistently argued that there is only one Church which consists 
of people who have had a true revelation of Christ and have confessed him as their Lord.
29
 
Wallis further maintained that this universal Church is expressed in local congregations which 
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 Walker, Restoring the Kingdom, 134. 
28
 Walker, Restoring the Kingdom, 134-135.  
29
 Wallis, ‘Stay In or Come Out?,’ 14. Wallis used Matthew 16:15-19 as his proof text.  
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he identified as a ‘company of committed believers who could act together.
30
‘ In the words of 
Bryn Jones, ‘the [local] church is the representative community of the cosmic kingdom [or 
universal church] in a given locality.’
31
 The implication of having only one universal church 
expressed simply in local congregations was that there was no place for denominations. As 
Wallis put it:  
Our only loyalty is to Christ, and then to the local church where He wants us to be... 
But denominational loyalty (as distinct from loyalty to a local church that may happen 




This universal Church of Christ embodied in the local church (not institutions or 
denominations) was understood to be a charismatic community which should manifest the 
four/five offices (‘gifts’) of Ephesians 4:11, as well as the ‘spiritual gifts’ of 1 Corinthians 
12:4-7, 11.
33
 These charismatic congregations were believed to be living organisms which 
would freely worship together and function naturally under the governance of leadership 
teams consisting of apostle(s), prophets, evangelists and pastor teachers. The ‘glue’ that 
would hold the members of a congregation together, unite the various local congregations, 
and allow the leaders to lead at local and national level, was not to be a constitution or a 
doctrinal statement, but ‘covenant’ relationships between the various members of the 
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 Wallis, ‘Stay In or Come Out?,’ 14. 
31
 Bryn Jones, ‘What is the Church?,’ Leadership Today – a supplement to Restoration magazine, 3 (no date), 
accessed August 26, 2017, 
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The Restorationist ecclesiological vision challenged Elim on three fronts. First, it questioned 
Elim’s denominationalism. This anti-denominational stance would have found at least some 
resonance within Elim, if for no other reason that Elim itself had developed into a 
denomination by default rather than by design (see chapter 3), and its founder George Jeffreys 
had himself boldly proclaimed in the halls of Royal Albert Hall that  
Thank God we are living in days when, as far as spiritual people are concerned, 
denominational walls are falling flat before the trumpet call to stand uncompromisingly 




Second, the biblical emphasis on (local) church governance managed by an apostolic team in 
line with Ephesians 4:11 and united by deep relational connections, would have made Elim 
question its local church leadership structure. In fact, already in 1972 Elim’s ‘Doctrine of the 
Church Committee’ had concluded that the movement’s leadership structures were too 
clerical and that its concept of deacons in local churches was unbiblical.
36
 Third, the freedom 
and charismatic enthusiasm flowing from the Restorationist ecclesiology provided new 
vibrancy compared to the seemingly old-fashioned subculture of Elim and its diminishing 
Pentecostal fervour (see Lancaster’s comments above).
37
   
 
However, it was not just the ecclesiology of the Restoration movement that challenged Elim, 
but its eschatology also seemed to provide ‘greater hope’. In other words, the Restorationist 
Charismatics provided a more optimistic eschatological imagination regarding the future. As 
discussed above, Elim’s eschatology was essentially dispensational premillennialism that 
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 Jeffreys, The Miraculous Foursquare Gospel: Supernatural, 2. 
36
 No author, ‘First Interim Report of the Doctrine of the Church Committee’ (1972), Elim Archives, Malvern, 5.  
37
 Maldwyn Jones also notes that by the arrival of the Restoration movement there was increasingly a ‘dryness’ 
in Elim regarding the ‘gifts of the Spirit’; Jones, interview by author. 
243 
 
expected ‘things to get worse’ before Christ would return (see 5.1.1.). In contrast, the 
Restorationist eschatology was post-millennial or amillennial.
38
 As pointed out by William 
Kay, the basic difference was that ‘restorationism exchanged stoic pessimism for charismatic 
optimism.’
39
 This positive eschatology is well captured by Andrew Walker when he writes 
that 
The ‘end-time’, which Restorationists believe is now, will be characterized not so 
much by world chaos and ‘wars and rumours of wars,’ but by an outpouring of God’s 
Spirit, culminating in the establishment of the Kingdom that is ready and fit for the 




The appeal of this ‘charismatic optimism’ for Elim was not only in the Charismatic 
Restorationists providing biblical arguments for their perspective, but it also fitted better with 
the ‘popular mood of the 1970s and 1980s.’
41
 That is, for the experientially and pragmatically 
minded Elim members and ministers, postmillennialism seemed a good way forward, not least 
when after 60 years the assumed imminent apocalyptic destruction of the world had not yet 
taken place despite the Elim tradition going through World War I, World War II, and three 
decades of the Cold War.   
 
In conclusion, the Restoration Charismatic movement in many ways appeared to be providing 
an updated version of the Elim tradition. On one hand, it shared to a great extent Elim’s 
rationality of biblical pragmatism and theological emphasis on aspects of the Foursquare 
                                                 
38
 See Walker, Restoring the Kingdom, 141; Scotland, ‘From the ‘not yet’ to the ‘now and not yet’,’ 277; 
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 Kay, Apostolic Networks, 29. 
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 Walker, Restoring the Kingdom, 40. Arthur Wallis was already expressing these sentiments in 1956; see 
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Gospel, which would have made Elim members and ministers feel at home in the Restoration 
movement. On the other hand, in light of this shared rationality, it also provided 
ecclesiological and eschatological modifications which could be seen as improvements to the 
existing Elim tradition. These improvements on first appearance were justified in light of the 
Bible, and pragmatically seemed to have strong warrant as the Restorationists were growing 
as a movement and manifesting charismatic ‘signs’ in their activities, while Elim appeared to 
have lost much of its Pentecostal focus and was not presently experiencing significant 
growth.
42
 In other words, prima facie the Restoration movement provided an updated Elim 
argument and so presented itself as a more progressive tradition.    
     
6.3. The ‘Epistemological Crisis’ and its Resolution 
The Restoration movement was not only presenting itself as a ‘restored’ and ‘renewed’ 
expression of the Elim argument, but it also invited Elim churches and ministers to join its 
ranks in building what is saw as the restored Church. For example, the Dales Bible Week 
organised by Bryn Jones was in the words of Walker a ‘successful recruitment office for R1’ 
with respect to ‘Baptist, Elim and Assemblies of God churches.’
43
 Kay also points out how 
the first edition of Bryn Jones’ Restoration magazine was ‘sent out free of charge to various 
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 Julian Ward is of the view that in the 1970s Elim was becoming stagnant; Ward, interview by author. This 
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people including ministers of Elim Pentecostal churches,’
44
 and John Cave remembers leaders 
of R1 directly asking Elim ministers to join them (although he was not personally 
approached).
45
 Indeed, by the early 1980s Elim had lost some of its ministers and 
congregations to the Restoration movement,
46
 and Elim’s national leaders feared that if 




It was the Southport Conference of 1981 that launched the process of instigating new reforms 
within Elim, with the aim of overcoming the potential crisis.
48
 This two and a half day 
Conference gathered 200 Elim ministers and allowed the movement to discuss the current 
state of Elim in groups and subgroups.
49
 John Smyth set the context for the Conference in his 
opening keynote speech by articulating how the ‘House Church Movement’ (i.e. Restoration 
movement) was posing a challenge for Elim and he advised Elim to reform.
50
 The agenda for 
the discussion groups was clearly influenced by the Restorationist themes and were: (1) 
‘Ministry and Leadership’ with respect to its ‘purpose’ (Section A), role ‘in the local church’ 
(Section B) and ‘in the Church as a whole’ (Section C); (2) ‘Law and Grace’ (Section D); (3) 
‘Church Membership’ (Sections E and F); (4) ‘Worship’ (Section G); and (5) ‘The Basis of 
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Fellowship’ (Section H) with other Christians.
51
 John Lancaster refers to this period as a ‘vital 
part’ in Elim’s history. He states that it was during this time that the movement yet again 
subjected itself to close self-analysis by asking what Elim was really about, what it believed, 
and how it practised those beliefs.
52
 So, how did Elim conduct its self-analysis and seek to 
resolve its second major epistemological crisis?  
 
6.3.1. Returning to Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism and the Foursquare Gospel 
Interestingly but not surprisingly, this self-evaluation was primarily conducted through a 
biblical lens. For example, when Ron Jones, Elim’s General Secretary at the time, called for 
the Southport Conference he made it clear that in exploring the issues Elim must have ‘the 
Bible as our text book.’
53
 This biblical focus is further reflected in the 1981 Southport Papers, 
as much of the analyses of the issues focuses on exposition of key biblical concepts and 
passages. Moreover, Elim’s biblicism is also evident in the ensuring discussion when the 
report of the steering committee on church leadership at local and national levels presented its 
findings to the Elim Conference in 1982 on what it called the ‘irreducible minimum of 
Scriptural guidance’ (my italics) regarding the topics in question.
54
 Therefore, as with the 
crisis of 1939-1940, Elim again sought to ground its argument on the Bible.  
 
However, these biblical principles were intended to be applied through the ‘leading of the 
Holy Spirit.’ Ron Jones noted that as Elim evaluated its present condition and future direction, 
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‘there should be a constant freshness and awareness of the moving of the Holy Spirit.’
55
 This 
view was shared by Jones’ successor as General Secretary, Tom Walker, when he wrote that 
‘as we continue to search the Word and seek the mind of the Holy Spirit, God will surely lead 




Now, neither Jones nor Walker define what being ‘Spirit led’ looks like. Nevertheless, it is 
not hard to argue that in practice it is analogous with Pentecostal pragmatism, which I have 
argued in chapter four consists of experientialism and experimentalism. The experiential 
aspect expects the Spirit to lead individuals, local gatherings and Elim as a movement through 
an inner witness, (supernatural) wisdom, prophecy, tongue, word of knowledge, or something 
similar. And the experimental aspect then subjects the charismatic experience to pragmatic 
criteria of ‘effects’ and ‘results’ that ought to have been produced by a genuine leading of the 
Spirit; that is, the ‘prophet’ and the ‘leading of the Spirit’ is judged by its ‘fruits.’  
 
This rationality of experiential experimentalism (read: Pentecostal pragmatism) can be shown 
to be at work in Tom Walker’s thinking when he writes that the ‘Steering Committee [for the 
Southport Conference 1981] were obviously led by the Holy Spirit in the plans and format 
produced.’
57
 So, what made Walker think that the Committee were led by the Spirit? Well, in 
his own words: ‘That the Groups and Sub-Groups [at Southport] where the right approach 
manifested itself in one of two resolutions passed by the final Plenary Session’ (my italics).
58
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In other words, for Walker the Committee must have been led by the Spirit because the 
‘results’ of the Conference, despite the present challenges, produced desired ‘fruit.’ 
  
To give another example of Elim’s Pentecostal pragmatism at work during this phase, before 
the second and final Southport Conference in 1984, an Elim minister called Johnny Barr 
apparently had a spiritual ‘revelation’ from ‘the Lord’ where Elim was called to repent 
regarding its ‘morality, party spirit and money’ or else ‘the Lord’ would ‘remove their 
candlestick from its place.’
59
 Barr shared this prophecy at the second Southport Conference in 
1984,
60
 and as a result ‘scheduled business was dispensed with as the implications of the 
message were assimilated and responded to.’
61
 Reflecting 30 years later, John Glass, who was 
present at the meeting and later became Elim’s General Superintendent, notes that ‘it is my 
belief that it is because of those actions [i.e. Barr’s prophecy and the following repentance 
within Elim] that the Lord has allowed us, thirty years later, to be able to acquire the level of 
prime properties that we own today.’
62
 Thus, again the same pragmatic rationality seems to be 
at work, namely, spiritual experience (i.e. prophecy) is justified by its effects (i.e. repentance 
by Elim ministers and future financial integrity of Elim).  
 
However, as well as falling back on its rationality of Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism, Elim 
also sought to return to the essence of its argument. Wesley Gilpin – an Elim statesman and 
Principal of the Elim Bible College from 1958 to 1980 – gave the final speech at the 1981 
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 In his speech he referred to the events surrounding the Southport 
Conference as the second ‘significant crisis’ within Elim (implying that the resignation of 
Jeffreys had been the first). He continued by pointing out that during both of these crises the 
raison d’etre of Elim and its ‘confessed purpose for the future’ was under scrutiny. He then 
went on to reflect on Elim’s destiny by claiming that  
we are challenged to take the lead, with vision and inspiration, before our own people, 
in the vanguard of the cause of the Full Gospel and, indeed, as a significant and potent 
force in the Evangelical world [my italics].
64
    
 
Two years later, as the movement had made important steps to recovering from its crisis, Tom 
Walker highlighted to Elim’s ministers and churches how Gilpin’s wish had in effect been 
fulfilled as the movement was now back ‘in the vanguard of the cause of the Full Gospel’ 
(although he does not actually mention Gilpin). Writing to the 1983 Elim Conference, Walker 
states that ‘the ministry of the Word throughout was of high quality and clearly indicated our 
determination always to stand foursquare on the Word of God’ (my italics).
65
 He then 
remarked that:  
The many saved, healed or filled with the Holy Spirit, the large number receiving their 
call to commitment, renewal or ministry, the tremendous spirit of worship – all these 




Thus, it seems that in overcoming its moment of crisis, Elim had again returned to the essence 
of its argument, that is, the Foursquare Gospel, at least if the rhetoric is anything to go by. It 
was also this reaffirmation of Foursquare Gospel as the raison d’etre of Elim that helped it 
                                                 
63
 G. Wesley Gilpin, ‘Wholehearted Affirmation,’ in Southport Papers (1981), Elim Archives, Malvern. 
64
 Gilpin, ‘Wholehearted Affirmation.’ 
65
 Tom W. Walker, ‘In His Name to All Nations,’ Elim Pentecostal Church – Annual Conference 1983 – 
Minutes of the Representative Session, Elim Archives, Malvern, 1. 
66
 Tom Walker, ‘In His Name to All Nations,’ 2. 
250 
 
fend off the anti-denominationalism of the Restorationists, because Elim could maintain that 
as a denomination it had a special argument to make to the wider Church and the world.
67
     
 
6.3.2. Structural and Theological Reformulations 
However, Elim also changed in and through the process of overcoming its epistemological 
crisis. These reformulations of the Elim tradition were primarily to do with (1) ecclesiology 
and (2) eschatology. 
 
Structural Changes 
With respect to Elim’s ecclesiology, or church governance structures, there were two 
important modifications. First, Elim devolved increasing powers to the local churches so that 
they were able to agree their own leadership structures, albeit with certain biblical and 
constitutional caveats. Before Southport 1981, Elim’s local church governance was 
constitutionally restricted to simply adopting a diaconate Church Session that left no real 
room for elders.
68
 This was not only considered to be ineffective but more worryingly 
unbiblical.
69
 Consequently, the Elim Conference amended its Constitution by stipulating that 
the Church Session would now consist of pastor(s), elders and deacons and provide 
‘oversight’ for the local church. Local congregations were also given freedom to appoint 
                                                 
67
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elders and deacons in a manner of their choosing, although the method of appointing elders 
and deacons needed to be approved by Elim’s Head Quarters.
70
 This constitutional change 
had been clearly influenced by the Restoration teaching on Ephesians 4:11 and the importance 
it gave to elders in a local church. Hence, in a sense Elim simply adopted the Restorationist 
local church structure, although the justification for Elim’s change was always made on 
biblical grounds, as well as the pragmatic hope that perhaps ‘greater spiritual renewal would 
ensue’ as a result of this more biblical model of governance.
71
 The local churches also now 
had greater autonomy, which in turn gave them greater freedom to adopt Restoration style of 




The second modification regarding Elim’s church structure came with regionalisation in 
1985.
73
 The Restoration movement had a huge emphasis on (covenant) relationships, 
including relationships between ‘elders’ and ‘apostolic leaders.’ This was seen as lacking 
within Elim and as a result many ministers felt isolated, despite the districts that had been 
introduced during the 1940s.
74
 Thus, the idea of introducing regions and regional leaders was 
to help ministers connect better with each other and also for them to have a personal pastor in 
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 The process of regionalisation was rolled out gradually and, according to 
the Elim Conference Minutes, provided welcome improvements,
76
 although Malcolm 
Hathaway has suggested that in the end the ‘result was a rather bureaucratic structure which 
inhibited the original objective.’
77
 Either way, the aspiration at least was to make Elim more 
relationally connected and devolve power from the centre to the regions.  
 
In sum, both of the ecclesiological changes (i.e. local church governance and regionalisation) 
demonstrated Elim’s flexibility to reform its structures, if there were good biblical and 
pragmatic reasons for doing so. Moreover, they both show increasing devolution of power 
within Elim from the Headquarters/Conference to the local churches and regions. 
 
Eschatological Changes 
The change in Elim’s eschatology is the second major modification following from its second 
epistemological crisis. As has been noted above, the Restoration movement was characterised 
by a more optimistic post-millennial and/or amillennial eschatology in comparison to Elim’s 
apocalyptic premillennialism. This, however, changed in 1993 when the Elim Conference 
adopted a revised Statement of Fundamental Truths and deleted premillennialism as one of its 
Fundamental Truths.
78
 Apparently the removal of premillennialism was ‘decided upon on the 
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grounds that the Fundamental truth is that He [Jesus] will return and not the context of that 
coming in relation to a fixed period of time.’
79
 What is interesting about the revision is that 
the previous precision regarding the doctrine of the second coming was removed. Therefore, 
although the hard core doctrine of Jesus as coming King was upheld by the Conference, the 
interpretation of this doctrine (or auxiliary hypothesis) of premillennialism was removed. 
Moreover, the nature of Christ’s return was left vague with simply affirming that He will 
return to ‘reign in power and glory’ in a ‘personal,’ ‘physical’ and ‘visible’ manner.
80
 This 
does raise the question whether Elim, by removing premillennialism and expressing general 
vagueness about its eschatology, was starting to show signs of becoming in the words of 
Lakatos a ‘degenerative scientific research programme’ regarding one of its hard core 
doctrines.   
 
It has been suggested that the removal of premillennialism was not directly connected to 
Elim’s epistemological crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s as such.
81
 However, if there 
were no connection between the two, it would seem like an amazing coincidence of history 
for Elim to change its eschatological views to allow Elim ministers to subscribe to 
postmillennialism and amillennialism after a direct challenge from the Restoration movement 
on this very issue few years previously. The fact that this change happened only twelve years 
after the first Southport Conference is not surprising, as it is not uncommon for official 
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doctrines to be changed after and in response to the actual doctrines having changed in 
practice some time before. Thus, it is proposed that Elim changed its interpretation of Jesus as 
coming King as part of its reformulations in overcoming its second epistemological crisis. 
This is also further evidence to suggest that it is not the Fundamental Truths (e.g. 
premillennialism) that is the hard core of the Elim tradition, but the hard core is the 
Foursquare Gospel (e.g. Jesus as coming King) implicit in the Fundamental Truths. That said, 
as has already been suggested, this particular modification in the Fundamental Truths does 
raise questions whether something in the hard core of Elim was also altered.  
              
6.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have tried to establish that it was the Charismatic movement, and the 
Restoration Charismatics particularly, that caused Elim’s second epistemological crisis. By 
the late 1970s Elim had lost some of its Pentecostal zeal and as a movement was not really 
growing. This made it vulnerable to the emergence of the Restoration movement which not 
only shared Elim’s basic Pentecostal rationality and theology, but also offered novel views on 
ecclesiology and eschatology. In other words, Restorationism seemed to provide an improved 
and updated version of the apparently stagnant Elim argument. Elim, however, responded to 
this challenge by reaffirming its rationality of Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism and theology 
of the Foursquare Gospel. It also reformulated its ecclesiological structures, and was ready to 
reinterpret one of its hard core doctrines of Jesus as coming King by removing its insistence 
on premillennialism. Therefore, in MacIntyrian terms Elim successfully moved from stage 
two (epistemological crisis) to stage three (resolution) by remaining true to its core beliefs and 
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rationality, while demonstrating creativity and flexibility in recalibrating aspects of the Elim 
tradition. 
 
In providing a historical narration of Elim’s two epistemological crises in this and the 
previous chapter, I believe I have substantiated my claim that the content of the Elim 
argument is indeed the Foursquare Gospel and its rationality is Pentecostal Biblical 
Pragmatism. However, the historical analysis provided seems to also suggest that the implied 
opponents of the Elim argument have broadened; that is, the ‘opponent’ instigating the first 
crisis came from inside the movement, whereas the second ‘opponent’ came from likeminded 
Charismatic Christians. The change in the implied opponents, as well as the changing context 
of the argument, has meant that Elim has had to revise and reformulate aspects of its argument 
to maintain itself as a progressive tradition. This reformulation has particularly been 
demonstrated in the changing embodiment of the Elim argument. In other words, through 
these crises Elim has significantly changed its institutional structures. The trajectory of the 
change in the embodiment of the Elim argument has been from the few to the many; that is, 
the initial Elim argument can be seen to be primarily embodied in one man (i.e. George 
Jeffreys), in 1934 this moved to few key leaders (i.e. the Executive Council), in 1942 it 
progressed to Elim ministers and representatives of congregations (i.e. the Elim Conference), 
before increasingly shifting to leadership teams and members of local churches (i.e. approved 
Church Sessions).
82
 To put it in political language, there has been an increasing 
democratisation and devolving of power in Elim. Interestingly, this change in Elim is also 
reflective of the developments in western democracies. Nevertheless, this change in the way 
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the Elim argument has been embodied has not been done at the expense of the argument’s 
content or its rationality, if anything it seems to have been informed by them, particularly by 
Elim’s biblical pragmatism. 
 
Chapters five and six have also raised some interesting questions about Elim’s rationality and 
the hard core doctrines of its argument. Regarding Elim’s rationality, the BI debate of 1934 
highlighted how Elim’s rationality is not merely biblicism or pragmatism but biblical 
pragmatism. This means, among other things, that the pragmatic beliefs of Elim must 
‘naturally’ arise from the biblical text, which in turn begs the question what is a ‘natural’ 
reading of a text? This hermeneutical matter needs to be addressed to help clarify Elim’s 
biblical pragmatism, and it is something that I will seek to do in chapter eight.  
 
In terms of Elim’s hard core doctrines, the deleting of premillennialism as a Fundamental 
Truth should not be quickly passed by, not least when during the movement’s first 
epistemological crisis premillennialism was a central tenet of Elim’s eschatology. To put it 
differently, has Elim effectively changed one of its hard core doctrines, namely, Jesus as 
coming King, by moving from a premillennial position to a general eschatological position? 
Or at least in generalising its eschatology is Elim showing signs of becoming in Lakatosian 
terms a ‘degenerative’ tradition by no longer being able to predict ‘novel facts’? I will return 
to this question in the conclusion of the thesis.
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PART III – (RE)CONSTRUCTING PENTECOSTAL BIBLICAL PRAGMATISM 
 
I began the thesis with a search for a Pentecostal rationality, epistemology and/or theological 
hermeneutics that would stem from and/or be compatible with Pentecostal spirituality, beliefs 
and practices. In doing so I evaluated the Pentecostal rationalities of Amos Yong, James 
Smith and William Oliverio, Jr (chapter 1). After engaging with the valuable contributions of 
Yong, Smith and Oliverio, I concluded that despite the various strengths of their proposals, 
their rationalities and epistemologies seem to suffer from being ahistorical and non-narrative 
and thus are in danger of not necessarily being Pentecostal, or at least not representing any 
particular Pentecostal/charismatic tradition. Following from this concern, I suggested that 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s concepts of ‘tradition’ and ‘tradition-dependent rationality’ provides a 
useful way forward for articulating a more historical, narrative and tradition-specific 
Pentecostal rationality (chapter 2).  
 
Utilising MacIntyre’s philosophical insights in constructing a tradition-specific Pentecostal 
rationality, however, cannot be done apart from historically exemplifying an existing 
Pentecostal tradition, or in MacIntyring terms articulating a Pentecostal ‘argument extended 
through time.’ Consequently, chapters three to six of the thesis have tried to narrate along 
MacIntyrian lines the Elim Pentecostal tradition as an example of a classical Pentecostal 
tradition, with particular emphasis on the context and roots of Elim (chapter 3); the early 
opponents, content, rationality and embodiment of the Elim argument (chapter 4); and Elim’s 
two major epistemological crises (chapters 5-6). The underlying argument from this narration 
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has been that Elim’s tacit Pentecostal rationality is best described as Pentecostal Biblical 
Pragmatism and the theological hard core constituting this rationality is the Foursquare 
Gospel. Moreover, I have tried to demonstrate that Elim has shown flexibility regarding the 
‘embodiment’ of the argument by revising its constitution and institutional structures in order 
to more effectively live out the Full Gospel. This narration has not only enabled me to provide 
a historical, narrative and tradition specific Pentecostal rationality, but in doing so I have also 
presented the first intellectual history of Elim. 
 
The purpose of the last section is to focus explicitly on Elim’s tradition-dependent rationality 
with the aim of developing it along theological and philosophical lines. Consequently, the last 
section is significantly narrower in its focus compared to the previous section. In other words, 
whereas in section two of the thesis I have focused on the wider social, intellectual and 
religious context of the Elim argument (chapter 3), before narrating it with respect to its 
implied opponents, content, rationality and embodiment (chapters 4-6), my focus will now be 
explicitly on Elim’s rationality of Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism. This is not because I do 
not consider it important to explore these other facets of the Elim argument (in fact, I will 
make brief comments about them in the conclusion of the thesis), but simply because I am not 
able to do all of this with sufficient detail within the word restrictions of the thesis. 
Furthermore, I believe that the broader historical narration of section two has provided the 
needed theological and philosophical resources to (re)construct a truly tradition-constituted 




Therefore, section three will exclusively discuss Elim’s Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism by 
first exploring the Pentecostal aspect with particular emphasis on Elim’s concept of truth 
(chapter 7). This I believe is a necessary precursor for a working theological rationality. After 
this I will bring Elim’s biblicism under closer scrutiny with the aim of proposing an 
appropriate biblical hermeneutic for Elim in light of its doctrine of Scripture (chapter 8). As 
has become clear in chapters three to six throughout Elim’s existence the Bible has remained 
the grounding document for its beliefs and practices, and thus the question of biblical 
hermeneutics cannot really be ignored when developing Elim’s rationality. Finally, I will 
focus on Elim’s pragmatism which is the underlying ethos of the movement’s rationality. I 
will do so by suggesting a pragmatic theory of epistemic justification with an emphasis on 
both ‘experientialism’ and ‘experimentalism.’  
 
In doing the above, I do not claim to provide the official Elim views on Pentecostal truth, 
biblical hermeneutics or pragmatic justification. However, I do believe that my proposals are 
compatible with, and flow out of, the Elim tradition. Moreover, they are suggestive (if nothing 
else) of what a theological/philosophical articulation of Elim’s explicit rationality and 
epistemology should look like, and therefore will hopefully serve as a constructive 
contribution in the search for a Pentecostal rationality and epistemology.    
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CHAPTER 7 – PENTECOSTAL TRUTH: PENTECOSTAL THEOLOGICAL 
REALISM 
 
In chapter three I have argued that the basic theological and intellectual assumptions of Elim’s 
rationality have been inherited from its Pentecostal and Evangelical forefathers. In other 
words, the underlying ‘spirituality’ (Land), ‘social imaginary’ (Taylor) and/or ‘worldview’ 
(Smith) of Elim has been significantly informed by late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
British Evangelicalism (particularly the Holiness movement and the Welsh Revival),
1
 as well 
as the early British Pentecostalism exemplified in Boddy’s Sunderland Conventions (1908-
1914) and Confidence magazine. It is important to stress, not least in light of the Pentecostal 
scholarship that tries to distance Pentecostalism from Evangelicalism,
2
 that for Elim the 
question has never been whether the movement is Pentecostal or Evangelical, but Elim has 
always been Pentecostal and Evangelical. As I have pointed out, the early Elim pioneers came 
predominantly from Evangelical backgrounds (chapter 3) and saw their movement as being 
Evangelical (chapter 4). Elim was also keen to join the Evangelical Alliance in 1964 (chapter 
6), and throughout its history has shared key doctrines with British Evangelicals (chapters 4 
and 6). Nevertheless, as well as being Evangelical, Elim has also identified itself (primarily) 
as a Pentecostal movement with certain distinctive and specific emphases implying that Elim 
has also gone beyond mainline Evangelicalism, although this ‘going beyond’ has not been 
perceived as going against Evangelicalism.   
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Elim’s Evangelical Pentecostalism has naturally shared a number of basic theological beliefs 
with Evangelicalism vis-à-vis the nature of God, creation, humanity, sin, redemption and final 
consummation, although Elim’s Evangelical Pentecostalism has also interpreted some of 
these doctrines in a distinct way. For example, the doctrine of God has increasingly been 
perceived through Christological and pneumatological lenses, redemption has been viewed 
‘holistically’ with an emphasis on both the salvation of the soul and the healing of the body, 
and the final consummation has been understood as an immanent eschatological event. 
 
These Evangelical and Pentecostal theological convictions have not just been seminal in 
constituting Elim’s rationality of biblical pragmatism, but also in shaping Elim’s tacit 
assumptions about the nature of truth. However, despite the importance of ‘truth’ in 
formulating a working rationality,
3
 thus far I have paid little attention to Elim’s concept of 
truth. Consequently, this chapter’s discussion on the Pentecostal aspect of Elim’s rationality 
will focus explicitly on Elim concept of truth. In exploring this, my aim is not to argue for the 
truth of Elim’s theory of truth vis-à-vis its theological and philosophical competitors, but to 
provide a working definition of truth that is ‘truthful’ to the Elim tradition and thus sufficient 
in grounding Elim’s rational enquiry according to its own standards. 
 
                                                 
3
 It seems that even if ‘truth’ is not the primary epistemic goal, it certainly is a central goal of epistemic enquiry, 
and therefore a working definition of ‘truth’ is central for any epistemology and/or rationality; see Jonathan 
Kvanvig, ‘Truth Is not the Primary Epistemic Goal,’ in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, ed. Matthias 
Steup and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2011), 285-296; Marian David, ‘Truth as the Primary 
Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis,’ in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 296-312. 
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7.1. Pentecostal Theological Realism  
Truth matters for Elim. The importance of the concept of truth for Elim was highlighted in a 
2013 Elim Conference debate on changing the name of the ‘Fundamental Truths’ to ‘Core 
Beliefs.’
4
 Much of the rhetoric defending the phrase ‘Fundamental Truths’ appealed to Elim 
standing on theological ‘truth(s),’ which the majority of the Conference seemed to understand 
as referring to universal and objective reality, rather than on ‘mere beliefs’ which were taken 
as relative and subjective opinions. After the debate, the Conference voted in favour of 
maintaining the language of ‘Fundamental Truths’ because it concluded that ‘truth’ as an idea 
was too important to be jettisoned, even if the term ‘Fundamental’ was seen by many as 
unhelpful in the contemporary religious climate of militant religious fundamentalism.
5
    
 
Nevertheless, despite the purported importance of truth for Elim, the nature of truth has 
received little discussion within the movement (although see 4.3.2.). Consequently, I will now 
try to suggest a theological concept of truth that emerges from the Elim tradition and is 
coherent with it. My basic assumption is that a theory of truth that is both informed by and 
compatible with the Elim tradition needs to be grounded in Elim’s Pentecostal beliefs, it 
needs to be biblically based, realist in nature, and eschatological in its disposition. In light of 
this, I will argue that truth for Elim ought to be characterised as Pentecostal theological 
realism. Elim’s theological realism can be seen to maintain and share the three common 
theses of realism, namely, 
                                                 
4
 Elim Pentecostal Church: Annual Conference, 2013. Conference Agenda and Reports, Elim Archives, Malvern, 
15. The author was present at the Conference.  
5
 Indeed, the phrase ‘Fundamental Truths’ was changed to ‘Foundational Truths’ in 2015/2016; Elim Pentecostal 
Church: Annual Conference, 2015. Conference Agenda and Reports, Elim Archives, Malvern, 23; Elim 
Pentecostal Church: Annual Conference, 2016. Conference Agenda and Reports, Elim Archives, Malvern, 24. 
The author was present at both Conferences.   
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1. Reality exists independently of the human mind (Thesis 1); 
 
2. A sufficient relationship between truth and ‘beliefs’ can be established; that is, true 
beliefs are those that ‘correspond,’ in one way or another, with reality (Thesis 2); 
  
3. ‘Beliefs’ and ‘propositions’ about God and the world are either true or false (i.e. 




It is worth clarifying that I will not discuss the various options for ‘truth-bearers’ but will 
simply assume that ‘beliefs’ and ‘propositions’ are sufficient bearers of truth,
7
 and my focus is 
primarily on theological truth, even if there are obvious overlaps with ‘truth’ generally 
speaking. I will begin by trying to theologically ground Thesis 1, before more explicitly 
focusing on thesis 2 and 3. I will seek to justify the three theses from a biblically based ‘Elim’ 
theology with particular emphasis on the doctrines of God, creation, humanity, sin, revelation, 




                                                 
6
 These three aspects constitute William Alston’s ‘alethetic realism;’ William Alston, ‘Realism and the Christian 
Faith,’ IJPR 38, no. 1 (Dec. 1995): 39. For further categorisation of the realist/anti-realist debate; see Michael 
Glanzberg, ‘Truth,’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
accessed October 20, 2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/truth/; Christopher J. Insole, 
‘Realism and Anti-Realism,’ in The Oxford Handbook of The Epistemology of Theology, 274-289.  
7
 For further discussion see William P. Alston, A Realist Conception of Truth (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1996), 9-22; Glanzberg ‘Truth.’ 
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7.2. God as Ultimate Reality        
In line with other Christian and Evangelical traditions, the basic assumption in Elim appears 
to be that God is the ‘ultimate truth.’
8
 The theological justification for believing this is based 
on the concept of God ontologically being the ‘ultimate reality’ as the creator and ground of 
being (see Gen. 1:1; Jn. 1:3).
9
 God as creator is conceived as the only necessarily existing 
being, implying that everything else that exists is contingent on his existence. As the unique 
creator God is perceived as the source of all things and hence all of creation is dependent on 
God for its existence. This leads to an asymmetrical relationship between God and creation; 
that is, the created order is dependent on God for its existence, but God is not dependent on 
creation for His existence. In the language of realism, this means that the transcendent God as 
the ultimate reality exists independently of the creation’s perceiving of Him. Or to put it 
differently, ultimate reality (read: God) exists independently of the human mind (Thesis 1). 
 
In a theistic worldview affirming theological realism with respect to Thesis 1 is generally 
uncontroversial. Even James Smith – who is no supporter of ‘realism as correspondence’ – 
acknowledges ‘the reality and independence of the transcendent God on whom creation 
depends for its existence.’
10
 However, even if Thesis 1 one is believed and God is seen as the 
‘ultimate reality,’ this need not mean that humans can have access to this ‘reality’ to the 
extent of enabling them to have sufficiently corresponding ‘beliefs’ about it (Thesis 2), nor 
allowing them to articulate truthful statements about this reality, at least not in the realist 
                                                 
8
 See Hicks, Evangelicals and Truth, 179; Marshall, Trinity and Truth, 2; Mark A. McIntosh, Discernment and 
Truth: The Spirituality and Theology of Knowledge (New York, NY: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 
2004), 4.  
9
 However, it should be noted that Elim’s Foundational Truths lack an explicit article on creation.  
10
 Smith, Who’s Afraid of Relativism?, 106. 
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sense (Thesis 3). Indeed, John Hick has argued that there is the ‘Real’ (i.e. ‘Ultimate 
Reality’), but the human experience of the Real is always informed by specific religious 
contexts and cultural-linguistic frameworks to the extent that the ‘truth’ of one’s beliefs and 
propositions of the Real are found  significantly wanting. To use Hick’s own example, it is 
impossible to discern whether the Real is in fact personal or non-personal; the best one can do 
is to speculate that the Real is ‘good or gracious, namely as the necessary condition of our 
highest good.’
11
 In other words, there is, or at least could be real theological truths out there, 




The denial of Thesis 2 and 3, despite accepting Thesis 1, however, does not seem to be 
justified in light of Elim’s broader Evangelical/Pentecostal theology with respect to the 
doctrines of creation, imago dei (despite human ‘sin’), and special revelation in Christ through 
the Holy Spirit. In fact, these doctrines provide good theological reasons for Elim to embrace 
the two remaining realist theses, namely, the possibility of human beliefs to sufficiently 
correspond with reality and for humans therefore to be able to make sufficient truths claims 




                                                 
11
 John Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 16. For a full 
articulation of Hick’s thesis see John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the 
Transcendent. 2
nd
 ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).  
12
 Smith seems to be leaning towards this position; Smith, Who’s Afraid of Relativism?, 107. 
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7.3. The Possibility for Beliefs and Talk about Reality 
Although Elim does not have a developed theology of creation and/or humanity,
13
 the 
movement appears to share the basic principles of other Evangelical and Pentecostal 
traditions. For example, Julian Ward notes in a recent official Elim publication that,  
...all human beings were and are created in the image and likeness of God and intended 
to be the summit of God’s creative acts (Gen. 1:26-28; Ps. 139:13, 14). We have been 
created as rational, moral and spiritual beings, with distinctive personalities endowed 




Regarding human ability to have ‘true’ beliefs and make ‘truthful’ propositions about God, 
even if not explicitly stated here, this seems to be assumed in Ward’s statement of humans 
being ‘created in the image and likeness of God’ as ‘rational’ beings with intellects and 
communicative abilities. Indeed Peter Hicks surmises that the basic Evangelical doctrine of 
imago dei implies, among other things, that humans can relate to God and have sufficiently 
realist knowledge of Him. Moreover, stemming from humanity’s ‘God like’ status there are 
reasons to assume that humans are also able to experience the world and interact with other 
people with sufficient accuracy.
15
 Thus, the Evangelical and Pentecostal concept of imago dei 
seems to provide a prima facie theological grounding for humans to be able to have true 
beliefs that correspondence with the reality about God (Thesis 2), and also to be able to state 
and communicate these beliefs in a manner that reflects reality (Thesis 3). 
 
                                                 
13
 Although see George Canty, In My Father’s House: Pentecostal Expositions of the Major Christian Truths 
(London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1969), 11-20; cf. Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, A Constructive Christian 
Theology for the Pluralistic World, Volume 3: Creation and Humanity (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2015).   
14
 Julian Ward, ‘Humanity and Sin,’ in The Message: Elim’s Core Beliefs, ed. Keith Warrington (Malvern: Elim 
Training, n/d), 43.  
15
 Hicks, Evangelicals and Truth, 152-154. 
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That said, the concept of imago dei also appears to cause some limitations for the human 
ability to grasp truth. For a start, humans are made as embodied beings in the image of God, 
and as such embodied creatures and mere images of ‘God’ (rather than ‘gods’), humans are 
not able to have ‘God’s point of view’ on truth but are limited by their very humanness (see 
Gen. 3:5-6). Consequently, both Amos Yong and James Smith rightly emphasise the partial 




These natural human limitations to know the truth are further exacerbated by the doctrine of 
‘sin.’ To quote Ward again:  
Sin darkens our understanding and corrupts the image of God in us and makes us self-




These sentiments expressed by Ward are not without support from NT theology. For example, 
Paul speaks of the hardening of the human hearts due to sin as resulting in people being 
‘darkened in their understanding’ (Eph. 4:18),
18
 as well as the ‘ungodliness and 
unrighteousness’ of people leading to the ‘suppressing of truth’ (Rom. 1:18).
19
 In John’s 
Gospel the effects of human sin vis-à-vis knowing the truth are equally stark, as the world is 
portrayed to be in ‘epistemic darkness’ when it comes to knowing the ‘truth’ about God (Joh. 
                                                 
16
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 176, 180, 182; Smith, The Fall of Interpretation, 10. 
17
 Ward, ‘Humanity and Sin,’ 44-45. 
18
 I am assuming Pauline authorship of Ephesians.  
19
 For further analysis of Pauline theological epistemology see Richard B. Gaffin, ‘Some Epistemological 
Reflections on 1 Cor. 2:6–16,’ WTJ 57, no. 1 (1995): 103–124; Ian W. Scott, Implicit Epistemology in the Letters 
of Paul: Story, Experience and the Spirit (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2006); Mary Healy, ‘Knowledge and 
Mystery: A Study of Pauline Epistemology,’ in The Bible and Epistemology: Biblical Soundings on the 
Knowledge of God, ed. Mary Healy and Robin Parry (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2007), 134-158; Simo 





 Therefore, from a biblical perspective at least, Alvin Plantinga is justified in 




Following from the epistemic limitations based on humans being both embodied and ‘fallen,’ 
at least two alethiological implications can be drawn.
22
 First, as well as being able to have true 
beliefs and to make true statements about God, humans are equally ‘able’ to have false beliefs 
and to make false statements about God. This does not undermine ‘realism’ (Thesis 2 or 3) as 
such, but it does point towards the significant likelihood of humans having false beliefs about 
God. In light of this, any theory of truth that takes the biblical concept of imago dei and 
human sin seriously should probably embrace some kind of fallibilism in its epistemology.  
 
Second, and following closely from the first implication, the doctrines of creation and sin 
suggest that simplistic or naïve correspondence theories of truth should be avoided. To put it 
differently, human beliefs and articulations of reality will always be characterised by their 
partiality and perspectivism because humans are limited in their access to absolute truth by 
the very fact of being the created. To be created means to have perspectival and contextual 
knowledge, as there is ‘no view from nowhere’ or ‘God’s point of view’ for humanity. As 
contextual beings humans are therefore inevitably also shaped by their (limited) experiences, 
                                                 
20
 See Cornelis Bennema, The Power of Saving Wisdom: An Investigation of Spirit and Wisdom in Relation to 
the Soteriology of the Fourth Gospel (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2007); Cornelis Bennema, ‘Christ, the 
Spirit, and the Knowledge of God: A Study in Johannine Epistemology,’ in The Bible and Epistemology, 107-
133.  
21
 Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 214.  
22
 Strictly speaking the limitations from creation are part of the ‘goodness’ of creation (Gen. 1:31) and therefore 
arguably something that humans should not try to transcend, whereas the limitations from the ‘fall’ are 
distortions to be corrected in redemption.    
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history, culture and linguistic abilities, and there is no obvious way of transcending these 
limitations. When these natural limitations are coupled with those arising from human 
sinfulness, human ability to have beliefs that really correspond with reality is further 
weakened. Consequently, a Pentecostal correspondence theory of truth should probably 
follow a version expressed by Amos Yong in which correspondence is seen as ‘correlation,’ 
rather than ‘congruence,’ meaning that true propositions need not be identical with their 
referents but should, nevertheless, resemble them sufficiently. Therefore, a theologically 
responsible ‘Elim correspondence theory of truth’ should acknowledge the perspectival and 





This does re-raise the issue that are the alethiological limitations stemming from human 
(fallen) nature too great to be able to sustain any meaningful theory of realism (apart from 
Thesis 1)? And thus should Elim’s realism simply accept Smith’s concept of ‘‘realism’ 
without correspondence’’?
24
 Surrendering Thesis 2 and 3, however, would be moving away 
from what seems to be implicitly assumed within the Elim tradition. Of course having these 
tacit realist assumptions does not necessarily mean that one should not significantly revise or 
even reject them, particularly if there are good theological reasons for doing so. Nonetheless, 
it seems that theologically rejecting Thesis 2 and 3 would in Elim’s case be a premature step. 
That is, once Elim’s Pentecostal theology of special revelation is added into the theological 
mix of doctrines, with particular emphasis on the revelation of Christ mediated through the 
Spirit, there seems to be no reason for Elim to abandon Thesis 2 and 3. 
                                                 
23
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 167-168, 185.   
24




Like other Evangelicals and Pentecostals, Elim believes that God has and continues to make 
Himself known through general and special revelation. The first refers to God generally 
revealing himself ‘in the things that have been made’ (Rom. 1:20; cf. Ps. 19:1-6), and the 
latter of God specially revealing himself through specific actions, interactions and 
communicative events. These special revealing acts in a biblical framework are fundamentally 
culminated in the person and ministry of Jesus Christ (Col. 1:15-19; Heb. 1:3). In fact, it is the 
special revelation found in Christ and illuminated by the Spirit that should be essential in 
Elim’s theory of truth, not least as the movement is Christologically focused on the 
pneumatically experienced Foursquare Gospel. To try sketch out the repercussion of the 
pneumatically mediated special revelation in Christ for Thesis 2 and 3, I will briefly interact 
with Johannine theology as a biblical example of what this might mean for Elim’s theory of 
truth. 
 
In the Gospel John, Christ is not only presented as the one who ‘bears witness to the truth’ 
(Jn. 18:37), but also as ‘the truth’ (Jn. 14:6).
25
 That is, He is portrayed as the perfect revealer 
of God because He is in fact the divine Logos (Jn. 1:1) who was and is incarnated in human 
‘flesh’ (Jn. 1:14). While being the embodied point of contact between humanity and ‘ultimate 
reality,’ Christ maintains His full humanity with all its corollary limitations (Jn. 4:6, 19:28), 
but simultaneously remains one with God (Jn. 10:30). Consequently, ultimate reality is 
brought to the epistemic domain of humanity as to ‘perceive’ Jesus is to perceive God (Jn. 
                                                 
25




14:9). This means that the revelation of God in Christ enables one to experience ‘Ultimate 
Reality’ by experiencing the person of Christ, despite the experiencer’s limitations resulting 
from their (fallen) human nature. Therefore, it is not hard to argue theologically that the 
revelation of God in Christ enables one to form in a manageable way beliefs about God which 
correspond sufficiently with His ‘Ultimate Reality’ (Thesis 2).     
 
Moreover, according to John, the possibility of coming face to face with the revelation of God 
in Christ is not just available to those who physically encountered Jesus of Nazareth in first 
century Palestine, but is a genuine possibility for others through the work of the Holy Spirit. 
In other words, the ‘Paraclete’ and ‘Spirit of Truth’ will ‘teach’ and ‘remind’ Christians about 
the ‘truth’ that is embodied in Christ (Jn. 14:26, 16:12-15); and when it comes to other 
humans, the Spirit will also bear ‘witness’ to the ‘truth’ (Jn. 15:26) and ‘convict’ them in 
accordance with the truth (Jn. 16:7-11). A major vehicle for the Spirit to continue this 
revelatory work seems to be through the witness of the written Gospel(s) (Jn. 20:31). In sum, 
for John the revelatory ministry of Jesus continues to have efficacy through the agency of the 
Spirit and thus the possibility of forming appropriately corresponding beliefs about God 
remains a theological possibility even after the ascension of Christ.  
 
Interestingly in the Gospel of John, those who encounter Christ are not only expected to be 
able to form sufficiently accurate beliefs about Him and God (Thesis 2),  but are also expected 
to be able to make true or false statements about God through human language (Thesis 3). For 
example, in the Gospel there are those who are depicted as making ‘true’ statements about 
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God; that is, statements that correspond with the reality of God revealed in Christ. This 
includes figures such as John the Baptist (Jn 1:29, 34), the healed blind man (Jn. 9:38), 
Thomas (Jn. 20:28) and most importantly for the Gospel the ‘beloved disciple’ (Jn. 21:24). 
However, there are also those who are depicted as making false claims that do not correspond 
with the reality revealed by Christ, most notably ‘the Jews’ (Jn. 8:48) and the Pharisees (Jn. 
9:24). Thus, the Johannine record seems to suggest that statements about God can be either 
true or false, indicating that a biblically informed Pentecostal theology can comfortably 
embrace the principle of bivalence regarding theological truth (Thesis 3).     
 
Now without a doubt the revelatory role of Christ and the Spirit from a Pentecostal and Elim 
perspective merits further discussion and development. Nevertheless, the rudimentary sketch 
provided based primarily on Johannine theology is at least suggestive for why Elim – a 
movement which boasts of being biblically, as well as Christologically and pneumatologically 
focused – has theological grounds for maintaining its theological realism not just regarding 
Thesis 1 but also regarding Thesis 2 and 3. To put it differently, the doctrine of special 
revelation with particular emphasis on Christ and the Spirit seems to mitigate against 
elements of anti-realism potentially inherent within (fallen) humanity. In fact, such is the 
‘truthfulness’ of the revelation in Christ mediated by the Spirit for humans to embrace, that 
for John those who encounter ‘the truth’ in Christ but fail to form sufficiently corresponding 





7.4. (Under-)Realised Realism 
So far the discussion on Elim’s concept of truth has focused on Pentecostal theological 
realism with a proposal that theological true beliefs should be understood as beliefs that 
appropriately correspond with the reality of God. Such theological realism has been argued 
for in light of Pentecostal doctrines of God, creation, imago dei, sin, and revelation of God in 
Christ as illuminated by the Spirit. However, Pentecostal realism thus conceived lacks a 
crucial element within Pentecostal theology, namely, eschatology. Indeed, Pentecostal 
eschatology is necessary to ‘complete’ the concept of Pentecostal theological realism. 
 
As has been suggested the notion of God as ‘ultimate reality’ is based to a great extent on the 
idea of God as the creator and ground of being. However, despite God grounding the 
existence of His creation, eschatologically speaking the ‘ultimate reality’ of God has not yet 
been fully ‘realised’ on earth. As Paul puts it, in the end God will be ‘all in all’ (1 Cor. 15:28), 
suggesting that currently creation is not experiencing the fullness of God. A similar idea is 
depicted in the Book of Revelation where the final consummation of the created order is 
characterised by God saturating the (new) world with his presence and reality (Rev. 21:1-8), 
which again implies that as things stand the ‘reality’ of God is under-realised. Indeed, Paul 
seems to draw a direct epistemological conclusion regarding one’s limited access to truth in 
the current dispensation when compared to the age to come. In his words: ‘For now we see in 
a mirror dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know fully...’ (1 Cor. 




This kind of eschatological vision has two important repercussions for an Elim concept of 
truth and realism. First, as already implied, the fact that God is not yet ‘all in all’ within His 
creations means that in the current dispensation any human access to God as ‘ultimate reality’ 
is in fact incomplete, which suggests that eschatologically sensitive Pentecostal realism 
should be mitigated realism. To put it more strongly, the realist Thesis 2 and 3 are not only 
weakened by the limits of human (fallen) nature but also by the not yet fully realised reality of 




Second, as well as God being the creator and ground of being, according to New Testament 
eschatology he also seems to be the completer and goal of being. For a Pentecostal realist 
concept of truth this means that one should not only focus on ‘what is’ but what ‘will be.’ In 
other words, truth can be seen to be the telos of enquiry in a double sense: (1) it is the goal of 
enquiry in terms directing one towards the full realisation of ultimate reality in creation; and 
(2) it is the end of enquiry at the moment of this full realisation. In sum, ‘truth’ is 
eschatological.
27
    
 
7.5. Conclusion    
In this short chapter I have tried to sketch an Elim concept of truth that stems from the 
implicit assumptions within the Elim tradition, as well as being explicitly informed by biblical 
and Pentecostal theology regarding God, creation, imago dei, sin, revelation, and eschatology. 
                                                 
26
 Indeed, according to the biblical eschatological vision there seems to be a direct correlation between ‘sin’ and 
‘under-realised presence of God’, as well as ‘absence of sin’ and ‘fully-realised presence of God.’  
27
 See Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, 5; Yong, ‘The Demise of Foundationalism...’, 580; 
Oliverio, Theological Hermeneutics, 342.  
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In doing so, it seems that despite the various theological obstacles for a realist theory of truth, 
there are adequate reasons for Elim to continue with its assumed theory of truth as Pentecostal 
realism consisting of the three realist theses. However, in light of the epistemological 
limitations caused by human (fallen) nature and eschatology, Elim’s theological realism 
should be strongly characterised by fallibilism regarding its beliefs (Thesis 2) and 
propositions (Thesis 3). Moreover, when it comes to the correspondent aspect of its theory of 
truth (Thesis 2), correspondence should be seen as ‘correlation’ rather than ‘congruence’ (see 
Amos Yong). Finally, ‘truth’ should not just be seen as that which corresponds with reality, 
but also as the telos of enquiry. 
 
This ‘Elim’ theory of truth has important similarities with the theory of truth offered by 
Alasdair MacIntyre (see 2.2.1.). That is, MacIntyre’s theory of truth has two major 
characteristics: (1) it adopts a Thomistic correspondence theory of truth as adaequatio 
intellectus ad rem, which means that MacIntyre holds to a version of correspondence but 
rejects any theories of ‘truth as correspondence-to-fact;’
28
 (2) for MacIntyre truth is ‘the telos 
of rational enquiry.’
29
 This similarity is noteworthy as it suggests that utilising a MacIntyrian 
methodology for constructing the Elim tradition and rationality (chapters 3-6) is not forcing 
Elim into an alien framework, at least when it comes to the concept of truth. 
 
                                                 
28
 MacIntyre, ‘Truth as a good: a reflection on Fides et Ratio,’ 200, 203. 
29
 MacIntyre, ‘Moral Relativism; truth and justification,’ 68-69. 
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Elim’s Pentecostal theological realism outlined in this section also serves as the ontological 
backdrop for understanding the biblicist and pragmatist elements of Elim’s rationality. 
Indeed, I will now focus on each of these elements in the following two chapters of the thesis.   
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CHAPTER 8 – BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS: COMMUNITY DISCERNMENT OF 
MEANING IN A DIALECTICAL BIBLE 
 
From its inception Elim has seen the Bible as the grounding document for its beliefs and 
practices. As discussed in chapter three, the Bible’s primacy as a theological source of 
knowledge for Elim is based on the concept that God is the foundation of all truth (see also 
chapter 7), and He has revealed the truth about Himself and the world in the Bible by 
inspiring its very words. Since the (Protestant) Bible as a whole is considered to be verbally 
inspired by God, and since God is believed to be perfect, it naturally follows for Elim that the 
Bible is seen as an infallible document. Indeed, the centrality of the Bible has been 
underscored when Elim navigated through its two epistemological crises (chapters 5 and 6), 
as during both of these crises Elim was adamant about the need to recalibrate its tradition in 
light of the Scriptures. Therefore, it is no surprise that Elim’s latest Foundational Truths 
affirm the Bible’s authority, inspiration, infallibility and inerrancy. The current statement 
reads:  
We believe the Bible, as originally given, to be without error, the fully inspired and 





So, why does Elim believe that the Bible is ‘the fully inspired and infallible Word of 
God’ and thus the supreme epistemic authority regarding Christian beliefs and 
practices? In chapter four I noted that the primary reasons offered by Elim have been 
                                                 
1
 Minutes of Elim Conference (1993), Item No. 27. For recent official interpretation of the article on the Bible 
see Geoff Richardson, ‘The Bible,’ in The Message, 11-18. 
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pragmatic. In other words, Elim has historically offered arguments from transformed 
lives, emphasising the ability of the Bible to produce ‘results’ in the lives of 
individuals and communities, and arguments from the uniqueness of the Bible, 
highlighting (among other things) the uniqueness and force of the Bible’s divine 
message.
2
 These two pragmatic arguments have then supposedly given credence for 
Elim to accept the argument from the Bible’s own testimony, which is claimed to 
support the concept of divine inspiration and infallibility of the whole Bible, not just 
parts of it (e.g. 2 Tim. 3:16; 2 Pet. 1:21). 
 
I will further explore and develop Elim’s pragmatic theory of justification (see chapter 
9). However, before doing so, what surfaced in the narration of Elim’s first 
epistemological crisis (see particularly the BI debate in chapter 5) was that despite 
Elim’s pragmatic approach to the Bible, the biblical text is believed to have certain 
interpretive limitations and thus cannot be made to mean anything in Elim, even if 
such a reading may possess pragmatic potential. In other words, for Elim certain 
hermeneutical principles need to guide the scope of what the biblical text can and 
cannot mean. Elim’s ‘hermeneutical principles’ will therefore be the focus of this 
chapter, since it seems to be meaningless to simply state that Elim’s rationality is 
characterised by biblicism without reflecting on how the Bible has and should be 
interpreted within the Elim movement.   
                                                 
2
 Elim’s pragmatic arguments are masterfully demonstrated by the Elim Minister and Evangelist George Canty 
when he writes ‘If it were possible to know that the Bible is the authentic Word of God, outside of personal 
experience, it would be no more use than knowing Mars is made of red sandstone. Such knowledge will not help 
us live or go places... Let the passage[s] prove itself as inspired;’ Canty, In My Father’s House, 66-67. 
Interestingly the more recent articulation on the authority of the Bible by Geoff Richardson does not really 




8.1. Historical Reflections on Elim’s Hermeneutics 
It seems that a community’s concept of the Bible, as well as their purpose for reading 
it, will inevitably influence their hermeneutical approach.
3
 For Elim the Bible has been 
primarily conceived as the ‘Word of God,’ rather than just ancient literature or history, 
and as such it has been believed to be ‘the final authority in all matters of faith and 
conduct.’
4
 This characterisation implies that for Elim the Bible is and consists of the 
very ‘words God has spoken to man,’
5
 and therefore the purpose of engaging with it is 
to inform ‘faith’ (read: theology) and to transform ‘conduct’ (read: practice). So, if this 
identifies for Elim what the Bible is and why it should be interacted with, the question 
then becomes: how should it be read? 
 
The ‘Bible Reading Method’   
Elim’s early hermeneutical method can be identified in the words of Kenneth Archer 
as ‘the Bible Reading Method’ (see 4.3.2.). Although Archer is referring to the early 
classical Pentecostal hermeneutics in the United States, his description, nevertheless, 
accurately reflects Elim’s early hermeneutics: 
The ‘Bible Reading Method’ was a modified form of the proof-text system. It involved 
looking up a specific word in an English Bible concordance, compiling an exhaustive 
                                                 
3
 See Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Philosophical reflection on the claim that God speaks 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 17; Craig S. Keener, Spirit Hermeneutics: Reading Scripture in 
Light of Pentecost (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2016), 139.  
4
 Elim Conference Minutes (1993), Item No. 27. 
5
 G. W. Gilpin, ‘The Inspiration of the Bible,’ in Pentecostal Doctrine, ed. P. S. Brewster (No city: P. S. 
Brewster, 1976), 127-136. 
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list of its occurrences, and deducing a biblical truth based on the reading of the texts… 
the focal point and primary concern of the Bible Reading Method was to synthezise 
concerning the data into a doctrinal statement and thereby produce a biblical 
understanding concerning the topic or theme under investigation… The Pentecostal 
reading scheme was thoroughly popularistic, thus a ‘pre-critical’, canonical and text 




As pointed out by French Arrington this hermeneutical approach was to a great extent based 
on the assumption of divine ‘inspiration as dictation.’
7
 To put it differently, it was believed 
that since the words of the Bible were directly dictated by God, the Bible could effectively be 
viewed as one book (not 66 books) and therefore could also be interpreted at face value 
without focusing on the socio-historical contexts of its various writings. For example, Elim’s 
J. Robinson surmised that ‘by verbal inspiration we mean that not only was the general sense 
of the message inspired, but that the writers were actually guided as to their various modes of 




The concept of direct dictation, however, is no longer maintained within Elim, or in most 
other classical Pentecostal traditions. In fact, in Elim’s latest official explanatory document 
regarding the doctrine of the Bible, Geoff Richardson explicitly writes that ‘we do not believe 
                                                 
6
 Archer, A Pentecostal Hermeneutic for the Twenty-First Century, 74-75. However, it should also be pointed 
out that the goal of Pentecostal/Elim biblical interpretation was not merely doctrinal data but also personal 
transformation. Indeed, the devotional reading was arguably the most common approach to reading the Bible 
within early Pentecostalism and Elim. For helpful analysis of early Pentecostal hermeneutics see; Veli-Matti 
Kärkkäinen, ‘Pentecostal Hermeneutics in the Making: On the Way from Fundamentalism to Postmodernism,’ 
JEPTA 18, no. 1 (1998): 77-80.  
7
 French Arrington, ‘Hermeneutics, Historical Perspectives on Pentecostal and Charismatic’, in Dictionary of 
Pentecostal and Charismatic Movements, ed. M. Burgess, G. B. McGee (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1988), 380. 
8
 Robinson, ‘Why I Believe in Verbal Inspiration,’ 413. Similar view is expressed in Elim Evangel by F. E. 
Marsh, ‘The Holy Spirit and the Bible,’ EE 13, no. 45 (November 4, 1932): 705. However, more room is given 
to the authors’ distinct styles by Parker, ‘To What Extent is the Bible Inspired?,’ 27, Bradley et al, Elim Lay 
Preachers’ Handbook, 6. 
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that God dictated the words of the Bible to those who wrote it, since that would deny the 





The change from direct dictation to increasingly acknowledging the role of the human authors 
in the writing process has also resulted in Elim changing its hermeneutical approach. Like 
other classical Pentecostal denominations, Elim has moved towards what William Oliverio 
calls the ‘Evangelical-Pentecostal hermeneutic.’
10
 This method of interpretation is primarily 
historical-grammatical with a focus on both the internal and external contexts of the text. In 
this approach the human author’s intent is commonly identified as fundamental in discerning 
the meaning of the text. Gordon Fee has been an influential champion of this interpretive 
method among Pentecostals.
11
 For example, Fee’s jointly authored book with Douglas Stuart, 
How to Read the Bible for All Its Worth, has been the main textbook on hermeneutics within 






In How to Read the Bible for All Its Worth, Fee and Stuart make a distinction between what 
the text meant in its original context (‘then and there’) and what it means in the reader’s 
context (‘here and now’). They call the first task ‘exegesis’ and the second task 
                                                 
9
 Richardson, ‘The Bible,’ 11; cf. Gilpin, ‘The Inspiration of the Bible,’ 130; Warrington, Pentecostal Theology, 
182.  
10
 Oliverio Theological Hermeneutics in the Classical Pentecostal Tradition, 16; cf. Kärkkäinen, ‘Pentecostal 
Hermeneutics in the Making,’ 80-83; Archer, A Pentecostal Hermeneutic, 131-137.  
11
 See Gordon D. Fee, Listening to the Spirit in the Text (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 7-8. 
12
 See Gordon D. Fee and Douglas Stuart, How to Read the Bible for All Its Worth. 3
rd
 ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: 





 This distinction is more or less identical with E. D. Hirsch’s concepts of 
‘meaning’ and ‘significance.’
14
 For Fee and Stuart an appropriate interpretation of a text must 
always start with ‘exegesis’ (Hirsch’s ‘meaning’) which explores the ‘historical context,’ 
‘literary context’ and ‘questions of content’ regarding ‘the meaning of words, the grammatical 
relationships in sentences, and the choice of the original text where the manuscripts... differ 
from one another.’
15
 The second task of ‘hermeneutics’ (Hirsch’s ‘significance’) apparently 
can then only arise from the ‘original intent of the biblical text.’
16
 Fee and Stuart go as far as 
to argue that a ‘text cannot mean what it never meant,’ and the role of the Spirit seems to be to 





Although Fee and Stuart helpfully acknowledge that the Bible is simultaneously a human and 
divine text,
18
 in practice their hermeneutics seems to have shifted the focus from the divine 
author to the human author. So, if the early Pentecostal hermeneutic underplayed the role of 
the human author in interpretation, Fee’s ‘Evangelical-Pentecostal hermeneutic’ appears to 
underplay the role of the divine author in the interpretive process. In other words, by 
assuming that the biblical text can only mean what the human author meant when they wrote 
it to their first audience, the text’s possible domain of meaning(s) is limited to the intentions 
of the human author. This kind of hermeneutical humanism seems to have two inherent 
problems for the Elim tradition.  
                                                 
13
 Fee and Stuart, How to Read, 23.  
14
 E. D. Hirsch, Jr. Validity in Interpretation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967). 
15
 Fee and Stuart, How to Read, 26-28. 
16
 Fee and Stuart, How to Read, 29. 
17
 Fee and Stuart, How to Read, 30. 
18




First, it does not accurately reflect Elim’s theology of the Bible being an inspired ‘living and 
acting’ Word of God (Heb. 4:12). That is, the excessive emphasis on the human author at the 
expense of its divine author is in danger of effectively demythologising the text. To put it 
simply, the Bible within Elim is maintained as ‘the fully inspired’ and ‘the supreme and final 
authority in all matters of faith and conduct,’ which strongly suggests that the Bible should 
probably be seen as ontologically different from other writings, and thus the hermeneutical 
method utilised for interpreting it should reflect this ontological difference. However, Fee’s 
and Stuart’s claim that ‘a text cannot mean what it never could have meant to its [human] 





Secondly, the ‘Evangelical-Pentecostal hermeneutic’ is at odds with the hermeneutical 
approach of the New Testament writers. To give just one example, Fee and Stuart note that in 
1 Corinthians 10:4 the Apostle Paul interprets Exodus 17:1-7 and Numbers 20:1-13 in a way 
that could have not been meant by its human author(s) or first readers when Paul identifies the 
‘rock’ as Christ.
20
 However, rather than acknowledging that under certain circumstances such 
a sensus plenior (fuller meaning) interpretive approach could be acceptable for contemporary 
readers due to the texts divine nature, Fee and Stuart write that Paul was unique in his ability 
to interpret the texts in this way because he was ‘inspired’ by the Spirit, but ‘what Paul did we 
                                                 
19
 Fee and Stuart, How to Read, 74. Fee’s hermeneutics also underplays the dynamism of a Pentecostal reading 
of the text where it is assumed that the Spirit who inspired the text is also present illuminating the text to the 
Pentecostal believer in the reading process. Consequently, in light of Pentecostal spirituality it is difficult 
maintain this clinical and chronological distinction between ‘exegesis’ and ‘hermeneutics;’ see Archer, A 
Pentecostal Hermeneutic, 142.   
20
 Fee and Stuart, How to Read, 202. 
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are not authorized to do.’
21
 In other words, for Fee and Stuart the sensus plenior ‘is a function 
of inspiration, not illumination.’
22
 Although one can see the practical wisdom of deterring 
Christians, and particularly Pentecostals, from overly subjective readings of the text, it seems 
surprising that the divine author’s ability to communicate to the contemporary believer 
through the text in a manner apparently communicated to Paul is seen as a hermeneutical 
impossibility. For a Pentecostal movement like Elim that seeks to restore the fullness of NT 
Christianity, this kind of hermeneutical cessationism appears unwarranted. This also seems to 
contradict Elim’s Foundational Truth of allowing the Bible to be the authority ‘in matters of 
faith and conduct;’ that is, why should the example of the Apostles and the Early Church as 
recorded in Scripture not function as a guide for ‘conducting’ Pentecostal hermeneutics?
23
 
Indeed, Craig Keener has recently argued that Scripture itself should be allowed to model 




8.2. A Proposal for Elim’s Hermeneutics 
In light of this seeming hermeneutical humanism and hermeneutical cessationism of the 
‘Evangelical-Pentecostal hermeneutic,’ a different hermeneutical approach needs to be 
articulated that is more attuned with both (1) the hermeneutics of the New Testament and (2) 
the concept of the Bible reflecting both its human and divine authors. To this end, I will first 
propose that John Christopher Thomas’s hermeneutical method based on Acts 15 is a useful 
overarching biblical hermeneutical model for Elim to utilise. Secondly, I will suggest how a 
                                                 
21
 Fee and Stuart, How to Read, 202. 
22
 Fee and Stuart, How to Read, 202-203. 
23
 Fee and Stuart would probably respond by noting that the Scripture does not explicitly encourage Christians to 
adopt this hermeneutical approach; Fee and Stuart, How to Read, 202. See also Fee’s distinction between what is 
‘normal’ and ‘normative.’      
24
 Keener, Spirit Hermeneutics, 1.  
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biblical text as ‘divine discourse’ through ‘human discourse’ can ‘mean’ more than its human 
author meant without either violating the human author or assuming that the text can mean 
anything.  
 
8.2.1. Experiential and Community Based Hermeneutic 
John Christopher Thomas’ 1994 article ‘Women, Pentecostals and the Bible: An Experiment 
in Pentecostal Hermeneutics,’ in the words of Jacqueline Grey, ‘has been one of the most 
influential writings on Pentecostal Hermeneutics.’
25
 In his article Thomas explores the 
possibility of utilising the Jerusalem Council of Acts 15:1-29 as a hermeneutical paradigm for 
Pentecostals.  
 
To give some textual context for Thomas’ hermeneutical ruminations, in Acts 15 the Council 
of ‘apostles and elders’ gathers to consider whether the newly converted Gentiles need to be 
circumcised (i.e. become Jews) to be part of the Christian Church (Acts 15:1-6). After serious 
discussion, the Council decides that the Gentiles who have converted to Christianity need not 
become Jews but abstain from food associated with ‘idol worship’ and refrain from any acts 
of ‘sexual immorality’ (Acts 15:29). The decision is a watershed moment in the history of the 
                                                 
25
 John Christopher Thomas, ‘Women, Pentecostals and the Bible: An Experiment in Pentecostal Hermeneutics,’ 
JPT 2, no. 5 (1994): 41-56; Jacqueline Grey, ‘When the Spirit Trumps Tradition: A Pentecostal Reading of 
Isaiah 56:1-8,’ in Constructive Pneumatological Hermeneutics in Pentecostal Christianity, ed. Kenneth J. Archer 
and L. William Oliverio, Jr. (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016), 143; For Thomas’ more recent 
hermeneutical articulation see John Christopher Thomas, ‘“What is the Spirit Saying to the Church” – The 
Testimony of a Pentecostal in New Testament Studies,’ in Spirit and Scripture: Exploring a Pneumatic 
Hermeneutic, ed. Kevin L. Spawn and Archie T. Wright (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 115-129. 
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early Church as recorded in Acts, because it means that Gentile Christians are now officially 




In reflecting on the Council’s deliberations, Thomas draws three hermeneutical conclusions. 
First, he emphasises the role of the ‘community’ (in this case the Council of apostles and 
elders) in making sense of both the Church’s experience (e.g. conversion and Spirit baptism 
of the Gentiles) and the interpretation of Scripture (e.g. Amos 9:11, 12). Second, the 
‘experience’ of the Spirit is seen as an important precursor in how Scriptures are interpreted; 
that is, Peter refers to his experience of seeing the Gentiles receive the Holy Spirit (Acts 15:7-
11), and Barnabas and Paul describe the ‘signs and wonders God had done through them 
among the Gentiles’ (Acts 15:12). Third, the Scriptures are referred to as confirming the 
community’s interpreted experience of the Spirit (Acts 15:15-19).
27
 In sum, Thomas argues 
that for discerning the voice of God one needs to have an interpretive community that reflects 
both on pneumatic experiences and the Scripture.     
 
The strength of using Acts 15 as a paradigm for Elim’s biblical hermeneutics is not just that it 
provides a biblical model for hermeneutics, and thus allows the Bible itself to be an epistemic 
authority in how it should be interpreted, but it also reflects closely Elim’s own rationality 
and historical practice. Regarding Elim’s rationality, the Acts 15 methodology acknowledges 
the role of the ‘community (read: living tradition), ‘experience’ (read: pragmatism) and 
                                                 
26
 F. F. Bruce refers to Acts 15:1-29 as ‘epoch-making’; F. F. Bruce, The Book of Acts (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1975), 298. Cf. Joseph A. Fitzmyer, The Acts of the Apostles. The Anchor Bible. Vol. 31 (New York, 
NY: Doubleday, 1998), 543-545; Darrell. L. Bock, Acts. Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2007), 507-508.   
27
 Thomas, ‘Women, Pentecostals and the Bible,’ 54-56. 
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‘Scriptures’ (read: the Bible). So, it corresponds closely with Elim’s rationality of Pentecostal 
Biblical Pragmatism. In terms of Elim’s historical practice, the Acts 15 hermeneutical model 
resembles Elim’s approach in resolving both of its epistemological crises. When it came to the 
first crisis, the Elim Conference consisting of ministers (‘elders’) and members of executive 
council (‘apostles’?) was central in rejecting British Israelism, as well as helping Elim to 
come to terms with the experience of Jeffreys’ leaving (see chapter 5). Moreover, both the 
British Israel controversy and the explanation for Jeffreys’ departure were interpreted in the 
light of Scripture. During Elim’s second epistemological crisis, again the Conference played a 
crucial role, particularly at the Southport Conference of 1981, in recalibrating the Elim 
tradition vis-à-vis its experience of the Restoration movement and by reflecting on Scripture.  
 
In fact, although there are obviously also differences between the Jerusalem Council of Acts 
15 and the Elim Conferences during the two epistemological crises,
28
 the similarities 
regarding the epistemic practice of discernment are striking. Therefore, my first proposal for 
Elim’s future hermeneutics in an attempt to move beyond (note: not against) ‘Evangelical-
Pentecostal hermeneutic’ is for Elim to increasingly embrace the model represented in Acts 
15, as it provides a biblical precedence for its hermeneutics and also naturally fits with Elim’s 
rationality and historical practice. 
 
 
                                                 
28
 For example, the Jerusalem Council seemed to represent the universal Church of its day and was dealing with 
a major shift in salvation history with the inclusion of Gentiles.  
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8.2.2. Discerning Divine Meaning(s) in ‘Dialectical Relations’ 
However, adopting the Acts 15 hermeneutical model with particular focus on community, 
pneumatic experience and the Bible has still not explicitly answered the question what the 
biblical texts can and cannot ‘mean.’ Thus, I will now offer brief hermeneutical discussion on 
how Elim should construct ‘meaning’ from the Bible which is simultaneously divine and 
human word(s). I will suggest that pace Fee and Stuart the text can mean more than its human 
author meant, but this need not result in undermining the text’s ‘humanity’ or for allowing the 
text to simply mean anything. However, this can only be done by appreciating the text’s 
dialectical relation(s) stemming from its divinity and humanity.  
 
The Text’s ‘Dialectical Relation(s)’ 
Merold Westhphal points out that the notion of the Bible being simultaneously divine and 
human creates a ‘dialectical relation’ not dissimilar to the Christological concept of Christ’s 
two natures.
29
 Westphal notes that  
...the Docetists and Ebionistes fell into heresy by trying to ease the tension by 
emphasizing one pole to the effective elimination of the other. We have a similar 
dialectic in Scripture itself. It is both human and divine, and the church has often 
pendulumed between affirming the divine at the expense of the human and then the 




Indeed, the pendulum swing identified by Westphal is perceivable in Elim’s historical 
approach to Scripture; that is, Elim initially emphasised the divine at the expense of the 
                                                 
29
 Merold Westphal, ‘Spirit and Prejudice: The Dialectic of Interpretation,’ in Constructive Pneumatological 
Hermeneutics in Pentecostal Christianity, 17.  
30
 Merold Westphal, ‘Spirit and Prejudice: The Dialectic of Interpretation,’ 17. 
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human, and then seems to have emphasised the human at the expense of the divine. If the 
Christological comparison has any merit for understanding the nature of Scripture – and I 
think it does have due to Christ being identified as the ‘Word of God’ and pinnacle of divine 
revelation (Jn. 1:1; 14:9; Heb. 1:3) –
31
 it would seem that a sufficient concept of Scripture 
should also adopt a Chalcedonian type definition which tries to navigate between 
Nestorianism which divides the two natures of Christ within one person and Monophysitism 
which emphasises the two natures being indivisible within one person.
32
 However, in walking 
this tightrope between Nestorianism and Monophysitism, Elim’s concept of Scripture being 
‘the inspired word of God’ seems to naturally lean more towards Cyril’s Monophysitism with 
the human and divine natures being indivisible within the text; rather than the divine aspect 
being somehow layered on top of the human element after the text has been written,
33
 or the 
human authors simply functioning as mechanical typewriters in divine hands. In fact, it could 
even be suggested that Elim’s historical overemphasis on either the human or divine aspects 
of Scripture has resembled the Nestorian ‘heresy.’  
 
This kind of indivisible relationship between the human and the divine in Scripture also has 
implications for how the text should be interpreted and what it ‘can(not) mean.’ In other 
                                                 
31
 The Elim Lay Preachers’ Handbook also makes the comparison between the Incarnation and the inspiration of 
Scripture; Bradley et al, Elim Lay Preachers’ Handbook, 6. 
32
 The 451 Chalcedonian definition reads that Christ is ‘to be acknowledged in two natures, inconfusedly, 
unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably; the distinction of natures being by no means taken away by the union, 
but rather the property of each nature being preserved, and concurring in one Person and one Subsistence, not 
parted or divided into two persons...’; quoted in Wayne Grudem, Bible Doctrine: Essential Teachings of the 
Christian Faith (Leicester: IVP, 1999), 244. For a historical analysis of Chalcedon see Diarmaid MacCulloch, A 
History of Christianity (London: Penguin Books, 2010), 222-228. 
33
 In light of the incarnation analogy it appears that Nicholas Wolterstorff’s theory of Scripture being the Word 
of God through ‘appropriation’ seems to imply a more of a Nestorian approach, namely the human and divine 
nature of Scripture are distinct to the point of (almost) possessing two separate ‘natures’ (i.e. human and divine). 
In fact, the idea of ‘appropriation’ could even be seen as a version of Adoptionism where the human text is 
adopted to become the divine text. This not only has implications for how Wolterstorff perceives Scripture as the 
Word of God, but also how he interprets it as such; see Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 222.    
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words, if one is to truly appreciate the dialectical relation in the text it is meaningless to talk 
about what the text ‘means’ without focusing on both aspects. This also means that a strong 
dichotomy between the human element (e.g. what it meant for the human author) and divine 
element (e.g. what it means for the divine author) in the interpretive process should be 
guarded against. I appreciate that this is easier said than done. Nevertheless, I will propose 
two interpretive dialectical relations that might provide some guidance for Elim’s Pentecostal 
hermeneutics à la Chalcedon. 
       
Historical and Dynamic Sense 
The first dialectical relation is between the text’s historical sense and the dynamic sense.
34
 
Craig Keener states that ‘the incarnation would show us that history and historical 
particularity matter.’
35
 In other words, if the incarnation is anything to go by then historical 
sense of the biblical text would appear to be central for appropriately understanding it.  
Keener identifies three basic interpretive principles for doing due diligence to the text’s 
historicity:  
 ‘Read a passage in light of its immediate context;’ 
 ‘Read a passage for its function as part of the larger book to which it belongs;’ 
 ‘Read a passage in light of the cultural context that its language, assumptions and 




                                                 
34
 My notion of ‘historical sense’ is very similar to Craig Keener’s ‘designed sense’ which he defines as ‘the 
sense projected by the ideal author or at least the ancient cultural sense;’ Keener, Spirit Hermeneutics, 99.  
35
 Keener, Spirit Hermeneutics, 99.  
36
 Keener, Spirit Hermeneutics, 117. 
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It seems that in taking the ‘human nature’ of the text seriously, these are reasonable steps to 
begin discerning the ‘meaning’ of the text. However, while having one ear tuned to the 
historical sense that is grounded in the text’s humanity, the other ear should be concurrently 
tuned to the dynamic sense grounded in the text’s divinity. That is, as well as appreciating the 
human historical discourse present in the text, the Pentecostal hermeneut should 
simultaneously appreciate the divine discourse directed at the present reader. To put it in 
Pentecostal parlance, what is the Spirit saying to the present reader through the text which is 
written by the human author? This implies that the reader should not just have a historical 
appreciation of the text, but a prayerful and pneumatically oriented disposition towards it. 
 
I acknowledge that the similarities between my so-called historical sense and dynamic sense 
are similar to Fee’s and Stuart’s concepts of ‘exegesis’ and ‘hermeneutics.’ However, I also 
believe that there are two important differences. First, my concept of historical sense places 
greater emphasis on the need for the hermeneut to approach the historical sense of the text, as 
well as the dynamic sense, in a ‘spiritually’ sensitive way.
37
 The reason being, that if the text 
is truly divine and human then it would appear that one cannot fully appreciate even its 
historical meaning without some revelatory insight and/or reliance on divine illumination. 
This is a potentially controversial claim, because it implies that the ‘natural’ person cannot 
have the same insight of the biblical historical text as the ‘spiritual’ person. However, if the 
Bible is genuinely believed to be divine revelation, then Paul’s argument that divine 
revelation can only truly be comprehended by those to whom the Spirit reveals it and who 
approach the text with spiritual sensitivity should probably also apply to the Bible (1 
                                                 
37





 Thus, if Elim allows the biblical concept of revelation to inform its 





The second difference is that I claim that the dynamic sense of the text can mean to the reader 
what the human authors did not intend it to mean. With respect to seeing the biblical text as 
divine discourse, Wolterstorff helpfully identifies the difference between what was God 
saying historically to the Scripture’s first audience, and ‘what is God saying to us today by 
way of confronting us with this passage of Scripture?’
40
 Wolterstorff expands this idea by 
pointing out that in fact ‘a single illocutionary act may have more than one addressee’ and 
‘one may address one’s remark to a number of people.’
41
 Furthermore, he maintains that this 
one remark can mean different things to different people. The example used by Wolterstorff is 
of a mother remarking at dinner that there are only two days to Christmas. For the children 
this might mean that ‘don’t lose hope’ as Christmas is now just ‘around the corner,’ whereas 
for the husband it might mean ‘hurry up’ and ‘get the Christmas shopping done.’
42
 Westphal 
further clarifies Wolterstorff’s example by distinguishing between the mother knowing that 
the father ‘will overhear the conversation from the one in which he does so without her 
knowing.’
43
 In the first instance ‘she intends both speech acts,’ whereas in the second she only 
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 See Frestadius, ‘The Spirit and Wisdom in 1 Corinthians 2:1-13,’ 52-70. 
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 Indeed, Elim’s P.S. Brewster wrote: ‘In so many ways the Bible is a closed book and cannot be fully 
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 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 216.  
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intends ‘the speech act of comfort’ to the children.’
44
 Westphal surmises that when it comes to 
Scripture, God can be seen to be in the first position of knowing the multiple audiences who 
will hear the ‘speech act’ communicated through the text, whereas the human author is in the 
second position of not knowing the multiple audiences hearing the ‘speech act.’
45
 Therefore, it 
appears that the dynamic sense of the text can ‘mean’ to the readers what was never intended 
by the human author (pace Fee and Stuart), although not what was unintended by the divine 
author and articulated by the human author. 
 
In sum, the first dialectical relation suggests that the ‘meaning’ of the text is grounded in its 
human historical sense. However, this historical sense can only be truly understood not just 
through historical interpretive methods but through spiritual discernment. Moreover, it only 
becomes ‘meaningful’ when the reader or community of readers also ‘hear’ the divine 
dynamic sense in the text. To put it simply, the historical sense without the dynamic sense is 
senseless, and the dynamic sense without the historical sense is non-sense. 
 
Canonical Plurality and Unity 
If the first dialectical relation focused more on the human and divine ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’ of 
individual biblical texts, the second dialectical tension emanates from the human and divine 
natures intermingling in the biblical canon. Elim, like most Pentecostal movements, believe 
that the (Protestant) canon with its 66 books in its entirety is the Word of God. As seen in 
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Elim’s early hermeneutic this is why the Bible was generally read as one book without 
necessarily distinguishing between the different human authors or their contexts, because the 
Bible was fundamentally seen to have been written by one author, namely, God. However, as 
Elim’s hermeneutical approach developed the humanity and diversity of the canon was 
increasingly acknowledged. Indeed, the second dialectical relation that should inform Elim’s 
hermeneutics should appreciate this tension of canonical unity that emanates from the Bible’s 
divine author and it canonical plurality which is founded in its humanity. 
 
This suggests that Elim should read the Bible both as one book with a unified message and as 
many books with particular messages. To explain this tension, Robert Wall and John 
Christopher Thomas have both helpfully conceptualised the canon through the metaphor of a 
(gospel) ‘choir.’
46
 In other words, the biblical canon can be viewed as a choir of many human 
members who sing a song in harmony under the inspiration and direction of its divine 
conductor. This, however, does not mean that all members of the choir are singing the same 
notes, at the same time, or even the same songs.
47
 Nevertheless, they are all in the same choir 
and performing within the same set of songs which all have been arranged by the divine 
conductor. So, the ‘canon’ as a human ‘choir’ under the divine conductor explains both the 
‘plurality’ and ‘unity’ found in the Bible.  
 
                                                 
46
 Robert W. Wall, ‘Reading New Testament in Canonical Context,’ in Hearing the new Testament: Strategies 
for Interpretation, ed. Joel B. Green (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995), 381; Thomas, ‘What is the Spirit 
Saying to the Church,’ 128. 
47
 Richard Swinburne refers to the Bible as ‘a symphony written and conducted by a genius, but played by an 
orchestra of wilful amateurs;’ Richard Swinburne, Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy. 2
nd
 ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 278. 
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The canonical plurality and unity has two important implications. First, it provides grounds 
for distinct theological emphases within different Christian theological traditions and 
denominations.
48
 Secondly, and more importantly for hermeneutics, it provides certain 
freedom for the Spirit lead community to discern which biblical text might be of particular 
importance in a given context. For example, Jacqueline Grey makes the valid point that the 
Jerusalem Council of Acts 15 chose Amos 9:11-12 but they could have easily chosen another 
Old Testament text that would have provided a different perspective on what should be 




This does raise the question of ‘discernment’; that is, how does one discern which texts 
should or should not be applied to a particular context? In line with the Acts 15 model, the 
discernment process should be done by a believing and Spirit filled community (or Council of 
Elders and Apostles), as well as in the light of pneumatic experiences of the Spirit. 
Furthermore, with respect to Elim’s rationality of biblical pragmatism, discerning the specific 
divine voice in the canon should not only be influenced by ‘experientialism’ but also by 
‘experimentalism.’ It is the living, moving, acting and experimenting Pentecostal community 





                                                 
48
 Ernst Käsemann noted that the NT canon did not ‘ground the unity of the church’ but ‘the diversity of 
denominations;’ Thomas Söding, Eisenheit der Heiligen Schrift? Zur Theologie des biblischen Kanons 
(Freiburg: Herder, 2005), 69. I am indebted to Martin Clay for directing me to this source. 
49
 Grey, ‘When the Spirit Trumps Tradition,’ 152. 
50
 Martin Clay, ‘From ‘Unity’ to ‘Dialogue’ in the Theology of the New Testament: A Methodological and 
Hermeneutical Proposal’ (PhD Dissertation, University of Bangor, 2012), 329. Clark Pinnock identifies 
‘fruitfulness’ as an important criterion for a Pentecostal/charismatic biblical interpretation; Clark H. Pinnock, 
‘The Work of the Spirit in the Interpretation of Holy Scripture from the Perspective of a Charismatic Biblical 





In this chapter I have explored the biblicist aspect of Elim’s rationality. Throughout its 
existence Elim has insisted that its beliefs need to be grounded on the Bible because the Bible 
is believed to be the ‘word of God’ and so the authority in matters of faith and conduct. This 
assumption is logically consistent with Elim’s concept of Pentecostal theological realism 
where God is seen as ultimate truth (read: reality) and as the agent who has communicated 
and continues to communicate the truth about Himself and the world through the human 
authors in the biblical text.  
 
However, to talk about the Bible’s authority within Elim cannot be done apart from 
discussing biblical hermeneutics. Consequently, I have outlined Elim’s historical approach to 
biblical hermeneutics by suggesting that while the early hermeneutic was characterised by a 
simplistic ‘Bible Reading Method’ (see Archer) that emphasised the divine author often at the 
expense of the human author, the latter ‘Evangelical-Pentecostal Hermeneutic’ (see Oliverio) 
has been in danger of focusing on the human author at the expense of the divine author.  
 
In light of these one dimensional approaches, my suggestion for Elim’s future biblical 
hermeneutics has been twofold. First, I have proposed that Elim should explicitly adopt the 
Acts 15 model that allows the Elim community informed by its pneumatic experience to 
discern the meaning of the biblical text(s) for its faith and conduct (see Thomas). Indeed, it 
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seems that this model has already been implicitly practised by Elim during its two 
epistemological crises.  
 
Second, I have argued that Elim should fully appreciate the dialectical relation in text 
emanating from its divine and human nature, as well as its canonical unity and diversity. The 
divine and human nature of the text implies that the meaning of the text is grounded in the 
historical sense of the human authors but nevertheless only becomes meaningful when the 
divine sense is incorporated. This is an important development from Fee’s distinction between 
‘exegesis’ (Hirsch’s ‘meaning’) and ‘hermeneutics’ (Hirsch’s ‘significance’), even if at first 
appearance it may seem little more than a subtle difference. That is, the historical human 
sense of the biblical text without the dynamic divine sense is senseless, and the divine 
dynamic sense without the historical human sense is non-sense. 
 
Coupled with the dialectical relation arising from the divine and human nature of the text, I 
have also noted that the canonical unity and diversity of the Bible provides its own further 
hermeneutical tension. In other words, Elim should maintain that the Bible has a unified 
overarching message but simultaneously acknowledge that it also has particular messages. 
This means that although all of Scripture is inspired by God some passages may be ‘more 
inspired’ than others for certain situations. This is not a license for modern day Marcionism 
where less palatable parts of the Bible can simply be eliminated, but it is a call for Elim’s 





An important aspect for discerning the right biblical interpretation for the community is the 
pragmatism inherent within Elim’s rationality. Moreover, it is this pragmatism that provides 
epistemic justification for Elim’s belief regarding the authority of the Bible. Hence, in the last 
chapter of the thesis I will explicitly develop Elim’s pragmatism.
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CHAPTER 9 – PRAGMATIC JUSTIFICATION: EXPERIENTIAL AWARENESS 
AND PRAGMATIC SIGNS OF THE FOURSQUARE GOSPEL 
 
In the third part of the thesis I have thus far argued that Elim’s rationality of Pentecostal 
Biblical Pragmatism should be underlined by a Pentecostal realist correspondence theory of 
truth (chapter 7), and I have noted that the Bible as a primary source of theological knowledge 
for Elim should be interpreted by a community of believers who appreciate simultaneously 
the Bible’s divine and human nature (chapter 8). Informed by these two chapters, the final 
chapter of the thesis focuses on the pragmatic side of Elim’s rationality, with particular 
emphasis on epistemic justification. In other words, I have sketched an ‘Elim’ concept of truth 
and proposed that the Bible should be the primary source of theological knowledge for the 
movement, so the question now becomes: how will Elim know whether its biblical beliefs are 
in fact ‘true’ or have justification/warrant?    
 
In chapter four I stated that Elim’s early pragmatism was characterised by experientialism and 
experimentalism; that is, human (spiritual) experiences are central in forming and justifying 
Elim’s Pentecostal beliefs, and these beliefs are further corroborated and tested in in light of 
experimental practices. I also discussed how Elim’s experiential experimentalism shares 
significant similarities with the American Pragmatism of Charles Sander Peirce and William 
James, and how this rationality was not just present during the birth of Elim but was also 




My aim is now to further develop Elim’s pragmatic concepts of experientialism and 
experimentalism, and I will do so in dialogue with the Christian philosopher William Alston. 
In doing this I will (1) outline Alston’s ‘Theory of Appearing;’ (2) propose how 
phenomenologically many Pentecostal experiences can be seen as either direct or indirect 
awareness of God; (3) suggest that despite some differences, the analogy between sense and 
mystical perception is adequate; and (4) argue how Elim’s explicit pragmatic experimentalism 
helps to overcome the main challenge directed at Alston’s theory, namely, the objection from 
religious pluralism. In the discussion below the terms ‘religious experience,’ ‘spiritual 
experience’ and ‘mystical experience’ are used synonymously.
1
     
 
9.1. Pentecostal Experience and Alston’s ‘Theory of Appearing’ 
George Jeffreys aptly summarised Elim’s experientialism and the role of experience in 
justifying theological beliefs when he claimed that ‘He that hath an experience is not at the 
mercy of him that hath an argument.’
2
 This emphasis on ‘experience’ is not unique to Elim as 
a Pentecostal movement. Indeed, it has become somewhat of a truism within Pentecostal 
theology to point out the centrality of ‘experience’ for Pentecostals.
3
 However, despite the 
                                                 
1
 It is not uncommon for philosophers of religion to distinguish between spiritual, religious and mystical 
experiences; see Gellman, ‘Mysticism and Religious Experience,’ 138-141; Wesley J. Wildman, Religious and 
Spiritual Experiences (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 77-82. 
2
 Jeffreys, Healing Rays, 56.  
3
 See Mathew  S. Clark and Henry I.  Lederle, What is Distinctive about Pentecostal Theology? (Koedoespoort: 
UNISA, 1989), 17, 40; Donald Gelpi, ‘The Theological Challenge of Charismatic Spirituality,’ Pneuma 14, no. 2 
(Fall 1992): 188; Cox, Fire From Heaven, 14; Joel Shuman, ‘Towards a Cultural-Linguistic Account of the 
Pentecostal Doctrine of the Baptism of the Holy Spirit,’ Pneuma 19, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 211; Peter Althouse, 
‘Toward a Theological Understanding of The Pentecostal Appeal to Experience,’ JES 38, no. 4 (Fall 2001): 399; 
Lewis, ‘Towards a Pentecostal Epistemology,’ 95; Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, Toward a Pneumatological Theology, 
ed. Amos Yong (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2002), 6; Macchia, ‘Christian Experience and 
Authority in the World;’ Tony Richie, ‘Awe-Full Encounters: A Pentecostal Conversation with C. S. Lewis 
Concerning Spiritual Experience,’ JPT 14, no. 1 (2005): 100; Keith Warrington, ‘Experience: The sine qua non 
of Pentecostalism,’ in The Role of Experience in Christian Life and Thought - Pentecostal Insights: Society for 
Pentecostal Studies - 36 Annual Meeting. Cleveland, TN: Society for Pentecostal Studies, 2007, 335; Terry L. 
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maturing theological and philosophical discussion on the concept of ‘Pentecostal experience,’ 
Pentecostal interaction with the work of the Christian philosopher William Alston on the topic 
has been minimal.
4
 For example, key Pentecostal contributors on the topic, such as, James 
Smith, William Oliverio, Peter Neumann and Daniel Castelo do not refer to Alston in their 
major works on experience/epistemology,
5
 and Amos Yong does so only twice in his 
influential Spirit-Word-Community but not explicitly in relation to religious experience.
6
 This 
is a surprising omission, not least as Alston’s work on the topic of religious experience 
epistemically justifying Christian belief(s) is commonly considered as the most articulate to 
date.
7
 In the light of this, I will seek to develop Elim’s pragmatic epistemology in relation to 
Alston’s important work. This will not only help in constructing a more robust theological 
epistemology for Elim, but will also bring the primary Christian philosopher on religious 




                                                                                                                                                        
Cross, ‘The Divine-Human Encounter: Towards a Pentecostal Theology of Experience,’ Pneuma 31, no. 1 
(2009): 6; Neuman, Pentecostal Experience, 5; Eriksen, ‘The Epistemology of Imagination and Religious 
Experience,’ 48.    
4
 See William P. Alston, ‘Christian Experience and Christian Belief,’ in Faith and Rationality: Reason and 
Belief in God, ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 
2009), 103-134; Alston, Perceiving God. William P. Alston, ‘Religious Experience Justifies Religious Belief,’ in 
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 135-145.   
5
 See the indexes of Smith, Thinking in Tongues; Oliverio, Theological Hermeneutics in the Classical 
Pentecostal Tradition; Neumann, Pentecostal Experience; Castelo, Pentecostalism as a Christian Mystical 
Tradition.   
6
 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 97, 167. 
7
 Matthew C. Bagger, Religious Experience, Justification, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 8; Wildman, Religious and Spiritual Experiences, 157; Thomas D. Senor, ‘The Experiential Grounding of 
Religious Belief,’ in The Oxford Handbook of The Epistemology of Theology, 64.   
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Alston’s ‘Theory of Appearing’ 
In his magnum opus on religious experience, Perceiving God (1991), Alston’s central 
argument is that in the same way as objects seem to directly ‘appear’ to individuals through 
sense experience, God can ‘appear’ to individuals undergoing religious experiences and that 
this kind of ‘putative direct awareness of God can provide justification for certain kinds of 
beliefs about God.’
8
 To ground his ‘parity thesis’ between ‘sense perception’ and ‘mystical 
perception,’ Alston utilises what he calls the Theory of Appearing to explain both types of 
‘perception.’
9
 According to Alston’s Theory of Appearing,  
for S to perceive X is just for X to be the entity that is appearing to S as so-and-so; and 
on externalist theories, to perceive X, in undergoing experience, E, is for X to figure in 
certain way in the causal chain leading up to E, and/or for E to lead to beliefs, or 




As seen from this definition, Alston’s Theory of Appearing is effectively a form of ‘direct 
realism’ as it assumes that experience can provide ‘direct awareness of an object that is 
presented to consciousness, usually an external physical object.’
11
 However, although Alston 
adopts a direct realist position – a position which has been unfashionable after the so-called 
linguistic turn in philosophy – he does not do so uncritically. Rather, he acknowledges that (1) 
it is possible than an object may appear to the subject when there actually is no real object 
                                                 
8
 Alston, Perceiving God, 9. 
9
 Alston is well aware how articulating an account of sense perception ‘is a notoriously controversial topic;’ 
Alston, Perceiving God, 9. Consequently, after completing Perceiving God, he wrote a monograph on sense 
perception; William P. Alston, The Reliability of Sense Perception (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).   
10
 Alston, Perceiving God, 58. Alston’s account is very similar to Richard Swinburne’s ‘Principle of Credulity.’ 
According to Swinburne ‘it is a principle of rationality that (in the absence of special considerations), if it seems 
(epistemically) to a subject that x is present (and has some characteristic), then probably x is present (and has 
that characteristic); what one seems to perceive is probably so. And similarly I suggest that (in the absence of 
special considerations) apparent memory is to be trusted;’ Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God. 2
nd
 ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 303. Alston acknowledges the similarity between his and Swinburne’s 
theories; Alston, ‘Religious Experience Justifies Religious Belief,’ 138.   
11





 and (2) ‘that a person’s conceptual scheme and beliefs can affect the 
way in which an object presents itself to him.’
13
 Nevertheless, Alston still insists that in 
normal circumstances if an object appears to a person, the person is prima facie justified in 
believing that a real object has in fact appeared; and that even if the appearing experience is 
influenced by the subject’s background beliefs, this does not mean that the belief formed from 
the experience simply mimics information previously known by the subject about the object 




So, why does Alston adopt his Theory of Appearing and its concomitant direct realism? It 
seems that Alston’s primary reason for accepting the Theory of Appearing is that for him ‘it is 
the only alternative to complete scepticism about experience.’
15
 Indeed, Alston has 
convincingly argued that it is very difficult (if not impossible) to establish the reliability of 
sense perception without some kind of ‘epistemic circularity,’ namely, the assumption that 
sense perception is in fact reliable.
16
 However, for Alston such epistemic circularity should 
not result in scepticism regarding sense perception, because he believes that the doxastic 
practices that rely on the senses for formulating beliefs about the external world have proved 
effective in understanding and making sense of the world, which for Alston suggests that it is 
reasonable to adopt the Theory of Appearing or a similar kind of theory with respect to sense 
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 Alston, Perceiving God, 56. 
13
 Alston, Perceiving God, 38.  
14
 Alston, Perceiving God, 38-39. Wildman argues that Alston fails to appropriately acknowledge the true 
implications of these two qualifications for his Theory of Appearing and thus Wildman offers his own 
‘ecological-semiotic theory of dynamic engagement’ as a way forward; Wildman, Religious and Spiritual 
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16





 If such an epistemic disposition is adopted vis-à-vis doxastic practices on sense 
perception, Alston argues that a similar approach should be employed for doxastic practices 
on mystical perception due to the similarities between sense and mystical perception.
18
    
 
However, although Alston maintains the basic reliability of both sense and mystical 
perception, he is careful to clarify that beliefs formed by these experiences are only prima 
facie justified or have ‘initial credibility,’ since they can be challenged by belief 
‘overriders.’
19
 In other words, he is not advocating for a naïve fideistic position where 
religious experiences are simply immune from all criticism. On the contrary, Alston believes 
that there can be two kinds of overriders: ‘rebutters’ and ‘underminers.’ ‘Rebutters’ refers to 
things that render the appearing of an object improbable; and ‘underriders’ to factors that 
question the efficacy of the belief forming process in its current circumstances.
20
 To illustrate 
the difference, Alston uses an example of seeing an elephant in his garden.  
My belief that there is an elephant there would be justified unless there are strong 
reasons for thinking that there is no elephant in the area (rebutter) or that my vision is 
not working properly (underminer).
21
    
    
Therefore, Alston’s Theory of Appearing is in many ways aligned with the so-called 
‘Jamesian Epistemic Justification,’ as opposed to ‘Cliffordian Epistemic Justification.’ That 
is, he adopts the more latitudinarian epistemic approach where ‘one is justified in engaging in 
                                                 
17
 Alston is utilising here a type of a pragmatic logic; that is, judge a practice on its ‘fruits.’ See Alston, 
Perceiving God, 149. 
18
 Critics of this approach commonly try to demonstrate the difference between sense and mystical perception; 
Evan Fales, ‘Do Mystics See God?,’ in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 146; Philipse, God in 
the Age of Science?, 321-324.  
19
 Alston, ‘Religious Experience Justifies Religious Belief,’ 138.  
20
 Alston, Perceiving God, 191.  
21
 Alston, ‘Religious Experience Justified Religious Belief,’ 138.  
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a practice provided one does not have sufficient reasons for regarding it as unreliable’ 
(James), rather than the more sceptical perspective where ‘one is obliged to refrain from 
engaging in a practice unless one has adequate reasons for supposing it to be reliable’ 
(Clifford).
22
 To put it simply, beliefs stemming from one’s experience are ‘innocent until 




Alston’s direct realism and Theory of Appearing seems to have a natural affinity with Elim’s 
implicit epistemological convictions, not least due to Elim’s theological realism and the 
Scottish Common Sense influences on Elim’s rationality.
23
 However, based on Elim’s 
concept of truth and theological assumptions (chapter 7), Elim should probably also qualify 
Alston’s Theory of Appearing in two ways. First, as has already been pointed out in chapter 
seven, following from Elim’s Pentecostal doctrines of imago dei, sin and eschatology, Elim’s 
theological correspondence theory of truth should be seen as ‘correlation’ rather than 
‘congruence’ (see Amos Yong). This means that Alston’s ‘direct realism’ should really be 
seen as ‘critical direct realism,’ with a greater emphasis on the perspectival and semiotic 
nature of human engagement with God and His world.
24
 Second, any Reidian reliabilist or 
Jamesian ‘innocent until proven guilty’ type epistemological assumptions should be 
accompanied with a strong dose of fallibilism, as for Elim humans are fallen beings living in 
                                                 
22
 Alston, ‘Christian Experience and Christian Belief,’ 116. 
23
 Alston himself follows the basic intuition of the Scottish Common Sense philosophical tradition. In his own 
words: ‘we will follow the lead of Thomas Reid in taking all our established doxastic practices to be acceptable 
as such, as innocent until proven guilty;’ Alston, Perceiving God, 153.  
24
 Wildman’s main criticism of Alston is that his theory of appearing is overly simplistic in not appreciating the 
semiotic and interpretive nature of all religious experiences; Wildman, Religious and Spiritual Experiences, 164.  
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the not yet fully realised eschaton and thus limited in their ability to experience and perceive 
God. So, epistemological speaking one might be ‘innocent until proven guilty’ but only by a 
small margin. Furthermore, in some cases due to human sin the balance of probability 
regarding epistemic ‘guilt’ might actually be against the experiencer. Nevertheless, due to the 
revelation found in Christ and the epistemic agency of the Spirit, for Elim a genuine 
experience of God, or in Alston’s terms of God ‘appearing’ to the experiencer, should be seen 
as a real theological possibility. That is, Elim and other Pentecostals will insist that despite 
human limitations, it is possible to experience and thus become ‘aware’ of the real God in 
Christ through the Spirit, which is altogether a different experience to simply reflecting on the 
inner workings of one’s human and sinful cultural linguistic framework.
25
 How this 
Pentecostal experience can be conceived as a real ‘awareness of God’ will be explored next.   
       
9.2. Pentecostal Experience as Direct and Indirect Awareness of God 
Alston acknowledges that religious experience can be defined in a ‘wide sense’ which refers 
to any experiences connected ‘with one’s religious life, including a sense of guilt or release, 
joys, longings, a sense of gratitude, etc.,’
26
 or in a more ‘narrow sense’ with an emphasis on 
experience of God or what Alston calls ‘perception of God.’
27
 Focusing on this narrower 
                                                 
25
 Lewis, ‘Towards a Pentecostal Epistemology’, 100; Macchia, ‘Christian Experience and Authority in the 
World.’ 
26
 Alston, ‘Religious Experience Justifies Religious Belief,’ 135-136. 
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 Alston, ‘Religious Experience Justifies Religious Belief,’ 136. 
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First, in the phenomenological accounts of religious experience referred to by Alston, people 
‘report an experiential awareness of God.’
29
 This causes Alston to conclude that the religious 
experiences in question cannot be easily reduced to ‘subjective feelings or sensations to which 
is superadded an explanation according to which they are due to God, the Holy Spirit, or 
some other agent recognized by the theology of the subject’s tradition.’
30
 To the contrary, 
there seems to be a genuine mystical perception of something not dissimilar from sense 
perception.  
 
Now without a doubt many religious experiences of Elim Pentecostals fall within Alston’s 
‘wide sense’ and hence are effectively more common human experiences ‘to which is 
superadded an explanation’ in line with a Pentecostal worldview. However, there also appear 
to be religious experiences within Elim that ‘report an experiential awareness of God’ that is 
different from God simply becoming an ‘explanation’ of a broader human experience. For 
example, experiences of conversion, baptism in the Holy Spirit and the manifestation of 
                                                 
28
 Alston, Perceiving God, 12-14. Interestingly one of them is identified by the experiencer as ‘baptism of the 
Holy Ghost,’ although the account is taken from William James’s Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) and 
there is no mention of external signs following the event.  
29
 Alston, Perceiving God, 14. 
30
 Alston, Perceiving God, 16. 
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Direct and Indirect Awareness 
Following from the first characteristic, Alston points out that secondly ‘the awareness is 
direct.’
32
 In other words, the awareness of God is ‘directly presented or immediately present 
to the subject.’
33
 Alston helpfully explores different levels and categories of immediacy vis-à-
vis one’s experience.
34
 Nevertheless, his central point is that in ‘direct awareness’ or ‘direct 
perception’ one does not perceive something by inferring it from something else, but rather 
the object perceived directly presents itself to the perceiver without an explicit intermediate. 
Alston acknowledges that there are probably a number of implicit intermediaries between the 
object and one’s direct awareness of it (e.g. different parts of the brain/mind processing the 
experience), but the experiencer does not ‘perceive any of this’ and thus the experience can 




Indeed, the concept of non-mediated and direct awareness of God is part of Elim’s 
spirituality. In fact, it is not hard to argue that a key reason why the early Elim pioneers 
argued against ‘ritualism’ was because it was seen as an obstacle and an unnecessary system 
                                                 
31
 See Jeffreys, Pentecostal Rays; P. S. Brewster, The Spreading Flame of Pentecost (London: Elim Publishing 
House, 1970); George Canty, The Practice of Pentecost: Recognising, receiving and using the gifts of the Spirit 
(Basingstoke: Marshall Pickering, 1987); Colin Dye, Living in the Presence: The Holy Spirit’s Agenda for You 
(Eastbourne: Kingsway Publications, 1996).   
32
 Alston, Perceiving God, 14. 
33
 Alston, Perceiving God, 21.  
34
 For example, he identifies: (1) ‘absolute immediacy,’ (2) ‘mediated immediacy’ and (3) ‘mediate perception;’ 
Alston, Perceiving God, 21. 
35
 Alston, Perceiving God, 21. 
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of mediation between the believer and their direct experience of God in Christ through the 
Spirit (see 4.1.3.). To put it differently, Elim saw the sacramentalism of Roman Catholicism 
and Anglo-Catholicism as superfluous and misleading, because God could be experienced 
directly. The Elim minister and theologian Mathew Clark summarises the immediate 
Pentecostal experientialism well when he writes that  
to be Pentecostal is to have experienced the power of God in Jesus... Precisely because 





This ‘direct’ encounter of God/Christ that is different from humans simply reflecting on their 
subjective sense of God in a spiritual experience is also emphasised in Elim’s concept of the 
spiritual gifts, with the insistence on the gifts being supernatural and objective manifestations 
of God.
37
 For example, referring to ‘words of wisdom’ and ‘words of knowledge’ (1 Cor. 
12:8), the Elim pioneer W. G. Hathaway writes that through these gifts  
we get an understanding of the Divine mind. In them we get a manifestation which 
appeals to our intellect, our understanding. The word of wisdom and the world of 




Hathaway’s description speaks of direct revelation of God being imparted to the believer 
through a religious experience; that is, the experiencer is purportedly given direct access to 
‘the Divine mind’ which will help them form religious beliefs accordingly.  
 
                                                 
36
 Clark and Lederle, What is Distinctive About Pentecostal Theology?, 43-45. However, it should be noted that 
at time of writing Clark was a member of the Apostolic Faith Mission of South Africa.  
37
 W. G. Hathaway, Spiritual Gifts in the Church (London: Elim Publishing, 1933), 12-13; W. R. Jones, ‘The 
Nine Gifts of the Holy Spirit,’ in Pentecostal Doctrine, ed. P. S. Brewster (1976), 47;  Canty, The Practice of 
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38
 Hathaway, Spiritual Gifts in the Church, 15. 
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This concept of ‘direct perception’ of God helps to conceptualise important aspects of Elim’s 
experientialism. Moreover, it provides philosophical grounding for why these types of 
experiences can potentially offer experiential warrant for Elim’s theological beliefs. Just like 
direct sense perception provides prima facie justification for beliefs about the natural world, 
in the same way direct mystical perception can provide prima facie justification about the 
spiritual world. Nevertheless, it seems that although some of Elim’s Pentecostal experiences 
can be understood as ‘direct perception’ of God, a number of such experiences are better 
conceived as ‘indirect perception’ of God.  
 
So, what is meant by ‘indirect perception’ of God? As well as highlighting various reports of 
people having directly perceived God, Alston also identifies that others witness to 
‘experiencing God in the beauties of nature, of hearing God’s voice in the Bible or in sermons 
or in the dictates of conscience,’ etc.
39
 Interestingly, Alston notes that historically he has been 
sceptical that such ‘indirect mystical perception’ occurs, but rather has believed that these 
kinds of experiences are better seen as examples of ‘indirect perceptual recognition,’ which 
for Alston is ‘taking something to manifest, indicate, or be the effect of, the divine presence or 
activity.’
40
 In other words, he has thought that ‘indirect perceptual recognition’ is not 
analogous to perception since the appearing is not immediate but inferred from something 
else that is perceived. However, in Perceiving God Alston rejects this conclusion by 
surmising that if he assumes that God can be directly presented to ‘one’s awareness,  why 
shouldn’t something that is phenomenologically just like that happen by way of one’s direct 
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awareness of something in creation?’
41
 In sum, Alston cannot think of any reason why God 
could not be ‘indirectly perceived,’ not just ‘indirectly recognised,’ through mediums such as 





Alston’s notion of ‘indirect perception’ is helpful in describing the experience of many 
Pentecostals, including those within Elim. That is, although ‘direct perception’ of God 
appears to characterise some Pentecostal experiences, many of the so-called divine encounters 
seem to be more aligned with ‘indirect perception.’ For example, Elim’s Keith Warrington 
notes how the Pentecostal practices of prayer, worship and preaching in a congregational 
context are meant to function as platforms for divine encounters.
43
 Daniel Albrecht states 
along similar lines that through Pentecostal liturgy, comprising music, proclamation and 
communal practice of spiritual gifts, the aim of the worshipping community is ‘to construct a 
sphere in which together a congregation most likely will encounter their God.’
44
 Moreover, 
Frank Macchia has argued that even the Pentecostal idea of ‘tongues as a sign’ should be 
understood in a sacramental manner where God’s presence and action is mediated through 
this gift (in)directly.
45
 These examples demonstrate that experiences of God are very much at 
the heart of Pentecostalism, but they also point out that these God encounters are often 
experienced through another medium, such as, bible reading, corporate prayer, musical 
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worship, and speaking in tongues. Indeed, Peter Neumann in his detailed discussion on 
‘Pentecostal experience’ concludes that  
A maturing Pentecostal theology... needs to acknowledge the ways in which experience 
of God is mediated, while simultaneously upholding the belief in the immediacy (or 
directness) of encounter with God.
46
     
         
The idea of ‘indirect perception’ seems to provide the philosophical concept for appreciating 
this kind of ‘mediated immediacy,’ where on the one hand what is experienced of God is 
mediated through something else, but through this mediation a genuine perception of God can 
take place that is different from ‘indirect perceptual recognition,’ where one makes a 
conscious inference about God from a physical object that has been perceived. This of course 
does not mean that Pentecostals do not also have ‘indirect perceptual recognitions’ of God, 
but it does mean that much of Pentecostal and Elim experientialism is purportedly ‘indirect 
perception’ of God and so seems to have similarities to sense perception. 
 
Awareness of God 
Thirdly and finally, Alston does not only see the paradigmatic cases of religious experience 
consisting of some kind of ‘(in)direct awareness’ of a greater power, but this ‘awareness is 
reported of God.’
47
 Alston categorise the perceptions of God as either being (1) ‘what God is 
experienced as being’ or (2) ‘what God is experienced as doing.’
48
 Regarding God’s being, it 
seems that Elim’s experience of God is fundamentally Christological, even if there is a strong 
pneumatological element. In the words of Mathew Clark: ‘It is Christ who lies at the heart of 
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the Pentecostal experience, although the power by which he is known is that of the Spirit.’
49
 
And when it comes to God’s doing, this seems to include divine activities such as convicting 
sin, providing guidance, offering reassurance, empowering for witness, bringing new 





To summarise the most salient points with respect to Elim’s Pentecostal experience of God in 
light of Alston’s philosophical categories. Elim’s religious experientialism can be seen to 
consist of three types of divine encounters: (1) general experiences of God in the world which 
are effectively common human experiences, but as they are experienced and interpreted 
through a Pentecostal lens, they carry spiritual significance for the experiencer (this has not 
been developed above); (2) indirect perceptions of God which can be seen as genuine 
awareness of God but this awareness is mediated through something else (e.g. nature, bible, 
tongues and musical worship); (3) direct perceptions of God which are characterised by God 
being perceived directly without any obvious mediation. All three types of experiences 
arguably provide some experiential justification for Elim’s theological beliefs and for the 
experiential viability of the Elim argument. However, it is categories two and three that seem 
to provide ‘fresh’ theological data, as well as greater epistemic justification by their virtue of 
being more analogous to sense perception. Indeed, the third type of experience is most similar 
to sense perception and therefore probably the most reliable source of theological knowledge 
and prima facie justification for Elim’s Pentecostal beliefs. 
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9.3. (Dis)analogy between Sense and Mystical Perception  
I have suggested that Alston’s Theory of Appearing and the various categories of religious 
experience are useful in conceptualising Elim’s Pentecostal experientialism. However, as has 
been noted above, Alston’s theory assumes there to be sufficient parity between sense and 
mystical perception, but there seem be some obvious differences between the two types of 
experience. In fact, at least five common objections regarding the analogy between sense and 
mystical perception can be identified:
51
 
1. Sense perception is universal, whereas religious perception is not.  
2. Sense perception is constant, whereas religious perceptions come and go. 
3. Sense perception perceives actual objects, whereas religious perception usually 
perceives God in something else. 
4. Sense perception provides detailed information, whereas religious perceptions 
are vague. 
5. Sense perception deals with physical objects, whereas religious perceptions 
supposedly perceive a God who is nonphysical and spiritual.   
 
Space does not permit a detailed discussion of each objection but I will offer brief comments 
on each. The fact that religious perception is not universal (Objection 1) or constant 
(Objection 2) is not surprising within Elim’s theological framework. After all it is believed 
that sin mars human ability to perceive God and the current eschatological dispensation means 
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that God’s presence in the world is not yet fully realised. However, the fact that the perception 
of God is neither universal nor constant does not make it dissimilar to certain types of sense 
perception. For example, Robert Audi notes that ‘in complicated matters such as aesthetic 
perception in music and painting... what is directly heard or seen nevertheless cannot be seen 
or heard without both practice and sensitivity.’
52
 Alston echoes this when he writes: 
Why suppose that what happens only rarely cannot have cognitive value? We wouldn’t 
dream of applying this principle to scientific or philosophical insight. That comes only 




Moreover, within a Pentecostal movement like Elim, the central assumption is that 
although the perception of God may not be universal or constant at all times, it is 
nevertheless available for all those who genuinely seek it. In the words of W. G. 
Hathaway, ‘Pentecost may still become the personal experience of every believing 
child of God.’
54
 The possibility for genuine seekers of God to experience divine reality 
is an important Pentecostal emphasis and it implies that in theory it is possible to 
cross-check many of the perceptions of God, because these perceptions are not 
restricted to few mystical experts but the Spirit of God is believed to have been poured 
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Objection three is true to some extent, particularly in relation to general experiences of 
God and indirect perceptions of God. However, the objection cannot be applied to 
direct perceptions of God. Furthermore, even in physical perceiving we often perceive 
realities through something else. For example, I can perceive my three year old son 
being happy (a supposedly physical state in his brain/mind) through perceiving the 
smile on his face, and hence perceive something (i.e. cognitive/mental state of 
happiness) in perceiving something else (i.e. smile). Therefore, it appears that even in 
some instances of physical perceiving we perceive things through other physical 
mediators, and so spiritual (indirect) perceiving is not necessarily so different from 
certain forms of physical (indirect) perception.  
 
The idea of experiencing God through created things is also a natural expectation 
within a Pentecostal worldview. As argued above, Elim with most other Pentecostals 
maintain that God is the creator and ground of being and that creation is thus 
contingent on God’s existence and providential presence. Indeed, as part of this 
doctrinal framework Pentecostals are known to view the world as being ‘enchanted,’ 
where God, as well as other spiritual beings, can be experienced in the things that have 
been made.
56
 This might not be full panentheism, but neither is it far from it.     
 
In terms of objection four, it does seem to be the case that sense perception typically 
provides greater detail than mystical perception. That said, many of the purported 
Pentecostal experiences of prophecy, words of knowledge, and words of wisdom do 
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also claim to provide fairly detailed information.
57
 Nevertheless, even if many 
Pentecostal experiences do not provide equivalent detail to sense perception, ‘we 




Objection five rightly notes the disanalogy between sense and religious perception. 
After all, the Christian God is understood to be a spiritual being (see Jn. 4:24) and it is 
also not wholly clear what human faculty perceives God in the religious experience. 
Nevertheless, the whole point of an analogy is to show similarity between the two 
entities not equivalence between them, and in light of the discussion above it seems 
that there is sufficient similarity between God and physical objects appearing to the 
perceiver to indicate that the two types of experiencing are ‘similar in an appropriate 
respect, not merely in any arbitrary respect.’
59
 To put it differently, the analogy seems 
to hold with respect to how the ‘objects’ appear to the perceiver, even if ‘what’ appears 
are very different entities (i.e. spiritual and/or physical realities).
60
 Therefore, it seems 
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9.4. Pragmatic Justification 
Even if there is sufficient parity between sense and mystical perception, which I 
believe there is, at best the (in)direct appearing of God through religious experiences 
only provides prima facie epistemic justification. That is, beliefs based on or informed 
by religious experiences only have warrant in the absence of what Alston calls belief 
‘overriders’ (see above).
61
 For Elim there seem to be three main challenges or 
‘overriders’ for such beliefs. First, in light of Elim’s doctrine of (fallen) humanity (see 
chapter 7), the human ability to form accurate theological beliefs is significantly 
limited and always fallible. Such human perspectivism and sinfulness can be 
categorised in Alston’s terms as a potential belief ‘underminer,’ as these doctrines 
undermine the cognitive ability of humans to form appropriate beliefs based on their 
experience of God. Second, as has been argued in chapters three and four, British 
Pentecostalism and Elim were birthed in the context of increasing religious pluralism. 
The fact of competing religious traditions arguing that their religious beliefs are also 
experientially justified can be seen as a belief ‘rebutter’ by providing contradictory 
evidence to Elim’s own experiential claims.
62
 Third, following from the previous 
point, one predominant type of competing (non-)religious tradition has been exclusive 
naturalism, which has sought to explain all religious experiences naturalistically, and 
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thus attempts to be a belief ‘underminer’ in explaining away the involvement of any 




Elim’s implicit experimentalism seems to provide the necessary further justification in 
the light of the potential ‘overriders,’ at least in theory, to supplement Elim’s 
experiential beliefs. This is the explicitly pragmatic, rather than just empirical, 
characteristic of Elim’s rationality. In other words, if Elim’s empirical experientialism 
looks at ‘what produced the belief,’ Elim’s pragmatic experimentalism looks at ‘what 
the belief produces.’ The emphasis of the latter is on the ‘effects’ and ‘results’ 
produced by the belief, which has been identified as the basic tenet of Peirce’s and 
James’ philosophical pragmatism (see 4.3.3.). Interestingly, Alston aware of the 
challenges provided by certain ‘overriders’ for experientially based Christian beliefs, 
particularly religious pluralism, has argued for the need of some kind of further 
pragmatic justification.
64
 But, as pointed out by Wesley Wildman, Alston’s 
pragmatism remains ‘underdeveloped,’
65
 and therefore Elim’s pragmatism may 
provide a way forward. 
 
So, my aim is now to articulate Elim’s doxastic practice of pragmatism as a proposal to 
help Elim’s experiential beliefs move from initial to more established justification. I 
will do so by first focusing on the internal criteria used by Elim to discern ‘true’ 
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religious experiences. Although this internal criteria has a strong pragmatic emphasis, 
it also uses biblical and doctrinal criteria to ‘judge’ religious experiences and thus it 
can be seen as a combination of coherentism and pragmatism. Second, I will evaluate 
the more explicit and evidentialist pragmatism of Elim, and finally I will argue that 
Elim should maintain the logic of its evidentialist pragmatism but recalibrate it with an 
increased emphasis on the Pentecostal concept of ‘outward signs following.’  
 
9.4.1. Coherentist Pragmatism 
Throughout its history Elim has adhered to the NT mandate to ‘test the spirits’ (1 Jn. 
4:1; cf. 1 Cor. 14:29; 1 Thess. 5:21), not least due to the fallible and fallen ability of 
humans to perceive the things of God. Elim’s internal criteria for distinguishing the 
authentic from the inauthentic can be seen to consist of three components. 
 
First, genuine religious experiences of God within Elim need to be consistent with the Bible. 
In the words of the Elim minister D. J. Ayling:  
The power of God must come to us by a Scriptural experience. The Bible is the only 
safe ground for any spiritual experience. Any claim to experiences that cannot be 
validated by an appeal to the Word of God must be suspect.
66
   
   
In other words, within Elim any spiritual encounters that are incompatible with what is clearly 
stated in the Bible are questionable at best. The general logic being that if God is the divine 
author of Scripture, then he would not contradict Himself in revealing something which 
opposes his previous revelation. However, in light of the Scripture’s dynamic sense and 
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canonical plurality (see 8.2.), the hermeneutical community needs to carefully evaluate all 
seemingly contradictory experiences of the Spirit, because Scripture cannot be viewed as a 
simplistic manual for rejecting human religious experiences since the reality of God is 
increasingly being made manifest at the dawn of the coming King. That said, the historical 
sense and the canonical unity do provide some historical grounding in enabling Scripture to 
be the plumb line to judge Elim’s contemporary spiritual encounters.  
 
Second, Elim’s religious experiences need to be doctrinally sound. It is no accident that from 
1916 onwards Elim has had official statements of faith. These doctrinal statements seem to 
stem from three primary sources. First, as has been pointed out in chapter four (4.2.) Elim’s 
doctrinal statements were to a great extent borrowed consciously or unconsciously from 
existing Evangelical statements of faith. Second, these doctrines seem to have reflected the 
collective experience of the Elim Pentecostal community. As such, the Evangelical doctrines 
were supplemented with doctrines reflecting the Pentecostal experience. Therefore, the 
doctrines are to some extent the articulated storehouse of past experiences of the Pentecostal 
community. Third, Elim leaders throughout its history have argued that, despite the influence 





However, more so than with the Bible, Elim’s doctrinal statements function as guidelines of 
what should be expected of religious experiences. In other words, they do not have the final 
say on whether an experience is or is not of God. Indeed, as has been pointed out Elim’s 
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Fundamental and Foundational Truths changed in 1922, 1928/1934 and 1993, and as I have 
argued these changes seem to have been instigated by experiences (or lack of experiences), as 
well as changes in biblical interpretation.  
 
Third, Elim has always insisted that religious experiences are known by their fruits.
68
 The 
expressions of the fruit have included a purported super/supranatural enabling to fulfil the 
Great Commission through witnessing to the world and building up the Church. For example, 
Colin Dye writes that ‘the Spirit enabled men and women to speak with a power and authority 
that they did not naturally possess.’
69
 And Ron Jones argues in line with 1 Corinthians 14 that 
the purpose of Spirit(ual) manifestations are ‘for the edifying (building up) of the Church.’
70
 
These more dynamic expressions of the ‘fruit’ have also been supplemented with the expected 
moral qualities that have been expected to accompany a true encounter with God. John 
Lancaster captures this well when he writes that  
...Christianity must prove its authenticity by the moral results it produces in its 
disciples. Christ himself laid this down as the acid test of all teaching, ‘Ye, shall know 




In sum, to help Elim mitigate the potential ‘overrider’ for religious encounters resulting from 
‘fallen humanness,’ the movement has used the Bible, doctrine and the ‘fruit’ of the 
experience as benchmarks for ‘testing the spirits.’ Thus, pragmatic coherentism has been and 
can be utilised for evaluating religious experiences. It is the pragmatic side that might also 
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help Elim to respond to the two other main ‘overriders,’ namely, religious pluralism and 
naturalism.  
 
9.4.2. Evidentialist Pragmatism     
Just like religious experiences can be defined in a ‘wide’ and ‘narrow sense’ (see above), the 
same categorisation can be used with respect to religious experimentalism. I will focus 
primarily on the narrow sense of experimentalism, but before doing so I will touch briefly on 
the wide sense experimentalism, as it is not without its pragmatic significance. 
 
Wide Experimentalism   
It is difficult to strictly delineate between ‘experientialism’ and ‘experimentalism’ in the wide 
sense. That said, religious ‘experientialism’ broadly conceived can be seen to refer to general 
human experiences that are interpreted through a religious framework (see above). The ability 
of a religious worldview (e.g. Elim’s Pentecostalism) to interpret lived experience is 
important, because if it fails to make sense of every day experiences it quickly becomes 
suspect for its experientially minded followers.
72
 Broad religious ‘experimentalism,’ on the 
other hand, can be seen as the effects produced by the religious belief for general human 
experience. These effects can be also characterised as the ‘fruits’ referred to above by Elim’s 
Dye, Jones and Lancaster. For example, increased boldness to stand for one’s beliefs, building 
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others up in love, compassion for the poor, transformed family life, improved work ethic, and 
freedom from addictive behaviour are some of the effects that Pentecostals commonly 
identify as resulting from their experience of God. Again, like with general religious 
experiences, these varied effects may not verify the truth of a religious tradition, but the 
inability of a religion to produce such effects quickly begin to call it into question. This 
concept of general experientialism is similar to William James’s religious pragmatism when 
he writes:  
If theological ideas prove to have value for concrete life, they will be true, for 
pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much. For how much more they are true, 





Without delving into James’ concept of ‘truth,’
74
 his basic point seems to be that the 
justification of religion is to a great extent determined by its ‘value for concrete life’ in 
comparison with the value provided by other factors and frameworks one is aware of. Indeed, 
in the final pages of Perceiving God, Alston echoes a similar sentiment when he surmises that 
‘the final test of the Christian scheme comes from trying it out in one’s life... and seeing 
whether it leads to the new life of the Spirit.’
75
 Therefore, it is not hard to argue that religious 
experimentalism in the wide sense seems to have epistemic merit in not only helping to make 
Elim’s Pentecostalism a ‘live option,’ but also in giving pragmatic justification to live one’s 
life in line with the Full Gospel.  
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This ‘wide sense’ experimentalism or pragmatism found within Elim, however, is not Elim’s 
only type of pragmatism. As has been argued in chapter four (see 4.3.3.), Elim’s early 
pragmatism appears to have had significant similarities to C. S. Peirce’s more scientific and 
narrow experimentalism. For example, it seems that Elim’s doctrines regarding divine healing 
and tongues as initial evidence for baptism in the Holy Spirit were both revised on the basis of 
this pragmatic logic. That is, (1) a hypotheses regarding the nature of divine healing and spirit 
baptism were articulated based on spiritual experience and reading of the Scriptures; (2) these 
hypotheses were then lived out and ‘tested’ in practice; and (3) the hypotheses were then 
revised based on the results of the ‘tested’ experience. In sum, historically Elim’s rationality 
seems to have been one of evidentialist pragmatism. 
 
Despite this historical precedence, Daniel Castelo has recently argued that Pentecostal 
epistemology should move away from this type of ‘evidentialist logic,’ because for him this is 
a ‘modern thought-paradigm’ and thus antithetical to Pentecostal spirituality.
76
 Castelo 
expands that (American) classical Pentecostalism has uncritically taken on board this logic 
from Charles Fox Parham who insisted that tongues were the ‘Bible evidence’ of Spirit 
baptism. Castelo writes that 
doing so has put this branch of Pentecostalism at odds with other Pentecostal 
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Indeed, Castelo concludes that the ‘initial-evidence logic’ should not be retained within 





Although Castelo rightly warns against the obsession that some Pentecostals may have had 
regarding the doctrine of ‘initial evidence,’ he seems to too quickly jettison a central aspect of 
the Anglo-American Pentecostal rationality. In other words, what he believes to be a 
borrowed ‘evidential logic’ from Evangelicalism actually appears to be a lynchpin of the 
Pentecostal rationality, at least as far as Elim is concerned. In effect Castelo’s rejection of the 





First, as I have argued in chapter three (see 3.1.4.), British classical Pentecostalism – and the 
same could probably be said of American classical Pentecostalism – is itself a modern 
religious movement. Despite the rhetoric of some early Pentecostal pioneers which suggested 
that early Pentecostals simply returned to a pre-modern and first century Christianity of the 
apostles, historically speaking Anglo-American Pentecostalism emerged within modernity 
and thus only really makes sense as a modern movement. This does not mean that 
Pentecostals were not critical of positivist aspects of early twentieth century modernity, but it 
does mean that their own spiritual alternative was itself also a child of modernity. To put it 
simply, classical Pentecostalism was not anti-modern per se but it was modernity plus; 
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namely, modernity enchanted with the super/supra-natural reality of God. Therefore, the 
modernistic evidentialist rationality of Anglo-American Pentecostalism should not be seen as 
peripheral but central to Pentecostal epistemology.  
 
Second, it is a mistake to assume that those classical Pentecostal movements that rejected 
tongues as initial evidence also rejected the concept of ‘external evidence’ for Baptism in the 
Spirit. For example, Elim abandoned the doctrine of ‘tongues as initial evidence,’ but still 
insisted that a genuine baptism of the Holy Spirit is accompanied by external signs. At the 
birth of the Elim argument ‘divine healings’ were presented as the main ‘sign’ to justify that 
the Spirit of God was at work within the movement (see 4.3.3.), and throughout its history 
other ‘signs’ have also been emphasised (see above). So, the ‘initial-evidence logic’ was very 
much maintained, even if ‘tongues’ as the first sign was not adopted. In fact, ironically for 
Elim the pragmatic evidentialism seems to have been the reason why tongues as initial 
evidence was itself rejected; that is, the evidence suggested that some were baptised in the 




Third, by rejecting the evidentialist pragmatic logic Castelo removes an important 
epistemological resource that helps Elim and other Pentecostal movements to respond to 
potential belief ‘overriders.’ To put it differently, without evidentialist experimentalism Elim 
and other forms of Pentecostal experientialism are left particularly vulnerable against the 
                                                 
80
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objection from religious pluralism. Thus, it is not only historically but also philosophically 
problematic to do away with this evidentialist logic of Pentecostalism. 
 
Having said all of that, Elim’s evidential experimentalism has historically been characterised 
by elements of triumphalism which is unwarranted in light of Elim’s wider Pentecostal 
theology. In other words, at the heart of Elim’s Foursquare Gospel is the person of Christ, and 
if the personhood of Christ is taken seriously within the Full Gospel structure then it would be 
misleading to try to demonstrate its truth in the same way as one were to demonstrate the truth 
of a non-personal scientific theory within the natural realm. Moreover, the eschatological 
(under) realised realism of Elim (see 7.1.4.) implies that although aspects of the reality of 
Christ’s truth can be experienced and grasped in the present dispensation, this reality is not 
yet fully realised and therefore any pragmatic verification will inevitably be partial in the 
present age.  
 
Consequently, within this Christological and eschatological framework it is not surprising that 
Elim has had to qualify, for example, its statements regarding divine healing from the initial 
boldness of healing being guaranteed in the atonement (1916/1922),
81
 to applying it for only 
those who ‘walk in obedience’ (1928/1934),
82
 before replacing this altogether with the more 
humble assertion that the Church is ‘to fulfil a ministry of healing and deliverance to the 
spiritual and physical needs of mankind’ (1993).
83
 To put it differently, it is unsurprising that 
the evidence regarding divine healing did not support Elim’s earlier triumphalism which 
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assumed that the person of Christ was somehow under divine obligation to heal everyone 
(‘who walked in obedience’) in the current age, and hence Elim’s doctrine of healing needed 
to be modified accordingly.  
 
Nevertheless, despite not seeing the ‘results’ and ‘effects’ anticipated in some of the earlier 
doctrinal statements, Elim has still maintained the pragmatic logic and the assumption that 
external evidence does support the truth of the Foursquare Gospel. Hence, in the remainder of 
this section I will propose that Elim’s pragmatic experimentalism should be developed from 
‘hard’ (naïve?) pragmatic evidentialism to a more nuanced signs-based pragmatism.   
 
9.4.3. Signs-Based Pragmatism 
My articulation of Elim’s signs-based pragmatism follows the common epistemic principle of 
allowing the order of things (ontology) to determine how things are known (epistemology).
84
 
As I have argued throughout this thesis, the assumed ‘order of things’ (i.e. the hard core) of 
the Elim argument is the Christological Foursquare Gospel, and this presupposed ‘ontology’ 
can be seen to have two important characteristics for further developing Elim’s pragmatic 
epistemology: (1) at the centre of what one seeks to know is a personal God revealed in Christ 
Jesus; (2) this revealed God in Christ is not a passive God of deism but an active reality who 
purportedly manifests Himself pneumatically in the world as Saviour, Healer, Baptiser in the 
Spirit and soon coming King. So with respect to these two theological facets, my aim is now 
to spell out their implications for Elim’s pragmatism of signs. 
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‘I-Thou’ Knowledge   
The first aspect of Elim’s Christological Foursquare Gospel is that what is supposedly known 
and/or sought to be known is a divine person (i.e. God revealed in Christ through the Spirit). 
If the divine person of Christ is central to the Elim movement, which I believe it is, then in 
Martin Buber terminology one should avoid the category mistake of confusing ‘I-Thou’ 
knowledge with ‘I-It’ knowledge.
85
 The difference being that ‘I-Thou’ knowledge is 
characterised by relationality and mutual involvement, whereas ‘I-It’ knowledge is impersonal 
with the subject seeking control over the object of enquiry. The ‘I-Thou’ is commonly 
exemplified in (meaningful) human relationships, whereas the ‘I-It’ is often reflected in 
human dealings with nature (e.g. natural sciences).
86
 It seems that like in mutual human 
relationships the Christ of the Full Gospel needs to be known primarily in the ‘I-Thou’ 
dynamic, at least if the personal nature of the divine Christ is taken seriously and the category 




For Elim’s pragmatic epistemology the ‘I-Thou’ dynamic has three implications. First, 
knowing Christ in a personal relationship means that one can only truly know Him if Christ 
reveals Himself (see Lk. 10:21-22; Jn. 2:24). Indeed, this is the case with all genuine personal 
relationships; that is, the knowledge of another person requires that the person sought to be 
known makes themselves known. In light of this, knowledge of Christ can never be simply a 
matter of human achievement or effort, and therefore the pragmatic ‘effects’ and ‘results’ of 
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the Foursquare Gospel cannot be guaranteed to the seeker by simply following particular 
methodological steps, unless one is willing to compromise the divine sovereignty of Christ.
88
  
    
Second, personal knowledge of Christ does also entail human ‘effort’ or perhaps better stated: 
human involvement, faith and trust. As with personal knowledge between two humans, the 
divine human relational knowing does not only require Christ revealing himself but the 
human individual likewise investing something of themselves within the epistemological 
quest. In biblical language this personal investment is commonly referred to as ‘faith’ (pistis), 
without which ‘it is impossible to please him [God]’ (Heb. 11:6). A full discussion on a 
Pentecostal concept ‘faith’ is beyond our focus, but following general Protestant theology it 
can be stated that ‘faith’ is not merely propositional knowledge (notitia) or public confession 
(assensus) but fundamentally consists of ‘trust’ (fiducia).
89
 Trust, however, by its very nature 
carries with it an element of risk. For example, in an intimate human relationship there has to 
be an element of trust between the two parties for the relationship to develop, and whenever 
someone places trust in another person they take a risk since there is a real possibility that the 
trust will be misplaced or indeed will be misused by the other. Nevertheless, the risk is the 
price humans pay for being able to have a genuine relationship, and it is not hard to argue that 
this risk is also necessary in the human-divine relationship.
90
 Thus, the possibility of spectator 
pragmatic evidentialism, where the person in search of Christ tries to remain detached from 
                                                 
88
 Buber makes a similar distinction by contrasting ‘magic’ with ‘prayer’ to a personal God; Buber, I and Thou, 
58; cf. C. S. Lewis, ‘The Efficacy of Prayer,’ in Fern-Seed and Elephants and Other Essay on Christianity by C. 
S. Lewis, ed. Walter Hooper (Glasgow: Collins, 1975), 96-103.  
89
 See Karl Barth,  Dogmatics in Outline (London: SCM, 1949), chapters 2-4; Grudem, Bible Doctrine, 307-309; 
Swinburne, Faith and Reason, 142. It is also misleading to assume that chronologically notitia necessarily comes 
before fiducia. In fact, Barth discusses ‘Faith as Trust’ (chapter 2) before exploring ‘Faith as Knowledge’ 
(chapter 3) and ‘Faith as Confession’ (chapter 4).   
90
 Although it should be noted that in the classical Pentecostal tradition God in Christ is considered to be 
perfectly trustworthy, even if His ways are considered to be different from those of humans (Isa. 55:8-9).  
332 
 
the personal implications of coming in contact with Christ’s Full Gospel, is questionable at 
best.
91
 This seems to be particularly the case when the purpose of the ‘I-You’ relationship is 
brought to the forefront.  
 
Third, and following from the second point, the purpose of the ‘I-You’ relationship in a 
Christological framework seems to be love, namely, God demonstrating his love towards 
humans in the life, death and resurrection of Christ with the aim of (some) humans responding 
in love and obedience (see Jn. 3:16; 14:23; Rom. 5:8; 2 Cor. 5:19-20).
92
 This means that the 
purpose of theological knowledge is not knowledge as such, but in the words of Paul Moser 
‘for humans to enter into fellowship with God via human repentance and obedience.’
93
 In 
other words, for Pentecostals as for many other Christians the knowledge of God is to be 
transformative in nature, and without such transformation the knowledge itself becomes 
meaningless and possibly even dangerous (see 1 Cor. 8:1; Jam. 2:19). This suggests that 
unless the theological epistemologist is rightly disposed towards the Christ of the Full Gospel, 
it is more than likely that Christ may not be revealed to the seeker, because the fundamental 
purpose of the Full Gospel is not to increase one’s theological knowledge but to call one to 
participate in its transforming reality.  
 
To summarise, the ‘I-Thou’ aspect of the Christological Foursquare Gospel means that the 
pragmatic verification of Elim’s argument may not have universal appeal, but may only have 
                                                 
91
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significance for those who have ‘eyes to see’ and ‘ears to hear’ (see Mk. 8:18). This 
conclusion is further substantiated by Elim’s under-realised eschatology, where the complete 
effects of Christ and the Full Gospel are not yet fully realised and thus any fully fledged 
scientifically based empirical pragmatism could at best only point to aspects of the Foursquare 
Gospel truth.   
 
Full Gospel Signs 
Having said all of that, the above should not lead to a complete deconstruction of Elim’s 
Pentecostal evidentialist pragmatism but rather for its reconstruction. In other words, 
although the Christological ‘I-Thou’ aspect of the Elim argument mitigates against simplistic 
pragmatic evidentialism, Elim’s Foursquare conviction that Christ is the active Saviour, 
Healer, Baptiser in the Spirit and soon coming King calls for maintaining some form of 
pragmatic justification. That is, the Elim tradition has assumed throughout its history that the 
activity of Christ has real effects and results in the world, and that Christ’s presence in the 
power of the Spirit is indeed accompanied ‘with signs following.’
94
 Therefore, what is needed 
is not a complete rejection of Elim’s evidentialist pragmatism but a more nuanced religious 
pragmatism, namely, signs based pragmatism.  
 
Phillip Wiebe, following the philosopher Stephen Braude, proposes that with respect to 
experimentalism we should distinguish between (1) ‘experimental evidence’ of the (natural) 
sciences, (2) ‘semi-experimental evidence’ which includes ‘accounts of lived experience’ and 
‘consists of claims that cannot be readily obtained at will, but are sufficiently numerous to be 
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worthy of being included in serious theorizing;’ and (3) ‘anecdotal evidence’ which ‘consists 
of claims – often one-off claims – that are insufficiently numerous to be rendered plausible, 
and consequently may not be included in theorizing about the world.’
95
 When it comes to 
Elim’s signs based pragmatism, in light of the personal ‘I-Thou’ aspect of the Foursquare 
Gospel it would be theologically and philosophically inappropriate to assume that 
‘experimental evidence’ of the natural sciences could be mustered to justify the truth of the 
Elim argument. However, in relation to the claim that the activity of Christ is accompanied 
‘with signs following,’ it would also be inconsistent with the Elim argument to maintain that 
only ‘anecdotal evidence’ is available to justify the truth of the Foursquare Gospel. 
Consequently, there seem to be good reasons to adopt the middle position of ‘semi-
experimental evidence.’ 
 
Wiebe expands by explaining that the semi-experimental approach treats religious beliefs as 
‘theoretical entities,’ and thus although the entity itself may be strictly speaking non-physical 
(e.g. God), the effects of the entity can still be empirically investigated and analysed.
96
 
Indeed, Elim’s Pentecostal pragmatic logic seems to be naturally aligned with this kind of an 
approach. For example, as discussed in chapter four (see 4.4.3.), the Elim pioneers tried to 
justify the truth of the Foursquare Gospel by documenting purported healings as empirical 
evidence,
97
 and by doing so were trailblazers for those who have used biomedical and social 
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scientific methods to analyse Pentecostal/Charismatic phenomena, even if they lacked the 




However, even when the results of Elim’s Foursquare Gospel can be supposedly empirically 
and pragmatically observed and evaluated, Candy Gunther Brown points out that even the 
more objective medical records regarding healing, for example, are not self-explanatory but 
‘require human interpretation.’
99
 Consequently, Amos Yong with good reason concludes that 
empirical evidence for the ‘eschatological transformation of all things as signs of the 
kingdom... are empirically discernible as divine action only in faith.’
100
 Nevertheless, the 
effects of the Full Gospel should still provide ‘pragmatic signs’ even if they require ‘the eyes 
of faith.’ 
 
As ‘pragmatic signs’ the Full Gospel phenomena should in the words of Blaise Pascal provide 
‘enough light for those who desire only to see, and enough darkness for those of contrary 
disposition.’
101
 That is, there should be sufficient accessibility for genuine seekers to perceive 
the evidence for the truth of the Foursquare Gospel, since the purpose of the ‘I-Thou’ 
knowing of Christ appears to be for humans to enter a loving and transformative relationship 
with Christ. However, since the purpose of believing in Christ is not to simply have more 
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spectator knowledge about God but to be in a loving relationship with the triune God revealed 
in Christ Jesus, it seems appropriate for this evidence not to be overwhelming so that those 
who do not want to have such a personal relationship with Christ are not forced or coerced 
into it, as well as for Christ to maintain His divine freedom in both revealing and hiding 
Himself. Stephen Evans has referred to these two aspects of Pascal’s dictum as the ‘Wide 




Indeed, the ‘revealing’ and ‘hidden’ nature of ‘pragmatic signs’ seems to be in line with the 
NT concept of revelation. For example, in the incarnation some witnessed in Christ the 
fullness of God (Jn. 1:14, 18), while others perceived Christ to be simply a deluded human 
being (Jn. 7:5); on the cross the centurion acknowledged Jesus as the Son of God (Mk. 
15:39), while others mocked what they believed to be a failed religious and political leader 
(Mk. 15:29-31); and at the resurrection the disciples saw the risen Christ (1 Cor. 15:3-8), 
while the Jewish leaders sceptically claimed that Christ’s body had been stolen by His 
disciple (Mt. 28:11-15). This same motif of simultaneously ‘revealing’ and ‘hiding’ is also 
present in Jesus’ use of parables (Mk. 4:1-12, 33-34), and in Jesus’ refusal to give an explicit 
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Summary   
In sum, my proposal of Elim’s signs-based pragmatism which stems from the Christological 
Foursquare Gospel is a recalibration of Elim’s Pentecostal evidentialist pragmatism. In other 
words, it maintains an empirical and pragmatic element by embracing a ‘semi-experimental’ 
approach to Pentecostal ‘signs,’ but does so by simultaneously appreciating the ‘I-Thou’ 
dynamic inherent within the Full Gospel. This means that the ‘signs’ are not self-explanatory 
but need to be ‘spiritually discerned’ (1 Cor. 2:14). That said, the purported signs cannot 
simply be interpreted to mean anything, because there is still real empirical content that 
guides the interpretation. Indeed, the history of Elim suggests that some interpretations can be 
empirically falsified (e.g. the concept that all who walk in obedience to Christ can enjoy 
perfect health in the current dispensation). 
 
This signs-based pragmatism provides further justification for Elim’s experiential beliefs and 
helps to rebut some of the belief ‘overriders’ stemming from religious pluralism and 
naturalistic explanations. In all fairness this pragmatism of signs does not provide the 
‘experimental evidence’ of the natural sciences and therefore anyone expecting this level of 
epistemic warrant will be disappointed. However, as has been argued above, theologically 
speaking assuming the methodology of the natural sciences to apply to the truth of the 
Christological Foursquare Gospel would be inappropriate with respect to the ‘I-Thou’ nature 
of the knowledge inherent within this theoretical framework, not to mention the current not 
yet fully realised eschatological dispensation. Nevertheless, the ‘semi-experimental evidence’ 
regarding the Full Gospel signs should provide sufficient grounds for both an adherent of the 
Elim movement, as well as a genuine would-be-adherent, to embrace the truth of the 
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Foursquare Gospel. Thus, in this sense it would provide reasons to respond to objections from 
other religions and naturalistic explanations, or at least this evidence should enable Elim to 
compare the pragmatic ‘effects’ and explanatory power of the Foursquare Gospel vis-à-vis its 
alternatives.       
                       
9.5. Conclusion   
In this chapter I have developed the inherent experientialism and experimentalism in the Elim 
tradition with particular emphasis on epistemic justification. In dialogue with William Alston 
I have proposed that Elim’s experientialism can be seen to consist of (1) general experiences 
of God in the world which are effectively common human experiences, but as they are 
experienced and interpreted through a Pentecostal lens; (2) indirect experiences of God which 
can be seen as genuine awareness of God but this awareness is mediated through something 
else (e.g. nature, bible, tongues and musical worship); and (3) direct experiences of God that 
are characterised by God being perceived directly without any obvious mediation. All of these 
religious experiences – but particularly the indirect experiences and even more so the direct 
experiences of God (see the analogy above with sense perception) – can provide prima facie 
warrant for the truth of the Foursquare Gospel.  
 
However, due to potential belief ‘overriders’ for these experiential beliefs (e.g. religious 
pluralism), the epistemic warrant provided by these experiences are at best only provisional. 
Consequently, I have suggested that Elim’s experimentalism (read: pragmatism) provides the 
necessary assistance to strengthen Elim’s epistemological position. As with experientialism, 
Elim’s experimentalism can be understood in a ‘wide’ (Jamesian) sense which focuses more 
339 
 
on the existential and practical effects caused by living in accordance with the Full Gospel,  
and ‘narrow’ (Peircean) sense with a more evidential, empirical and observational logic. I 
have primarily focused on this latter ‘narrow’ sense and in doing so have defended the 
evidentialist logic of Elim’s Pentecostalism as central to any classical Pentecostal rationality 
(pace Castelo). That said, I have also argued that the evidentialist logic needs to be 
recalibrated in light of a more theologically informed Pentecostal pragmatism of ‘signs.’ Such 
pragmatism would take seriously the ‘I-Thou’ dynamic in the Christological Foursquare 
Gospel, but also appreciate the pragmatic effects expected within the Full Gospel remit.
103
 
Hence, with Phillip Wiebe I have stated that the evidence expected within this theoretical 
framework is ‘semi-experimental evidence.’ It provides ‘enough light for those who desire 
only to see, and enough darkness for those of contrary disposition.’
104
 Or in the words of the 
Psalmist it is a call to ‘taste and see that the Lord is good’ (Ps. 34:8). That is, real pragmatic 
and even empirical effects are to be expected, but not through ‘testing’ as spectators, but 
through ‘tasting’ as participants.  
 
Now, what has been provided in this chapter is suggestive rather than comprehensive. 
Moreover, I have not tried to argue that there is epistemic warrant for the Elim position, only 
that according to Elim’s own tradition-specific rationality this is the kind of warrant one 
should expect. That said, the Pentecostal pragmatism articulated in this chapter is not only a 
contribution to the intellectual self-understanding of the Elim movement, but also makes a 
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contribution to Pentecostal theology and philosophical/theological pragmatism. It also offers 





In conclusion, I will first provide a summary of the thesis, with particular emphasis on its 
contributions to the disciplines of Pentecostal, philosophical and historical theology. Second, I 
will identify suggestions for future research.  
 
Summary and Contributions of the Thesis 
In the introduction to the thesis I identified ‘the problem’ as the need for Pentecostal 
theological methodology to be informed by a Pentecostal rationality, or at least a rationality 
that is compatible with Pentecostalism(s). In an attempt to contribute towards resolving this 
problem – I am under no illusions that a single thesis could actually solve the problem – I 
began the discussion in Part I by analysing significant academic articulations of Pentecostal 
rationalities by Amos Yong, James Smith and William Oliverio, Jr. (chapter 1). Although I 
noted the various strengths of these epistemological constructions, I also highlighted the 
seeming ahistoricism in the methodologies of Yong and Smith and in the practice of Oliverio. 
The implication of this ahistoricism is that it is questionable to what extent their 
epistemologies are in fact ‘Pentecostal,’ or at least they do not reflect any particular 
Pentecostal tradition. As a way forward, I outlined Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of ‘tradition-
constituted’ rationality as a method of developing a historical, narrative and tradition-specific 




Part II of the thesis moved on to provide such a historically informed tradition-specific 
rationality. In doing so, I used Elim as an exemplar of a classical Pentecostal tradition. I began 
by providing the ‘prologues’ to the Elim tradition by focusing especially on the social, 
philosophical and theological context, as well as the holiness, revival and British Pentecostal 
roots of Elim (chapter 3). My central claims were that the Elim movement, and British 
Pentecostalism as a whole, needs to be increasingly understood as a modern movement; and 
that the British Pentecostal logic developed Keswick romanticism and the Welsh Revival 
communal experientialism into full-blown Pentecostal evidentialism. In chapter four I then 
narrated the birth of the Elim tradition and explored how the emerging movement argued 
against theological liberalism, fundamentalist cessationism and high church ritualism; it 
argued for the Foursquare Gospel; it argued by using the rationality of Pentecostal Biblical 
Pragmatism; and it argued within the social embodiment of revivalistic meetings, 
denominational alliance and publishing/training institutions. I continued my historical 
exploration by narrating Elim’s two major ‘epistemological crises’ to date; that is, the 
resignation of Jeffreys (chapter 5) and the arrival of the Charismatic/Restoration movements 
(chapter 6). These two chapters substantiated my claim that the hard core content of the Elim 
argument is the Foursquare Gospel and its tacit rationality is Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism. 
They also identified that although Elim has always structurally had a centrally governed 
leaning, it has also demonstrated great flexibility regarding how the Elim argument is socially 
and institutionally embodied.  
 
Part III of the thesis built on the historical, theological and philosophical foundations of Part 
II by taking Elim’s implicit rationality of Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism and developed it in 
line with the narrated Elim tradition. Chapter seven did so by focusing on the underlying 
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Pentecostal assumptions regarding the nature of truth, and then argued for a Pentecostal 
theological realism as an ontological foundation for Elim’s rationality. I effectively rejected 
Smith’s (possible) anti-realism as theologically unnecessary, and aligned Elim’s rationality 
more closely with Yong’s and Oliverio’s critical/hermeneutical realism (not to mention 
MacIntyre’s critical realism). Chapter eight then focused on the biblical aspect of Elim’s 
rationality and proposed a revised biblical hermeneutic in keeping with Elim’s Pentecostal 
doctrine of the Bible. I believe that my proposal for an experiential and community based 
biblical hermeneutic which seeks to discern divine meaning(s) in ‘dialectical relations,’ is not 
only a contribution to Elim’s biblical hermeneutics, but also to the ongoing scholarly debate 
on Pentecostal hermeneutics. The final chapter of the thesis (chapter 9) developed the 
pragmatic epistemic justification within Elim’s rationality. I did so by bringing Elim’s 
Pentecostal ‘experientialism’ into dialogue with William Alston and proposed the possibility 
of Elim having prima facie justification for its theological beliefs based on its purported 
experiences of God revealed in Christ through the Spirit. Moreover, I went on to re-construct 
Elim’s pragmatic logic by focusing on Elim’s historical doxastic practices of coherentist and 
evidentialist pragmatism. However, although I argued that such pragmatic logic should not be 
abandoned (pace Daniel Castelo), I sought to re-calibrate it as semi-experimentalism (see 
Phillip Wiebe); that is, I argued for signs based pragmatism that appreciates both the personal 
nature and effects oriented Christological Foursquare Gospel. 
 
In doing the above, I believe the thesis has made three major contributions to knowledge. 
First, it has provided a MacIntyrian tradition-specific Pentecostal rationality and thus offered 
a new methodological approach in the search for a Pentecostal epistemology. Second, it has 
presented the first substantial intellectual history of Elim and therefore has not only 
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contributed to Elim’s self-understanding but also to Pentecostal history of ideas. Third, in 
arguing that Elim’s rationality is Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism, as well as developing a 
theory of truth, biblical hermeneutics and epistemic justification in line with this rationality, 
the thesis has made its own contribution to Pentecostal philosophical theology.       
 
So returning to the initial problem of the thesis – having a Pentecostal theological 
methodology based on a Pentecostal rationality – I would like to make two further 
observations. First, it seems that methodologically it is insufficient for Pentecostal 
philosophical theologians to talk about Pentecostal rationality without firmly rooting it in the 
history and practice of Pentecostal communities.
1
 Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ‘don’t think, but 
look!’ is apposite advice for Pentecostal philosophical theologians,
2
 and MacIntyre’s insights 
employed in this thesis may provide some of the necessary tools for analysing other 
Pentecostal traditions and rationalities. Second, based on the historical ‘looking’ at a 
particular Pentecostal tradition (i.e. Elim) and early British Pentecostalism, it appears that the 
underlying logic of classical Pentecostalism is indeed Pentecostally informed and biblically 
focused religious pragmatism. Therefore, despite criticising the ahistorical elements of 
Yong’s, Smith’s and Oliverio’s Pentecostal rationalities, as well as questioning to what extent 
they are in fact Pentecostal, the pragmatist elements within all of their epistemologies follows 
a deep and justified Pentecostal intuition. In sum, if Elim and early British Pentecostalism is 
anything to go by, Pentecostalism is indeed a biblically and pragmatically focused movement, 
and this should be reflected in the how and what of its future theologising.   
                                                 
1
 I appreciate that my focus has primarily been historical rather than exploring contemporary practice. In fact, I 
will suggest below that such empirical research into the current rationality of Elim ministers and members would 
be a welcome addition to this thesis.  
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In terms of future task, I think there are particularly three aspects that would merit further 
exploration regarding the ‘Elim argument.’ The first relates to the reasonableness of the 
contemporary Elim tradition as a ‘progressive argument’ according to its own standards; the 
second to Elim’s strength as a tradition vis-à-vis its main religious and non-religious 
competitors; and the third to the effectiveness of Elim’s current structures and institutions in 
embodying its argument effectively. I will articulate these three issues as questions.   
  
1. Is the Elim tradition a coherent argument according to its own rationality? 
In chapters four, five and six I have tried to demonstrate how the Foursquare Gospel of Jesus 
as Saviour, Healer, Baptiser in the Holy Spirit and coming King should be viewed in 
Lakatosian terms as the hard core of the Elim argument. In other words, if Elim is seen as a 
type of a ‘[semi-]Scientific Research Programme,’ then the Foursquare Gospel provides its 
essential doctrinal core, and its Foundational Truths are the auxiliary hypotheses which 
interpret the Foursquare Gospel and function as the protective belt against modus tollens 
arguments directed at the hard core.    
 
Furthermore, in line with MacIntyre’s concept of ‘tradition-specific rationality’ I have tried to 
show (see particularly chapter 4) how Elim’s rationality of Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism 
stems from the movement’s essential core of the Foursquare Gospel with its auxiliary 
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hypotheses. However, in accordance with MacIntyre, I have also argued that Elim’s 
Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism has not just been ‘tradition-constituted’ but has also been 
‘tradition-constitutive.’ That is, as well as being shaped by the Elim tradition, Elim’s 
rationality has also shaped its tradition from its inception (chapter 4) to the present day 
through its two epistemological crises (chapters 5 & 6). Consequently, the relationship 
between tradition and rationality has been interdependent and mutually informing. 
 
In light of these two claims – (1) the Foursquare Gospel is Elim’s hard core, and (2) the 
Foursquare Gospel with its auxiliary hypotheses has both constituted and been constituted by 
Elim’s rationality of Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism – the question arises to what extent is 
Elim today coherent as an argument vis-à-vis its own hard core and rationality? To give two 
examples: firstly, is the current doctrine of Jesus as healer pragmatically evidenced within 
Elim to provide the necessary ‘semi-experimental evidence’ to justify this as a hard core 
doctrine? Secondly, is the current doctrinal articulation and expectation of Jesus as coming 
King so vague that pragmatically it makes no difference to the Elim movement? If the answer 
to the first question is that there is no sufficient semi-experimental evidence to warrant Jesus 
as healer, and/or if the current doctrinal articulation of Jesus as coming King makes no 
practical difference to Elim members and ministers, then it could be argued that the Elim 
tradition has become incoherent according to its own rationality and that its hard core has lost 
its potency.  
 
These questions need further investigation for Elim to remain a coherent and progressive 
tradition according to its own standards. Therefore, further empirical research into the current 
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state of Elim, as well as subsequent theological analysis, is essential. Regarding the ‘semi-
experimental evidence’ relating to Jesus as Healer, the empirically and theologically informed 
methodology of Candy Gunther Brown could be utilised in studying healing within Elim.
3
 
Brown’s theologically sensitive empirical approach would fit well with Elim’s pragmatic 
rationality; that is, if Jesus is the Healer as Elim believes, then according to Elim’s own 
rationality the effects of this belief should be observable in a semi-experimental manner. With 
respect to the eschatological beliefs of Elim members and ministers, contemporary 
quantitative and qualitative studies similar to those that have been carried out by William Kay 
and Mark Cartledge among British Pentecostals could be undertaken.
4
 This 
quantitative/qualitative research would demonstrate whether Elim still embodies the fourth 
pillar of its hard core. If Elim ministers and members no longer see Jesus as coming King as a 
central doctrine, then in MacIntyrian terms it could be argued that the Elim tradition has been 
transformed effectively into another tradition by losing this core belief.    
 
2. Is the Elim tradition intellectually more progressive than its main ‘competing’ 
religious and non-religious traditions?  
According to MacIntyre traditions are not only justified or defeated in relation to their own 
rationality and core content, but also in dialogue with the main ‘competing’ traditions. This 
means that for Elim to be a fully rational and warranted tradition in its current expression, its 
main contemporary religious and non-religious competitors should be identified and then 
brought into dialogue with Elim. To do so in a comprehensive manner would be a significant 
piece of work, since this would not only imply updating my narration of Elim with 
                                                 
3
 Brown, Testing Prayer: Science and Healing. 
4
 William K. Kay, Pentecostals in Britain (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2000); Cartledge, Testimony in the Spirit. 
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contemporary empirical data (see above), but also in providing a historical narration of Elim’s 
main competitors along MacIntyrian lines. Nevertheless, this might become a philosophical 
necessity, if Elim seeks broader dialectical justification for its argument in the public sphere. 
In a British (non-)religious context this would probably mean bringing Elim into dialogue 
with ‘live options’ such as secular humanism, Buddhism, Islam, Roman Catholicism, 
‘Liberal’ Christianity, and other forms of Charismatic Christianity (e.g. Charismatic 
Anglicanism).   
  
3. Is the current embodiment of Elim fit for purpose vis-à-vis the movement’s core 
beliefs and rationality? 
In chapter four I identified the initial embodiment of the Elim argument, and in chapters five 
and six I noted how Elim has been relatively flexible regarding its structures if it has had good 
reasons for revising them in accordance with its rationality. In light of this, further research 
could be done in evaluating Elim’s existing structures vis-à-vis the Foursquare Gospel and 
Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism. In other words, are the current Elim institutions, 
constitution, governance structures and ecclesiological frameworks best suited for embodying 
the Elim argument in the context of the twenty-first century? The Elim movement under its 
current General Superintendent is effectively exploring these questions,
5
 but this assessment 




                                                 
5
 Chris Cartwright, ‘20/20 Vision: The challenge to step into more focused outreach, mission and expansion,’ 
(January 2017), accessed February 21, 2018, https://www.elim.org.uk/Articles/510713/Respond_to_the.aspx.   
6
 See Goldman, ‘A Guide to Social Epistemology,’ 18-20. 
349 
 
That said, these three further tasks should not be seen as undermining my thesis; to the 
contrary, they flow out of my argument that Elim’s essential core is the Foursquare Gospel 
and its rationality is Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism. In other words, the possibility of doing 
the further tasks relies on the central arguments of this thesis. Therefore, despite the tasks that 
lie ahead, the work for now is done.  
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APPENDIX 1: ELIM’S CHRONOLOGY
1
 
1915 The Elim Evangelistic Band is formed by George Jeffreys and six others in 
January in Monaghan, Ireland. The first Elim church, Elim Christ Church, is 
established in August in Belfast with Jeffreys as its pastor.   
1916 Elim’s first doctrinal statement, Elim Christ Church: What We Believe, is 
produced by George Jeffreys in January 1916. 
1918 The Elim Pentecostal Alliance is formed in June 1918, consisting of the Elim 
Evangelistic Band, local churches and Elim missions. This effectively makes 
Elim a denomination. 
1919 The first Elim Evangel is published in December 1919 and becomes the 
official organ for promulgating the movement’s Pentecostal message. Elim 
also sends its first overseas missionary, Dollie Phillips.     
1921 Elim expands from Ireland to mainland Britain and establishes churches in 
Wales and England. George Jeffreys begins to travel increasingly in Britain 
holding evangelistic campaigns. 
1922 Elim produces the Constitution of the Elim Pentecostal Alliance which 
includes a ‘Statement of Fundamental Truths,’ and moves its administration 
from Belfast to Clapham, London.    
1924 The Elim Publishing House and Elim Crusaders (Elim’s youth movement) are 
established.  
1925 The Elim Bible College (now Regents Theological College) begins to train 
people for ministry. 
1926 Elim holds its first Easter Convention at Royal Albert Hall, an event which 
becomes a highlight in the movement’s calendar for years.  
1927 The Elim Church Incorporated is formed with a view of allowing local 
churches to be part of Elim without being Direct Government churches.   
1929 Elim changes its name from Elim Pentecostal Alliance to Elim Foursquare 
Gospel Alliance. 
1934 The Deed Poll cements Elim’s constitution and doctrinal statement, and makes 
the Executive Council the governing body of the movement. 
1939  George Jeffreys resigns from Elim for the first time in December 1939.  
1940 After having been reinstated as Elim’s spiritual leader, George Jeffreys resigns 
from Elim for the second and final time in November 1940. 
                                                 
1
 The sources used for the chronology include the Elim Archives; Archives of the General Superintendent; 
Desmond Cartwright, The Great Evangelists; Hathaway, ‘The Elim Pentecostal Church,’ 1-39; Chris Cartwright, 




1942 The Deed Poll is altered through the Deed of Variation to make the Elim 
Conference, consisting of ministers and lay representatives, the governing 
body of the movement. 
1944-1945 An Evangelistic Committee is formed and P. S. Brewster emerges as Elim’s 
national evangelist. 
1961 Elim holds a special Prayer Conference in Birmingham in light of the changing 
attitudes towards morality and religion in Britain. 
1964  Elim joins the Evangelical Alliance. 
1965 The Elim Bible College moves to Capel, Surrey. 
1968 The Elim Headquarters moves to Cheltenham, Gloucestershire. 
1970-1976 The Doctrine of the Church Committee is set up by the Executive Council, 
following a Conference decision in 1970, to evaluate Elim’s ecclesiology.  
1978 In June thirteen Elim missionaries (including five children) are murdered in 
Vumba, Zimbabwe. 
1981 The first Southport Conference is held in response to the rise of the Restoration 
movement in Britain. 
1984  The second Southport Conference is held with a view of recalibrating Elim. 
1987  The Elim Bible College moves to Nantwich, Cheshire.  
1989  Elim Evangel is rebranded as Direction Magazine. 
1993-1994 Revisions to Elim’s Fundamental Truths are approved by the Elim Conference.  
2000s  A number of Elim departments are rebranded and relaunched.  
2009 The Elim Headquarters and Regents Theological College (formerly Elim Bible 
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